EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

(HISTORICAL SERIES)

VOLUME XV

EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

1963

MADE PUBLIC DECEMBER 1986

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

65-005 O WASHINGTON : 1987

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

S381-12

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PREFACE

What should have been a year of diplomatic triumph in 1963 was overshadowed by tragedy. The United States and the Soviet Union, so recently engaged in nuclear showdown over offensive missiles in Cuba, reached agreement on a landmark Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The world's two great powers had not come to trust each other more, but they each recognized the urgency of restraining testing and halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ratification of the test ban treaty marked the greatest foreign policy achievement of John F. Kennedy's administration. The hearings contained in this volume reveal the Foreign Relations Committee's careful examination of the treaty, the mingled hope and skepticism of its members, and the administration's willingness to provide extensive information.

The same month that the Senate approved the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, President Kennedy was assassinated. This cruel act ended a young and ambitious presidential administration with much of its program still not enacted. President Kennedy's death also left unclear his intentions in such critical areas of foreign policy as the situation in South Vietnam. In later years, Kennedy's advisers differed sharply over whether he planned to escalate the war or reduce the American commitment in Southeast Asia.

At the time President Kennedy died, the Government of South Vietnam was unstable and its future was uncertain. Just weeks earlier, President Ngo Dinh Diem was killed during a coup. While evidence indicates that the United States did not precipitate this coup, American officials in Saigon did nothing to prevent it. Rather than stabilizing the government, as some had hoped, the coup removed the only viable South Vietnamese leader and left a vacuum which took years to fill. As the situation worsened, the United States found itself increasingly drawn into the war in South Vietnam.

These hearings, previously unpublished, remind us of the complexity of issues occurring during the last year of the Kennedy administration. In addition to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, the hearings also highlight American concerns with Cuba in the aftermath of the missile crisis, instability in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the problem of foreign government lobbyists in Washington, and wide ranging briefings on world troublespots.

The selection of transcripts for this volume represents the editor's choice of material possessing the most usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads, editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material deleted (other than "off the record" ref-

erences for which no transcript was made) has been noted in the appropriate places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes of those sessions, in chronological sequence. Unpublished transcripts and other records of the Foreign Relations Committee for 1963 are deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to scholars under the access rules of that agency. Some transcripts will require further declassification procedures.

In accordance with the general policy of the series, portions of the volume were submitted to the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and participating Senators for review and comment.

This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A. Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.

RICHARD G. LUGAR.

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MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:30 p.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (Subcommittee Chairman) and Senators Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, briefed the subcommittee and committee members attending on the current situation in the Congo.

No transcript of the proceedings was kept.

BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

JANUARY 11, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This is an executive session, as everyone knows. We are very pleased and honored this morning to have the Secretary of State to come and give us a briefing here early in the session. He will talk about matters of great interest to this committee. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. It is a very great privilege for me to be before the committee again. May I say at the beginning that my last visit with the committee was on September 17. A great deal has happened since that date, and we do, I think, have a problem of time in order to get into the many important things that have transpired in the last three and a half months.

I would hope today if it is agreeable with the committee, to talk about three or four of the most urgent and major developments and then if the committee is willing to let me come back for a number of things that we may not have time for, because we do have a formidable problem, I think, of covering a great many developments.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, I am sure that is what the committee would be interested in doing.

Secretary RUSK. It is also possible, Mr. Chairman, that the committee or one of its subcommittees would want to go into greater detail on one or more of these questions in another kind of session with all of the documentation made available for the committee, but that is something the committee might wish to consider.

OFFENSIVE MISSILES IN CUBA

I last met with the committee in September and we were then talking about Cuba. In the middle of September it was our estimate that the military buildup on that island was consistent with a defensive configuration of its military establishment. There had been issued by the President on September 4th and 13th two press conference statements making it, we thought, simply and solemnly clear, that if Cuba were to be transformed into an offensive base by the Soviet Union, or if ground-to-ground missiles, for example, were to be established there, that the gravest possible issues would arise.

Let me say to the committee quite frankly and in anticipation of a more detailed examination of the day-by-day and week-by-week events of that period, that the intelligence community, including us at the Department of State, did not expect the Soviet Union to put strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba. This, it turned out, was the first time they had done so. It was our estimate in mid-December they would not depart so far from their practice, they would not take the risks that were involved in such a move, and therefore, this political and intelligence judgment in the middle of December is something that——

Senator HUMPHREY. Middle of what?

Secretary RUSK. Middle of September, is something you gentlemen ought to know about and, of course, there are papers on this subject we will be glad to eat the present time, but it does, I think, have this bearing, that when casual rumors came in, that is from passersby or from refugees and that is not based upon hard pictorial or other information, I think there was a tendency for the analysts to measure these against what we did know about.

For example, the ground-to-air, anti aircraft missiles are considerably longer than this table, and when someone reported, "Well, we saw a whale of a big missile," there was a tendency at the beginning, I believe, to think this is consistent with what we know about this other business and, therefore, the examination of bits and pieces of evidence was against the background of a judgment that the Soviet Union would not be expected to move in this direction.

I point this out because this is a continuing problem for us all in government, in the interpretation of intelligence.

However, during the very end of September and early part of November, some information did come in which appeared to draw——

Senator SYMINGTON. September and November?

Secretary RUSK. September and October, excuse me, information did come in which did seem to point the finger quite specifically at two suspicious locations where some construction seemed to be going on, that was not consistent with what was expected in Cuba.

MESSAGE FROM KHRUSHCHEV

So that in early October two things happened: On the one side, the Soviets sent us an oral message form the highest authority, from Khrushchev himself, saying that there was not and would not be in Cuba any missiles capable of reaching the United States. The committee ought to know, if it does not already, that this was not

an argument on the basis of what was in the minds of the people owning the weapons, "My weapons are defensive, yours are offensive."

It was stated exactly in those terms that there are not and would not be in Cuba any missiles capable of reaching the United States.

Senator AIKEN. How did that message come?

Secretary RUSK. That came orally from a member of the Soviet Embassy.

Senator AIKEN. To whom?

Secretary RUSK. To a member of the Administration in a casual contact, but it was——

Senator AIKEN. I see.

Secretary RUSK. And then the Ambassador later repeated this more formally.

Senator AIKEN. Never in writing?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, never in writing.

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

Now, at the same time that we were getting that message, we got other information and laid on over-flights to take a particular look at those particular locations.

On the night of October 14, late at night I got a telephone call showing that the read-out of these photographs showed the pattern of construction going on identical with the pattern of a four-pad MRBM site of the sort that we were familiar with in the Soviet Union.

Senator HUMPHREY. When did you talk to Gromyko or when did the President?

Secretary RUSK. That was on the following Thursday.

Senator HUMPHREY. In that same week?

Secretary RUSK. Of that same week, yes, sir. I will mention that in just a moment, Senator.

During the next four or five days, therefore, two things were happening. One is that we then intensified very heavily the complete air coverage of the island to find out what was the situation throughout the island, and secondly, we immediately laid on, beginning that night and early the next morning, a full examination of the alternative lines of action that were open to us in that situation we might have to take.

By Friday night or Saturday morning of that week the coverage of the entire island had been made. It indicated that as many as six MRBM sites were going into position and that two IRBM sites were under early stages of construction.

The two sites which were first picked up were perhaps in about a week or ten days stage of development. Some of the other sites were picked up from practically empty pasture into a later stage of development. But I think had we sent the same air cover, say, ten days earlier we might have picked up one or possible two of the sites. We would not have seen the other MRBM sites.

PRINCIPAL CONTINGENCIES

But let me say that the one contingency that was not seriously examined because it was obvious at the beginning that were not

really open to us was the contingency of doing nothing. It is the consequences to our alliances, to the whole position of the free world, to the security situation of this country which was such that that was not a contingency that was given a special task force kind of analysis and examination.

The principal contingencies that were looked at were first, the quarantine moving to full blockade; second, the possibility of an immediate and unannounced air strike on these installations themselves, or third, a full scale invasion of the island.

I would also like to say in face of some of the newspaper comment that has been made on these days, that no one in a responsible position was, I think, able to have a responsible judgment as to what ought to be done until the Saturday morning of that week—until the full information was available and until the groups working on the different contingencies had come in with a full examination, and pros and cons, the contingencies, the operational features and everything else involved.

On the Saturday the President returned from his trip to the West Coast we discussed the contingencies that night and developed the course of action which was announced on the Monday evening.

THE MOST DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION

Now, there were a number of things in our minds at that time that you gentlemen, I think, would be interested in knowing.

It has been apparent to all of us that this was the most serious and dangerous confrontation which has occurred since World War II. It is the first direct confrontation of U.S. and Soviet arms since the Soviet Union acquired a massive delivery capability for nuclear weapons in the years 1955, 1956 and 1957.

There was no doubt whatever about the gravity of the act taken by the Soviet Union of putting missiles into Cuba, and the gravity and potential danger of such actions we would have to take in return.

Second, we felt that the official confirmation of the information about these weapons in Cuba had to be accompanied simultaneously with an announced course of action about what to do about it. There were many reasons for that. It was perfectly obvious to us that there would be uncontrolled fury throughout this hemisphere when the presence of these missiles became known. That, if the information became available without the line of action announced at the same time, there would be a period of perhaps confusion and disarray within the alliances, and also and most important of all, a delay would have given the Soviet Union a chance to insert an ultimatum of some sort which would have greatly increased, in our judgment, the risk of war.

Further, we tried to deal with it as much as possible as a Western Hemisphere problem. We thought that by doing so we might reduce somewhat the probabilities that Moscow would retaliate in some other part of the world if we took action with respect to Cuba.

REASONS FOR NOT INVOLVING NATO

We, for that reason, did not attempt to make it a matter of formal NATO action, for example.

Also, we could not be sure in advance what the response of our NATO allies would be, because we have been consulting with them through the previous year about Cuba. They were inclined to look upon it more as a Western Hemisphere problem, something of our concern and not theirs, something that did not seem to them to bite in deeply into the commitments of NATO or the concerns of NATO.

It does them a little injustice, they were somewhat more serious than that but this was not seized by them as a major issue for NATO, as we had hoped they would be willing to.

Therefore, by treating it as a Western Hemisphere problem we thought that the question that went to NATO at a moment of great danger could be simpler for them to answer. Rather than go to them and say, "Do you agree that we should do this about Cuba," the question that they were confronted with was, "Do you in this situation of danger support the United States?" And we thought the second question was much easier to answer than the first question from their and our point of view.

A SOVIET MISCALCULATION

Further, it seemed to us that a very serious mistake, miscalculation, misjudgment, had been made in Moscow. I think we still must give very sober and very thoughtful reflection to how it was possible for that kind of miscalculation to occur, and what degree of risk Moscow thought they were running in this situation because it has a bearing on such further issues as Berlin, for example.

We thought, therefore, that it was important before events moved out of control to give the Soviet Union at least some opportunity to reverse this mistake while the situation was still manageable.

Therefore, I think the essential element in the President's October 22 speech to the Nation was that the quarantine which was imposed was an initial step. What in effect was done was to combine the three courses of action that I mentioned in sequence, the initial step would be the quarantine, and the additional steps would be taken, if necessary, but the initial step would give the Soviet Union a chance to correct its mistake.

What was in their minds? Certainly from a strict military point of view, the presence in Cuba of missiles of this character and of that number would have been a very significant military improvement in their situation. It would not, perhaps, have changed the over-all total capacity of the United States, for example, to destroy the Soviet Union. But nevertheless, had these pads all become operational and all become equipped with the missiles which are normally used from such pads, numbers could have gone up to something like 72 missiles within range of the United States, which is comparable to their present missile capacity from longer distance against the United States.

In other words, this would be a very significant military increment which itself might explain some of their readiness to take some risk.

But I think also in retrospect now it appears that part of what was in their minds was that Mr. Khrushchev was planning to come to the United Nations General Assembly at the end of November, early December, he had these missiles in readiness position. He would then find an opportunity to talk to Mr. Kennedy about Berlin. He would talk very insistently about Berlin and point to these missiles in Cuba. That might well be the scenario that he had in mind.

QUARANTINE CAME AS A SURPRISE TO THE SOVIETS

But, whatever was in their minds, we do believe that the application of the quarantine against Soviet vessels came as a surprise to the Soviets; that their timing was thrown off and that for a period their contingencies were thrown out of gear.

On Monday the 22nd, for example, Soviet diplomats at the U.N. were saying in the corridors there they thought the President might that evening impose a blockade on Cuba but not, of course, against Soviet vessels because that would mean war. And it was some two or three days before the official Soviet position in the U.N. caught up with the known and demonstrable facts of the situation in Cuba itself.

Now, by the end of the day of October 23, two or three things of some significance, I think, had happened.

In the first place, the Soviets themselves did not elect to launch a first nuclear strike. In retrospect that may appear to have been highly improbable. We did not think they would, but we could not know that they would not. So, that was, I think, one of the most significant of the immediate developments that they made that decision straightaway.

They made the decision to take it up in the United Nations. They also immediately turned around six or seven of their own vessels coming toward Cuba in which we were especially interested. Having found the missiles, we looked for the vessels that would be bringing in more or in support of the missile force and identified seven vessels that looked as though they might be engaged in this particular operation. We were quite interested that apparently the vessels were picked out, because immediately those particular vessels were turned around.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOT LOCATED IN CUBA

We were intrigued by the fact that we never found a nose cone, never found an identifiable nuclear weapon in Cuba. We have to assume that they were there, but they are not too difficult to conceal, maybe five or six feet long.

We never, however, actually identified them. It is possible that the quarantine intercepted the later shipments of this total effort, and that this might have included the nose cone, but we just don't know. We never found them.

We never saw a missile actually raised on its launcher. Had we found a missile on its launcher, with nose cones in the vicinity,

then I think the development of events would have taken quite a different course than in fact they did.

MISSILES IN TURKEY

Now, during that week, there were several exchanges. There was a private letter from Mr. Khrushchev on October 26, the existence of which has been referred to in the press. I would be glad, Mr. Chairman, to show that letter to the committee if the committee wishes to get into a detailed examination of these events on a day-to-day basis.

It appeared to be a letter which was written by Mr. Khrushchev in person. We gather from what they have said to us since then, that it was written and sent by him personally without general clearance topside in the Soviet Union. It showed some sense of agitation, and it showed that he seemed to be disturbed about trying to find a way to get out of this particular situation.

But then there came the public letter of October 27 which raised the issue of American bases in NATO, pinpointing Turkey but also referring to Italy and Britain and other places where missiles had been present and were present.

We don't know exactly why he put that out on the 27th. It is possible that he thought that Mr. Kreisky's [1] speech in Austria had been somewhat inspired on our side. He might have thought perhaps the Walter Lippmann article on our side was inspired, neither of which was true.

Senator HUMPHREY. What was that?

Secretary RUSK. It had to do with the missiles in Turkey, the Lippmann article. It may be, I think it is very likely, that he did know we have been discussing in NATO for sometime the re-evaluation of missile deployment, the handling of the MRBM situation, and that both Turkey and Italy had themselves been discussing with us the question of the Jupiters. It may be that they had put away somewhere a leak on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee's report which appeared in our press sometime ago expressing considerable unhappiness about certain aspects of the Jupiter deployment.

But in any event there was a White House statement immediately on this same day which said that these missiles in the NATO area are a NATO problem. They cannot be linked to the Cuban problem, and that this is not a matter which can be handled on that basis.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I get one thing clear?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you say that the statement in the Lippmann article was wrong, was incorrect?

Secretary RUSK. The Lippmann article did not purport to be an article on the facts. It was a think piece saying why not the Turkish missiles, you see.

Senator SPARKMAN. It was in some article, I thought it was in his article, that I read which said this had already been under discussion and more or less agreed to.

---

[1] Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky.

Secretary RUSK. I don't remember that particular fact. As a matter of fact, the subject had been discussed with the two governments. One of the problems for these two governments has been that when the Jupiters were offered to NATO, the Turks and the Italians accepted them and then found they were the only ones in the alliance who had accepted them and this created some problem at home. I had a very sharp approach on this from a Turkish diplomat at the recent meeting in NATO who expressed rather strong feeling about the sense that the rest of the alliance had let Turkey and Italy down by not coming into this business the way Turkey and Italy had.

Senator SPARKMAN. Italy took the Jupiters.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, both of them.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought you said Greece and Turkey.

Secretary RUSK. No, Norway and Greece turned them down.

MISSILES IN A READINESS POSITION

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like some enlightenment. Mr. Secretary, you said if we had found a nuclear warhead you thought things would be considerably different. What did you mean by that?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it is always a little dangerous to say what a decision would have been when, in fact, the occasion for the decision was not made. But I would say, it certainly was our clear thinking at the time if we saw these missiles in a readiness position we would have to strike them.

Senator HUMPHREY. If they were raised for launching?

Secretary RUSK. Raised and ready they would have to be hit.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wanted to be sure I understood. You weren't talking about finding them on ships coming in, but seeing the warhead on the missile itself, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, that is correct.

RELATING MISSILES IN CUBA AND TURKEY

Senator LAUSCHE. Before he passes on, what did Lippmann suggest or what was the substance of that article?

Secretary RUSK. The article seemed to acknowledge that there was some reciprocal problem here. That the missiles in Cuba ought to be looked at in relation to our missiles in Turkey.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is what Khrushchev argued?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. But from our point of view the missiles in Turkey are related to missiles in the Soviet Union. Now, whether we use Polaris or Minuteman or something else, that is a weapons problem. But it is not a matter which can be dealt with outside of the NATO framework and its confrontation with the Soviet Union and that was the purport of the President's answer.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why would Khrushchev think that the Lippmann article was leaked out by the State Department?

Secretary RUSK. I was speculating about why after the letter of October 26 he immediately put out this public letter of the 27th. It is just possible by that time he had heard of Kreisky's speech in Austria, he had heard of Lippmann's article. He had been remind-

ed there had been some discussion of these Jupiters before and he might have felt that maybe there was a chance to do something about this.

Senator HUMPHREY. Kreisky's speech in Australia?

Secretary RUSK. Austria.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. You see it is just possible, I mean there was no truth in it at all, but it was just possible that looked at from their point of view they might have wondered whether either Kreisky or Lippmann——

Senator HUMPHREY. Kreisky had been here just before.

Secretary RUSK. I am not certain how long it had been.

Senator HUMPHREY. It wasn't so long before.

Secretary RUSK. But he had been here months before. But, you see, they tend to identify key newspapers and key reporters as somehow speaking for the Administration much more than the facts support.

Senator HUMPHREY. They are not so far off at times.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is no feeling here. [Laughter.]

BALANCING OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT

Senator MORSE. Just one quick observation on this Lippmann article. It has always been my understanding that we take the position and, I think rightly, that the missiles in Turkey involve a balancing of the NATO Pact against the Warsaw Pact and Khrushchev's attempt would seem to be to weaken the NATO Pact by getting himself in a position in Cuba where he would sort of single out the United States for an attack and NATO couldn't be of immediate assistance to us.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator MORSE. But at the present time Warsaw and NATO pretty well contain themselves.

Secretary RUSK. I think there is a weapons problem in terms of what you ought to do from our side in terms of the most modern capabilities. These weapons are relatively obsolete. They are first strike weapons, they are exposed, and there are better weapons than those available, and there is a weapons problem on our side without relation to this political exchange with the Soviet Union which had to be rejected for the most obvious reasons.

KENNEDY'S RESPONSE TO KHRUSHCHEV

The President then, on October 27, issued his public letter to Khrushchev. We deliberately elected to base that on the October 26 letter although it had not been made public rather than the Turkish letter of October 27, because there was more of an opportunity in the October 26 letter to find out what, in fact, the Soviets were ready to do.

That was responded to by public letter of Khrushchev on October 28, which opened the way for the removal of the offensive weapons from Cuba.

I might say that one of the real problems that came out of this Cuban crisis that we and our NATO allies particularly will have to give a lot of attention to, is in effect the problem of crisis manage-

ment, how to keep abreast of events or, if possible, ahead of them in a very fast-moving situation and this applies even to the physical capacities of communication.

The public communications that were used on the 27th and 28th, I think, were used chiefly because ordinary channels of diplomatic communications weren't operating fast enough—coding, decoding, translating and that sort of thing.

Now, I mean it was just barely possible that events could have gotten out of control there because we had not received that message on October 28, then the next phases of the contingency planning would have had to go into operation fairly quickly because the missile sites were still, so far as we could tell, under construction and operation, and some of them seemed to be in a high state of readiness.

Then, after October 28, the out traffic of weapons and military personnel began.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it would be very interesting, sometime, Mr. Secretary, if you could indicate what communications media were used during this period of crisis because there has been a good deal of comment about the necessity of a hot line, so to speak, emergency line, between the White House and the Kremlin as we have between the White House or between Kennedy and Macmillan. The whole subject matter of communication and international relations is surely one of primary importance and whether we will ever get by again as luckily as we did this time is questionable.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, we did—could I just go off the record just for a second?

[Discussion off the record.] [2]

INFORMATION VIA FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Senator AIKEN. Do you suppose there could be some means of prompt communications with members of the Foreign Relations Committee so we won't have to get our information from foreign countries first? About the middle of the day before the President spoke, I was given information as to the contents of his message which came from a Latin American country. I didn't know whether to believe it or not, but it turned out to be accurate. That was several hours before we got it officially here.

Secretary RUSK. There was a meeting of the leadership of Congress that afternoon, five o'clock, I believe it was. I don't believe that this was given to Latin American countries. There must have been a leak. I don't think it was given to them quite as early as that. I understand there was a possible leak in Mexico.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, it was from Mexico. It was quite a few hours, the report was, that it had been given to them, so there would not be too much commotion to prepare them and so they could post their police in their proper places to prevent rioting when the President spoke, but the contents of the President's message were also reported.

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[2] No transcript was made of "off the record" remarks.

Secretary RUSK. I think there was a leak in that particular capital on the contents of the message. What we did with a number of governments earlier in the day was to tell them that the Ambassador would want to see the President of their country at, I think it was two hours before the President's speech, but that he would advise that they consider taking any necessary security measure because of developments were likely to be very serious.

Senator AIKEN. I think that was a very proper course to follow, but it was a little disconcerting to get our information from a foreign country several hours before the President spoke in this country.

Secretary RUSK. I can see that problem, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. I don't criticize the course of action because I think it was necessary.

Secretary RUSK. The problem of consultation with other governments was one that we did think very hard about. It was important for us that there not be a leak of the information without knowledge of what action was being taken. I think the consequences of that could have been very serious right around the world.

Also, we had been talking about Cuba with NATO and with the OAS for a long time. The President had made his September press conference statement solemnly stating that weapons of this sort would be the gravest possible issue and so we took our chance. I am reminded of a question that came up during the Korean War, and I called in the Ambassador of Australia and the Ambassador of New Zealand and put to them the question, I forget now what the question was, and they both said, "Don't ask us that question, give us something to support it."

I think on some of these really vital issues, there are moments when they want to know what you are going to do rather than ask them a question which they are unable to answer really from any satisfactory point of view.

SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA

Well now, the out traffic started with the missiles. If you look at the record in detail you will find that while the missiles were going out we did not say very much about the bombers. But when the missiles were five or six hundred miles offshore we then made an issue of the bombers, when the bombers then got out we have been putting pressures on the out-traffic of further military personnel. There remain on the island perhaps up to 17,000 Soviet military personnel. That is based upon not a count but on a filling out of the table of organization, in effect, of elements that we think are there.

Senator WILLIAMS. How many were there at the peak?

Secretary RUSK. I would think now based on what we think of going out, I would say it might be just over 20,000, but there are quite frankly differences in the intelligence community about the count because some of this is necessarily speculative.

The most serious elements that are there are Russian crews for the surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles and the accompanying radar, and four battalion combat teams, heavily armed, that are located at four different places on the island, which apparently originally

had the mission of protecting the missiles, including protecting them against Cubans, but now seem to be in relation to key centers in the event there are any disturbances on the island.

Now, the Russians have said to us that these additional military elements, organized units, will move out in due course, but although there is some out traffic they are not moving out as fast as the missiles and the bombers did.

So, we are on the one side wanting to see that out traffic continues, but on the other side we are not at the present time content with the rate at which they are moving out.

Senator AIKEN. Are replacements coming in?

Secretary RUSK. So far as we can tell not. The rest of the Soviet personnel that are there are apparently on training missions and supply and support missions for their own units and things of that sort, and communications.

SOVIET MIG'S IN CUBA

Senator SYMINGTON. May I ask a question about this?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. A MIG–21 fighter is an infinitely more dangerous weapon, to us, than an IL–28 bomber. They have, as I understand it, some 40 MIG–21 fighters, and many more MIGs. Why do we just figure those people are only for antiaircraft defense? Those planes are very hard to maintain, and hard to fly. Why couldn't we think they were keeping some of those Russians in there to handle these offensive weapons they still have on the island?

Secretary RUSK. I think that at the present time, Senator, that there are Russians flying these MIG's. I think in the fly-past on the parade on January 2, that the ratio of Russian pilots to Cuban pilots——

[Discussion off the record.]

CUBA HAS BECOME A SANCTUARY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I have talked this over with the Secretary before, he knows my views on it or my speculation rather than views, I don't know whether they are views or not. But I have raised the question of whether or not Mr. Khrushchev paid anything for this or whether he didn't get full value for what he did and whether this wasn't the most colossal bluff in history because basically, I wonder if Khrushchev and——

The CHAIRMAN. Castro.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And Castro haven't got exactly what they want, a sanctuary now, an assurance that they won't be physically disturbed. What more could they ask? I have never been able to get myself into a position to believe that Khrushchev wanted any part of a shooting war in this hemisphere. He knew he would have a shooting war in Russia if we had a shooting war in this hemisphere. I never have been able to get myself to fully accept the premise that he was preparing for an actual shooting war here, but the net result is maybe a pulling away from Castro in Cuba and leaving him—maybe this is an exaggerated statement but for the sake of emphasis I will make it—in a more or less protected

position now, and what more advance could communism want in this hemisphere——

Secretary RUSK. Senator, may I comment on this?

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. And a protection or a haven in Cuba with the assurance we are not going to do much to disturb them as long as they don't do overt acts toward other countries.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, let me speak to that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I only ask that question and I talked to you about it.

POINT OF ORDER

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise a point of order. Why don't we let him testify now and let questions be put later and abstain from getting into a discussion of what conclusions the facts justify. It is not a point of order, but I think we could allow him to give his views and then ask questions about matters upon which we can formulate our judgments.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no feeling about it other than the informality of being able to ask questions as he develops a particular point. If the committee wishes we will reserve all questions until he finishes, but I thought it was going on very satisfactorily.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is a very good idea on how to proceed, but I understood this was an informal discussion; otherwise I usually try to keep still until the fellow has finished his talk.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am not taking exception with what you have done, Bourke, but I think questions ought to be put in to get clarification on something as you go along. I will withdraw my objection.

The CHAIRMAN. I was under the impression that what the Senator was trying to do is to question the assumption of the Secretary in this particular instance that he paid a price.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is all right for me to have the Secretary——

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I can make some more remarks on Cuba and then perhaps I can pause there before going on to another subject.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

PROBLEM OF INSPECTION IN CUBA

Secretary RUSK. I do want to point out that the Cuban crisis is in no sense over. It continues to be a highly dangerous situation and could flare up in a number of contingencies.

In the first place, without any adequate inspection in Cuba which we consider to be a combination of both ground and air instruction which was U Thant's original proposal to the Cubans, it is necessary for us to continue such overflights as we need, both high level and if necessary low level. Those may get shot at. If they get shot at we will have to take counteraction and this could build the thing up very fast.

We do know that the other side knows about our overflights, and that since November they have not bothered us. This has been thoroughly explained to the Soviet Union, that we will not abandon them and we will have to take whatever action is necessary to enforce the overflight operation.

And tacitly they have been accepting it. They have a capability of firing and shooting at these planes. Thus far, since the loss of our one U–2 at the height of the crisis we have not had our planes shot at or menaced.

Secondly, there is a possibility of events happening on the island while Soviet military personnel are still there.

We know there are tensions on the island. I don't want to exaggerate this because I don't want to seem to be in any sense optimistic about what might happen on the island in the absence of further effort from the outside.

MIKOYAN'S VISIT TO CUBA

But Mikoyan and Castro had a very rough time with each other while he was in Havana.[3] There was one period of ten days in which Castro refused to see Mikoyan and finally Mikoyan sent him word at one of Mikoyan's briefings when he got back here to New York. Mikoyan sent him word that unless Castro came to see him he would leave immediately for Moscow and Castro did immediately see him in the final day or two he was there.

It is our belief, we have no hard evidence for it, that the Soviet Union did propose on-site inspection in Cuba and Castro rejected it. I think there is a limit beyond which they could not get complete control over Castro without threatening the complete kind of break which would be the kind of price they would be reluctant to pay. We have had the same sort of problem with some of our friends abroad, the ability to persuade which has a certain limit unless you are prepared to break your entire relationship with a particular country.

But, there is tension between some of the 26 of July revolutionaries still left there and the Communist apparatus. There is tension within the regime among those, some of those, who apparently would like to get rid of both the Castro and Russian influence. There is some flirting with China, Peiping going on in Cuba at the present time.

Now, if there should be any move from any direction of that sort and Russian forces in Cuba start shooting at Cubans then we would have to do something immediately because we do not take this Hungary-type action in this hemisphere.

There is also the possibility of acts against other Latin American countries. Castro's speech showed no retreat on this subject, and acts of that sort would again lead to a further buildup of the situation.

INABILITY TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS

We were not able to come to any agreement with the Soviet Union in these discussions which have been going on in the last two and a half months in New York. The only thing that was possible to do was simply to thank U Thant, tell him that some progress had been made, as was true. There were a number of points at which agreement had not been possible but to suggest that we saw

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[3] Immediately after the Cuban Missile crisis, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastes Mikoyan made a 24-day visit to Cuba to confer with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

no present occasion for further consideration by the Security Council.

Now, because of the very point that Senator Hickenlooper raised, we were unable to undertake any commitments that gave up, for example, the overflight right, that seemed to amend in any way the basic responsibilities of the Rio Treaty, that would create a sanctuary in Cuba for action by Castro against other people in Latin America and we could not cut across, as the President's November 20 press conference indicated, the resolutions taken at Punta del Este about the attitude of the hemisphere toward the penetration of the hemisphere by a Marxist-Leninist regime.

Those were issues on which the Soviets charged that we were somehow running out on a commitment that they considered we had made in October 27.

The fact is that that exchange of October 27, 28 was not performed on their side. There was no on-site inspection, there were no assurances about what might happen in the future. That is the present status of the disagreement, the range of disagreement between us and the Soviet Union on this particular subject.

Senator HUMPHREY. I just think it would be very good to make this very plain to people, Mr. Secretary, because this is something that while it has been spread out on the record many times, it has been hit and miss, and the concern that Senator Hickenlooper expressed is not an unusual concern.

NO DILUTION OF THE RIO PACT

In fact, it is prevalent, because I don't think a neat, concise package has been stated of where we stand vis-a-vis the continuation of Castro's regime. What does stand out is that the no-invasion pledge, and Pat [Holt] knows we ran into this again and again in our little visit to South America——

Secretary RUSK. We are consulting with the OAS, we expect to have an OAS meeting shortly of a public sort where this part of it can be thoroughly clarified, because we are fully aware not only of the attitude of our own people but of the hemisphere on this point, and there have been no commitments made that cut in in any way to the basic obligations of the hemisphere under the Rio Pact.

Senator AIKEN. No commitments at all made?

Secretary RUSK. I say——

Senator AIKEN. You say no commitments that would cut in any way?

Secretary RUSK. I mean there has been no dilution of the Rio Pact and that was the thing that was the concern of our Latin——

Senator AIKEN. The no-invasion pledge was a conditional and temporary promise.

Secretary RUSK. That was part of our transaction against a background of solemn treaty and historical arrangements in the hemisphere that in our view were not changed at all.

Senator AIKEN. It certainly didn't mean no invasion under any circumstances.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. Now also, I want to point out that that was directly related to a contingency which was not performed by the other side.

Senator AIKEN. That is on-site inspection.

Secretary RUSK. On-site inspection and assurance of no weapons in the future so there is no contract here on this point.

Senator LAUSCHE. What was it if there is no contract, what was this understanding? What did they promise to do, what did we promise to do?

TEXTS OF THE KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV LETTERS

Secretary RUSK. The understanding is in the exchange of letters of President Kennedy's letter of October 27, and Khrushchev's letter of October 28. Let me say about that, Senator, that—I mean I have the text here and I would be glad to pass them down to you, but the contingencies were included in those letters, but if you look at the October 26 letter which has not been made public and I have indicated I would be glad to show the committee——

The CHAIRMAN. Does the committee wish him to read that letter?

Senator LAUSCHE. I think it is the crux of the whole thing.

Secretary RUSK. The 27th, I don't have the text of the 26th letter with me at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you get it?

Senator SPARKMAN. There has been more speculation on that letter, more than any other one.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said you did have it available.

Secretary RUSK. No, I can make it available.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Lausche's question is pertinent. I would like to know what they said they would do and what we said we would do.

The CHAIRMAN. If he has the letter there, read it to us.

You have the 27th letter?

Sentor MORSE. The 27th letter, Mr. Chairman, was based upon Khrushchev's letter of the 26th rather than——

Senator LAUSCHE. So then you have got to have both to understand it.

The CHAIRMAN. It would contain whatever commitments we had made, if any, in response to his letter.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, but it says, "In accordance with what you said in the letter of the 26th," and refers to that letter in several instances, if I remember correctly.

Secretary RUSK. Just give me a moment, Mr. Chairman, and I will find it.

Let me say that I think if you look at the text of the October 26th letter, the President's public letter of October 27 and Khrushchev's reply of October 28, also public, a lawyer could never find a contract in those letters. We exploited the October 26th letter for more than it was worth in our public reply of the 27th, but we did so because we wanted to ignore the October 27th letter from Khrushchev about Turkey and Italy and so forth.

PRECISE CONDITIONS IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER

Further, the precise conditions set forth in President Kennedy's public letter of October 27 were not picked up precisely by Mr. Khrushchev in his public letter of October 28. So that this could

not stand up to the inspection of contract law. This came up, for example, when the issue of the bombers came up.

Senator HUMPHREY. I recall.

Secretary RUSK. There was considerable discussion during one period whether bombers had in fact been included. We insisted they were included.

Senator HUMPHREY. Even though they had not been directly mentioned.

Secretary RUSK. Not in every instance. They were mentioned in the President's October 22 speech, you see.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And Mr. Khrushchev had referred to weapons "which you considered to be offensive."

Now, I suspect what he meant by that from his point of view was that he was not willing to put that label on himself. He was assigning to us that label "that you call offensive" but we weren't going to miss the chance to say that "You said you were going to take out the weapons that we call offensive and we call these bombers offensive."

So these transactions did not stand up to, they were not meticulously negotiated precise views. These were transactions in a fast-moving exchange where events might have taken over at any moment.

Senator CHURCH. May I ask there, Mr. Secretary, about the letters themselves?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. Were they actually delivered in letter form? I was at the U.N. on the 27th, and at that time the only text that the mission had there to work on was a Reuters dispatch which contained contents of a letter that hadn't then been located or at least it was not known in New York that it had actually been delivered to the President.

Secretary RUSK. The exchanges were based on the public texts, but the official text came along in due course. In other words, we didn't get the actual text from the Russians other than their broadcast message until the whole thing was practically over, just as a matter of transmission.

THE FIGHTER QUESTION

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask this question on the wording?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. "Weapons you consider offensive." Everybody knows bombers are offensive. Everybody knows a missile is offensive unless it is a defensive ground-to-air missile. Might that not have been clever terminology to evade the fighter question?

Secretary RUSK. The fighter question, Senator, to be completely candid, was—we would like, of course, to see these fighters out of there. We had accepted in September the configuration of these fighter aircraft as a part of a defensive configuration.

In retrospect it is just possible that had we specifically included the fighters those could have been gotten out. But when we were on October 22 deciding what to make an issue, if necessary, of nuclear war, it seemed to us we had to concentrate on the offensive

weapons that created a serious threat to this country and to the hemisphere. I perhaps could regret now that we didn't include them at the time, but at that time the question was how much would the traffic bear, how much would the traffic bear in terms of what had to be done.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have seen scores of our fighters in Turkey [deleted].

A fighter can be infinitely much more of an offensive danger than old and slow bombers.

Secretary RUSK. I will mention this, but with the assurance that given our experience we don't value it more than it is worth, the Soviets have given us again the most categorical statement that there are no longer any nuclear weapons in Cuba. We have had a categorical statement before about what was in Cuba, so we are fully aware of that. We are not under any illusion on that. But that is at least part of the picture.

KHRUSHCHEV'S ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask which of the documents do you claim sets forth the commitments which we made, whether legal or merely having the semblance of legality. Is it the letter of October 27?

Secretary RUSK. The October 27 letter, with its contingencies, that is the provisos there, but again we would, and we have insisted that this was a precise transaction of that time and does not in any way change the whole structure of international relations in the organization of the hemisphere for an indefinite future.

In other words, this was a transaction, not a——

Senator LAUSCHE. Then Khrushchev's statements and the statements carried in the papers of Russia that we committed ourselves not to make an invasion constitute an erroneous interpretation of what we promised.

Secretary RUSK. Stated in those categorical terms, that is correct. I might say this, Senator——

Senator LAUSCHE. May I read what it says here?

Secretary RUSK. All right.

Senator LAUSCHE. "Which seem generally acceptable," this is the letter of October 27, and I think it is——

Senator SYMINGTON. From whom to whom?

Senator LAUSCHE. From President Kennedy to Mr. Khrushchev. He gets down into the letter and he says:

> As I read your letter—

That is Khrushchev's letter—

> The key elements of your proposal which seem generally acceptable, as I understand them, are as follows:
>
> 1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, and undertake with suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
>
> 2. We, on our part, would agree upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba, and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

Now, are there any other further specific commitments than these two?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. That assurance on invasion of Cuba related, did it not, to the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the possibility of our invasion was very imminent, providing that these weapons systems were not promptly removed?

KHRUSHCHEV PRESENTS HIMSELF AS A PEACEMAKER

Secretary RUSK. It also, I think, in terms of what the Soviets say about it, is related to the fact that Khrushchev, from his point of view, had to say something about why he was taking them out, and his theory of the case was that he is taking them out because they had performed their mission of protecting Cuba against an imminent invasion.

This was nonsense as far as what the plans were.

Senator AIKEN. Not imminent invasion because when those missiles went in there the invasion wasn't imminent.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. But I mean that was the theory of the case that he needed to get the missiles out, then this was the one that he used and he came forward as the great peacemaker, you will recall.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we wanted to get the missiles out. But what it was we said to them for the last two and a half months is that this language cannot in any circumstance move in on the treaty arrangements in this hemisphere. We included all the treaties including Guantanamo, and they were unwilling to recognize the continuing validity of these treaty arrangements in any public or formal way, therefore, there was no agreement, you see. I mean that was the key issue on which these discussions broke down.

NO-INVASION PLEDGE

Senator HUMPHREY. I think the point that the public raises or that is raised in public, have we made a commitment that we will never invade Cuba——

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is the point in simple language, as you have given, is to give assurance or some assurance that some people want. As I understand it, the no-invasion pledge was related to the provisos and conditions contained in this rather personal document, and also to the fact that these conditions were not fulfilled in light of inspection not being granted that even that pledge, the document of October 27, is no longer valid.

Secretary RUSK. I might draw the committee's attention to a paragraph in the President's November 20 press conference:

> I repeat we would like nothing better than adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba, and we are prepared to continue our efforts to achieve such arrangements.

He had just gotten through saying we had to continue otherwise.

> Until that is done, difficult problems remain. As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguard, and if Cuba is not used for the export of

aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in September, we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.

He continued:

We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island.

In other words, it was the military invasion of the island under those circumstances that was being talked about at this this time.

THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF CASTRO

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it would still be very helpful if there could be somewhere along the line a coordinated, concise, statement of U.S. policy vis-a-vis Cuba, because it surely is one that is in a rather nebulous state.

One gentleman the other night told some of us that he considered the real menace of Castro today was not really subversion, not really the possibility of attack upon Latin American countries, but the very fact of his presence and continuing presence as a way of telling other potential Castroites in other Latin American countries that "You can last it out, you are not liquidated, you are not removed, you can last it out."

In other words, the longevity of Castro in Cuba is an inspiration to the activity, and the accession to power of potential Castroites in other countries. Now, that is just a statement of a man who has responsibility in a new country or another country.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that has been made abundantly clear by a number of countries and a number of people in a number of countries, I have heard it a number of times, that is the great danger.

ON-SITE INSPECTION

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, as long as we are discussing this letter, I am not entirely clear.

A question asked me on a telecast program back home was, had we agreed not to invade Cuba. I said no, we hadn't. This was the information I got from the newspapers, the only information I had, that we had specified on-site inspection; and that inasmuch as we had not been granted on-site inspection, any agreement not to invade was cancelled out. But there is nothing in this letter which stipulates there must be on-site inspection.

Secretary RUSK. I think the paragraph that has the reference to invasion in it begins that way, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. But it doesn't say we want on-site inspection, I mean they might say——

Secretary RUSK. Would you just let me see it?

"We on our part would agree upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to assure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments," that language was to include on-site inspection.

Senator HUMPHREY. Which we specified.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. But we had better find out where we stand. Do we say we are not bound by the promise not to invade because they didn't carry out their commitment or are they not bound because we never committed ourselves not to invade?

Secretary RUSK. We never made an unadorned commitment not to invade Cuba in the first place. In the second place a crucial element on the conditions that we then talked about specifically have not been performed, has not been performed by the other side. So both elements apply, Senator.

QUALIFICATIONS TO THE NO-INVASION PLEDGE

Senator LAUSCHE. Just this: Is it the contention of our government now that this promise to invade was applicable only to this ad hoc emergency that existed, and was not applicable to the future?

Secretary RUSK. It is not applicable in the presence of a wholly new situation. I mean, for example, I cited two cases as instances: One, if Russian troops in Cuba start shooting at Cubans a la Hungary to impose or to defend one particular kind of regime rather than another, we have said that to the Russians.

They understand this is a qualification of the sort that we were talking about when we were talking about the Rio Treaty.

Second, if, as a result of our necessity for over-flying, the situation moves into a point where we have to invade this could develop out of a contingency. I mentioned those two, there may be others.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is our interpretation. That is not the product of talks that you have had with them?

Secretary RUSK. Well, this is our interpretation but we have said that to them and that is the principal reason why we were unwilling to accept the only kind of language that we could use which would make reservations on all these points, you see.

NOT A BINDING CONTRACT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, pending the arrival of the letter of the 26th, which I think would be basic to any analysis of what agreement was entered into, I think on the basis of what the Secretary has said we musn't overlook the elements of an agreement, the offer, the consideration and the acceptance.

Of course, our offer is based upon the contents of the letter of the 26th. My understanding of this discussion, and the Secretary will tell me if I am wrong, is that we made an offer of no invasion on the basis of the conditions that then existed provided there was a certain conformance on the part of Russia in respect to the nuclear weapons that we insisted come out.

We also offered that the policing of it or the administering of it would be through the United Nations under suitable conditions that we subsequently were free to approve or reject. I think that is all part of this contract or agreement, and unless there is something in the October 26th letter that is at great variance from what the Secretary has told us is in there, I am sure it will be as he has represented it. It seems to me that we made no offer for an agreement separate and distinct from the then existing conditions. It has nothing to do with the future or of new conditions that could arise

and I happen to think are arising in Cuba, but we will go into that later at another session.

What I see from this discussion this morning are no elements of a contract binding on us in future or separate from the conditions that existed at the time the so-called offers and acceptance were made by Kennedy and Khrushchev.

LETTER NOT MADE PUBLIC

Secretary RUSK. Senator, you will find when I get the text of the October 26 letter, and by the way, let me say that we would appreciate it very much if the committee would not make that letter public. The only reason for that is from our point of view the Soviet Union does not wish the make it public and we wish to conform to amenities of diplomatic exchange because it is their privilege to decide just as it is our privilege to decide on other matters. For reasons of their own they don't want to make it public but you will find in that letter that we stretched the October 26th letter of Khrushchev's perhaps far beyond its actual language in our reply of October 27. You will not find there the kind of language that we put into our letter of October 27, although reference was made to their letter of the 26th.

One of the reasons why we referred to their letter of the 26th was we wanted to get away from their letter of the 27th from Khrushchev about Italy and Turkey and the NATO bases and so forth. We feel we had a much stronger case in the Security Council or in the General Assembly or in the OAS or in NATO about what we said in the 27th than we would have before the International Court of Justice in terms of any contract.

Senator HUMPHREY. Any Senator ought to understand that, because sometimes when we are asked a question on telecasts and so forth we say, "Thank you for that question," and then proceed to go off on a subject matter that we are more interested in, and is not as embarrassing as a proper answer to the question would be. In other words, the art of diplomacy isn't a monoply of the State Department in negotiations with Khrushchev.

WHAT OUR EXACT POSITION IS

Senator LAUSCHE. I do think we ought to get ourselves clear on what our exact positions is: One, do we confess we committed ourselves not to invade, but that commitment became illegal because of a breach of contract on the part of the Soviet, that is, a confession and avoidance?

Two, do we deny that we at any time made a promise not to invade? Now, that cannot be both. It has got to be one or the other.

Senator MORSE. I think there is a third avenue that we haven't sufficiently approached, and I will keep still with this.

We made an offer, and I don't think our offer was ever accepted because our offer was based upon certain conditions precedent being complied with by Khrushchev. He never complied with them and I think the International Court of Justice would find that there was no binding commitment that was made until there had been a performance.

Senator LAUSCHE. That would mean that there never was a contract made. But I am talking about admitting we made a contract, and the contract being voided because of a breach, that is what you contended in our telecast, as I understand it.

Senator MORSE. We only admit that we made an offer.

Secretary RUSK. The basic problem is that of the most overriding political and strategic considerations in relation between the Soviet Union and the free world. It is partly legal in character but not fully legal in character. It is only partly. One of the most important elements in the legal position, and indeed in the constitutional position inside this country, is the Rio Treaty.

Senator LAUSCHE. It the Rio Treaty mentioned in any of the letters?

Secretary RUSK. We offered to the Soviets in the course of the discussions in New York language which put in all the reservations, including existing treaty arrangements. We used all treaty arrangements rather than the Rio Treaty because we wanted to include the Guantanamo Treaty, for example, but the Rio Treaty itself, was not by name mentioned in this particular exchange of communications, although it was mentioned by reference in other communications in other public statements since then.

CONDITIONS WHICH MIGHT JUSTIFY AN INVASION

Senator WILLIAMS. Suppose Russia was to pull out these fighters and her personnel, would we then be obligated to live up to our pledge of no invasion?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, if Castro committed aggressive acts, if Castro were to do the kind of things which would from our point of view justify invasion. I mean when we talk about invasion, gentlemen, we are talking about a large scale military operation involving many American casualties and the estimate has been up to 30 or 40 or 50 thousand Cuban casualties. In other words, this is not a weekend operation. This is a very serious matter, and it would be undertaken only for the most serious reasons. These serious reasons involve considerations under the Rio Treaty, the aggressive character of the regime, some other factor which are fully included in the reservations we have expressed on the whole subject.

Senator WILLIAMS. Do we understand, if Russia had completed all of the requests which we made that they carry out, our suggestion that there would be no invasion was made with no intention on our part to carry it out?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, before October 14 we had no intention of invading Cuba. Under the Rio Treaty there was always a possibility that circumstances could develop where we might invade Cuba or if there was an attack on Guantanamo we almost certainly would move our troops into Cuba at that point. But there was never an unreserved commitment regardless of circumstances not to invade Cuba.

Senator WILLIAMS. But we understand that in the event of an attack on Guantanamo or attack elsewhere, but in the absence of an attack or aggression militarily from Cuba would we be bound that there would be no invasion?

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Secretary RUSK. I don't think that question is so much a question of our being bound because I think in that sense we would be bound anyhow under U.N. charter, OAS treaties not to launch an invasion except for a thoroughly justifiable purpose. I think what would restrain us in that situation would be for what does the United States invade Cuba.

Senator WILLIAMS. We don't accept the premise, as I understand it, that the original invasion of the Bay of Pigs was a violation of the United Nations charter or agreement and would we have a right repeat that if we wanted to?

The CHAIRMAN. That was a covert operation. [Laughter.]

That was not an official operation. That was one reason they tried to make it covert is because on overt one would have been in violation.

Senator WILLIAMS. I think we would do a good job in getting some of these offensive weapons out. But what is disturbing me is maybe there is some indication that we weren't so sincere on our part that we would live up to our obligations if Russia lived up to her obligations.

Secretary RUSK. Let me mention another——

Senator WILLIAMS. I don't say they did, but if she did.

Secretary RUSK. Let me mention another contingency that we would not consider interfered with her in this situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

PLACING OF MISSILES IN CUBA

Senator AIKEN. How did the long range missiles get into Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. They apparently came in the holds of wide hatched ships. I must say that they laid this on as a very expert technical job, looking back at the pace at which they actually put them into position and what was required. They brought in prefabricated coverings for the cables running from the radar station to the actual pads. All of their housing was brought in prefabricated. All the vehicles, the refueling vehicles, the fueling vehicles, and the power generators, certain kinds of fencing around the area, were all brought in and laid on, I would suppose, in about a three-week period.

It was a fantastic logistic job of pre-planning, and this means that somewhere back in the late spring they would have had to have made the decision to do this.

Senator AIKEN. Did the Army or any other branch of the armed services ever indicate a suspicion or a belief or information to the effect that this strong military build-up was going on, we will say, from April 1st until October 1st?

Secretary RUSK. I think the military build-up reached Cuba beginning about July 1st, that is, the significant military build-up of the surface-to-air missiles. The Comar type motor torpedo boats, the MIG's came in from the period July until——

Senator AIKEN. Wasn't there strong suspicion as early as late March or April of an exceptional number of boats moving in?

Secretary RUSK. There had been early artillery tanks and things of that sort, and a considerable number of technicians going in during that period to be there for training purposes.

Senator AIKEN. And you had full coordination among the Army, CIA and all other military branches?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that it might be that the committee or subcommittee might want to go through this scenario in great detail to see how this developed, what the sources of information were, what the information was at a particular time, what steps were taken to try to confirm the reports that came in, and I think that would be a matter of considerable interest to the committee, and we would be very happy to go through it.

Senator AIKEN. I think we might want, Mr. Chairman, to get some information from the branches of the armed services, intelligence, on what they were thinking last spring.

SUSPICIONS WITHOUT REAL EVIDENCE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, wasn't it true that there were some people as far back as August who felt very definitely they would not go to the site expense and development unless they were putting up offensive weapons?

Secretary RUSK. I know of one who thought so, despite the fact that he could not put his finger on anything very tangible. He could not put his finger on anything very specific, but he made the judgment, and it turned out to be right, that they would not go to this enormous expense unless it were for something worth more than the conventional defense of the island. But at the time that he expressed this, he said, "I can't base this on any real evidence."

This was similar to another judgment that got me into a little bit of trouble during the summer. I had been saying that I thought the Berlin situation was going to get to be very serious in the autumn, in the late autumn. This was more osmosis than anything else.

Some of my own colleagues, when asked about this by the press, couldn't offer them any evidence. Our allies were a little disturbed that out of Washington was coming a view that the Berlin situation was going to get more serious, but they didn't know why.

But there was something in the atmosphere, and this man made the judgment to which I just referred. My antennae picked up that things were going to get tougher, but I had no evidence for it. Then you get another situation, Senator, that you are familiar with in background, when thousands and thousands of pieces of information come in from all over the place, from all kinds of sources of different classifications—getting this properly analyzed and the real possibilities up to the top policy echelons is a major problem.

You remember the time of the Korean affair, that after the North Korean attack started, it was possible then to go back and find six or eight or ten bits of intelligence that would have pointed in that direction. But the weekend of the Korean attack the Director of Intelligence in Korea was on vacation, the general was over in Japan; the headquarters in Tokyo thought that this attack at the beginning was simply another border incident. No one picked up the phone then and telephoned the Assistant Secretary for Far

East that we are expecting an attack, you see. Afterwards, you could find out which bits were right.

Now, it was not until we had what seemed to be direct suspicious information pointing to a specific location involving construction of a suspicious character that the policy people had this brought to their attention. We authorized the overflights to take a look at that precise situation, and this opened up—I mean the intelligence community and all of them down the line have an enormous problem in what to raise and what time as a flag on the situation.

We are examining that very carefully to see if we cannot find ways so that maybe when conclusions are drawn on an intelligence judgment, that at least some sampling adverse indicators be noted in the margin so that the policy people will know that maybe this is not just the full story, and that we had better be just a little reserved about what could develop. But this is a terribly difficult problem when you are getting thousands and thousands of pieces of intelligence every day.

FURTHER BRIEFINGS BY THE SECRETARY

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you could give me information as to what your plans for a further briefing by the Secretary are? I apologize, but I have to go for a very important conference I have now, and we have not gotten over Cuba yet, and we certainly need briefing on some other subjects, particularly, may I say, Mr. Secretary, on France.

I understand de Gaulle is supposedly planning to make a major speech this coming Monday which, if its contents are what I have been advised will be part of it, I think would be alarming, and I think it is very important, Mr. Chairman, that we get together with the Secretary next week for a discussion of some of these European problems, including Berlin and NATO. I want to say good naturedly, in my campaign the issue was raised over and over again that I talked too much in the Senate. I assured the people in my State that if they re-elected me, I would talk more in this session than the last because there was so much more to be said.

Senator HUMPHREY. He said that in jest. [Laughter.]

Senator MORSE. And one of my first offerings will be next week in regard to U.S. relations with France. I would like to be advised by the Department of State before I make that speech, which I hold in my hand, because I think we ought to know about our relations with NATO, what they are going to be and how much more we are going to be expected to pay through the nose. But I cannot stay. I was going to raise some of these questions this morning if we got to France.

I would like to have a briefing with the Secretary of State next week, and I would like to have the October 26 letter put in your possession, Mr. Chairman, so that we can read it in the committee room, either this week or the first of next.

So whatever arrangements you work out I would like to know about before I make this first—keep this pledge that I made starting next week.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would greatly welcome a chance to come back at the earliest opportunity because, as the committee has observed, we have not begun to cover the ground.

The CHAIRMAN. No. We have a lot of things to go into.

Senator HUMPHREY. India.

Secretary RUSK. I could do it any time—I am seeing the House committee on Monday afternoon, but otherwise my schedule is at your disposal.

The CHAIRMAN. The staff will get in touch with you Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday morning, whenever it is convenient, just as soon as you are able to make it.

SOVIETS IN CUBA

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, may I just ask a departing question. You said at peak strength you estimated 20,000 Russians were in Cuba. What is your present estimate?

Secretary RUSK. Based upon a certain amount of counting and estimating what would be the situation if the tables of organization would be at full strength, there is a rough estimate of up to 17,000.

Senator CHURCH. Who are still there?

Secretary RUSK. About that amount. We do know that on a pretty close count that at least 4,000 have gone out, and that the out traffic does continue, but not at the pace we would like to see.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. This figure was used in a press story this morning, I believe, or yesterday. It looks fairly accurate from our point of view. But it does have that speculative element in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to continue with Cuba or do you want a very few brief comments about some of these other situations, and then continue this later or do you wish to continue with Cuba?

Senator SPARKMAN. I would like to ask just one question.

Senator AIKEN. I think the other items might take as long as Cuba.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought just to give a brief evaluation of the Congo and just in a few words do that or do you wish to——

RANSOM OF PRISONERS

Senator WILLIAMS. I would like to ask one question. To what extent did the United States Government put up anything or equipment toward this ransom of prisoners?

Secretary RUSK. To my knowledge, Senator, I think there was some release to the Red Cross of some food from the CCC if needed. But whether that has actually been presented I do not know. I will try to get the details on it, but I have not caught up on it since I came back after New Year's—but the medicines and foodstuffs and cash were raised by private contribution.

The CHAIRMAN. No government cash?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. What about tax adjustments such as eligibility for deduction purposes?

Secretary RUSK. The Families Committee and, indeed, the Red Cross, had much earlier received the tax exemption privilege for contributions.

The CHAIRMAN. Which committee?

Secretary RUSK. The Families Committee, the prisoners Families Committee.

Senator HUMPHREY. That was under that old tractor deal.

Secretary RUSK. It was done at the time that question originally came up. Looking at it in one sense, that itself involves governmental participation. But I point out that the American people come up with about $8 billion a year for all sorts of charitable, educational and similar purposes on the same basis. The same rules were applied here as were applied to other situations.

I realize, Mr. Chairman, that this problem has some very disagreeable aspects, and it is on balance a kind of judgment as to what ought to be done in all of the circumstances. But I must say that I feel better that those prisoners are out of Cuban jails; that we do not have that problem overhanging us in our future relations with Cuba.

USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS

Senator WILLIAMS. The reason I asked the question is I have seen statements made that there were no Federal funds involved, and I understand that there were Federal funds involved. The contribution of food certainly costs Federal money, and whether you put up the food or whether you put up funds is immaterial, and I want to be frank about it, and if it is true, why not just admit it?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I would have to verify whether a certain amount of food which had been earmarked by CCC was, in fact, called for, because the hope was that the Families Committee would raise the necessary funds to handle this on a purely private transaction basis.

Senator WILLIAMS. The fact that the pledge was made so far as the government is concerned, that we would furnish a portion of it.

Secretary RUSK. On a purely standby basis.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Secretary who has full information as to any Federal money that might have gone into this thing and, if so, what Federal money, what food went into this program, what medicines and the specific details of the type, kind and amounts of medicines that went in. Who would have that information so that we do not have to get somebody over here who will say, "Well, my uncle knows that," or "somebody over in some other department knows," and then we will have to send for him, this, that or the other. Is there anybody who knows so that we can get the fountainhead of complete information and so the questions can be answered?

Secretary RUSK. I think I know there is someone who does know the full picture. I will check to see.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not care to pursue it today.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But there will come a time very soon when I think those complete details have to be fully explored, the types of medicine, the kinds of medicines, amounts.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What it was, and so on. There are some very disquieting rumors going around about the types and kinds of drugs and medicines, and so on. I think, at least from my standpoint, they have to be explored.

Secretary RUSK. I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to tell Mr. Marcy about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else on Cuba?

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISOLATION OF CUBA

Senator CARLSON. I have one question. I think the Secretary has been very candid and has given us a very good report on the past. But what is our future on Cuba? What does he have in mind as to the administration's program or the Secretary of State's program in regard to the situation with which we are all familiar?

Secretary RUSK. The most immediate point that we have in mind, two points that we have in mind, are, we do feel we must continue the economic and political isolation of Cuba in any event. That involves the OAS. It involves NATO countries, and it chiefly refers to shipping and trade matters.

In the case of shipping there has been a very sharp reduction in free world shipping into Cuba trade. We still have a few ships from Britain, Norway and Greece, and we are trying to work that out with those governments to get those ships out of the Cuba trade. There is no shipping from Latin America into the Cuba trade at the present time, according to my information.

We are also applying Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act—that has to do with refusing assistance to any country who permits their ships to carry assistance to Cuba.

Now, this involves two difficulties: What does "permit" mean? In the case of a government where there is a flagship that has been under, say, a three or four-year time charter to the Soviet bloc, and there is not the same physical control over it that you might have under a voyage charter, for example. Also, how do you know whether a ship is carrying assistance?

We are taking the view that a ship in the trade presumptively is carrying assistance as far as policy is concerned. We would like to work it out so that the ships just are not there, and you did not have to get into the question of what it is carrying.

The most difficult problem there is Greece. I think there are three or four ships on a long-time charter from minor Greek companies, and there are at the moment no legal weapons in the hands of the Greek Government that they can use to get these ships out of the trade, and yet Greece is one of the staunchest of our NATO allies. An immediate and vigorous application of Section 107 to them would be a very serious thing indeed. I talked to the Greek Foreign Minister about it at NATO, and our Ambassador is talking about it in Athens, and we are trying to get to those ships so that Section 107 does not apply.

Senator CARLSON. In other words, our government intends to keep economic pressures, at least, on Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. And, secondly, Senator, there is another element here in terms of timing and the exact techniques used.

We would like to see, if this out traffic of Soviet military personnel continues, if it is to continue, we would like to keep that out traffic going, so in terms of what is said or done in any particular moment we have to think of it in terms of whether that interferes with the very out traffic that we want to promote. So I think there is a little problem of timing here about exactly how we move at a particular point.

Senator CARLSON. I think we are all in accord that we are hopeful that something will develop down there, and that economic pressure will bring it on.

FOOD TO CUBA

We are in this situation as I see it. We are going to give them this $53 million worth of medicines and food, and I am not critical of it because I think it is a humanitarian program, but it will be continuing to pour in there for the next year or two. It is not over yet.

Secondly, the United Nations is about to give them $1,200,000, through the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am glad you brought that up. It has nothing to do with the prisoners.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are we going to be put in the position of supplying our own taxpayers' money for the furnishing of food to Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. We objected as late as yesterday to their going ahead with that. We think we have got it put off for at least six months. But they know very definitely both in the Special Fund and in the FAO we oppose it. We are not taking an acquiescent view toward it.

They have said to us that no U.S. resources would be used if they go ahead with it. But we have said in a situation where it is so easy to sidestep your books, there is not a decisive attitude at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which water came out of the well. [Laughter.]

Secretary RUSK. That is right. But I would appreciate it if this were not made public at the moment, because Paul Hoffman has a problem on his hands in dealing with all the people who are pushing him in the other direction. But we think we have this put off for at least another six months.

Senator HUMPHREY. Does the Soviet contribute to the U.N. Special Fund?

Secretary RUSK. I do not know, Senator, quite frankly. I would have to check that.

Senator HUMPHREY. What I am getting at, these are multilateral organizations, and once in a while I imagine there may be some Russian money, even though it is very modest, that is in a particular project or fund that goes to even Nationalist China.

Secretary RUSK. Soviet jeeps, for example, went into Cuba in connection with a WHO project.

Some governments make contributions in kind just as we do in food, so some of these international funds, and there are some Soviet contributions in some places—but I would have to check to see about the Special Fund.

CONTACTS WITHIN CUBA

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, on this matter that Senator Carlson brings up, what our policy is for the future which, of course, is a long discussion within itself, and which many of us will want to at least contribute to in a small measure, what are the contact within Cuba to work with the dissident elements to bring about some real difficulty to the existing Cuban Government? I predicate the question upon the fact that if we continue our economic pressure, we will continue the political pressure through our allies and friends in OAS or what have you, but there has to be something done inside the country. I heard a good deal about the fact that there were dissident elements that were in very key positions. In fact, even within recent weeks, at least one key person left the country.

Secretary RUSK. Could we have reference to any individual left off the record?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. May we go off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we couldn't spend the next 20 minutes on a very brief discussion about what the present situation is in the Congo.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do understand, Mr. Chairman, that we will have a further hearing on Cuba?

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. We will have two or three, but it would be set by the Secretary either Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday morning, depending on the time.

CHANGING SITUATION IN THE CONGO

Could you give us a few words about Tshombe.[4] We read in the paper he has given in and all that.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, on this Congo, I want to say, not just in humor, that I could say something here and walk out, and we will all find tickers that would cut right across what I have said, because that situation has been changing so rapidly in the last few days.

It has been very hard in the Congo to find certain elements of reality to which you could hang on, because it was a country that became independent prematurely without any preparation. But I would like to just mention the following elements, if I might. The Central Government in the past year and a quarter has done rather well in the rest of the Congo. It did succeed in removing the secessionist leftist regime in Stanleyville, where the Iron Curtain countries had their diplomatic representatives.

The CHAIRMAN. What has happened to Gizenga? [5]

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[4] Moise Tshombe, President of the secessionist Katanga Province of the Republic of the Congo.
[5] Antoine Gizenga, former vice premier of the Congo, was imprisoned in 1962.

Secretary RUSK. Gizenga is still in the pokey. They have not released him yet, although Tshombe has been pressing for the release of Gizenga as a means of weakening the Central Government. That is one of the elements in the situation.

They reduced the secession of Kasai, but the Central Government strengthened its position with what it did in the rest of the Congo until in the last few months, the inability to solve the Katanga problem became the overriding issue, and the Adoula [6] government has been faced with overthrow.

This is partly because the Parliament, I suppose, is the most corrupt parliament that has ever existed anywhere. Everybody has been tinkering with it, from the Soviet Union all the way around Tshombe, and Adoula has been finding it difficult to hang on by a thread because of the Katanga issue. Now, the Parliament has been prorogued for, I think, about sixty days. It will be back for another session.

Another element is there has been agreement on a unified Congo under a federal structure. This has been agreed by everybody, the U.N., the Belgians, the British, the French, the Union Miniere, Adoula, Kasavubu,[7] Tshombe; they have all agreed that this is the result that ought to be brought about.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is actively in the wings in Leopoldville ready to move in, if possible, if the Katanga operation fails. They have been offering aid, arms, economic support, as an alternative to the U.N. if the Katanga operation fails.

A ROLE FOR TSHOMBE

Now, as far as we are concerned, we think that there is a role for Tshombe, that it ought to be possible to move ahead on a federal constitution, that neither Adoula nor the U.N. should close the door to a Katanga government under Tshombe taking part in a federal Congo.

Day by day the prospects of that shift drastically. Indeed Tshombe will make a statement at 9 o'clock in the morning saying that he is ready to go ahead with the U Thant [8] plan, and at 12 o'clock he will make a statement saying, "We are going to have a scorched earth policy here if you fellows don't watch yourselves."

I think the latest information, which may be wrong by the time we leave this room, is that the local U.N. people and Tshombe are getting together better than they have for the last three days. We feel that U Thant has been trying to get this thing to a prompt solution peacefully without an extension of his military operation. He has had some problem in communications with his people on the ground.

My remark is not quite literally true, but it is figuratively accurate, I think, in terms of the situation.

There was one occasion where we had agreed with U Thant that he should withhold his forces from Jadotville to give Tshombe another chance to come in and start performing on the U Thant reconciliation plan. When he got the message out to the ground there

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[6] Congo Premier Cyrille Adoula.
[7] Congo President Joseph Kasavubu.
[8] U.N. Secretary-General.

the brigadier, who is a very courageous and very effective Indian brigadier, informed U Thant that he was in Jadotville talking with the mayor and the general manager of the Union Miniere, who had helped him come in to preserve these properties and preserve order in the city.

So in a fast-moving situation of this sort the prospect this morning was that Tshombe is now cooperating with the U.N. on two points: one, full freedom of U.N. movement around the Katanga, and he personally made good on it in a move down in the southwest, by going ahead of the U.N. column, and telling his fellows not to shoot. Secondly, we understand he has made a commitment not to blow these installations in Kolwezi, and that, I think, there is one other element which I would like to discuss off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, could we hear a little bit about India?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to hear about India and about France.

THE INDIAN FRONTIER

Secretary RUSK. Well, on the Indian problem, the attacks that were delivered in November and December against the northern Indian frontier, both on the Northeast Frontier Agency and in the west, caught the Indians unprepared from a military point of view on those frontiers. Most of their forces were aimed at Pakistan.

It looks now as though the Chinese intended to make a limited push into areas which they theoretically had been claiming, rather than at that stage in December to try any sort of an all-out attack on Assam or anything of that sort.

If you look at a map you would see—as an old CBI war plans man during the war I am intrigued by this point—that if they had in it designs beyond the areas which they claimed, they would not, I think, have moved militarily the way they did. They would have come down through Darjeeling, cut off the northern narrow neck of East Pakistan, and all of East India would have dropped off the tree. It would have created an impossible situation from the Indian point of view.

The pull back is likely to create a very difficult problem for the Indians because they won't pull back all the way. They will pull back on the high hills in the Northeast Frontier Agency, the key passage, and probably sit there. The Indians would have the problems of mobilizing a very substantial military effort if they expected to winkle them out of those hills up there, during a protracted period in which public opinion would not be sustained in India by actual fighting, and this is the kind of prospect that the Indians are most concerned about.

Now, I think we ought to recognize that the Indian soldier is a good soldier. The allied position in World War II, and the entire Middle East turned on the Indian Army for a period of about two years. I served with them during the war, and they have got good soldiers in their forces. There has been some deterioration in their

officer corps since the British left, and Khrishna Menon's [9] influence on the high command was disastrous. The new Defense Minister [10] is quite another kind of fellow, and the new commanders, I think, are a great improvement.

What we have done thus far is to try to give them the necessary equipment that would help them in the kind of fighting that they are likely to be enaged in up there in those frontier areas, that is, small arms for mountain type divisions and things of that sort.

EVEN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE BRITISH

But we are doing it on the basis of full and even partnership with the British, and thus far on a relatively small scale, if you look at the size of the two countries involved, and the issues at stake.

Senator HUMPHREY. You mean 50–50?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. I think we have put about $25 million in thus far, and we have said to the British, "This is a Commonwealth problem as much as ours, at least, and we are not going to do any more than you are able to do, than you are willing to do."

There are several elements here that we think are vitally important if India is going to face up to a systematic Chinese attack in the future. The first is that India itself has got to make the basic decision about what is going to do, because if you have an alerted India, an awakened India, the problem of bringing troops along the Himalayas to take on that kind of country, India, 450 million people, would be a whale of a problem for the Chinese.

During World War II, the Indians could have stopped us in our tracks by simply stopping to carry our water, our wood or keeping communications going. This is not a simple problem from the Chinese point of view.

The first thing in India, India must get their relations with Pakistan sorted out. We don't care at what cost, but they must get their relations sorted out, so far as Kashmir is concerned.

THE INDIAN AIR FORCE

Senator SYMINGTON. When I was there last year I found India had the largest Air Force in that part of the world. Why didn't they use it, especially when an enemy going through a pass gives your most effective use of air power in resistance?

Secretary RUSK. I think there were two reasons: Because the Air Force and accompanying equipment was not properly deployed for that action and, second, they had no air defense of their own cities along the Ganges Valley which were within easy reach of Chinese bombers. They were concerned about escalating it so long as the Chinese were up there in the hills, but I think that has been their primary problem.

Now, we think that in this first emergency stage that our commitments on military assistance, which the Pakistanis fully understand, might run up to as much as $60 million from us and $60 mil-

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[9] In November 1962 V. K. Krishna Menon was removed as Indian Defense Minister.
[10] Y. B. Chavan.

lion from the Commonwealth, Britain, Canada, Australia, and so forth.

We would have to look pretty carefully at any longer range situation there because that would turn upon Pakistan, it would turn upon who else was in the party, but we do believe that it is up to India, as a matter of its own geopolitical necessity, to straighten out its relations with Pakistan so that the two countries can work together, if possible, for the defense of the subcontinent. Otherwise the defense problem becomes very difficult indeed.

I would say, Mr. Chairman, I do not have the exact figures on this at the moment, but we had anticipated that our aid to India this year would be somewhat lower than last year on the economic development program, technical assistance, and things of that sort, PL 480. This circumstance may force us to go somewhat beyond the limits of last year, depending upon this particular military emergency.

Senator SYMINGTON. It was $750 million, and we agreed last year to keep it at $750 million, not to raise it to $830 million. Are you now saying you think it should be raised above $750 million?

Secretary RUSK. I think it might in view of this military emergency with China, but we will be in consultation with the committee on it because we have not had the figures. Had it not been for the Chinese military attack it would have been less than $750 million.

Senator SYMINGTON. But that is what was granted?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

NEHRU'S PROGRAM OF NON-ALLIANCE

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, is Nehru now arguing that his non-alliance program has worked out favorably because it was Russia that stopped the Chinese from advancing in their invasion?

Secretary RUSK. He has not made that argument to us. Obviously, he would like, if possible, to get both Russia and the West to show Peiping that they disapprove of this attack on India. But this has not been something that he has thrown to us as an argument. This has been the reason why he has not taken it to the United Nations. He did not want to force the Russians to make a choice between Peiping and New Delhi on this issue in the U.N.

The CHAIRMAN. Has he given up Menon altogether or is he still hanging around?

Secretary RUSK. Menon, so far as we can tell, is out.

I do want to say that one of the most encouraging things which has happened in the situation has been the rise to dominant influence of a much more realistic and hard-headed and intelligent group of leaders.

One of the most surprising figures who emerged in this business, given his background, was [Sarvepalli] Radhakrishnan, the President, who was the poet, the philosopher, the writer, but he turned out to be the man with the steel in his backbone in this whole situation. He is the one who got rid of Menon.

Chavan, the new Defense Minister, young, vigorous, tough, able; Morarji Desai, very, very strong in this situation—so it appears there is a new quality of leadership in India.

In terms of non-alignment, Senator, I think, my impression is that India is ready to change its non-alignment policy perhaps faster than we are ready to [illegible] they see this as a means of involving us, perhaps [illegible] and with massive resources and manpower, if necessary, their defense.

We think an awful lot has to be done before we get around to any such situation as that, because we cannot be the gendarmes for the universe, and here is a country of 450 million people who can do this job themselves with the conditions.

INDIA AND FORMOSA

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, you are already committed to Formosa, and they haven't got anybody over there. If you are going to defend, if you are going to supply arms, I would suggest that you would get some people to supply them too as an ally, and 450 million people in India may be, just on the basis of sheer arithmetical proportions, a little more effective than, how many have they got on Formosa?

Senator RUSK. Four hundred thousand.

Senator HUMPHREY. No, about 9 million, haven't they?

Secretary RUSK. You mean people? About 10, 11 million.

Senator HUMPHREY. Ten, 11 million. Don't misunderstand me, it seems to me what has happened recently in India can be and is being brought around somewhat to the advantage of the West.

Secretary RUSK. Very definitely.

Senator HUMPHREY. This cleavage between China and Russia is something that has been watched very carefully. I don't think anybody can draw any final judgment on it, but the fact that the Indians have been able to keep the Russians supplying some supplies to India at the very time that the Chinese are raising the dickens with Russia and also fighting the Indians, seems rather significant.

AIDING INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO FIGHT EACH OTHER

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask a question there?

Senator SYMINGTON. Our total program is $3.9 billion. If we talk about only economic aid, fifty per cent of that economic aid goes to two countries, India and Pakistan. Both countries have great armies facing each other. Suppose we said, "If you all don't cut this out, we won't give you any of it at all."

Then one country might go to China and one country to Russia. What would happen then? In other words, can we continue to pour this money into both these countries in order to help them prepare militarily to fight each other?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have been making exactly that point in both capitals with all of the eloquence and pressure we can mobilize in this present situation because it is true that we have in a real sense been paying both sides in this animosity. We are giving direct military assistance to Pakistan, economic assistance to India, while they use certain resources for their military operations.

Now, we are trying to say to both capitals, "You have got to settle this Kashmir problem. We don't care on what basis, but settle," because this is unfinished business from the partition when

the arrangements with Britain were made in 1947. We have no special national view as to how they settle it as between them.

UNITING INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO DEFEND THE SUBCONTINENT

What we have a tremendous interest in is that the two of them get the thing settled, and then move in to do a common job for the defense of the subcontinent which has to be common, given the splits of Pakistan, for example, which has to be common, because of transportation, terrain, resources, manpower, and all the rest of it. That is where our interest lies, and now we have been somewhat encouraged by the first round of talks between the two in Rawalpindi in December. They are meeting again in two days time in Delhi, but this is as passionate an issue as ever came down the track. It is at least as tough as the Arab-Israeli problem. But we see some growing realization on both sides that this is something that somehow has to be settled.

The Indians, I think, would never have settled it had there not been the Chinese threat. The Pakistanis have not, I think, helped too much because they have, I think in the most open and flagrant way, showed to the Indians they are going to exploit this Chinese pressure for all it is worth, and that has made it more difficult to move the thing to a settlement.

Senator SYMINGTON. They have made a trade agreement already with China.

Secretary RUSK. They made a trade treaty, they made a sort of in-principle boundary settlement with them. I can't say that I blame the Pakistanis too much in terms of how they feel about it, but I do have some doubt about the wisdom with which they have handled this particular one. Had they repeated in this circumstance when a lot of Indians were getting killed, the gesture that Ayub made two years ago when there was some trouble on the frontier, by saying, "All right, we want to express solidarity with India in this common defense problem in the subcontinent," given the change in Delhi, with people like Radhakrishnan, had they taken the lead there, I think they might have found the atmosphere in Delhi making the settlement of Kashmir easier.

But this is an element 15,000 miles from the scene, in lieu of those people who have these turbulent people to deal with in this most controversial matter.

PROBLEMS WITH DE GAULLE

The CHAIRMAN. Before you leave, can you say something about this French thing that Senator Morse mentioned?

Senator RUSK. I do not know what General de Gaulle is going to say on Monday, but in terms of the Nassau discussions, it is our impression that he wants to take a lot of time to think that one over and, of course, as do we, because in the case of France there would be full consultations with the respective committees about anything that might be done there.

But the offer to Britain was based solely on our furnishing them Polarises six, seven, eight, nine years from now for their submarines and their warheads.

The problem for President de Gaulle and, therefore, partly our problem, is whether this offer means anything to France because France is behind Britain both in submarines and in warheads. They are building, we understand, warheads for a missile in France, but they have never really told us what is in their minds about their nuclear program, so we don't know how relevant it is.

General de Gaulle has ordered a thorough evaluation of the entire nuclear program between now and 1970. I do not think he is going to make any judgment about the Nassau business until he gets a revaluation of his own program in terms of what this might mean. He is not, as you know, enthusiastic about any kind of multilateralism, and I must say that we have a number of problems with President de Gaulle about how we proceed, and he is abstaining for all practical purposes from the U.N. and many purposes from NATO.

He has not been very helpful on the Common Market discussions. He has taken no part in disarmament discussions. He has taken a minimum part in the Berlin discussions. He has almost abandoned Southeast Asia and the commitments of France under the SEATO Treaty.

In terms of any active participation in responsibility for what goes on out there, and in a lot of these things, French policy is very difficult for us these days. But I must say that when you get down to the really, utterly fundamental issues such as Cuba, he was very direct, very simple. "We understand what you are doing. If this involves world war, France would be with the United States all the way."

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

The CHAIRMAN. Is Britain going to get into the Common Market or not?

Senator RUSK. There has been a slowing down in the pace of the negotiations. We are inclined to think it will come to some sort of a head in February or March. It is very difficult from the agricultural side.

The CHAIRMAN. It sure is.

Secretary RUSK. Because this involves some troubles with us as well, which we are pushing very hard in Europe. The odds, I gather from talking to different participants, are still slightly favorable to success.

But one of the difficulties is that the more this is protracted, the more risk becomes that the negotiations can succeed, and the Common Market be turned down in Britain, for example. So we think unless it is done fairly soon and with a sense of forward movement and exhilaration that this might not work out. But, Mr. Ball is there at the present time, today, talking with some key people on these prospects.

The one thing that the European governments have been unanimous on is that the United States should stay out of these Common Market negotiations. But nevertheless we continue to insist upon our own basic interests in how the arrangements come out. We have got to sell at least a billion and a quarter of agricultural products to Europe every year, and we want to participate in the ex-

panding market there, and elements of that sort. But I would think the odds are that they will succeed, but we are worried about the further delays.

FRENCH PRESTIGE

Senator HUMPHREY. When you say de Gaulle is essentially opposed to multilateralism, he is surely not opposed to his domination, I mean his entente with Adenauer on the Common Market. He is a European, isn't he, essentially, and wants to develop that economic integration of Europe.

Secretary RUSK. I would think, Senator, his concern is even more with France than Europe. One can understand that, given the traumatic experiences he has lived through since 1939. But if he could establish the prestige of France as the leader of the kind of Europe we have all been talking about, because there is much more hope there for the real prestige of France than to move in the direction that seems to be isolationist in nature——

The CHAIRMAN. I think the time has come when we ought to let you go.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

CANCELLATION OF SKYBOLT

Senator SYMINGTON. When the Skybolt was cancelled, which meant that we reneged on our offer to give England a national nuclear force, was that done in the hope that if we did not give a national nuclear force to England it would have some influence on de Gaulle, with respect to his determination to build his own national nuclear force?

Secretary RUSK. It wasn't in quite that combination, Senator. There was, first, the pure weapons decision as far as our arsenal was concerned and Secretary McNamara will be taking that up in another committee, as you know, in great detail.

We, of course, were very much aware of the impact of this on the British because of the understanding with respect to Skybolt. The British were offered Skybolt, and on liberal terms of participation if they wanted to continue with Skybolt. They were also offered Hound Dog as an alternative which our own manned aircraft use.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is an obsolete weapon.

Secretary RUSK. It is coming to be obsolete.

The Polaris did raise, because of its character and its longer term viability, the issue of relations with the Commonwealth, and it was for this reason that we tried to emphasize the multilateral possibilities at the time that we discussed Polaris with the British. But the continental side didn't have anything to do with the original Skybolt decision, which was an arsenal decision from the point of view of our own establishment.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary about the press, you prefer we not go into details on this, I take it?

Secretary RUSK. I have said a number of very sensitive things this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I will be very general about it. Thank you very much. The committee is adjourned until the call of the Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 11:02 a.m., in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and by an unanimous voice vote, the nomination of J. Wesley Jones to be Ambassador to Peru was approved for report.

The committee next considered an original resolution continuing the inquiries of the committee into United States foreign policy and its administration, and requesting $150,000 for the purpose. On motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the resolution was unanimously approved by voice vote for report.

The next order of business was an original resolution continuing the committee's study of non-diplomatic activities of representatives of foreign principals in the United States, and asking $50,000 for the purpose.

During discussion, and on motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Symington, the committee fixed one member as a legal quorum for the purpose of taking sworn testimony for the full committee and each subcommittee thereof. Before the vote, however, Senator Hickenlooper raised the objection that adoption of this regulation might lead to uncontrolled subcommittee and committee hearings on the part of one member. The chairman assured the committee that that was not the purpose of the regulation at all—to allow single Members to conduct hearings on their own. He said he did not anticipate such, and would not permit it as chairman. On the vote being taken, the chairman called attention to the fact that a physical quorum of the committee (nine) was present.

The committee then adopted for favorable report by an unanimous voice vote the resolution continuing the committee's study of the non-diplomatic activities of foreign representatives in the United States, and approving the amount at $50,000. On discussion, Senator Lausche changed his vote to "no."

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:40 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Church, Aiken, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Holt and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have the Secretary of State here to continue the briefing on various matters of interest to the committee. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you here this morning.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to initiate a statement on your own or merely continue the questions which were in the course of being asked when we last met?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, first, I would like to inform the committee that Mr. [Nicholas] Katzenbach, the Deputy Attorney General, and Mr. Robert Hurwitch within the Department of State, who between them know everything that is known about this Cuban prisoner exchange, would be available to the committee in response to Senator Hickenlooper's request.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Katzenbach and who?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Robert Hurwitch of the Department of State. The committee asked me to ascertain who would be in a position to come up here, who would know all about the situation and those are the two who would be available to the committee, and who do know all about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there was a piece in the paper that I wondered if you cared to comment on which I think might clarify a bit for the committee.

AIR SUPPORT FOR BAY OF PIGS INVASION

The AP about 2 days ago said,

A Cuban invasion leader says his forces had never been promised U.S. air support in their ill-starred landing at the Bay of Pigs.

"We had our own planes, but they were knocked out," said Jose A. Perez San Roman, commander of the 2506th Cuban Liberation Brigade.

Is that, in your opinion, a correct statement?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, it was made very specifically clear to the brigade ahead of time that U.S. Armed Forces would not be committed in their support. The whole thesis of that operation was that the brigade as well as elements on the island, and the refugee groups here felt utterly confident and this turned out not to be right that the landing itself would precipitate reactions throughout the island. But we went to great pains to be sure that the brigade did understand that U.S. Armed Forces would not be used to support their landing.

Now, it is also true that in terms of the deficiencies of information that turned up after the event, that the count of planes on the island from sources on the island as well as other resources, turned out to be inaccurate. There were some planes in hangars and so forth that were not hit with the strike that did take place, and more planes, in fact, turned out from the Cuban side than had been anticipated.

The CHAIRMAN. It is fair to say then that our intelligence as to the situation in Cuba was defective, inaccurate?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it was inaccurate, but it was intelligence that was built by both sides, that is, by the U.S. effort intelligence and also by the Cuban effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. The Cuban group itself, and the Cuban refugees and Cubans on the island helped put together the picture and put together their own picture about what the prospects were, but it is true that the brigade did know ahead of time. In fact as it turned out we used more U.S. forces than had ever been promised, particularly in extricating a great many who had to be extricated.

The CHAIRMAN. Just for the record, I want to put that little piece in there just as a matter of historical significance. I have never seen an accurate correct statement by one of the Cubans.

[The clipping referred to follows:]

U.S. PROMISED NO AIR SUPPORT, CUBAN INVASION LEADER SAYS

WASHINGTON (AP).—A Cuban invasion leader says his forces had never been promised U.S. air support in their ill-starred landing at the Bay of Pigs.

"We had our own planes but they were knocked out," said Jose A. Perez San Roman, commander of the 2506th Cuban Liberation Brigade, in an interview Friday in Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy's outer office.

Whether the United States had promised air cover for the invasion and then had failed to deliver was one of the most controversial issues raised in the turmoil following the invasion's failure in 1961.

The Kennedy administration has maintained an official silence on that point.

One invasion veteran, Manuel Penabaz, wrote in a news magazine that during the invasion Perez San Roman had called unsuccessfully for jet cover. He said the appeal had been made in communication with an American ship, but that the rebels "looked in vain for the air support that could have knocked Castro's planes from the sky."

Perez San Roman, who with five comrades dropped in on the attorney general, was asked about this by newsmen and he shook his head.

When asked if he had ever received indications the United States would supply air cover, he shrugged and then repeated: "No. We had our own."

But he begged off answering further questions about the venture.

The 32-year-old brigade commander was among the 1,113 prisoners ransomed from Cuba Christmas Eve after more than 20 months in prison camps.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, if it is agreeable I would like to say a few more words about the Cuban situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. The committee might wish for me to read the October 26th letter from Mr. Khrushchev.

Senator MORSE. Before you do that. This story, I am sorry I was late, but I was in a very important conference and I could not get here. Does this story that you put in the record deal with this subject matter?

The CHAIRMAN. It is an Associated Press story, an interview with one of the leaders in the bridade at the Bay of Pigs where he says they had not been promised air support by the U.S. Government. They had their own planes.

Senator MORSE. I don't argue for a minute. I think it is important to have cleared up that this administration has been unnecessarily damaged by some very false propaganda about this air coverage. Of course, the hearings conducted at the time, you will recall by my subcommittee, left no room for doubt. The testimony of witness after witness after witness was that there was no such air coverage promised at any time. This got into the 1962 campaign and it became explosive in my state because my opponent used this big lie technique and I got into a television debate with him. I did not quote from the record, but I took that transcript of the record onto that stage with me and I said, "I hold in my hand a top secret document that contains the testimony of this group of witnesses," and I named them, "And I give to the people of Oregon my word of honor that they give a rebuttal and denial to any such statement of my opponent. Now, I want him to tell this audience where he got this information."

It has been this kind of political propaganda that has been used against this administration for the last time in this state as far as the senior Senator from Oregon is concerned, and he said he relied on U.S. News and World Report, Time Magazine and Readers' Digest. I just want to tell you his campaign collapsed then and there on this matter. I want to say to the Secretary, I do think that this point ought to be cleared up officially, because it is a disservice not only to President Kennedy but a disservice to President Eisenhower. Let's not fool ourselves what this project was, it was a combined Eisenhower-Kennedy program, and we carried on where Eisenhower left off, and I am glad the Senator from Arkansas has put this in the record.

Although we still don't have permission to release this material, here is one Senator who is going to answer it with this denial whenever I run into it, because I don't intend to have my Administration libeled this way by this kind of big lie technique that is used by our opposition on the Bay of Pigs matter. We did not promise air coverage. It never was promised, at least if we can rely on the testimony of the witnesses who testified before this committee, and I intend to spike it every time it is raised.

The CHAIRMAN. The only significance I thought was that this was testimony of one of the leaders of the brigade itself. That was all.

INVADERS DIRECTED BY U.S. SHIPS

Senator LAUSCHE. What about the correctness of the article carried in U.S. News written by one of the participants in the landing who got away and said that they were being directed by United States ships of what they should do once they landed, "Move forward and hold." Did you read that piece?

Secretary RUSK. I did not read that piece, Senator, but this is not correct. There were some United States ships off shore, far off shore. Indeed, there was some radar and other protection given from a distance to these people on their way in, but the operation was entirely under the direction of the commander of the Cuban Brigade.

Senator LAUSCHE. In that article it is stated that they were in constant touch with the ship offshore and the ship offshore was directing them how to move. Why would that have been done? Why were these communications in existence?

Secretary RUSK. There were several ships involved with the brigade, under the brigade command including supply ships.

Senator LAUSCHE. No. But this was a ship of the United States telling these people how they should proceed into the interior.

Secretary RUSK. This is news to me.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have the U.S. News piece on that item?

Mr. HOLT. I have read it and I will see if we have got it here.

A POPULAR UPRISING IN CUBA

Senator SPARKMAN. While we are looking that up, Senator Morse, I am not sure you heard the Secretary say this, which was likewise verified in the hearings before the committee, that it was the belief both of the refugees and apparently of our intelligence that when they went in and landed there would be a popular uprising in the island. If you remember, Mr. [Allen] Dulles 5 or 6 months before, maybe further back than that, while we were in session in 1960, testified before us that it was proceeding on that assumption, and that the invasion, if it came, when it came, would be made only on that basis.

The CHAIRMAN. I heard him personally state this, also in an executive meeting downtown, that their intelligence, their reports, indicated there would be that uprising.

Senator SPARKMAN. He testified right before this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.

Senator SPARKMAN. Before you start, I wonder if I could ask one or two questions. I am going to have to leave very briefly within a few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Both of us have to go for a few minutes. We have a meeting.

RECONCILIATION PLAN IN THE CONGO

Senator SPARKMAN. I just wonder if you will tell us what is the Congo situation today.

The CHAIRMAN. The latest.

Senator SPARKMAN. You notice I said today.

The CHAIRMAN. I say this morning.

Secretary RUSK. I am very pleased I cautioned the committee that it might be different by the end of the day and it was different by the end of the day.

Senator SPARKMAN. Before you left the room.

Secretary RUSK. It is true as of today, Mr. Tshombe sent a letter yesterday to Mr. Adoula and to the U.N. saying that he was prepared to proceed with the reconciliation plan, to grant the U.N. forces freedom of movement throughout the Congo which would open up the way to secure the very valuable facilities at Kolwezi against demolition, but asked for amnesty for himself and his followers from Adoula.

Adoula, somewhat to our surprise, because he has been riding high in the last few days, has been somewhat difficult, Adoula responded very constructively to that. He and Kasavubu issued a letter reaffirming the amnesty, and the problem now is where Tshombe and Adoula or Adoula's representative can get together to work out further talks. Tshombe has indicated he is returning to Elizabethville. Adoula himself does not wish to go to Elizabethville but a high-ranking representative would be ready to go. Both of them might meet in some mid place between Leopoldville and Elizabethville.

TEAMWORK AMONG BELGIUM, BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES

Perhaps I ought to say to the committee that there has been much closer teamwork among Belgium, Britain and the United States in this situation than has appeared on the public record. The Belgians and the British have taken on the job of trying to advise and persuade Tshombe to accept a plan. We have tried to take on the job of persuading Adoula and the U.N. to keep on the plan, and leave the way open for a Katanga peacefully under Tshombe and his government, to join a federal Congo.

This has left us in a somewhat different public position as we have carried out these respective roles, but I can tell the committee we have worked most intimately with Mr. Spaak [1] who has been extremely helpful here in this situation. We have had for a few days some problem of communications and possibly of discipline, between the U.N. Secretary General and certain of his leaders on the spot. When Ralph Bunche went out to make a thorough investigation of this he came back and seemed convinced that it was more a matter of communications than discipline, but we have tried on the one side to keep the U.N. and Adoula nailed to the reconciliation plan, and the Belgians and British have worked mostly with Tshombe.

It looks today that the prospects are promising—but I will have to enter the same reservation when I was with the committee before.

If we could get the threat of the destruction of those important facilities at Kolwezi removed, then I think the way would be open for a much more reasonable kind of negotiated settlement.

One of our problems has been that we have had to put great pressure on Adoula to get him to realize that the facts of the situa-

[1] NATO Director General Paul-Henri Spaak.

tion are such that Tshombe is not just another provincial president, that in fact what is needed is a negotiated and agreed solution between Adoula and Tshombe. It has been hard to nail down in Leopoldville just as it has been hard for the Belgians and the British to get Tshombe nailed down in Elizabethville, but that is the present situation.

Mr. Chairman, if the committee is agreeable I might continue the Cuban discussion briefly. I would like to read to the committee the October 26th letter which has been so mysterious during all this business.

The CHAIRMAN. Please do it now before we have to leave.

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir, and then perhaps I would like to go into the de Gaulle situation. I have some copies of the de Gaulle press conference and I think some members of the committee might wish to read that because it is——

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest as we take up these subjects we deal with them separately until we have concluded one subject, that is, if we take up the Cuban situation let's proceed with that. And if we take up the Katanga, let's proceed with that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all right with me.

KENNEDY'S WARNING TO THE SOVIET UNION

Secretary RUSK. I will remind the committee of the President's press conferences of September 4 and September 13 in which it seemed to us that a very clear warning had been given to the Soviet Union, that the gravest issues would arise if the Soviet Union put anything like offensive strategic missiles on the island of Cuba. Further, that the Soviet Union had told us quite specifically that there are not and would not be in Cuba any missiles capable of reaching the United States.

The October 22 speech of the President was delivered to the Soviet Ambassador here in Washington an hour before the speech was delivered, and the the next morning the Soviet counterblast was similarly delivered, each with a very brief letter of transmittal. The communications that followed that largely passed through the Secretary General of the United Nations who came in urging both sides to take no steps which would further exacerbate the situation.

On October 25, the President sent a letter to the Secretary General saying:

> I deeply appreciate the spirit which prompted your message of yesterday. As we made clear in the Security Council, the existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons in Cuba and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons.
>
> In your message, in your statement, to the Security Council last night you made certain suggestions and have invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured.

Then further,

> At the same time a very brief message—we would not have described it as a letter—went to the Soviet foreign office through our embassy in Moscow on the same day making the point that we had been given most specific assurances on this matter of missiles. In the face of a solemn warning by the President of the United States, these assurances had turned out to be false; that it was not the United

States that issued the first challenge in this situation and we expected the Soviet Union to take the steps to restore this situation.

KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER TO KENNEDY

Then on October 26, we got a long message from Mr. Khrushchev. I am able to read this letter on the understanding that it will not be quoted or used in anyway without consultation with the Secretary of State.

He said:

I have received your letter of October 26—

We are not sure whether he is talking about the letter to U Thant or the message that passed through the embassy which was not strictly speaking a letter—

From your letter, I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and some sense of responsibility. I value this.

Now, we have already publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his understanding of these events. Consequently, I would judge that, apparently, a continuation of an exchange of opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to that which one side has already said to the other.

The reference to a secret letter was with reference to this letter, I think, because this was transmitted to us as a secret letter.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still more, Communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We Communists are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor as a means for the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our ememy and a calamity for all the peoples.

I think I will warn the committee this is a rather somewhat agitated and somewhat discursive kind of letter.

It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together with us, other peoples as well, understand the questions of war and peace.

I can, in any case, firmly say this for the peoples of the socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among peoples.

I see, Mr. President, you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, or understanding of what war entails. What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. And that must be clear to us people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty patience, regardless of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everything sowing death and destruction.

In the name of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, I assure you that your conclusions regarding offensive weapons on Cuba are groundless. It is apparent from what you have written me that our conceptions are different on this score, or rather, we have different estimates of these or those military means. Indeed, in reality, the same forms of weapons can have different interpretations.

You are a military man and, I hope, will understand me. Let us take, for example, a simple cannon. What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive means if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But if one concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary number or troops, then the same cannons do become an offensive means, because they prepare and clear the way for

infantry to attack. The same happens with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any type of this weapon.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our means on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not quarrel now. It is apparent that I will not be able to convince you of this. But I say to you, Mr. President, are a military man and should understand. Can one attack, if one has on one's territory even an enormous quantity of missiles of various effective radiuses and various power, but using only these means. These missiles are a means of extermination and destruction. But one cannot attack with these missiles, even nuclear missiles of a power of 100 megatons because only people, troops, can attack. Without people, any means however powerful cannot be offensive.

How can one, consequently, give such a completely incorrect interpretation as you are now giving, to that effect that some sort of means on Cuba are offensive. All this means located, there and I assure you of this, have a defensive character, are on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Government. You, however, say that these are offensive means.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba can attack the United States and that even we together with Cuba can attack you from the territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has something so new appeared in military strategy that one can think that it is possible to attack thus. I say precisely attack, and not destroy, since barbarians, people who have lost their sense, destroy.

I believe that you have no basis to think this way. You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way. But you, too, will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I think that you also understand this. My conversation with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to you this way.

This indicates that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect action which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this.

We, however, want to live and do not at all want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country on a peaceful basis. We quarrel with you, we have differences on ideological questions. But our view of the world consists in this, that ideological questions, as well as economic problems, should be solved not by military means, they must be solved on the basis of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in capitalist society, on the basis of competition. We have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the peaceful co-existence of the two different social-political systems, now existing in the world, is necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable peace. That is the sort of principle we hold.

You have now proclaimed piratical measures which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have called this "a quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the scene which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these cargoes are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the most ordinary peaceful products.

At the time this was given, seven of their vessels were already on the way home, the one that I told you last time we were especially interested in.

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.

I don't know whether you can understand me and believe me.

Incidentally, also in the background, the bases were continuing to be constructed while this letter was received here. In other words, the buildup was going on.

I don't know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions. It is necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions, because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be no peace, there would also be no peaceful co-existence. We should then be forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our interests in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what would all this lead?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from the acting Secretary General of the U.N., U Thant, with his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals come to this, that our side should not transport armaments of any kind to Cuba during a certain period of time, while negotiations are being conducted—and we are ready to enter such negotiations—and the other side should not undertake any sort of piratical actions against vessels engaged in navigation on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way of the situation which has been created, which would give the peoples the possibility of breathing calmly. You have asked what happened, what evokes the delivery of weapons to Cuba? You have spoken about this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what evoked it.

We were very grieved by the fact—I spoke about it in Vienna—that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed, as a result of which many Cubans perished. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake.

This was at Vienna. My recollection was he said it was more than a mistake, it was a failure.

I respected that explanation. You repeated it to me several times, pointing out that not everybody occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you had done. I value such frankness. For my part, I told you that we, too, possess no less courage; we also acknowledged those mistakes which had been committed during the history of our state, and not only acknowledged but sharply condemned them.

If you are really concerned about the peace and welfare of your people, and this is your responsibility as President, then I, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Moreover, the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war not only between the reciprocal claims, but a world-wide cruel and destructive war.

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with military and economic aid? The answer is, we have proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarianism. At one time, our people itself had a revolution, when Russia was still a backward country. We were attacked then. We were the target of attack by many countries. The U.S.A. participated in that adventure. This has been recorded by participants in the aggression against our country. A whole book has been written about this by General Graves, who, at that time, commanded the U.S. expeditionary corps. Graves called it "The American Adventure in Siberia."

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a country on new foundations. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people, but we are not interfering in questions of domestic structure, we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union desires to help the Cubans build their life as they themselves wish and that others should not hinder them.

You once said that the United States was not preparing an invasion. But you also declared that you sympathized with the Cuban counter-revolutionary immigrants, that you support them and you would help them to realize their plans against the present Government of Cuba. It is also not a secret to anyone that the threat of armed attack, aggression, has constantly hung, and continues to hang over Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond to the request of the Cuban Government to furnish the aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity of this country.

If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the U.S.A. itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden

for every people. Then too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but all other armaments, as well, would look different.

I spoke in the name of the Soviet Government in the United Nations and introduced a proposal for the disbandment of all armies and for the destruction of all armaments. How then can I now count on those armaments?

Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them, this damages the economy, and if one puts them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are for the destruction of man himself. If people do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like blind moles and then reciprocal extermination will begin.

Let us therefore, show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive piratical actions, which you have declared the U.S.A. intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand peril of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

We welcome all forces which stand on positions of peace. Consequently, I expressed gratitude for Mr. Bertrand Russell, too, who manifests alarm and concern for the fate of the world, and I readily responded to the appeal of the acting Secretary General of the U.N., U Thant.

There, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you agreed with them, could put an end to that tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.

Respectfully yours.

PUBLIC LETTER OF OCTOBER 27

Now let me comment, gentlemen, that while we were still studying this letter, the public letter of October 27 came in proposing the Turkish deal relating to the NATO bases.

Since that was a public letter we thought we ought to reply publicly, both as a matter of information and as a matter of time, but we elected to reply to this letter of October 26, but you will have observed that our outgoing letter of October 27, the public letter that I showed you last time did not find a precise equivalent in its terms in this letter.

What we did there was to try to pull as much as possible out of this letter, but to be precise about the pre-conditions for what we were saying, so you couldn't get a contract between this letter and out letter of October 27, nor indeed, between our letter of October 27 and Khrushchev's letter of October 28. The problem, I think, is

not a contractual problem, but a political problem. There was a matter which, I am sure the committee realizes, was being handled at the time under the contingent threat of a nuclear war, and we, I think, read more into this letter than was there, but nevertheless we did so in order to try to move the matter forward another step in a way that would conform to our interests.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I see the letter of the 26th while you are talking?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you.

KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, have you studied Chairman Khrushchev's speech of yesterday?

Secretary RUSK. He made a speech, I think, early this morning, the long speech.

Senator AIKEN. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. He made some comments at the airport yesterday. I have not had a chance to study the full text on that. In that he claimed a victory in Cuba.

Senator AIKEN. That is what I was going to ask you.

Secretary RUSK. And at the same time pointed out, I think, for the benefit of the Chinese who were sitting on the platform that the United States has 40,000 nuclear weapons. You see, he had made the earlier remark publicly that this paper tiger that the Chinese talk about has nuclear teeth and he apparently underlined that today.

Senator AIKEN. Apparently China took exception to that letter of October 26, if you were speaking for the socialist countires, you would.

Secretary RUSK. Very sharply.

SOVIETS ARE RELUCTANT TO MAKE LETTER PUBLIC

It is interesting also to me that the Soviets are very reluctant to make this letter public. Our understanding of that is that this was dictated personally by Mr. Khrushchev under conditions of considerable strain, that it was not cleared through the upper echelons of the Politburo.

Senator AIKEN. It sounds like a man-to-man letter.

Secretary RUSK. It is a man-to-man letter,. but was also written under some pressure.

Senator MORSE. It is obvious.

Secretary RUSK. As I told the committee the last time you cannot construct a contract out of those exchanges because you do not meet each other head on. Each was a progression of each other.

Senator MORSE. It is an imaginative study in psychology.

Secretary RUSK. It is, indeed.

Senator MORSE. Any further questions on this letter?

Senator AIKEN. No, not on this matter.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you want to go through the process of asking questions on the letter or let him proceed?

Senator MORSE. He might be turning perhaps to another subject.

Senator RUSK. I think perhaps if we could pause here to get into those aspects of the Cuban questions which the committee might want to pursue before I go into the de Gaulle letter.

KHRUSHCHEV ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR

Senator AIKEN. You have not received the text of the Khrushchev's speech this morning?

Secretary RUSK. Just a few pages of it, Senator, and I haven't had a chance to study it. On the Cuban matter he said:

> The superior influence of socialism and peace has been demonstrated in the Caribbean. The U.S. imperialists had to proclaim publicly that they would abstain from aggression. Those who said socialism suffered a defeat have a peculiar logic. The Cuban people want to build socialism. The U.S. imperialists had to be shown that they must expect a thermonuclear counterblow if they struck against Cuba. The U.S. Government had to renounce armed intervention against Cuba. This was a victory for peaceful co-existence and the policy of preventing the export of counter-revolution.
>
> The Soviet Union has made a concession, and so have the imperialists. The Soviet Union wanted to protect Cuba from aggression: this aim has been achieved. With the Cuban people, the Soviet Union made the United States abstain from aggression on Cuba.
>
> The Soviet Union has never intended to launch a thermonuclear attack on the United States. It does not matter where the rockets are located. They can be used with equal prospect of success wherever they are.

Senator AIKEN. What was that last statement?

Secretary RUSK [reading]:

> The Soviet Union has never intended to launch a thermonuclear attack on the United States. It does not matter where the rockets are located. They can be used with equal prospect of success wherever they are.
>
> The United States has 40,000 nuclear charges and bombs. The USSR also has more than enough. The consequences of nuclear and thermonuclear war would last for many generations. The capitalists would perish. But would the socialist countries win? Marxist-Leninists cannot imagine the building of socialism on such devastated and poisoned ground. I want to give away a secret: Our scientists have tried out a 100-megaton bomb. Such means are at the disposal of man. Such means can be used only outside Europe.

It is an interesting paragraph.

DEPARTURE OF SOVIETS FROM CUBA

Senator MORSE. In your letter of the 26th, Mr. Secretary, there are many significant comments. His comment about the Russians in Cuba, I think, is a very important handle to take hold of in support of the position you took the other day; after all, we have made very clear that the threat to the United States including not only missiles but other threats were conditions that would have to be met before we were bound not to protect our security by an invasion, if necessary.

Secretary RUSK. After we got the commitment on the bombers, and they started moving out, we have been pressing continuously on the additional military personnel. I told the committee the last time that our traffic continues but it is not continuing at the rate we would like to see and that is the present issue we are now pushing with the Soviet Union.

Senator MORSE. Do you have any questions on Cuba now?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I do.

WHAT WAS OUR MISTAKE?

If we did not participate in the landing, invasion, and did not promise coverage, what was our mistake that we have been apologizing for?

Secretary RUSK. At the time I said to this committee that any action of this type and scale cannot realistically be conducted as a covert operation. Looking back on it in retrospect, I think we were guilty of being too optimistic about it—what would happen in Cuba if this particular landing occurred, and that the purely refugee aspect of it, the covert aspect of it was something that we in any event would be responsible for. Therefore, our decision ought more clearly to have been at that time, in retrospect, Senator, either not to do it or do it all the way.

Senator LAUSCHE. You see here Khrushchev says, "I spoke about it in Vienna that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed as a result of which many Cubans perished. You"—that is the President—"yourself told me then that this had been a mistake."

Secretary RUSK. The President had said that to our own people.

Senator LAUSCHE. I know. But what was the mistake if we were not participants.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we were not participating against the island with our own armed forces directly, but the mistake was to have as much responsibility for it as we did, and either misjudged the situation on the island or failed to follow up.

SEA AND AIR COVERAGE TO THE INVASION

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, [Allen] Dulles appeared before our committee and told us about the training of these refugees at Guatemala. Let me ask: Was there a time, as far as you know, either during the Eisenhower or the Kennedy administration, in which we did contemplate giving them sea and air coverage?

Secretary RUSK. That was always one of the alternatives, and this was looked at in the Kennedy Administration, as it, I think, had been looked at at one time in the Eisenhower Administration.

But let me make this remark, Senator, on that point. I think there was another mistake that was made. We in Washington understood that this brigade was determined to go into Cuba, and that the brigade itself said that if we do run into any serious trouble we will immediately move into guerrilla type action, therefore we are not concerned about just what might happen at the beachhead.

Now, when the time came, apparently much to our amazement and surprise, we were then informed by the brigade leadership that they had not been trained for guerrilla action, therefore, they could not undertake that course of action. I mean this again was one of the elements of mistake made.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was the equipment of war which they had supplied by our Government?

Secretary RUSK. It was supplied by a number of governments and also from the private services in some instances.

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Senator LAUSCHE. Then there was in contemplation, two courses, one not to give them air and sea cover, and the other to give it to them?

Secretary RUSK. There were several alternatives that were looked at, of course. One was to call the whole thing off, and do everything we could to prevent it from occurring.

Another was to let it go forward on the basis that the brigade itself had fully understood and on the basis of its own assurances if they got ashore that the Cuban people would begin to take things into their own hands promptly. Indeed, they had information that particular commanders in different parts of the island would in effect defect at that point, which turned out not to be possible or true whichever the situation was on the spot.

The third would be just on the basis of the brigade itself to move in with U.S. forces.

I think had there been widespread significant disorders on the island, that we almost certainly would have had an appeal from important Cuban elements in the island to come to their assistance; that might have changed the situation on that particular judgment at that time.

Senator LAUSCHE. My understanding was it was felt, if the invasion showed some signs of success, that there then would have been revolt and uprising, but since there was no sign of success all of those who were ready to rise up went for cover.

Secretary RUSK. This was a question of timing and also a question of security ahead of time.

NO U.S. FORCES WOULD TAKE PART

Senator LAUSCHE. When was the decision finally made not to give them air or sea cover?

Secretary RUSK. That was made substantially before any operation, anything was done at all. In other words, this was the understanding from the beginning in terms of anything that was actually done with respect to the invasion itself.

In other words, no overt act was taken by anybody in relation to this invasion or its preparation or movement of the brigade or anything of that sort except on the understanding that U.S. forces were not going to take part.

Senator LAUSCHE. What were our ships doing out there? What was their part in the matter?

Secretary RUSK. We had, as I recall, certain naval vessels in the Caribbean, who were prepared to relay information if the other side's air cover, for example, discovered these forces before the actual landing. There probably would have been an abort of the invasion plans had they been discovered by Cuban air. Our vessels were in the Caribbean anyhow in that general area, but they were there on station some distances from Cuba to give a radar screen to the forces coming in.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you know whether or not our ships there were in communication with these troops when they landed and were telling them what to do?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do not believe that this point which was reported involved any U.S. naval vessels. You see, there were

several vessels with the brigade that stood offshore; there were some supply vessels, for example, and there was a communications vessel, and I think that must have been referring to one of those vessels.

Senator LAUSCHE. My recollection is that this man who wrote this story states that they were in contact with United States ships and that the United States ships told them exactly what to do, "Move forward. Wait. Wait," and this piece rather vividly and pointedly says that they were waiting for the coverage and never got it. I am not going to question on this further.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator——

Senator MORSE. Did you want to say something, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. I just wanted to say I am not clear on every exact detail because I simply have not refreshed my memory on this episode for a year now, but I could look into any precise points you wished me to look into.

COVERT SUPPORT

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. If we did not have participation or a guilty feeling why did our Government go to the extent of getting together $50 million worth of goods to buy these men out for ransom?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it is one thing to commit the U.S. armed forces in uniform overtly into an undertaking of this sort, and another thing to support it and know about it and wish it well covertly. I mean one of the great mistakes that was made that we did not sufficiently appreciate that you cannot undertake an operation of this scale covertly.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it fair to assume there is a feeling of guilt and that we did have an obligation to these 1250 men to get them ransomed, because of what we did?

Secretary RUSK. I feel it, Senator, because I feel that I could have stopped it had I wanted to and, therefore, I was glad to see these prisoners come out of Cuba, I will tell you very frankly. Whether you call it guilt or not, I would say the most unfortunate thing about it was that it was a failure. I don't think we need any feeling of guilt so far as Castro is concerned.

Senator LAUSCHE. Oh yes, I agree, once having tolerated it we should never have permitted it to fail.

Senator AIKEN. Did you say you could have stopped it?

Secretary RUSK. I think the United States Government could have stopped it, yes.

Senator AIKEN. They did stop it the first of November, 1960, when they first wanted to attack?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the brigade apparently had on several different occasions wanted to do things that they were not fully trained for.

Senator AIKEN. I think they planned to invade about four or five days before the election of 1960 which was a heck of a time for an invasion, in my opinion.

Secretary RUSK. In all candor, I would simply have to say that the United States Government could have stopped it.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead, I yield.

ULTIMATE SOURCE OF EQUIPMENT

Senator WILLIAMS. You said that equipment was supplied by several countries. What other countries participated in arming these men other than ourselves?

Secretary RUSK. Guatemala, Nicaragua, I think Costa Rica; I would have to recheck this, Senator.

Senator WILLIAMS. It was my understanding that the equipment that they furnished to them in turn came from us, and some of it we siphoned through those countries but in reality it was all our equipment anyway.

Senator RUSK. I think the ultimate source of the equipment was the United States under our various military assistance programs, but there was some assistance furnished that had not been furnished specifically for the brigade.

Senator WILLIAMS. Predominantly it was U.S. equipment?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator WILLIAMS. Who furnished the vessels? Were they American vessels?

Secretary RUSK. I am not sure under what flag they were sailing, but they were leased or bought as a part of the general undertaking.

Senator WILLIAMS. In other words, we were furnishing the bulk of the equipment and means for getting it over there.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct. I would not deny that, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Is it true, Mr. Secretary, that a large portion of the equipment was collected and furnished to this refugee group while the Eisenhower Administration was still in office?

Secretary RUSK. A considerable, very considerable part of it was, and the whole training program was laid on then, and it was organized as a brigade in 1960 with this kind of possibility in mind.

A JOINT ENTERPRISE OF TWO ADMINISTRATIONS

Senator MORSE. As far as the White House is concerned, looking back it in retrospect, this, in fact, was a joint enterprise of two White House administrations.

Secretary RUSK. I think the idea, the organization, training of the brigade, the equipment, those things were participated in by two administrations through the covert channels. But when you get to the actual point of the Bay of Pigs only one administration was in position to make the decision.

Senator MORSE. I understand, the Kennedy Administration was in power. I don't want to spend more time on it. But it may be that a good purpose can be served by this committee going further into the problem.

Secretary RUSK. I think there is one thing, Senator, that gave us great distress at the time in terms of what was wise to do, and this has been borne out by the conduct of the brigade in prison and since they have returned. They were utterly determined to go to Cuba, utterly determined, and the consequences of saying to this brigade, "Just disband and go and get jobs," and that sort of thing,

were considered to be very bad in terms of the whole morale of the entire anti-Castro Cuban community everywhere, and I think, this perhaps was valued too highly in terms of taking a realistic assessment of exactly what could surely be accomplished under all the circumstances.

But the real fire in this, the real drive in it came out of that brigade. It was an astonishing thing to see how this operated at the time.

A CIA PROGRAM

Senator MORSE. I don't want to argue the point or go into it at length, but I want to make this observation, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin America, I have held to the point of view that there was a very close working relationship between the CIA and the refugees, the exiled group, as far as covert program was concerned.

We faced the fact that it was part of a covert program of our government over a period of many months. I am speaking off the top of my head, but I think the record is correct that the testimony disclosed that in the neighborhood of $40 million were spent on this project by the Eisenhower Administration and somewhat better than $5 million by the Kennedy Administration in its final execution, but I have always felt, Mr. Secretary, that the evidence was pretty clear that this was pretty much a CIA program. That is water over the dam.

I am concerned about another matter which at some future date I think you ought to discuss with the full committee or my subcommittee and that is this whole problem of our relationships with the refugees in this country and what can be done to see to it that under existing treaties, binding upon the United States, we are not confronted some day with a course of action on the part of the refugees that is going to embarrass us with our Latin American allies. One of the points raised in conversations with me by ambassadors from Latin America and by executives of Latin America when I am down there is their concern that the exiles in this country are going to follow a course of action that is going to make a very embarrassing situation for them and they are going to be called upon to give support to some precipitous action on the part of some group of refugees that we don't keep under control.

KEEP REFUGEES UNDER CONTROL

I am all for giving them sanctuary and all for giving them help consistent with our treaty obligations. I am not sure, Mr. Secretary, that this committee is fully apprised as yet as to what steps are being taken by our government to keep these refugees under some reasonable check and control. Under international law my curbstone opinion is that, if we permit a group of exiles in our country to follow an aggressive course of action against a Communist state or any other state and tolerate it, we implicate ourselves and we may very well find ourselves in the next Latin American conference comparable with Punta del Este in an embarrassing situation.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think we have, with the full understanding of the other American states, taken the view that at this stage we should not encourage or permit wholly fruitless mosquito bite kind of things that cannot contribute to anything.

For example, the Alpha 66 millimeter shots at a hotel accomplishes nothing. In the whole, on a system we are discussing, where do we go from here?

One interesting development, Senator, I think will be of great interest to the committee, the non-Communist liberal or even non-Communist left in Latin America is taking a very keen interest now in what can be done about Castro—People like Bosch, Betancourt, Figueres,[2] indeed, the present Government of Costa Rica—and this is having its effect internally in a number of countries.

I just got a message this morning that the La Paz teachers union has ousted the Communist leadership by a vote of five to one. That teachers union has been under Communist control for years.

If the non-Communist left gives some serious thought to this, they also have resources in Cuba and this might open up some very interesting possibilities along with the moderates and conservatives.

A GREAT DIPLOMATIC ACHIEVEMENT

Senator CHURCH. I suppose it is part of our function here to be skeptics and that is frequently the character of the dialog between us.

Secretary RUSK. Please.

Senator CHURCH. But I want to depart from that role and also depart from the Bay of Pigs for a moment to say to you that I think we all appreciate that we have come through as perilous a crisis as has ever confronted the country because it involved the imminent possibility of an all-out nuclear war, and the most sobering confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and I, for one, feel that the President and his advisers, of which you were a principal among them, handled that situation with consummate skill.

We were faced with a mortal threat that we had to remove. You defined, the President defined, that threat accurately, insisted upon the removal of the missiles that had to go, and did it under circumstances on a world checkerboard where the delineation was made in such form that we had not only had a queen, we had a handful of queens. I think that history is going to mark up the success as one of the great diplomatic achievements of the United States, and I just personally want to express to you my profound admiration of the way you handled it.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator, I appreciate it very much. I would only like to comment that any of us who saw the President during this period could not help but be deeply comforted with the clarity and the calm that he brought to bear in what was the most frightful decision which the President has had to make in the United States, but it was also a great assurance to him in these

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[2] Juan Bosch, President of the Dominican Republic; Romulo Betancourt, President of Venezuela; and Jose Figueres, President of Costa Rica.

trying times that the leadership of the country recognized the danger, and that the people and the leaders on both sides of the aisle showed a calm and a resoluteness that I think made a deep impression in Moscow.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed with the questions?

CASTRO SHOULD BE REMOVED

Senator MORSE. Let me make this one observation.

I simply want to share Senator Church's comments and associate myself with them, and I want to say that I think the work that you did in that crisis in support, the right arm of the President, will go down in history as a great monument to you. I think you did a magnificent job. I am very proud of you for it and if Frank would permit this additional statement, Bosch said to us the other night, speaking to us on the Castro situation, on the interest of Latin American leaders and his perpetuation, said in effect, I paraphrase him, "One of the great problems is this man's longevity, that the longer he stays in power the greater tendency there is in other Latin American areas for leftists to say, 'Well, you see you can survive,' and you have got to weather this storm, you have got to wait it out and you can survive and eventually we will have our revolutionary victory," and that is why Bosch said to us, "We think it is so important that at the earliest possible date Castro be removed."

NEGOTIATIONS APART FROM THE LETTERS

Senator LAUSCHE. I am directing your attention to this communication of the 26th sent by Khrushchev, and having listened to you reading it I cull from it the following that is important from the standpoint of an agreement.

> If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the U.S.A. itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba evidently would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armament would disappear.

Now, going on to the next page, there is this further statement:

> Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose we for our part will declare that our ships bound to Cuba will not carry any kind or armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

May I ask whether there were any negotiations carried on between the 26th and 27th separate and apart from the letter that the President wrote in answer to the letter?

Secretary RUSK. There was the public letter of the 27th from the Soviet Union about NATO bases and the White House statement of the 27th on that particular letter.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Well now, then, on the 27th the President writes, I am not going to read the whole letter, "Assuming this is done promptly——

Secretary RUSK. Senator, would you excuse me just a moment, Senator Morse, I have a full copy of President de Gaulle's press conference, you might want a full copy.

Senator MORSE. The President has called me and I have got to go.

Secretary RUSK. I have other copies here. Excuse me.

ANSWERING KHRUSHCHEV'S PROPOSAL

Senator LAUSCHE. In the letter of the 27th the President states to Khrushchev:

> You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United States observation and supervision and undertake with suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba. We, on our part, would agree upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a), to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba, and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

I assume that these two paragraphs, identified by the figures, one and two, are reflective of what you thought answered the proposal, the President thought answered the proposal, of Khrushchev for the solution of the problem?

Secretary RUSK. But only reflective, Senator, would you mind just reading the sentence in which the October 26th letter is referred to there at the top of the paper you have?

Senator LAUSCHE [reading]:

> I have read your letter of October 26 with great care and welcome the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable under the effective United Nations arrangements.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think there also was a reference there too "along the lines of your letter of October 26."

Do you see that phrase there? In other words, we knew perfectly well that this letter of ours of October 27 did not meet Khrushchev's letter that I read to the committee this morning in any exact terms. We added conditions to it, and there were other things that we could not accept.

For example. Khrushchev said to us later that since he had told us that any arrangements would depend upon Castro's agreement, and since Castro had not agreed, that that relieved him of his obligations about on-site inspection and things of that sort. Those are basic conditions with us and we were not able to——

DID NOT REACH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING

Senator LAUSCHE. Let's assume that the letter of the 27th and the letter of the President, and the letter of the 26th of Khrushchev did not reach a common understanding, that is the position taken by the Department.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. On the letter of the 28th again written by Khrushchev he states:

> I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962 that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba and not only on the

part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappeared. This in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

It is my understanding that there is another letter that the President wrote in reply to this letter of the 28th, may I see that? Doesn't that say specifically by the President—this is a letter of President Kennedy to Khrushchev dated October 28 and I will read the second paragraph.

Secretary RUSK. That was made public on the same day.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

"The distinguished efforts of acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks," this is the President speaking, "I consider my letter to you of October 27 and your reply of today,"—that is the letter of the 28th—"as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out."

I stop at that point. Doesn't this letter of the 28th state specifically that the President considered his commitment of no invasion, no toleration of other nations in the Western Hemisphere making an invasion as a firm commitment?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, just as the letter of October 27 from President Kennedy to Khrushchev was not on all fours with Khrushchev's letter of October 26, neither was Khrushchev's letter of October 28 exactly on all fours with our letter of the 27th. In other words, this understanding was more political than legal, and it was at a point where the primary objective was to get these missiles, these bombers out of Cuba.

Now, you would have to read, I think, in connection with this exchange, the letter which was sent by the Soviet Union and the United States by Secretary General U Thant the other day pointing out that it had not been possible to reach agreement on all of the elements involved in this situation and also you will note when the full text is available that Khrushchev in his Berlin speech today did not claim that he had an unequivocal, unconditional commitment with respect to Cuba from President Kennedy.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Now then, getting to another point——

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir.

SOVIET STRENGTH IN CUBA

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. How many technicians and troops of the Communists were in Cuba before the ground-to-air missiles were delivered, if you can answer?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to give an approximation, I would say in the order of 4 or 5,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. And there are now about 17,000?

Secretary RUSK. The 17,000 has been an increase based upon more recent estimates which fill out the tables of organization of units that we have identified as being there.

Senator LAUSCHE. So there are now 12,000 more Communist troops and technicians in Cuba than there were, I think, last August?

Secretary RUSK. Say, in August, to the best of our information.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many Russian MIGs and supersonic planes do we understand to be there now?

Secretary RUSK. I think MIGs on the order of about 70 of all categories. About 30, I think, are the MIG-21's.

Senator LAUSCHE. Those MIG's are capable, and supersonics are capable, of carrying atomic warheads and dropping them just as we dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, they have that technical capability.

Senator LAUSCHE. And they have——

Secretary RUSK. Just as our fighters of the same category have.

Senator LAUSCHE. Last week you testified that you believe there are no missiles now in Cuba and no atomic or hydrogen warheads, but you cannot say positively they are not there?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. I would not attempt to say to this committee that we are 100 percent certain that there is none of this there.

Senator LAUSCHE. When were the MIGs and these supersonic planes delivered into Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. In the period from July to October.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. So that since last July they have 70 planes of Russia newly there.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. Whether all 70 had come in since July or whether some had come in earlier I am not certain, but this is approximately correct.

POSSIBILITY OF ERROR

Senator LAUSCHE. With the inference that there are no warheads nor missiles there, there is, of course, the possibility of error in your information and deductions?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. We did make an error in evaluating the air strength of Cuba prior to the invasion at the Bay of Pigs.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, that was a matter of a number of planes you could count on your fingers at that point.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, that is upsprung more planes than we thought were there.

Secretary RUSK. Than we had seen, yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't our position worse now than it was last August or last July in Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that is correct so long as we have up to 17,000 Soviet military personnel left on that island, yes, sir. That is in terms of what is there on the island, from that point of view the situation is worse. I think what has greatly changed has been the position of Castro in Cuba and throughout the hemisphere and the attitude of the hemisphere toward Castro. That has gone through a major change in this situation and I think will prove to be far more decisive than the actual military personnel.

ISOLATION OF THE CASTRO REGIME

Senator LAUSCHE. What is our program for the future, that is, is there going to be a right or a firm effort made to economically bring them down?

Secretary RUSK. The President made it clear when he visited members of the Cuban brigade that our purpose and objective must be the removal of the Castro regime from Cuba.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. That is not easy. On these questions it is going to take time and difficulty, but in the short run, now, we are working on that, as complete an isolation of the Castro regime as we can from the rest of the free world.

For example, free world shipping which was running about 72 a month, say back in August and September, is now down to 21.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And most of those are on long-term charter to the bloc and we have been making considerable headway on that. Trade has similarly dropped very rapidly between the free world and Cuba.

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to express my judgment that the prime thing was to avoid an all-out involvement with missile and bomb fights. Now, on that I realize the gravity of the problem that you mentioned.

Secretary RUSK. Right, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all that I have on Cuba.

CLARIFICATION OF REMARKS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I would like to clarify that answer. Would it be proper to quote you as saying that you think our conditions in Cuba are worse than they were?

Secretary RUSK. I was thinking more with respect to the presence of Soviet military personnel, but I immediately said after that——

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but confusion can come from that. What we really are concerned about is our over-all situation, isn't it?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Regarding Cuba, do you think it is worse now than it was last year?

Secretary RUSK. No, that is why I mentioned the other. I hope that a single sentence in an executive session would not be taken out of context.

The CHAIRMAN. It can be.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. Let me clarify it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it ought to be clarified.

Secretary RUSK. There has been a remarkable demonstration of the unity of the hemisphere with respect to Castro and this threat from the island.

The CHAIRMAN. Which you didn't have before.

Secretary RUSK. Which we didn't have before, and particularly in NATO we didn't have before. There has been a sharp reduction in the stature, the prestige and the danger from Castro as such in the hemisphere. His own prestige in the island has suffered. There are tensions between Castro and Moscow from which I think, we have

not heard the last. He apparently, even now with Khrushchev in East Germany, is trying to straddle the Chinese-Moscow dispute, which is something that will not be to Khrushchev's liking at all.

There are very important political and economic gains since August, but on the specific presence on the island of Soviet military personnel that is different.

CONVINCING THE SOVIETS OF AMERICAN RESOLVE

The CHAIRMAN. But wouldn't you go further and say that as a result of this confrontation, which really was a kind of testing, that this has convinced the Russians that this country is not going to be lax in standing up for its rights and it has had a very substantial effect on Khrushchev's attitude, not only here but everywhere as far as the seriousness of toying with nuclear weapons?

Secretary RUSK. I think I covered some of those byproducts at the last meeting, for example.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't want us to say we are worse off now than we were before. You can say there are more troops now than last year, but I think it is an insignificant debit in relation to overall.

Secretary RUSK. I thought the situation was related with respect to the question of troops on the island. But I did at the last time speak of other items, the great impact of this on other nonaligned countries and substantial shifts in their attitude and a good many positive elements.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think it must be conceded that the psychological impact on the Western Hemisphere and the people around the world has been good.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. I just think this ought not be lost sight of in face of what you said, that we were worse off now than we were before. I think that letter of the 26th, it is discursive, it is difficult to pin it down, but it reveals a concern about precipitating a war more clearly and positively than anything else I have heard him say or write.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I would put it this way: The Russians are stronger in Cuba than they were a year ago, although perhaps not as strong as they were three months ago. However, I hope that we can deal with these international crises and situations without getting involved with the politics. I don't want to be forced into a position of pointing out the very bad situations which I know exist in order to counteract expressions of undue optimism which don't exist from somebody else. I think it is important that we don't get this whole international situation, and I am willing to tell the President so, too, in a position where perhaps part of us have to say things we don't want to to counteract things and to bring the facts before the public generally.

OPPOSITION TO SENDING TROOPS TO VIETNAM

There has been a trend toward real political involvement. I have seen the earmarks of it, and if I had the correct solution to the Cuban question, I would feel more free to criticize what has gone on. But I think we should worry about the next country, and there

is one, that could be another Cuba, to deal with that before it happens.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator, this is the important part of it because prevention is so much easier than cure.

Senator AIKEN. I am not satisfied with the Vietnam situation and unless I am pushed I don't publicize it, but I don't like the idea of our sending combat troops in there, but they are on their way.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions, Senator Williams?

Senator LAUSCHE. Not on the Cuban situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman, any more on Cuba?

What would you like to hear?

DE GAULLE AND THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I think the committee might be interested in hearing a brief discussion of de Gaulle and the European situation because this is going to be very much in the headlines for the next several days.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed.

Secretary RUSK. We have had for, well, since he came into office, some very serious probelms in knowing how to work effectively with President de Gaulle.

In 1958 he proposed to President Eisenhower, for example, that there be constituted a formal structure, tripartite structure, of the U.S., U.K. and France, which would establish a special relationship as the leadership of the free world constituting a sort of a directoire of the free world. President Eisenhower, at that time, offered him the maximum consultation, offered to reinforce our embassy in Paris or in London or invite them to do the same in Washington, to facilitate the most continuous and broadest consultation on every conceivable subject in order that our three governments could work a little more closely together.

But what President Eisenhower felt he could not do and what we feel we could not do is constitute a formal structure of three countries and say to the rest of the world, "We are the chancellors-in-chief of the free world and everybody else is in a secondary position."

Now, General de Gaulle did not accept these counterproposals in 1958 because he is more interested in the structure and form than he is in the substance of consultation, I make that one point. Secondly, General de Gaulle is a man who has seen his country live through a traumatic experience during his own lifetime. No one who was a great patriot as he was could live through the event, perhaps, of the beginning of World War II and not come away deeply scarred by the loss of the morale and the political integrity of the French nation.

REVIVING FRENCH PRESTIGE AND MORALE

In addition to that he has had an army which first suffered a stunning defeat at the beginning of World War II and has fought all over the world a series of losing battles, in the judgment of the army, not for France. So he has had a problem of the inner morale, the discipline and the national feeling of his own armed forces to think about.

So we can understand why he is greatly preoccupied in trying to revive the position and the prestige and the inner morale of the French nation.

But in doing so, he has tended to step aside from the main historical trend of the last 25 years, and to try to rebuild France on so narrow a nationalist basis that it makes it very difficult for France to take a part in the general western alliance and the Atlantic Community. If he had decided that the prestige of France is to be best built by becoming a leader of a new Europe, and of an Atlantic Community, this would have been far preferable from our point of view.

But over these past five years he has fallen into a position where he is abstaining or vetoing almost every important allied undertaking. He participates to a minimum in NATO, for example. We had a very important discussion in mid-December about military strategic problems at the NATO Council, for example, at the meeting of the Ministers. France didn't even speak, didn't even ask for the floor, stepped aside.

He has withdrawn many of his forces from their NATO commitments. He told us when the Algeria matter was over, that when he brought his troops back from Algeria, he would meet his NATO commitments. He has not done so and has indicated he will not do so. Because he wants to renationalize his own French forces so he has only two divisions instead of four and a half or five supporting forward strategy in Germany itself.

FRANCE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

We cannot deploy nuclear weapons in France on the same basis on which we deploy them in any other country of NATO where they are now deployed because General de Gaulle insists that he have something more than the arrangements we have with, say, Britain, and let General de Gaulle himself have sole and complete charge and command of what happens to nuclear weapons located in France.

Interestingly enough, he is perfectly willing for us to—we have worked with him, worked out a nuclear arrangement with some of his air forces located in Germany but if it is on the soil of France he says, "I am the only one to determine what happens."

He has participated to a minimum in the United Nations. I think this is to a degree understandable because France has had two or three painful problems in the U.N. and the United Nations has not distinguished itself in some of the attitudes it has taken in all these Afro-Asian controversies. He is not filling his seat in the disarmament discussions and is taking no part in them.

The NATO representation in Geneva is one seat short. We need France to help work on these problems.

He will have nothing to do with nuclear testing. If we get an agreement at the present time, it is quite clear that France is not going to take part and, therefore, he will not be able to bring that kind of an agreement to bear with maximum pressure on China, which is our preoccupation in this field.

He has taken a minimum part in discussions among the allies on Berlin. He has practically resigned from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

Now, I mention these things to show a general mood and atmosphere. But I think the most serious concern is we don't feel that we really are able to enter into his mind to understand what he is really thinking about on many of these questions. Consultation with the French Government for 4 or 5 years now has been largely a matter of exchanging conclusions with each other, not having the far-reaching systematic discussions that we are accustomed to have with any other government, particularly with those we feel close to.

No one else in his government is able to dig into these matters in great detail because they don't really know what is on his mind, so there are really no spokesmen who can speak for him.

COMMON MARKET NEGOTIATIONS

On the Common Market negotiation which is the most immediate problem, he again is in a minority of one among five on that subject as among the six, just as he is a minority of one out of 15 in NATO on the question of, say, whether or not you talk with Russians at all about Berlin.

He has a strong feeling for the Continental Europe of six. I think he feels in part that it is in that kind of Europe that France can best play the role that he sees for France and he is very concerned about its being enlarged so that a lot of foreigners, as he calls them, a lot of Anglo-Saxons——

The CHAIRMAN. Especially Americans.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Sort of affect the character of this European organization.

Now, he also is not bringing to these Common Market negotiations any flexibility on exactly the very points on which he was most insistent for France when the Common Market, the present Common Market, was organized.

Mr. Spaak yesterday pointed out in a public statement after the de Gaulle press conference that France should not forget that the six accepted a large number of special arrangements for France's benefit with French-speaking African countries, and they shouldn't be too surprised, therefore, if Britain might want some concessions made to some of the members of the Commonwealth.

Well now, he made a statement yesterday which was valuable in one sense that it showed us more of what was in his mind than we have been getting through direct governmental discussions. But also it seemed to be quite negative on the possibility of a Common Market or multilateral force in NATO or serious involvement with the New Europe and the New Atlantic Community that the rest see coming into being.

The British, and I think wisely, immediately made the decision to press ahead with their application to the Common Market, in effect to disregard or discount this press conference statement. They expected, and this has already begun to appear, that there would be a significant reaction on the Continent itself away from the position taken by General de Gaulle in his press conference.

That has occurred in Germany, where Mr. Ball on the same day that Mr. de Gaulle's press conference occurred, was talking to Chancellor Adenauer, he committed himself to go fully forward in discussions with NATO on a multilateral force and his government is clearly behind England on the Common Market.

It occurred in Italy where the spokesman said these are matters which have to be decided by six and not by one, and Mr. Spaak made a very vigorous statement.

EASY TO LOSE PATIENCE WITH DE GAULLE

Now, it would be very easy to lose patience, get mad with President de Gaulle and there would be a clear and open break in the crisis, of the alliance. I think that would be a mistake. I think what we need to do on our side is show a little patience in this situation and let the Europeans pick this up and find ways to move ahead despite President de Gaulle's apparent attitude, because I think the Europeans feel, men like Spaak, for example, feel, that if it is quite clear to President de Gaulle that the rest of Europe and the Atlantic Community are determined to move ahead, that President de Gaulle will almost certainly have to find a way to swing on to the caboose and find his own way to come along on specific issues.

Now, de Gaulle has been extremely cooperative on financial and trade matters. We have had fewer problems with him than we have had with a number of other European countries on that side of things. It may partly be that he leaves that to other people and he is content to let them work it out. He has played a very significatn role indeed among the French-speaking African countries and we are perfectly willing to leave in his hands the handling of the Togo problem. They have French troops based to take any steps necessary if Ghana should move into Togo or things of that sort. There is a good friendly and warm relationship in most of those countries in the French-speaking African communities; he is working on improving relations with Guinea. This is being reciprocated on both sides. The same with Mali. Some of these people who defected in the past seem to be coming back toward the community in a very encouraging way.

But we and the rest of the alliance do have an important problem about how to deal with de Gaulle during this period, how long this period will last, on what basis he would come back.

COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR ARMS

Now, on the nuclear matter, I would like to suggest one comment, Mr. Chairman. It has been supposed that our refusal to cooperate with France on the nuclear matter in the same way in which we have cooperated with Britain has been the root of all our trouble. We are inclined to doubt this. Neither President de Gaulle himself nor his foreign minister has ever asked us for nuclear assistance as an intergovernmental matter. They have never discussed it, raised it for discussion, at least during the present administration.

We have never said to them, "You must not have a nuclear force," so that here is a situation where if there is a disagreement it has not been seriously discussed at the highest governmental

level. One of the reasons for this is that President de Gaulle has said to friends and, on one occasion, to a high American official, that he has not raised this question because if he were in the position of the United States he would not cooperate either, that he would pursue exactly the same policy that we are pursuing. But he is determined to get on with his own national force.

Now, he seemed to reject the Nassau arrangements as applied to France very specifically. This surprised us a little because he——

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I don't know how much time you have.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to be presumptuous about the committee's time but I am available to come back at your convenience because I think it is important we get into these matters.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have more of the committee here. I feel there are so few here it doesn't warrant having you here unless the whole committee is here. It is just a question of conservation of each other's time. I have some important matters on the floor, some of them don't think it is so important. But for today we will have to go.

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JANUARY 17, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 4 p.m. in executive session in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting committee chairman) and Senators Hickenlooper and Aiken.

Jack Kubisch, AID Director for Brazil, and John Dieffenderfer, head of the AID mission in Recife, discussed the proposed program for foreign aid to Brazil in fiscal year 1964.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Symington (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; William Gaud, Assistant Administrator, AID, for Near East and South Asia; and William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, briefed the Subcommittee on the subject of foreign aid for India.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered upon an executive session at 11:25 a.m., in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, and Aiken.

The committee discussed briefly a recent article by Drew Pearson in the Washington Post purporting to quote certain things said in the executive session of the committee held with the Secretary of State on January 16.

On voice vote, and by unanimous consent, the committee agreed to the favorable report of the nominations of William B. Dale, to be U.S. Executive Director of the International Monetary Board; John C. Bullitt, to be U.S. Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Christian A. Herter, to be Special Represenative for Trade Negotiations with the rank of Ambassador; David Elliott Bell, to be Administrator for the Agency for International Development; and William T. Gossett, to be Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations with rank of Ambassador.

The nomination of Dr. James Watt, to be U.S. Representative on the Executive Board of the World Health Organization, was passed over, pending his appearance before the committee.

Senator Lausche asked that the staff hereafter volunteer any adverse information on any nominee for the information of the committee, and he was assured that this would be done.

The Chairman announced the next nomination for consideration to be that of Bill D. Moyers, to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps. Senator Lausche moved to reject the nomination. Senator Sparkman offered a substitute motion that it be approved for report. Senator Sparkman's motion carried on a voice vote with Senator Lausche registered in the negative, and voting Senator Long's proxy against said motion.

The committee then considered nine recess appointments and nominations, of which one was a list of routine promotions and appointments in the Foreign Service, dated January 15, 1963. The Chief of Staff explained that all but the routine appointees were presently at post, and that it had been committee practice in the past not to call a recess appointee back from his post for an appearance before the committee if such appointee was in the career serv-

ice. In the case of political appointees, the committee might be of another mind.

The Chairman directed the Department of State to be informed that none of the recess appointments would be acted upon until they returned to the United States and were seen by the committee. This was amended to approve for report the routine list of Foreign Service appointments only, but to withhold action on the Class Eight sections of same until a sampling of these Class Eight appointees could be brought before the committee. The Chairman also directed the Department of State be notified that political appointees hereafter would be seen, and the Department should make its travel plans for them to conform accordingly. This was not to be construed to career persons, already on post, and who had been seen before, unless a committee member desired their appearance.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

BRIEFING ON CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS

FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator Wayne Morse (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Senators Fulbright (chairman of the full committee), Humphrey, Mansfield, Lausche, Symington and Carlson.

Senator [John] Stennis of Mississippi.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

Senator MORSE. All right, gentlemen, this briefing session will come to order. The chairman wants to make a statement that this committee is in no way responsible for the news story that this committee is starting an investigation of Cuba.

As Dr. Marcy can tell the committee, when the AP, Mr. Tony Vaccaro, brought to this committee room a story from the New York Times, which I shall put into the record in a moment, and asking for a statement, I said I knew nothing about it. I said I would simply call the State Department to give us an early briefing as to any knowledge they have as to the allegations made in the story.

In my presence Dr. Marcy called the State Department and notified them of my desire to have a briefing before my subcommittee. The Secretary of State, as usual, in his spirit of wonderful cooperation with the Foreign Relations Committee, agreed to set up this morning at 10 o'clock for the briefing.

CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND THE SESSION

But I want this record to show the circumstances that brought this briefing session into being. I shall insert into the record at this time a copy of the New York Times article of January 23, an AP story, and for the benefit of the subcommittee I will read it; it is very brief.

The New York Times News Service said today Soviet forces in Cuba are reported working around the clock building and improving "highly sophisticated ground and air defenses."

A Washington-dated dispatch by Tad Szulc said private reports from Havana, confirmed in part by American experts on the Cuban situation, relate that large shipments of weapons and other materials are continuing to arrive in Cuba.

The story added:

Soviet encampments are being relocated and strengthened, and Soviet experts are directing Cubans in the construction of underground depots, hangars and runways.

The construction work is apparently concentrated in the main defense complex between Havana and the San Antonio De Los Banos air base, in Camaquey province, and in the Sierra Maestra area of Oriente province.

Soviet troops exclusively are doing the work and some sites are closed even to Cuban military personnel.

So far as can be determined the military equipment being brought into Cuba and the work being done fit the classification of "defensive weapons."

I felt that before a story such as that started to gain headway in this country on the basis that it might be authentic, we owed it to the State Department to really give them the opportunity to participate in this briefing this morning. I want to thank the Secretary for obliging us and I want to thank the head of the CIA, Mr. McCone, for coming up here. We did not ask him to come but he is always welcome and he is apparently coming up at the request of the State Department, which is fine with us.

STAFF AS OBSERVERS

I have only one other matter and I want to state this while the chairman of the full committee is here because I don't want this chairman to be embarrassed in any way because of the ruling that he has made concerning the procedure of this committee. I think my ruling is right, I haven't had a chance to talk to my colleagues but certain absent Senators who just couldn't be here this morning wanted to send their administrative assistants to this meeting, and I refused to grant that permission. It has always been my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that in our Foreign Relations Committee executive sessions Senators are not free to send their administrative assistants to sit for them and as observers. I certainly, unless I am overruled by my subcommittee, shall strongly urge that that always be the rule of procedure of my subcommittee, because frankly, in my judgment, if we ever start in this committee with all the top secret information that we handle to permit Senators, and I speak respectfully of them, to substitute their administrative assistants as their eyes and ears, at any executive meeting of this committee, we will never have any check on leaks. We don't have much anyway but you will lose all chance of checks on leaks, and that is simply, I think, a statement of reality, and not a criticism of any individual. But unless I hear some objection at this time, I am going to assume that the refusals that I have already made conform with the pleasure of the committee.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that if we acted otherwise, I would refuse to come to any more executive meetings, because they are not Senators and I don't think they are entitled to that consideration.

Senator MORSE. I appreciate that very much, coming from the Majority Leader, I think it is sound policy.

Senator AIKEN. Me, too, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is the policy of the full committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am in full accord.

Senator MORSE. I am not sure in one instance my refusal was too happily received, but I am accustomed to that reaction, too, sometimes.

Mr. Secretary, the table is yours and we will be very glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN A. McCONE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

I understand the committee is interested in the first instance in the question of the possible military buildup by the Soviet Union in Cuba. I am deeply grateful to my colleague John McCone, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, for being here this morning. I would like, if the chairman is willing, to ask him to give the committee a full briefing on the present Soviet military situation.

Senator MORSE. We will be honored to hear him.

Mr. MCCONE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss the Soviet military equipment that we observed to be in Cuba prior to the 1st of July, and that which we believe and have reasonable proof is in Cuba at the present time, which will establish the relative position today as opposed to 6 or 7 months ago.

However, I would like to preface that by saying that we have Cuba under frequent aerial surveillance and, therefore, we have reason to believe that we know pretty well what is going on. In addition we have other sources of intelligence which keeps us rather currently informed but, of course, we do not have so-called on-site inspection and to that extent we are handicapped.

Nevertheless, it is our belief that there has been no substantial delivery of military equipment into Cuba by the Soviet bloc countries since October the 24th; there have been very substantial amounts of shipping, as you know.

Unquestionably I believe there have been some military items received but there has only been one instance where we have detected a full shipload of what we thought was military equipment. That was on a ship called the *Simferopol*, which we kept under observation from the time it cleared the Bosphorous. The conduct of the ship gave us reason to believe that it carried military equipment. It docked and unloaded in Havana between January 17th and January 19th. We had it under aerial surveillance. We are satisfied that it, the manner in which it, was unloaded was proof in itself that it did have military equipment. The crates were large although they were not of sufficient size to crate an offensive missile. We do not know the nature of the material that was received. The fact that it was unloaded in an excluded area by Cuban military personnel proved to our satisfaction it was military equipment.

That was the only ship which had come in since October 24 carrying military cargoes to the exclusion of all else. Other military cargo that might have been received was incidental and was for replacement and repair.

INCREASE OF SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CUBA

Now, to go back to the situation on July 1st, as you know, there were a substantial number of items of military equipment in the hands of Cubans. We think at that time there were about 500 Soviet and bloc technicians or training personnel who were there to assist the Cubans in the operation, training for the operation, of this equipment.

The situation today is quite different. We estimate that there are about 17,000 Soviet personnel in Cuba at the present time. This number is an estimate derived from all sources of intelligence, as well as our understanding of the table or organization of the units that we have learned. Therefore, it is not based on a head count, but we think there is sufficient hard intelligence so that it can be afforded as a reasonable view of the situation.

Hence, the rise in Soviet and bloc technicians and military personnel from 500 on July 1st to 17,000 at the present time is in itself a disturbing fact.

OFFENSIVE WEAPONS HAVE BEEN REMOVED

I will go into the specifics of the increase of the amount of equipment. However, it is our opinion that offensive weapons, including MRBM, the IRBMs and the bomber aircraft capable of reaching the United States we know of have been removed from Cuba, and our aerial surveillance has not given us evidence that any such equipment remains. How, the exception to this is MIG-21 which can reach the United States, a limited area of the United States, and I will speak of that later.

The absence of penetrating on-site inspection is impossible to absolutely prove the non-existence of offensive equipment in Cuba, but the estimate that all have been removed is considered acceptable by the intelligence community.

Except for the withdrawal of the 42 MRBMs and IRBM, the 42 IL-28 bomber aircraft, and a modest quantity of ground equipment, we have observed no withdrawal of military equipment from Cuba or no concentration of such equipment at leading points which might indicate a plan for such withdrawal.

We also have observed substantial construction of various kinds going on, the most significant being construction of barracks at four locations where we believe Soviet personnel are concentrated in units. We think this construction are barracks to house the personnel and would indicate to us an intention for their being permanently quartered.

AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

We have given a great deal of thought to the air defense systems that have been created and installed. This involves 24 so-called surface-to-air-sites of the most advanced type that the Soviets have, equipped with radar and linked together with an island-wide communications net.

There are six——

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. McCone, could you tell us the range of those?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, about 30 miles, 30 miles effective range.

Secretary RUSK. And effective altitude?

Mr. MCCONE. Effective altitude from 80 to 100 thousand feet. These missiles are effective against the U–2 aircraft. There are six launching positions at each one of the sites.

We believe there is an inventory of about 500 missiles on the island. This whole system is in the hands of the Soviets. Insofar as we know the Cubans do not have access to it at all. There is some indication the Cubans are being given some modest amount of training in the communications system but none on the surface-to-air missile system itself.

STATISTICS ON SOVIET WEAPONS IN CUBA

Now, Mr. Chairman, to go to the specifics, so much is being said about this I would like with your permission to go into some numbers. I will give you first the figure prior to July 1st or on July 1st and the figure that we estimate today. Heavy and medium tanks, there were 160 of them in Cuba on July 1st, they have 380 today. Assault guns there were 50 July 1st, and there are about 100 today. Armored personnel carriers there were 25 July 1st, we estimate 165 today. We think these estimates are rather dependable because they are taken from a variety of photographic interpretation and which are reasonably good.

Artillery pieces ranging from 76 to 122 millimeter there were 400 on July 1st and there are 750 now. Anti-aircraft guns as such about the same although the number is quite formidable. We figured 800 July 1st and maybe as much as a thousand at the present time. They are, 30 millimeter, 37, 57 millimeter and I lumped them all together.

Now, in small arms we have no estimate of what there is now. We estimated about 200,000 on July 1st. We would assume that the inventory is undoubtedly doubled.

Motorized transport trucks ranging from one quarter ton to ten tons, there were 3,800 on July 1st, there are between 7,500 and 10,000 now. I have spoken of the SA–2 missile sites of which there are 24 with 144 launchers, and an estimated 500 missiles, they are on launching pads or in inventory. There are 4 coastal defense missile sites with 10 launchers. These missiles have a range of about 30 miles, and we estimate there are between 40 and 48 missiles on the island, either on the launchers or available.

There has been a very marked increase in the radar capability. Prior to July 1st there were some normal surveillance radars of a type used in most airports. There were no radars associated with the air defense. At the present time there are between 130 and 200 radars on Cuba, some of them of the most advanced Soviet type. Only the very most advanced of them, this is the only country in which certain types of radars have been employed, outside of the Soviet Union. There were some 20 or 25 helicopters last summer. There are about 100 helicopters now. There were 35 MIG–15 and 17 jet fighters in the summer. There are 106 now.

Senator SYMINGTON. 106?

Mr. MCCONE. 106, yes, of which 42 are MIG–21. There is no appreciable increase in the complement of naval ships except for a COMAR type coastal defense vessel that carries two missiles on

each vessel. There were none of them and there are now 12 of them in Cuba.

With regard to the personnel, we estimate that 17,000 personnel are distributed as follows: 7,500 of them are for air force operations, half of which are engaged in the operation of the SAM sites, about 1,000 associated with the communications, and about 2,100 engaged in the radar and miscellaneous support activity, and perhaps a thousand of them in the operation of the aircraft.

It would interest this committee to know that of the 42 aircraft in the January 2 flyover during the Castro parade that 26 of them were flown by Soviets.

The army has about 7,500 there, of which some 6,000 are in four armored groups that are maintained in units and fully equipped with tanks and with mobile guns and troop carriers and those sort of things. The balance are in command and training Cubans. There are about 2,000 naval personnel of which about 1,000 seem to be associated with the cruise missile ships and coastal defense communications.

The MIG–21 is a very advanced fighter; the ones that are there are equipped to operate with air-to-air missiles. That plane has a range of 700 miles or a radius of operation of 350 miles if equipped with its wing tanks and carrying a normal load.

FREQUENT SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA

That, in general, Mr. Chairman, gives you a summary of the comparative situation as we see it. I would like to emphasize that we are keeping the island under very frequent surveillance. We think that it is productive. Although we can't prove the negative, we don't think that they have succeeded in hiding or otherwise camouflaging offensive missiles. In the absence of penetrating on-site inspection we can't be absolutely sure of the cognizance of the rumors and the reports that missiles are there and being hidden in caves and so forth. I would like to point out that it is very difficult for an uninformed person to say for sure just what type of missile he has seen, and there are several types of missiles which I have referred to which are on the island, some of them are quite large. The surface-to-air missiles are about 30 feet long and, therefore, it is very easy for an observer to say that he saw an article that was 50, 60 feet long. Our information does not support the presence of offensive missiles. But again it is a big island.

Senator MORSE. Thank you very much.

CAPACITY OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

Secretary RUSK. Since I asked Mr. McCone about the altitude capability of the surface-to-air missiles we might just put into the record the estimate as to the lowest level at which they are effective because that has something to do with what could be done or what might have to be done in the event action became necessary. They are ineffective below approximately what level?

Senator SYMINGTON. I didn't hear you, I am sorry.

Secretary RUSK. We are talking about the capability of these surface-to-air missiles.

Mr. MCCONE. 2,500 to 3,500 feet they are ineffective.

Secretary RUSK. In other words, there is a ceiling, but also a floor under which they are not effective against aircraft?

Senator MORSE. You can come down low then.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But the ordinary aircraft guns are effective at the low altitude.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Mr. MCCONE. I am a little perplexed personally why they are retaining this complex of surface-to-air missiles. Certainly they are not an essential part of any defense of the island because they are located around the perimeter of the island, and very sensitive installations with their radar and their associated control equipment, they are essentially a telephone switchboard. A fighter bomber coming in low level could take them out with no warning whatsoever. I conclude, therefore, that the purpose for which they were installed and the only purpose the Soviets have in keeping them there is to ward off our high level aerial photography if they reached the decision they wished to do that. We have no evidence of that since the shooting down of the U–2 on October 27. They are not operated and they are kept under obviously close control.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might just add a few observations before we turn to questions.

Senator MORSE. Yes, sir.

A TACIT STANDOFF ON OVERFLIGHTS

Secretary RUSK. In connection with this last point, we in the discussions in New York with the Soviets have insisted upon the necessity of surveillance, and told them we would have to continue in any event and react if they should themselves move against our overflights. They were unwilling to accept that as one of the reasons why we did not get an agreement with them. They were unwilling to accept it publicly, but it is, I think, obvious to the committee, they have the capability of firing upon and shooting down the U–2s. They are not exercising it, so that at the moment there is sort of a tacit standoff now. That could change tomorrow morning, but they are fully aware of these overflights. They have the capability of hitting them. They are not hitting them. One of the Russians at one point, perhaps we could leave this particular remark off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

OUT TRAFFIC OF SOVIET FORCES

Secretary RUSK. Now, on this matter of the Soviet forces, you will recall when I was before the committee before, I said we have been very much interested in the out traffic and we had taken up this question in phases in order to keep the out traffic going. While the missiles were being removed we did not make a sharp issue of the bombers, but when the missiles got well offshore we made a sharp issue of the bombers.

Now that the bombers have gone, we have been expecting and discussing with the Soviets the out traffic of other Soviet forces. There has been some out traffic but that seems to have slowed down. We have not taken other steps that would seem to block that out traffic or stop it. We may be coming to the end of that chapter

because as the director of Central Intelligence indicated the barracks being constructed at certain of these installations may indicate they are settling down there.

We also have been, in connection with other measures that we might take, have been interested in the recovery of the brigade and also the 23 Americans who are now being held in prisons in Cuba, some of whom are of very special interest to us. We don't know when that question will likely come to a conclusion, but we hope in the next few days we will know about that.

SHIPPING TO CUBA

Meanwhile we have been working intensively on the further isolation of Cuba economically from the Free World, and if the committee agrees, I would like to put into the record a little table of the Free World shipping into Cuba from July through January of this year. It shows, for example, in July, 92. It dropped down to 64 and 52 in August and September. In December it was down to 21, and thus far through January 19 there have only been six Free World ships in the Cuba trade.

[The information referred to follows:]

Free world shipping into Cuba continues to decline, as following table shows:

	July	August	September	October	November	December	January (to 19th)
Dry cargo	75	57	43	54	32	15	4
Tanker	17	7	9	11	5	6	2
Total	92	64	52	65	37	21	6

Twenty-five free world dry cargo ships arrived in Cuba between 20 November and 19 January. Fifteen of these were under bloc charter. Of ten tanker arrivals, seven were under bloc charter.

Secretary RUSK. We have done this not by imposing formal measures thus far, because that could create some very sharp issues with friendly governments who at the moment lack the legal resources to move promptly to comply. But we have been working with them behind the scenes and they with their own shipowners to reduce their shipping in the Cuba trade.

We just got a report this morning, for example, that the Greek Government has taken the next step of insisting to their own shipowners that they get all of their ships out of the Cuba trade. Their shipowners come back with the obvious question about the British and the Norwegians. The British in the period from the 20th of November to the 23rd of January had four dry cargo vessels and seven tankers. That is a total of 11, seven of which were in long-term charter to the Soviet bloc.

Now, this business of long-term charter is a complicating factor because the governments themselves do not have immediate capability of reaching out and pulling those things back.

Senator MORSE. The table suggested by the Secretary for inclusion in the record will be included at this point.

[The table referred to follows:]

CUBAN TRADE WITH NON-BLOC COUNTRIES

[Value in thousands of U.S. dollars]

	1960		1961		1962	
	Exports to Cuba	Imports from Cuba	Exports to Cuba	Imports from Cuba	Exports to Cuba	Imports from Cuba
United States	223,700	357,300	13,700.0	35,100.0	398 October	6,801 October.
Canada	13,500	7,756	31,800.0	5,000.0	8,258 October	1,393 October.
European OECD Countries:						
Austria		48	100.0	100.0	2 August	56 August.
Belgium-Luxembourg		2,097	4,100.0	800.0	802 July	622 July.
Denmark		130	700.0	200.0	374 October	51 October.
France	10,700	8,819	5,800.0	1,100.0	1,145 September	1,662 September.
Federal Republic of Germany	14,500	12,607	11,800.0	1,900.0	3,493 September	5,106 September.
Greece		2,544	0.0	3,400.0	NA	3,909 July.
Iceland		186	500.0	500.0	NA	29 September.
Ireland		1,630	0.0	200.0	NA	110 August.
Italy		141	4,000.0	200.0	1,113 August	144 August.
Netherlands	7,400	11,265	10,900.0	4,200.0	7,084 September	2,826 September.
Norway	2,400	7,890	2,300.0	100.0	1,837 September	264 September.
Portugal			800.0	0.0	8 September	NA.
Spain	10,000	7,329	4,500.0	8,700.0	676 August	4,459 August.
Sweden		773	1,500.0	500.0	715 August	2,338 August.
Switzerland		2,792	1,300.0	2,600.0	291 September	2,535 September.
Turkey		899	NA	NA	NA	NA.
United Kingdom	20,700	8,482	13,200.0	15,000.0	6,269 October	18,809 October.
Europe, other: Finland		30	300.0	400.0	340 September	3,056 September.
Latin America:						
Argentina	531	381	324.0	15.2	NA	NA.
Bolivia	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA.
Brazil	199	2,625	311.0	10.0	NA	NA.
Chile	733	814	3,414.0	10,688.0	1,938 May	190 April.
Colombia	211	1,047	NA	4.0	NA	NA.
Costa Rica	100	400	NA	16.8	NA	NA.
Dominican Republic	NA	60	NA	0	NA	NA.
Ecuador	905	37	7.9	.2	NA	NA.
Guatemala	16	184	NA	34.0	NA	NA.
Haiti	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA.
Honduras	1,619	99	287.4	17.1	NA	NA.
Mexico	1,469	907	3,464.1	215.1	401 July	11 July.
Nicaragua	227	80	402.0	17.0	NA	NA.
Panama	0	180	NA	62.6	NA	NA.
Paraguay	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA.
Peru	241	323	NA	65.7	NA	NA.
El Salvador	1	152	NA	8.3	NA	NA.
Uruguay	0	1,055	NA	762.5	NA	NA.
Venezuela	27,676	1,322	246.3	82.9	NA	NA.
Other Countries:						
Israel	NA	15	100.0	100.0	45 August	11 July.
Syria	NA	4,231	NA	NA	NA	2,407 August.
Egypt	NA	NA	6,000.0	11,600.0	NA	NA.
Morocco	NA	11,858	2,900.0	6,900.0	3,887 September	14,717 September.
India	NA	475	0	8,100.0	1,931 September	NA.
Ceylon	NA	691	14,800.0	0	NA	1,559 October.
Burma	NA	NA	0	0	7,902 November	NA.
Pakistan	NA	NA	4,700.0	2,300.0	417 August	2 August.
Japan	6,086	NA	11,600.0	24,300.0	7,397 September	33,112 September.

Secretary RUSK. I would hope to have for the committee, before too long, Mr. Chairman, some statistical information on the corresponding drop in Free World trade with Cuba. Those statistics seem to drag a bit in terms of becoming available, but there has been a corresponding drop in Free World trade with Cuba in 1962

compared with 1961. We will try to get that information to the committee as rapidly as we can.

In addition to that we have been talking with the other members of the OAS about what further measures ought to be taken with respect to Cuba, both as they might affect Cuba directly in terms of political and economic isolation or in terms of action in other countries in Latin America to interrupt the activity of agents, to counter an impact of propaganda, to stop the flow of surreptitious funds and the other elements in this behind-the-scenes fight against Communist penetration.

DIVISIONS IN THE OAS

We will probably be holding a meeting of the OAS within a very short period, perhaps a week or ten days, but we have encountered one problem that will be of interest to the committee on which we would be glad to have your comments.

On October 23 we had a demonstration of unanimity on the hemisphere. Now that the missiles and bombers are believed to be gone and the sharpness of the crisis is considered to be somewhat abated, some of the internal political pressures which governments have to face have begun to assert themselves, and it looks as though we may not get at least two of these OAS countries in any further action we take.

Since we have resolutions already on the books that can cover any kind of action that may be necessary, the question is whether we go for fresh resolutions that get less than a unanimity or whether we rest where we are and go ahead on the basis of assumed unanimity. That is the problem we are consulting other governments about today.

Senator AIKEN. Which two?

Secretary RUSK. It will be Mexico and Brazil at the present time primarily. We can't be completely sure about either one of them because Mexico has been moving, at least the government has been moving, pretty steadily away from Castro and they were one of the first to come in with support on the missile problem. Brazil has just reorganized its government. Their new foreign minister is the man who had been prime minister just recently.

Senator AIKEN. Who is he?

Secretary RUSK. De Lima and he is very much attached to this notion of an independent foreign policy for Brazil. So we can't be certain of Brazil.

But on the whole the attitude in the hemisphere has been extremely hopeful on these matters and shows, say, from September, 1960 at the San Jose meeting to the October 23 meeting of last year, shows enormous movement in the hemisphere on this issue. I just thought I would add those comments to what Mr. McCone says.

Senator MORSE. I know the Chairman, Senator Fulbright, has to go to another engagement so I am going to ask him to ask the questions first. But before I do, Mr. McCone, if there is any material that you wish to file for the record—you read from some tables, too—and you think it would clarify the record, you have the same

privilege that the Secretary had to insert in the record any material you cared to.

Senator Fulbright.

PROMISE OF AIR COVER AT THE BAY OF PIGS

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. McCone, I regret I have to leave. I wondered whether it would be useful if you could state very simply the situation in regard to this air cover. I get all these inquiries; I think I understand the situation as the President stated it. Do you care to say that that was a very accurate statement as to the promise of air cover in the Bay of Pigs?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I wonder since Mr. McCone was not there at the time and I was, I wonder if you will permit me to comment on that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is right, I forgot he wasn't.

Secretary RUSK. As a matter of fact, I think I am the only member of the Department not on foreign assignment who was involved in that episode.

The question of air cover breaks into two categories: One, there was never any promise of United States air cover.

Senator FULBRIGHT. By that you mean official United States planes?

Secretary RUSK. United States forces. Indeed, it was made very clear from the President at an early stage of the operation, that is in the very late phase of the plan, that there would not be any participation in Cuba by U.S. forces, and that this was to be fully explained to the brigade and the brigade should take this into account in making their own decision as to whether they wished to proceed with the operation and felt they had a chance of success.

I must confess—and we got information back from the brigade that they fully understood this, but they nevertheless did want to go ahead because they were confident of success on the basis of the information they felt they had from Cuba as well as from other factors.

Now, the thing that is puzzling to me is whether or not the commanders at the troop level in fact made it clear to their own members of the brigade that this was the situation. We know what was said to the brigade leaders, we know what they said back to us, but whether the company commanders or the battalion commanders or someone else said something different is something we, in retrospect, cannot know. So when a member of a brigade says, "We promised X," by whom, certainly not by anyone who had any authority to promise anything, and the evidence that we had at the time was quite to the contrary.

THE BASIC MISCALCULATION

As far as the air cover that was available is concerned, this was one of the elements which in retrospect was a part of the general mistake. There were some eight B–26 type aircraft in the hands of the brigade and those working with the brigade. I think those were piloted by some Cubans, I think we had a report at the time there was one American, Flying Tiger kind of fellow, who was flying one of them. They also had, I think, three or four transport aircraft

that would be used to take in supplies, if necessary, after the seizure of the two landing strips at the Bay of Pigs. There were no fighters involved as far as the Cuban brigades' own equipment was concerned.

This proved to be the decisive factor, because when the air strike was delivered on the 15th of April, two days before the actual landing, and there was a postponement of a strike from Monday morning until later in the day in the Havana area, the B-26s were not able to provide any air cover over the beachhead. They are not that type plane, indeed, four B-26s were lost over the beachhead from some T-33s.

In addition to that there were more planes on the island than had been nose counted ahead of time, they were in hangars. We had information later that after the strike on the 15th they dispersed planes, they hid them and indeed brought some other planes. They actually finished the actual assembly of other planes, in about two days time.

Now, this is a part of the basic miscalculation of judgment that was made as to the ability of the brigade to get ashore, seize these two air strips and then begin to operate their aircraft off these air strips in Cuba. The plan was that immediately upon seizing the air strips the planes would be based there. They would be Cuban planes operating out of Cuba, and that they would go on from there. And that is the story of the air cover.

COUNTERACTION AGAINST SHOOTING DOWN AMERICAN PLANES

Senator FULBRIGHT. One last question before I go: What do we do if they do shoot down some of our planes now, supposing tomorrow morning they shot down a couple of our observation planes.

Secretary RUSK. That would depend upon a decision that the President would make. But we have talked about that a great deal. We have told the Cubans and the Russians we would take counteraction. Indeed, back in September we announced publicly that we would make full use of international waters, close up to Cuba on incoming ships, things of that sort, and enforce that. Since then we have also extended that now to the overflights and the exact action would depend upon the decision of the President at the time. But we would have to react in some way.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator MORSE. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CUBANS ARE WELL EQUIPPED

Mr. McCone, is it a safe rough percentage, not exactly accurate but indicative, to say that as of now the Cubans have got about twice as much equipment in there, leaving out intermediate range weapons and the bombers, as they had last July?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, I think that is a good figure.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As you went through your statistical report in here it seemed they had twice as many weapons, twice as many trucks, twice as many guns, this, that and the other, in rough estimate.

Mr. McCone. I think in rough estimate. Some items are more than that; some items that were not there at all are now there in quantity.

Senator Hickenlooper. I understand, but I am just asking a rough estimate without getting into percentage.

Mr. McCone. Yes, I think that is roughly correct.

Senator Hickenlooper. From the standpoint of completely sophisticated, according to present standards of sophisticated radar, detection devices, they are quite well equipped now, is that correct?

Mr. McCone. They are quite well equipped.

FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN CUBA

Senator Hickenlooper. The report was given me this morning, I don't know the authenticity of it, that we have detected the delivery of fissionable material into Cuba.

Mr. McCone. I have no such information, Senator.

Senator Mansfield. Could you repeat that question [again] Bourke?

Senator Hickenlooper. I was given a report which I could classify only as rumor, I don't know the authenticity of it or the original basis, that we have discovered and detected the injection of a certain amount of fissionable material on three ships into Cuba and that it has caused considerable concern among the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the last couple or three days, they have been having meetings on it. As I say, that is the only information I have; I will tell you everything I know about it.

Mr. McCone. I have no such information and I don't think that any such information is in the hands of the intelligence community. I would be very much surprised if it was in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I spent all of yesterday afternoon, at least several hours yesterday afternoon, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussing among other things this very problem and he made no reference at all.

Senator Hickenlooper. Because this was suggested to me I am only raising the question, I have no knowledge of it. The ships are alleged to be the *Simferopol*, the *Mitchurinsk* and the *Angarskles*.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Subsequent information supplied for the record follows:]

Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC.

Memorandum for Hon. Wayne Morse,
Chairman, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

1. The following information concerns three Soviet ships mentioned by Senator Hickenlooper at the 25 January 1963 hearings:

a. The *Angarskles* arrived in Havana, Cuba on 8 January 1963. From all information available, the ship carried various types of commercial cargo and in addition one transport aircraft. Receipt of this transport aircraft was reported by the intelligence community through regular reporting channels.

b. The *Mitchurinsk* arrived in Havana, Cuba on 15 January 1963. This ship is known to have carried general cargo and included in the cargo was a small quantity of radioactive isotopes which we believe are intended for industrial purposes. The shipper of the isotopes was an agency of the Soviet Union known to be exporters of industrial equipment and the consignee an organization in Cuba known to be receivers of equipment and material of this nature. Information concerning this consignment which was developed by the intelligence community on 30 December 1962

came through channels normally connected with information on industrial shipments and never known to have been used for notice of military shipments.

c. The *Simferopol* was unloaded in Havana from 17 to 19 January 1963. As the Director of Central Intelligence reported, this ship was suspected to be transporting a cargo of military equipment, and it was kept under close surveillance while enroute and during unloading. The ship was unloaded by Cuban military personnel; the cargo consisted largely of large crates which we believe contained military equipment, but none was of a size to contain large offensive missiles or aircraft.

2. It is concluded that the information given to Senator Hickenlooper to the effect that all three ships carried military cargoes, including nuclear weapon material, is incorrect. One ship, the *Simferopol*, is the ship referred to by the President in his press conference on 24 January 1963 and discussed by the Director of Central Intelligence on 25 January 1963. Analysts feel that if the radioactive substance openly mentioned as being included in the *Mitchurinsk* cargo was weapon material, its transportation would have been handled differently and quite clandestinely.

(Signed) JOHN S. WARNER,
Legislative Counsel.

Senator AIKEN. May I ask you a question, Bourke?

Senator MORSE. Senator from Vermont.

Senator AIKEN. Isn't this report from about the same source that was so insistent that a buildup was taking place last summer?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, it is not. It may be. But the immediate source to me is not. It is a newspaper source to me.

Mr. MCCONE. I was asked the same question when I came into the room.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said I have no information.

Mr. MCCONE. And, of course, I will go into this immediately, but I have no such information.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The allegation was made—I asked for a copy of this memorandum and was given it—that low flying naval patrol planes equipped with special surveillance instruments detected fissionable materials aboard three Soviet vessels docking in ports near Havana within the past two weeks. If such thing has been detected I would certainly think that you would know about it through your department.

SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET SHIPS

The alleged names of the three ships are, *Simferopol, Mitchurinsk*, and that last name that is almost as bad as Hickenlooper.

Mr. MCCONE. The *Simferopol* was the ship that I mentioned, the one ship we felt came in with military equipment. We had it under surveillance.

Secretary RUSK. I think there was one incident during the movement out of the missiles where one of our planes in low buzzing the ship felt they had picked up some radioactivity. We sent additional and more sophisticated equipment over it and were satisfied that this first report was not accurate. That was on an outgoing ship.

Senator MORSE. Just a minute. I don't think you had quite finished the statement you were making before the Secretary made his last statement.

Did you finish what you wanted to say?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, I had. I just wanted to point out that the *Simferopol* was the one ship we suspected and were satisfied it brought in some type of military equipment, but we don't know what it was.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This matter having been suggested, I raised it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was that a Russian ship?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. At what height could radioactivity on a ship be detected?

Secretary RUSK. I am not an expert to know.

Mr. MCCONE. Just a very few hundred feet. But if radioactive material is being brought in a ship and with the Soviets suspecting we would attempt to detect it by means of detection devices, it would be very easy to stow the material and shield it so that it couldn't be detected.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If they wanted to conceal it and bring it in, it would seem to me to be a comparatively simple matter to keep it from being detected.

Mr. MCCONE. Put it in a shield or case that you are thoroughly familiar with.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Put a bunch of lead around it.

Mr. MCCONE. And there would be no way of detecting it at all. I couldn't conceive of their shipping a nuclear device without some shielding.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CUBAN BRIGADE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, getting down to the Bay of Pigs invasion, we have had some hearings here on that matter and as far as I know no evidence has been developed that purely from a technical point of view nobody ever assured the Cuban invaders down there in the Bay of Pigs that "American military personnel in American uniforms with American ships and commanded by American officers would fly cover there." But weren't they given every assurance that the Cuban air force would be taken out on the ground by bombing, and that at least one and probably two of those planned and programmed raids to eliminate the Cuban or the Castro air force were called off just before the morning of the Bay of Pigs?

Those were to be manned by "Cuban personnel" or non-official personnel of the United States, and the planes were supposed to have Cubans.

Now, the public has been technically told certain facts are true, but in my view, the public has been practically deceived by these statements that have come out. I base that on conversations that I have had for a long time and kept still about. I am concerned about public information on this thing, some of it I don't think was necessary to come out, but it is out on the table right now. I am concerned about it.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, there is no question at all that this was not merely a technical communication to the brigade that U.S. Armed Forces would not be involved.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. This was much more fundamental and far-reaching than that. The instructions were to discuss this thoroughly with the brigade and let the brigade fully understand it and to let

them know and make a judgment on that basis whether they wanted to proceed in that operation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But weren't they given——

Secretary RUSK. Now, on the question of air support, I don't want to offend any airmen present, but as an infantry man, I know something about the difference between the hope and the final result in a particular and limited air strike.

The leaders of the brigade knew what their resources were. They knew they would make the strike on the 15th preceding the 17th. It was apparently in their mind planned that there would in fact also be surely a strike on the morning of the 17th.

SOME IMPRECISION IN PLANNING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Wasn't it also in the over-all plan that was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for perusal that there would be a strike just prior to the landing in an attempt to take out the remaining Castro airplanes on the ground?

Secretary RUSK. One of the troubles about that is that there was some imprecision on that point at the time because apparently there was not a clear understanding as to exactly the sequence. The plan called for an immediate use of the seized airstrips at once for landing.

Now, there was, I think, an expectation that there would be the second strike and that was postponed, as the President said in his press conference.

But, that second strike, had it been delivered, would not have made a difference in the success of the operation. The first strike, the second strike together could not know about the planes that proved to be available, some in hangars, some dispersed, so you still would have had the same problem of the kind of air cover that was required in an operation of that sort, and that is fighter cover over the beach as well as persistent, repeated attacks on air fields in which Cuban aircraft could have been housed.

In other words, it was not the difference between one or two. It was the difference between one or two and many more plus air cover over the beach.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well now, the only planes that Castro had over the beach there, the first day or the second day, were a couple of Furies and a couple or perhaps three converted jet trainers, and some bombers, weren't they, and weren't those known about and calculated and counted before.

Secretary RUSK. Planes come out of Cuba more than and different than the nose count ahead of time indicated.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But I am talking about the nose count that we have had testimony on here afterwards. We have a record here of this thing.

Secretary RUSK. But the point I am making, Senator, is that had the planes that had been counted been destroyed there still would have been planes over the beach from Cuba.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know about that, I mean that is like the domino operation, if this had been done or that had been done something way out at the end would probably have occurred.

It is a speculative thing. I am talking about the practical fact on the day of the invasion when they were shooting down there, the only planes that came out and were over the area of Castro so far as I can calculate were the planes that they already knew were still in existence. Where these extra planes were nobody knew. They didn't seem to show up on the day of the fighting.

Secretary RUSK. I have got to check up on numbers, it was my impression also that some of those planes were those reported to be destroyed on the 15th.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know. We have a record here on the number of planes that came out, on the types, the Furies and the jets.

Secretary RUSK. The T-33 trainers, converted trainers.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And some converted bombers, whether they were B-24 or B-26's.

Secretary RUSK. B-26's.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And those numbers, as far as I can understand it, actually appeared in the air. Some of which did the damage, with either rockets or fire of one kind or another on the day of the fighting and the next day. Those were the ones that were in the calculations as they understood to have remained on the airports undamaged after that April 15 raid which was the first of either three or two that would be done.

CONVINCED THAT THE CUBAN AIR FORCE HAD BEEN TAKEN OUT

Now, I have no evidence that in the plan they were assured of American official participation by air, but I am thoroughly convinced, subject always to alteration of that conviction, that these fellows were told that the Cuban air force would be taken out there that morning and there wouldn't be any Cuban air force remaining to attack them on their landing on the beach and the consolidation of their positions. Then the question of the diversionary tactic at the east end of the island——

Secretary RUSK. Which did not come off.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which didn't come off.

But I think maybe in this publicity hassle we are in, in connection with this matter, maybe we are talking about two different things. Some people are talking about the technically flying in Navy uniforms or Air Force uniforms and participating or whether Cuban pilots were running planes which had been furnished by the United States or even trained by the United States ostensibly and the Cuban independent movement personnel.

But I am thoroughly convinced at this moment they were assured that there would be air support to go in there and knock out those threatening Castro planes, the ones that remained, 30 percent of the so-called Castro air force which still remained. So it could be argued that both sides of this argument are right, the one from a technical standpoint——

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that one at least ought to bear in mind this was one of several factors in which mistaken judgments were made or estimates were made both on our side and by the Cuban brigade itself. All of which contributed to the failure, a failure for which the President has taken full responsibility. The

rate and mass of the Castro buildup against the beach was faster and greater than had been anticipated to be possible. There was, as I——

SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't have at my fingertips the exact statistics on that but they got on the beach and maintained themselves for a day and a half and then ran out of ammunition, so the buildup 10 to 100, if the ten have got the machine guns and the hundred have nothing——

Secretary RUSK. But the shortage of ammunition was related to the amount of forces against them and they used it up.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sure they used it up.

Senator SYMINGTON. They sank an ammunition ship.

Senator AIKEN. They had a five-knot speed boat which was so far behind the invaders they didn't have a chance.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They sank one ammunition boat out there and turned around and went away.

Secretary RUSK. There was one ship which instead of going in in the darkness turned around and went back.

Senator MORSE. I think the ship which contained most of the ammunition was sunk by the Castro air force.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I think the situation is pretty well described in the hearings we had in May in 1961, even the failure to eliminate the Cuban air force. They were supposed to strike 3 days, they struck the first day and some of the parties assumed they had got the entire air force, but they guessed wrong.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't get any such assumption like that. There were other reasons for calling off this strike.

Senator AIKEN. It was called off after the first day.

A MORAL PROBLEM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as I know, and we have had nothing presented to us that alters this, the whole evidence is that it is a fairly reliable estimate that 70 percent of the available air force of Castro was knocked out that first strike, roughly 70 percent, 30 percent of it was left. Now, you can calculate that weight of the 30 percent as you want to, you can give a greater value to the jet trainers or the Furies or bombers but in numbers about 30 percent were left.

The other strikes were to take out those, and the statements have been flatly made here in the evidence by, I believe to be, competent testimony that they knew exactly where these planes were, and that these strikes were calculated to immobilize these remaining planes. The strikes were called off. These fellows understood they were going to not have to face that strafing and harassment and difficulty by these planes because they would be taken out. Whether or not officially uniformed American soldiers and sailors would take them out with planes marked with American symbols or whether it would be taken out by other planes manned by Cubans or mercenaries or what have you, is a kind of monkey business.

Secretary RUSK. There was no monkey business about the discussion with the brigade on the point as to whether U.S. official forces would take part in this, none whatever.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is correct. I say there is no question about that. But there is a serious moral problem involved here in my mind as to whether or not these people were given assurance that while official U.S. personnel would not participate, that is one thing; the other side of that coin being that "Never mind, the Cuban air force will be taken out. It is going to be taken out one way or another," and these fellows were in training, they were highly trained fighters.

WHO GAVE THE ASSURANCE?

Senator SPARKMAN. Who gave that assurance?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say there is no question but what the expeditionary force was given that assurance.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, by whom?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By who was planning it, the CIA or somebody else, whoever was running the show. That is pretty well established in this evidence that was the original plan and that was the plan that was called off, the last two strikes were called off the night before.

Senator LAUSCHE. John Sparkman raises a good question here. We never assured them, we never told them. Let's find out who the person was who was in contact with the leader of the brigade, who is the individual, and what did that individual tell the brigade. I merely make that as a suggestion, because it is constantly being said, "We never told them." Let's find out who the man is who did the speaking and with whom did he talk, and have both of them brought in.

Senator MORSE. Gentlemen, I want to get to these questions but I want to finish Senator Hickenlooper's questions first and then Senator Sparkman's.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't want to monopolize any more time. You have others and we will go ahead. We will get to this after a while. I merely raised the question.

Senator MORSE. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will continue that line of questioning briefly. I am interested. It is so easy to make these general statements that they were assured. There are some of these things that have puzzled me, and I would like to know by whom they were given that assurance.

Now, I noticed there in the paper a week or so ago, in fact the chairman put it in the record here in our committee hearings about a week ago, a statement by a brigade leader saying that they were never given such assurance. Did you see that?

Secretary RUSK. I saw that in the newspapers.

Senator SPARKMAN. Who was he?

Secretary RUSK. I don't have that story with me.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you recall who that was? Then 2 or 3 days ago another leader was quoted out of Miami as saying that they were given the assurance. I would like to know who the two were and what their comparative responsibilities were.

PRESIDENT CALLED OFF THE AIR STRIKE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. John, let me ask you this. This is a confusing thing. The President has admitted he called off the strikes the night before. If he called off the strikes they must have been on sometime.

Secretary RUSK. A strike.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Or a strike. It must have been a part of the plan or it couldn't have been called off. You don't call off something that has never been contemplated. I am just talking about the whole general connotation in the picture here.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would the Senator yield there?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. It is my understanding after reading the record, I did not attend the hearings unfortunately, but the strike that was called off was not an air strike covering the invasion but a strike against one of the Cuban air fields inland prior to the invasion.

Secretary RUSK. In the Havana area, that is correct, Senator.

Senator MORSE. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is correct.

Secretary RUSK. But the President pointed out in his press conference yesterday that he had postponed that to the afternoon. Now, the idea was that you would get these planes onto those strips immediately and that they would be operating out of Cuba. They would be Cuban planes operating out of Cuba. It is relevant to bear in mind that the first strike on the 15th presented us with a massive political problem throughout the world, because the involvement of the United States was no longer concealed and perhaps never could have been concealed.

The situation in the United Nations was highly explosive. Ambassador Stevenson did not have to involve himself in this particular question because it was apparent for all to see. We were faced with a situation that could be roughly compared to the Suez reaction in most of the rest of the world on this situation. It was very important at the earliest possible moment to get these planes operating off those strips in Cuba by Cubans as a Cuban matter. This was the hope and expectation on that first day because they were getting ashore, they did get the strips, and this was also a part of the plan from the beginning.

Senator MORSE. Senator Sparkman?

AN UPRISING OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am rather lost here. I recall a hearing that we had in this committee back in 1960, I don't remember the date, at which time Mr. Allen Dulles of the CIA described to us just what was taking place, the training of this force down in some of the Central America countries. My recollection is that he said at that time that the whole plan was based upon the idea that when these people got ashore and were able to get inland there would be an uprising of the Cuban population.

Senator SYMINGTON. He denied that without reservation when he came before the committee in 1961 and said that the CIA never felt that way at any time.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think we can show in the record in 1960 that was the testimony.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think he is completely mistaken.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think he was the one who, if I remember correctly, gave the testimony, and I noticed this statement.

Senator MORSE. I want to give an order to the staff. Mr. Marcy and Mr. Holt, I instruct the staff to make note of this comment of the Senator from Alabama and I instruct you to proceed to do some research on the testimony of Mr. Dulles on his two appearances before this committee referred to by the Senator from Missouri and the Senator from Alabama and report at a later date.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I also testified on this in May 1961, before this committee.

Senator MORSE. And furnish a memorandum.

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY

Senator SPARKMAN. May I continue: In the paper either of last night or the night before last there was a short news item in which President Eisenhower made a similar statement, if I construe it correctly. Did you see that statement?

Secretary RUSK. I only saw reference to the guerrilla——

Senator SPARKMAN. Reference to what?

Secretary RUSK. His anticipation that this group would conduct a guerrilla operation.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what I mean, counter-revolutionary, guerrilla activity, and my impression has always been that is the kind of an operation that was contemplated rather than one that was based upon seizing and holding territory. I may be entirely wrong. But as I say, I am confused by these strikes and calling them off and putting them on and so on and so forth.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I testified before the committee on earlier occasions that the idea was that the brigade would go ashore get these two strips and hoped that an initial success would stir reaction in other parts of Cuba. That if they failed in that brigade type action they would then resort to guerrilla action.

Senator MORSE. I remember that very clearly.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. This was an alternative which was very much in mind. The brigade had been trained as a brigade. I think its guerrilla training had perhaps not been emphasized as much as its brigade training and I think it is also retrospect likely that the brigade did not make a decision early enough to move toward guerrilla action because by that time the Castro forces had got themselves in a very powerful position at the beachhead. I testified on that on May 1, 1961.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would be interested in seeing that 1960 testimony, because I can be wrong in my memory, but that is the way I remember it. I won't take anymore time, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MORSE. Senator Aiken?

ARRESTS IN CUBA

Senator AIKEN. I have only one question relating to the past, and a couple which relate to the present. Assuming that there was no

promise to the brigade in the Bay of Pigs that they would have air cover, are we to understand that the United States Government left the decision to the brigade as to whether they would advance or not, knowing that they would not have air cover?

Secretary RUSK. That is the instruction that went from Washington to which we had a direct reply. We were told from the brigade leadership that they were to be told very specifically that they would not have the participation of U.S. armed forces in this operation at the beach or in Cuba or over Cuba, and that the question was then put to them, "Under that condition do you wish to go ahead and do you think you will succeed," and they came back and said, "We understand that and we think we ought to go ahead because we think we will succeed."

You see, one thing we got into a kind of descending circle here, Senator, was that the brigade did not have a chance to succeed unless there was reaction on the island. Reaction on the island was not likely to be stepped off until it seemed apparent that the brigade was succeeding. Now, this created a situation where the two pieces just didn't fit, and this was part of the combination of the failure. I testified before the committee in May of 1961, that partly because this covert operation turned out in prospect to be about as overt an operation as the world has ever seen in terms of flagging it in advance in terms of newspaper stories and things like that out of Guatemala and other places that immediately Castro's internal security forces moved to arrest tens of thousands of people throughout the island. I testified that it is entirely possible that those arrests immediately broke the possibilities of the very reactions that were required for the success of the brigade.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Those arrests did not occur until after the landing.

Secretary RUSK. They were arrested as soon as it was clear that the landing was taking place, immediately, you see, and I think the internal security capabilities of the Cuban regime were underestimated.

This was part of it, and it is difficult now after so much has happened to go back and recover the atmosphere of the situation at the time. I have earlier testified that there was a race here, as seen at that time, between the discontent of the Cuban people on the one side, and the capabilities of this authoritarian regime to impose instruments of control. One of the reasons for taking the very considerable risk that was known to be taken at the Bay of Pigs was the longer you waited the longer that apparatus of control would be in position to prevent that situation inside from occurring.

WHY THE SECOND AIR STRIKE WAS CALLED OFF

Senator MORSE. I am not taking time to ask questions but as chairman I would like to direct the discussion. I would like to make this very brief statement in the record for the parties to comment on; senators as well as the Secretary and Director. It seems to me that it should be said at this point that the question is not whether the brigade was assured the Cuban air force would be taken out. It was part of the invasion plan that the Cuban air force would be

taken out, but this part of the plan along with many other parts failed.

In any military operation nothing can really be assured by anyone. The real question, therefore, is why the second air strike that we have discussed this morning was called off. This is probably not the critical factor in the failure of the invasion but it is the only question that has not yet been answered before this committee. There need not be a discussion about it, but I do think the administration ought to clear up that question.

I am sorry, Senator, but I wanted to get it into the record so they would know it is still pending.

ARMAMENTS WITHIN RANGE OF GUANTANAMO

Senator AIKEN. Apparently they made the mistake of leaving some very important decision to the Cuban refugees themselves at that time. But I am somewhat concerned about the President, too, and from Mr. McCone's statement of what we believe the arrangements in Cuba to be at the present time, I would judge that Cuba has become one of the stronger military bases in the world today, even assuming the offensive weapons——

Mr. MCCONE. Certainly in the Western Hemisphere.

Senator AIKEN. In the Western Hemisphere and it has been reported, I think in the press, that fortifications, part of them in the Sierra Maestra mountains, are within range of the Guantanamo base, that is not more than 30 miles, 25 miles.

Secretary RUSK. Some of the armaments are within range of Guantanamo. We know of no actual gun emplacements that are within range of Guantanamo.

Senator AIKEN. Castro hid his revolutionists in those mountains for some years without getting caught or even found and they could do the same thing now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He was in touch with the New York Times all the time, though.

Senato AIKEN. That is right. He had press conferences, I believe, most of the time he was there.

REMOVAL OF MISSILES FROM TURKEY

But there is something else that I think may be raising criticism and that is the announcement of yesterday we are withdrawing our missiles from Turkey. The public will just think back to October when removal of missiles from Turkey was laid down by Russia as one condition for removing their missiles from Cuba. When was the decision made to remove the missiles from Turkey?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this question has been up for some time. I first talked with the foreign minister of Turkey about removing these Jupiters in April 1961.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. It was known that these Jupiters were then relatively obsolete and would become more a burden than anything else.

As far as the October 27th message is concerned, the President rejected that straightaway on the very date that it came out. But you will recall that the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, I don't

know, Senator Hickenlooper, perhaps you or any other member of the committee could help determine whether this should be in this record or not, but the Joint Atomic Energy Committee had itself been very critical two years ago about these Jupiters in Italy and Turkey and urged that it be——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They weren't very quiet about it.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the report was classified, but it did leak at the time. You can be very sure Mr. Khrushchev did not propose substituting Polarises for Jupiters.

Senator AIKEN. No.

Secretary RUSK. And this is connected with our modernization of our nuclear striking capability, with the phasing out of Jupiters in Turkey, the removal of Corporals for Sergeants in Italy; the movement from lesser aircraft to F–104's in Turkey, and the entire program of modernization of NATO forces, and it was pointed out to Mr. Khrushchev at the time that this is a NATO problem. These things are related to the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, and would not be mixed up with the Cuban situation.

Senator AIKEN. And we do not plan to substitute land-based Polaris for that?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Mr. MCCONE. Mr. Chairman, can I make just one additional remark?

Senator MORSE. Mr. McCone.

Mr. MCCONE. In the fall of 1960 I visited the bases with a subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I became convinced at that time that these Jupiter missiles should be removed and replaced with Polaris submarines, which had become operational at that time, and improved.

I made a very strong recommendation to President Eisenhower in that regard, and it was seriously considered. Whether in the fall of 1960 it was discussed with the Italians and the Turks I do not know.

It was felt, however, in the councils of the higher administration officials that it presented some internal political problems to those countries. However, it was apparent as early as that that the system was obsolete and had to be replaced early.

CONNECTION OF MISSILES IN TURKEY AND CUBA

Secretary RUSK. This matter did come up in connection with our thinking in the Cuban matter early in October in a wholly different context. We were considering, as you know, the necessity of a strike against these missiles in Cuba. The most immediate and, shall we say, relevant retaliation by the other side might have been conventional strikes against these missiles in Turkey.

Now, had we struck the missiles in Cuba this would have, except for this capability, thrown the nuclear decision to the Soviet Union. In other words, these vulnerable first strike type weapons accessible to Soviet conventional capability proved to be a drag on us at the time of the Cuban decision because we just did not know what way this thing would escalate, given an opportunity for an immediate and similar retaliation.

Senator AIKEN. I am not questioning the substitution of Polaris for Jupiter, but simply pointing out that the public is bound to tie in the Khrushchev message of October with the announcement—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, there is no question in my mind that it furnishes propaganda grist for Khrushchev's mill. I agree, I remember the argument, and I remember Mr. McCone's arguments and arguments of others that they were useless and should be removed. He has held that position for a long time, and he was very early in it, and I certainly agree.

Senator AIKEN. With the Chairman's permission I yield to the Senator from Montana.

TIMETABLE FOR REMOVING MISSILES FROM TURKEY

Senator MANSFIELD. I just want to ask a question to get this matter cleared up. Is it a correct statement to say that these negotiations with Turkey and other countries were under way at the time the Soviet Union made their proposal, and because they made their proposal we reacted in the negative and, perhaps, the decision was delayed because of that factor? I do not know, I am just asking.

Secretary RUSK. The reaction was negative because we could not connect what was a NATO problem with the Cuban business. But, on the other hand, we did not think we should delay the substitution of Polaris for Jupiters because of the Cuban affair, because we may have another crisis coming down the track here, say, in regard to Berlin. We want to get these forces modernized as rapidly as possible.

Senator MANSFIELD. Then Khrushchev's proposal did not interrupt the timetable?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. Remember Khrushchev's proposals did not even make a reference to the Italian missiles. There was some reference to bases generally in his October 27 letter, but it had no reference to the Thors. In other words, this is not the basis of any deal or agreement. It is not in Khrushchev's interest to make the arrangements that we now contemplate.

Senator AIKEN. We decided to take the missiles out anyway, why didn't we get a quid pro quo from Khrushchev? Did it look as if we were soft in the eyes of the world?

Secretary RUSK. No. If we put Polarises in the Mediterranean it would be very hard to trade this kind of modernization for a quid pro quo.

Senator AIKEN. The way I understand it, the Italians want to manufacture their own Polaris. They are not asking for missiles. All they want are the blueprints.

Secretary RUSK. I hadn't heard that, if that is so. I would have to check on that.

Senator AIKEN. I do not know. I was asking you.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Fanfani [1] did not take that up with us when he was here.

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[1] Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Fanfani did not take that up?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think so. I do not know. Do you?

Mr. MCCONE. I do not know that he did.

Senator AIKEN. I do not know.

Secretary RUSK. This would surprise me in terms of their manufacturing capabilities.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just ask the Secretary, your statement is then that the removal of the missiles from Turkey—of which I approve, don't misunderstand my position—was in no way, shape or form, directly or indirectly, connected with the settlement, the discussions or the manipulation of the Cuban situation?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Just one other question.

Secretary RUSK. You see, this will have to go to NATO for NATO approval.

SITUATION IN PANAMA

Senator AIKEN. I get disturbing reports about conditions in Panama at this time. Assuming that the Panamanian Government should change or that they should even elect a Communist Vice President—I believe there is someone down there who has a pretty good chance of being elected—that would become another Cuba. Would we permit that to proceed to the extent that armament has taken place in Cuba or are we looking to that possibility?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we are, and one of the demonstrations with respect to that occurred in the case of the Dominican Republic where, in order to forestall either a Trujillo bloodbath or an extremist takeover, we placed the American fleet offshore there.

May I, at the risk of being presumptuous before a committee of such distinction——

Senator MORSE. There is no such risk here.

Secretary RUSK. I wonder if I could make a general remark that is not involved in this area here at all?

A SERIES OF MISTAKES ABOUT CUBA

If we are concerned about Cuba, the Cuban story is a long story. January 20, 1961, is not a magical date. The United States has made a series of mistakes about Cuba. President Eisenhower and Secretary [Christian] Herter have taken full responsibility for everything that happened up to January 1961. President Kennedy and I have taken full responsibility for everything that has happened since Janaury 1961. I am not in any sense inclined to criticize President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter about things that were done or not done before January 1961, and they have been exceedingly restrained and careful about criticizing what has happened since January 1961, because I think both pairs have seen the complexity and the agony of the judgments that have to be made in matters of this sort, particularly matters which may or may not require the use of the armed forces of the United States, with the ramifications that go all over the world when this happens.

This Cuban matter is a serious question for the United States. It has brought us up to the very edge of the incineration of the Northern Hemisphere. I would hope that we get to the answers to

these questions that the committee is interested in, but I hope we can find a way not to let this entire Cuban story, from its start to its finish, be an occasion for our ripping each other apart at a time when we need maximum unity to get our job done in regard to the Soviet bloc.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I answer that?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

REMARKS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then I would suggest that these voluntarily offered statements such as the Attorney General made the other day when he didn't have to do it, stirred these things up. This thing was rather quiescent. That statement stirred it up, and I think now that it has stirred up, we had better go to the bottom of it.

Secretary RUSK. My remarks covered everything involved.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Because, in my opinion, that statement created an entirely false impression in the minds of the American people, and while I have had considerable discussion with a lot of people, as you well know, and others, I haven't said much about this thing. But I am not about to stand still and be pushed around by things that I know are not quite creating the right knowledge on the part of the American people, and that was not done by any dissident group, so far as I know of. The Attorney General undertook to come out of a clear sky and make that statement which, I thought, was unnecessary. He opened up this Pandora's box for full investigation, and I did not instigate this investigation at all.

I have not attempted to, but, you know, it is two-way street on this business.

Secretary RUSK. I realize that, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And there are a lot of things about this that are very interesting, and including Panama, which I did not get into. There are some things in Panama that I would like to talk to you about.

PERMITTING REFUGEES TO MAKE AMERICAN POLICY

Senator MORSE. May the chairman only say this, and I will be glad to hear from the Senator from Missouri. It is the opinion of the chair that what the Secretary of State has just said ought to be pretty carefully pondered by all of us who have the responsibility of being responsive to responsibility in these critical days. No good is going to be served by our re-fighting the Cuban mistake through two administrations, because if we get off here on a partisan front, there are going to be charges and counter charges of mistakes in two administrations, and I just do not think our security can stand that at the present time.

I do not want to spend any time discussing it now, although at a later date I think we should. I am disturbed about another matter, and I asked for a memorandum, to have some research done by the committee staff. I am very much concerned about whether or not foreign policy is going to be determined by Americans and by responsible people in our government and responsible organizations who owe their first allegiance to the government or if we are going

to permit a group of refugees and exiles in this country, to whom we have granted sanctuary—and I thoroughly agree they should have sanctuary—to continue as some of them are doing, to stir up foreign policy issues and work with various organizations, private organizations, in this country to scatter confusion among the American populace as to what American policy is or should be.

I am passing no judgment now. I am only simply saying I do not think we are very far away from having to make perfectly clear to people to whom we have given sanctuary, that sanctuary does not permit them to intervene in American foreign policy, and I seriously doubt if we should tolerate any longer these leaders down here. They have got about 200 factions stirring up a lot of dissension in our country, which I interpret to mean that they think we ought to go to war with Cuba, and we ought to follow their advice about it.

AVOID PARTISANSHIP

That is another matter. But I think, gentlemen, this is a very delicate balance this morning as to whether or not—I know exactly what Senator Hickenlooper has in mind, and I think he knows me well enough to know that I do not want any partisanship in this, whether it is Democratic or Republican.

Maybe some orders have to go out for some people in positions of responsibility to be responsive to it by letting the President of the United States and the Secretary of State comment on foreign policy no matter how high they may be in the administration in other departments. But that is for the President to determine.

But, gentlemen, I just do not think we would be doing anything else than playing into Russia's hands if we have a so-called "great debate" over who made what mistake in Cuba, because you will never be able to exclude a Republican administration from that analysis either, and no good purpose is going to be served. I hope through this committee we can use our good offices to try to get the sea quieted down.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I will just say that I was not a party to restirring this thing up.

Senator MORSE. I did not imply you were.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, I understand that. It has been stirred up, so far as I am concerned, and I think foreign policy ought to be as nearly unanimous as we can conscientiously make it on all sides. But if it is going to be stirred up, I am not going to back away from discussing it.

Secretary RUSK. I certainly agree with that.

Senator LAUSCHE. I concur with what the Chairman has said. He is, in effect, repeating the words which I uttered repeatedly at the time of the U-2 event. I said it is my country, my country right or wrong, and I will stand by it. But I was ridden over roughshod, and the U-2 incident was made a political football, which should not have happened.

Senator MORSE. Of course, the Secretary of State has not stirred it up; Mr. McCone has not stirred it up, and the Pentagon Building has not stirred it up. All I wanted to do was to find out what the quality of oil would be that it is going to take to calm the waters.

Senator LAUSCHE. I concur with what you said about it.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I can assure you I know no one in the administration who has attempted to claim any partisan benefit form the Bay of Pigs episode.

A STAFF STUDY

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may make just a suggestion, and this is probably something which should be considered by the full committee rather than by the subcommittee. You know we got into a hassle in something similar to this in reference to the Middle East situation back in 1957, and the committee at that time reached a decision, and the State Department cooperated with us, making the entire files available with reference to dealing with that situation. The staff did a study of it. It seems to me that if we get to this point of hassling over this we might go all the way back to the beginning of the Batista trouble, say, 1952, somewhere along there, and let the staff study the documentation during that whole time.

Here was the outcome if I remember correctly, in the 1957 staff study: The committee was satisfied, and it was agreed by Senator William F. Knowland, representing the minority, Senator Fulbright, that the whole matter just be dropped.

Senator HUMPHREY. We looked at the volumes of documents and——

Senator SPARKMAN. And nobody cared to look at it.

The staff did make a study of it, and I just throw that out as a suggestion that might be decided on by the full committee.

Senator MORSE. Senator Carlson.

Senator CARLSON. Nothing right now. Let some of the other members ask questions.

Senator SPARKMAN. Carl Marcy reminds me that Senators Fulbright and Knowland, the two who were really heading it up, spent many long hours going through the files. It was we individual members who did not spend too much time.

Senator MORSE. Senator Humphrey.

Senator CARLSON. Let me just make this point. I just asked Carl Marcy for this. This is just a summary of a transcript of the 2 New York Times reporters, the chairman presided, and it was a very interesting discussion. I am going to read that transcript on it, and I urge the other members to read it, those members who were not present.[2] It was quite a discussion.

Senator MORSE. Senator Humphrey.

SITUATION IN HAITI AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator HUMPHREY. My main concern, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, is not with what was done, because I think you put your finger on it, I do not know anybody who has profited from the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and I do not know anybody who is very happy about the rise in power of Fidel Castro, and there is plenty of blame for everybody if anybody wants to get to wallowing around in the soup; there will be plenty of blame for all parties. But what is more im-

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[2] Testimony of Tad Szulc and Max Frankel, June 22, 1961. See Volume XIII, Part 2, pages 235–70, of The Historical Series.

portant, it seems to me, is, number one, what is our continuing policy on Cuba which, I think, would be very helpful if we would have stated as clearly and as succinctly as possible. I think it is rather clear, but it means repetition.

Second, what do we do in case of a subversive take-over in Haiti which, I think, is surely probable or at least within the realm of possibility?

Third, as Senator Hickenlooper, I believe, and Senator Aiken both pointed out so wisely this morning, the growing problems of Panama which are, I am confident, being given very careful consideration in the Department, but about which so little is known by Members of Congress or by the public?

And, finally, what is going to be the future of the Dominican Republic? These are the areas that I think we ought to be looking toward. If we get ourselves fastened down into a detailed review of pre-Castro, post-Castro or the Batista-Castro era, we will be studying ancient history, and it will do exactly what it always has done before, it will result in a partisan wrangle and harangue that will not be very educational or helpful. In the meantime, none of us will really get the information we need on what, I think, and this is just one Senator's opinion, what I think are really tough problems coming up.

The situation in Haiti is becoming explosive. It is right next door to the Dominican Republic, it is just a few miles from Cuba. There are many people who worry as to whether or not they can have a democratic form of government in the Dominican Republic despite the elections that took place.

I am worried about these matters, and what I think we need is to get our government concentrating on a coordinated policy of common objectives on Cuba, the Latin American countries, particularly the Caribbean nations and ourselves, the Haiti situation and the Dominican Republic. I, for one—and I want to go on record as saying so—think it is a complete waste of time to go back over this old ground. I think Bourke Hickenlooper is right. I do not know what the Attorney General made his statement for, I am not trying to defend him. I just do not think it proves anything anyway. All it proves is that we sure got a lot to learn.

So I would hope that we might concentrate our attention under the chairmanship of Senator Morse who, I think, also made a very wise comment on the matter of the refugees to whom we have given sanctuary. They do not run this policy. They should be treated with dignity and respect, but this business of stirring up the masses and multitudes and harassing our government in the most critical time of our history has got to come to a halt.

WORK OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator MORSE. The Senator from Minnesota has really outlined the work of my subcommittee that the full committee authorized, as you remember, before we adjourned last fall, and about which I am in close contact with the chairman of the full committee. As the Senator from Alabama has pointed out, I think the full committee has great responsibility, too, and any hearing that we have

every member of the full committee will be invited to it to participate in it fully.

I have to work out with the Secretary so that we are not trespassing upon their precious time a work schedule here where we can conduct this study. I shall always call it a study, in regard to this whole matter of U.S. relations with Latin America, with reference to the Alliance for Progress and, of course, with these trouble spots which include not only Cuba but Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and, possibly a couple of other points.

The Senator from Missouri.

SITUATION IN HAITI

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I make a very brief comment on Senator Humphrey's remarks——

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. About these 3 trouble spots? They are indeed trouble spots. Panama is uncertain in this electoral situation. Haiti is the sinkhole of the hemisphere, and is very dangerous there, and we have been working on that quite intensively. It is not easy to deal with Duvalier, and find alternatives to him that have any opportunity of taking hold there. May this be off the record?

Senator MORSE. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MORSE. The Senator from Missouri.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

REMOVAL OF MISSILES FROM EUROPE

First, I think it is very instructive of the chairman to call this hearing and, secondly, I agree entirely with the statement made by Secretary Rusk a few minutes ago, although I must say I think there is great merit in the position taken by Senator Hickenlooper.

Now, on these Thors and Jupiters in Europe, in 1959 I went to England and recommended that the Thors get out of there. I agree that the Jupiters in the other two countries were in the course of going out of England, and they certainly should have gone out. I am glad to hear that they have no relationship with the Cuban situation.

PLANES IN CUBA

The question of the postponement, I think, is clear, that is, the postponement of the second strike. For the first time this morning I learned about some planes we did not know about and, therefore, if the Secretary would be good enough to put in the record what planes we thought were there and later on what planes we found were there, I would appreciate that, because that is part of the story that I did not know.

Secretary RUSK. Those predicted to be there and those reported to be destroyed on the first strike, and those that turned up later?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, any planes that turned up later that were not known to be there, that is new one on me.

Senator MORSE. I will request the Secretary to insert in the record a memorandum based upon his research, and it is so ordered.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONCERN ABOUT POLARIS

There is a great deal of talk about the Polaris. There is a book out called "The Tenth Fleet" on the submarine picture, and I hope we do not get lulled into thinking that the Polaris is the answer to everything, because we plan to put about $12 billion into it. The day they perfect underwater detection, it is going to be just as hard to detect as a turtle going across a sunny road.

Some of the military decisions that have been made disturb me a great deal. I do not want to put all of my eggs into a basket of thirty-mile-an-hour boats, especially when you get into that question, and especially electromagnetic impulses in the atmosphere. I hope we do not get into a Maginot Line of thought on that and try to sell that to the Allies. That is what this committee might be primarily interested in.

What I am worried about, Mr. Secretary, and we have not discussed that very much, because I think we have been flogging a dead horse this morning—on the other hand, I think my friend from Iowa is entirely correct when he says that it was not flushed by the oposition.

A TREMENDOUS MILITARY BASE IN CUBA

But the past is the past, and based on the figures that Mr. McCone has given us this morning, it is just as clear as light to me that the Cubans are building a tremendous military base 90 miles from the United States.

A year ago last June, they flew a supersonic bomber in operations quantities in a show. They could refuel at sea, and use these bases as staging bases just the way we plan to use bases in Africa, and so forth. They have got the supersonic fighters that are just about as good as anything we have got. I think the figure Mr. McCone gave us was 42, and they also have, he said, 160 MIG's. That is a whale of a big air force, and they have also, I think he said, 7,500 airmen who are there, and half of those might be handling these MIG's. I think we ought to find out more about this buildup, because nobody can do anything about what happened in the past—I could not agree with you more—that whatever the mistakes are they have been made. But from the standpoint of the future, especially when the Director talks about this business of putting nuclear stuff in without our being able to detect it, these are the types and character of things, I believe we ought to get into, because if they get a solid military base in Cuba, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that is something that is going to cause some apprehension.

That is all I have to say about it. It is the future in which I am interested a great deal more than about who made the mistakes in the past. This military buildup in Cuba disturbs me a great deal.

Senator MORSE. The Senator from Ohio. When the Senator from Ohio finishes, the chairman has reserved his questions, but he has a few questions.

LEAKS TO THE PRESS

Senator LAUSCHE. Number one, in these hearings with the Secretary, I would like to obtain information of what the military posture of Cuba is. My questioning in the last two meetings was directed to that purpose, and only to that purpose. My judgment is that if we are to take care of the future it is necessary to know what the military strength is in Cuba.

Now then, this is a matter of importance, and I want the chair to listen to it. I have said nothing about what is supposed to transpire in these executive hearings. Last week, after we had our meeting with the Secretary, a columnist carried a story that four Senators, Lausche, Symington, Aiken and Hickenlooper——

Senator MORSE. And Morse.

Senator LAUSCHE. It did not say Morse.

Senator MORSE. My name was in the column.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Morse's name was in the column, when Senator Morse was fighting against the invasion while Lausche and others were fighting for it.

I never uttered one word in the direction of invasion. I specifically said that it should not be. But Senator Humphrey was given credit for doing the job of keeping things on the track, and four or five of us——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was pictured as giving the Secretary a hard time.

Senator LAUSCHE. I pledge that when I come into these meetings I will say nothing to anyone about what transpires, and I have the right to expect from my colleagues that they will not speak. But if they do speak they should speak the truth, and not the falsehoods. So there were 2 grave errors committed. One, the breach of confidence and, secondly, the misstatement of the fact.

Senator MORSE. If the Senator will dwell on this for a moment, because I think it should be out on the table, is it the opinion of the Senator from Ohio that when one or two of his colleagues——

Senator LAUSCHE. I am not casting reflections on anyone.

Senator MORSE. My name was in the column.

Senator LAUSCHE. The column is there, and it has in quotation marks what was said paragraph after paragraph.

Senator MORSE. If the senator from Ohio wants my word of honor, he has it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am not asking it.

Senator MORSE. I have never talked to Drew Pearson; I never talked to anybody else, and I give you my word of honor. I want to say, and let us get it on the table, I do not know whether that was the meeting or some other meeting, there was some joshing in the Senate dining room later about some statement that I made that I had made a pledge in my campaign that I was going to speak more in this session of the Congress than I did in the last, and I told the committee I was going to start with my speech on NATO. That is the only thing that the Senator from Oregon ever said about the

meeting, it was said in good humor. I do not know who was there, and I am not sure whether or not you were there when I was kidding about it in the dining room.

Senator LAUSCHE. You and I have been kidding about that for a long time.

Senator MORSE. I am going to deliver on that. But I want this committee to know, because I do not like my name in his column, but I want this committee to know that—I remember the column now, it sort of gave the impression I was fighting Goliath—I want you to know that I had no conversation about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield, as long as he mentioned my name?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator from Ohio yield?

Senator LAUSCHE. I yield.

SECRETARY WAS NOT GRILLED

Senator SYMINGTON. I felt very badly about that column, Mr. Secretary, because when I was out in my State I made a flat denial on the TV program that the President had agreed not to invade Cuba unequivocally was the implication, you see. The St. Louis Bar put 3 Republicans, and they were all concerned on the subject and, therefore, I got quite a lot of criticism and argument resulting from that questioning, and my answer was as I have stated. So I was anxious to find out, along with the Senator from Ohio, what the facts were, and I think the Secretary knows that I have no intention in any way of grilling him.

You cannot find out about these things unless you ask. It was a classified, executive meeting. I believe the Secretary remembers I congratulated him on his forthright testimony when it was over, and I felt very badly about it. I have read the record afterwards carefully, and I am certain that he did not feel, as I am sure members of this committee including my friends from Ohio and from Iowa feel, that there was any grilling done. If we cannot get the information in here, we had better fold up this setup and start a new one.

The only other point I want to make is that I think it was said, and that I was the number one preventive war advocate in my party. I have never advocated preventive war. Based on the rapid closing of the overall security gap that we might be in, in our favor, I sure am not in favor of it now.

I thank the Senator from Ohio for letting me make my statement.

Senator MORSE. That is an accurate statement of your position.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. I came in here about 10:30. Did Mr. McCone testify about his understanding dealing with the military position of Cuba now? That is in the record?

Secretary RUSK. In some detail.

Mr. MCCONE. Some detail, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. I can get that out of the record.

CONTACT WITH THE CUBAN BRIGADE

Now, secondly, with whom were the conversations carried on? Who was in contact with the head of the Cuban Brigade, was it the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Army? Who actually carried on the talk? That is only one question I would like to ask. Mr. McCone, can you answer that question?

Mr. McCone. No; I cannot, sir, because I was not here at that time. Perhaps the Secretary of State can.

Secretary Rusk. Unfortunately I cannot as of today identify these individuals because as soon as the subject left the room in which we were talking about it, given what we thought were the highly secret nature of these activities, we lost contact with it, and it went through channels that I frankly do not know. We will try to get it.

Senator Lausche. That is the upper echelon people did not talk with these Cuban Brigade leaders?

Secretary Rusk. That is correct.

STATE DEPARTMENT DID NOT LEAK STORY

Mr. Chairman, could I be privileged to make a very short comment on some of the earlier remarks because I do want to express my great appreciation for the constant consideration I have received from this committee. I have never felt I have been put upon. Indeed, if I have any impression it is that the members of this committee are thankful that they do not sit in my chair. I do appreciate that. So far as this recent episode is concerned, I am confident myself it did not come from the State Department or the two of us here. If we had leaked it would not have been to leak that story. [Laughter.]

Senator Morse. I have a few questions to tie up this briefing. I and some of the staff have prepared these questions.

SOVIET PLANES TO CUBA

The Russians are flying nonstop from Russia to Cuba with planes capable of carrying 100 passengers, we are told. Do we know what these planes carry, and how often they fly?

Senator McCone. I would like to give you any information we have on this subject in a memorandum.

Senator Morse. Fine.

Mr. McCone. I just do not have it available. I can give you the facts on all planes that have gone from the Soviet Union to Cuba and non-stop, whether by stopping or non-stop.

Senator Morse. The memorandum will be made a part of the record of this highly classified transcript this morning.

[The information referred to follows:]

Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington DC, January 28, 1963.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Soviet Civil Air Route to Cuba.

1. The Soviet civil airline, Aeroflot, inaugurated its first regularly scheduled flight from Moscow to Havana via Murmansk on 7 January 1963. The flight by a Soviet TU-114 four-engine turboprop transport opened the first Soviet air route into the

Western hemisphere and is billed by Moscow as the "world's longest regular nonstop air service." A roundtrip flight is now scheduled to be flown once a week rather than twice as announced initially by the USSR.

2. The new route goes north from Moscow to Murmansk and from there, after a stop for refueling, direct to Havana over neutral waters of the Norwegian and Greenland Seas, the Danish Straits, the Atlantic Ocean and the Straits of Florida—a total distance of more than 6,500 miles. The route does not pass through the airspace of Western countries, but the Soviets have requested the use of navigational and weather aids from Norway, Iceland, Canada, the UK and the US. The flight from Moscow to Havana is covered in about 16 hours flying time; the return trip from Havana to Moscow is shortened to about 14 hours because of favorable winds. By flying nonstop from Murmansk the USSR avoids the problem of obtaining overflight and landing rights from Western countries. These rights became increasingly difficult for the Soviets to obtain after the Cuban crisis erupted last October.

3. Although frequently alleged to be an undependable aircraft, the TU-114 probably is fully capable of servicing the Moscow-Havana route. Maintenance difficulties, which are common to this transport—the largest commercial aircraft in use, may present some problems, however, and Moscow has announced they are assigning five aircraft to the Cuban route, possibly in anticipation of such difficulties. For the flight to Cuba the passenger load has been reduced to 60 from the normal 170 in order to carry more fuel. In addition, up to 17,000 pounds of freight could be carried depending on the fuel load. Previously the only regularly scheduled TU-114 service was on a route connecting Moscow and Khabarovsk in the Soviet Far East.

DELIVERIES TO CUBA

Senator MORSE. I am told by the staff, Mr. McCone, that the New York Times claims that it checked the story with CIA in advance of publication and that CIA confirmed the Times' facts as substantially accurate. In view of the fact that we started out this hearing this morning by putting that Times story in the record, I would like to ask you that question for whatever comments you want to make.

Mr. MCCONE. It is my understanding that some, but not all, of the actual figures in that story were checked. Some of them were erroneous, and they were so advised. The manner in which the article was headlined and the lead sentences, were misleading as much as they would give the impression that the delivery was taking place currently or over the last two or three months; whereas, as I testified earlier, the deliveries took place between the first of July and October 24, the date of the quarantine, and there has been only one ship that has gone out and delivered military equipment in quantity since that time.

Senator MORSE. It seems to me your testimony earlier given itself shows in some respects that the story did not have the facts accurately stated.

INTELLIGENCE REGARDING CUBA

Mr. Director, in general terms, and we are not asking you to be specific, what sources of intelligence does the United States have in regard to Cuba other than aerial photography and refugees?

Mr. MCCONE. [Deleted].

Senator MORSE. There are some anti-Castro underground movements in Cuba with which we maintain close intelligence contact?

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct, and there is recent information reported as recently as today, that there is considerable agitation in some of these underground movements within Cuba; there are riots and discontent and an expression of discontent by dissident groups.

We had a report yesterday, a report that there were 21 people executed in a particular area. We are inclined to believe that that report is authentic in view of the fact that we know that that was a dissident movement.

Senator SPARKMAN. You mean these were executed by Castro?

Mr. MCCONE. That is right. It comes down pretty hard on that.

EARLIER CONCERNS ABOUT MISSILES IN CUBA

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, you testified last week that most policy officers in the executive branch had been so sure that Khrushchev would not put missiles into Cuba that they failed properly to interpret intelligence reports from Cuba. Isn't there a real danger now that our policy people are so sure that Khrushchev has suffered a defeat in his Cuban policy that we do not give adequate weight to intelligence reports from Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, since I have been reviewing the record much more closely in the last few days, I will have to modify that subject.

First of all, I discovered I myself in May 1961 talked about the threat of a possible missile base in Cuba, and that was one of our deep concerns about it; and I also have learned that in terms of some of these preliminary reports that might have pointed the way toward a larger missile, supposing that came in after the judgment I referred to in my last meeting, so I do think if we have learned one lesson, one among many in this whole affair, it is that we cannot take anything for granted with respect to Cuba and Khrushchev.

Mr. McCone's agency, for example, takes every one of these news reports, rumors that come in, and immediately runs them down to find out what the basis for it is, the origin, what the substance of it is, and we try to stimulate the entire intelligence community and every other resource we have to be sure we are not caught unaware again.

MORE DEBATE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, might it be a good idea to bring in some skeptics to analyze the intelligence reports from Cuba, those who are disagreeing with some of the interpretations that the government is making of them?

Secretary RUSK. My impression is that there is the most vigorous discussion and debate in the intelligence community where there are differences of evaluation. I know Mr. McCone is very alive to this, and discusses this freely with the top policy officers, so we are under no illusion that a particular judgment is necessarily 100 percent fact.

Senator MORSE. I am a little concerned in view of some recent events—I do not need to particularize—as to whether or not there is any danger that a dissident or one that does not go along with what he thinks may be the policy of his superiors, is going to be subject to criticism if he stands up and is counted, so to speak, in some discussions within our government. I do not happen to share that view. But there are those who wonder if in the National Security Council or in the State Department or in the CIA or in the

Pentagon Building, he can be classed as a skeptic about some proposal, whether he is free and encouraged to express his dissension or whether we are running the danger, because of recent events, that if you have a contrary opinion you keep still?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. McCone may wish to add to my own comment on this. In the Department of State, one of the purposes of my morning staff meeting every day is to insure that we have full discussion and opportunity for the dissidents to express their views on policy or otherwise. I think this makes far more profitable a meeting, and I do believe my colleagues understand that taking me on is a perfectly fair game, and that they are invited to do so.

I also have noticed in reports prepared by the intelligence community and interdepartmental groups that the dissidents' views, if there are any, are usually expressed, and I do not believe there is any suppression because that would frustrate the purpose of the exercise. But there is always a danger that those down the line may feel they are not wholly free, and one of our problems of administration is to insure that these channels of thought and communication be kept open.

Senator MORSE. I know that is the case, but I wanted to make it part of the record because you have got people around here who, because of the recent Stevenson episode are of the opinion that the best way around here is to keep still. This last Alsop article, his second attack on Stevenson is the one I am referring to.

I am not interested in what those facts are, to be frank with you, because I have said from the beginning, let us assume he said all he is supposed to have said. He ought to have said it if he thought there was some basis for raising it for discussion. That does not mean he is not going to support the final policy. I do not care whether it is Stevenson or X, Y, or Z. They ought to raise all the alternatives. But once you agree on a policy then we all go on it together.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Mr. MCCONE. I would like to add just one comment to what the Secretary has said in connection with your last question. Within the intelligence community since I have been the Director of Central Intelligence, I have encouraged rather than discouraged open debate. I have insisted that estimates and memoranda be footnoted with dissenting viewpoints.

The Intelligence Board meets every Wednesday morning, and it is seldom that we produce an estimate that does not have some footnotes of where there is disagreement. I prefer to do that so that the disagreement is brought out than to attempt to adjust to the different views into something that represents a compromise. That is a firm policy I have.

DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV

Senator MORSE. I am almost through, gentlemen, with my questions. But we have heard a great deal in committee and out of committee said about the possibility of a growing disagreement between Castro and Khrushchev. If it is true that they are at swords' points, how is it possible that Khrushchev would want to keep 17,000 Russians still there?

Secretary RUSK. I think that the marriage is still basically intact between Castro and Khrushchev, although there have been tensions between the two, certainly very high tensions during the crisis in October and during Mr. Mikoyan's visit to the island.

I think that it is possible—and this is something which we are watching very closely—if these Soviet forces that were there remain they may be there to reinforce the control of the Communist apparatus, not only as between the regime and the people but also between elements in the regime. We have indicated to the Russians that if this leads to a Hungary type operation this will not be accepted in this hemisphere.

I think there have been tensions, but I do not believe that those are approaching the breaking point yet. I do not know whether they will, in fact, reach a breaking point. There has been some flirtation between elements in the Castro regime and Peiping, and this has not helped their relations with Moscow.

Mr. MCCONE. I would like to add, Mr. Chairman, that this is a matter that the intelligence community follows very closely, and our opinion as of the present time concurs with the statements made by the Secretary. I think it is pretty well borne out by not only our intelligence sources but also the public statements.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, we ought to also keep in mind that when the State Department is negotiating with Khrushchev in regard to other matters elsewhere in the world it may very well increase that breach between Khrushchev and Castro depending on to what extent, depending on the extent to which, we are successful with him in reaching understandings elsewhere.

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.

SPANISH-SPEAKING AGENTS

Senator MORSE. Mr. McCone, are you satisfied that we get real hard intelligence based on competent Spanish-speaking agents in Cuba?

Mr. MCCONE. Not fully satisfied, no. It is very difficult.

One thing that Castro, under Soviet guidance, has succeeded in doing is to create quite a firm police state, and it is very difficult for our agents to operate because of his system of informers.

Senator MORSE. I ask this because of the constant references to the adequacy of our air coverage, and because of the reports that are coming out from some of these refugees in exile who are speaking to some people in quite emphatic terms about what was or was not promised, which disturbs me. I was to the Democratic Women's Dinner the other night and spoke on the Alliance for Progress, and there was a very, very prominent Cuban exile there, and I was aghast at the lengths to which he went prior to the meeting in talking to me about what we ought to do.

I was very polite to him. I did not express an attitude at all. In fact, I led him on because I had heard he was a man who had been a high political figure in Cuba under Batista, but had gone over to Castro at the beginning and now was anti-Castro, and I could not talk to him without my being convinced that he seems to be motivated by a desire to get us into war.

A NATION'S RIGHT TO BUILD ITS DEFENSES

My final question goes to a question of international law that has puzzled me throughout all this. Under international law any nation, Communist or free, has the right to build its defenses. Isn't this part of the trouble we had with Mexico and Brazil because, Mr. Secretary, we had to deal with their legalistic approaches at Punta del Este. You remember you sent me to meet with one of them and Hickenlooper with the other to see if we, as lawyers, could argue with them about their legalistic approach.

Aren't we in a very difficult position here that a Communist nation has the right to build its defenses, and that is all they are going to claim that Cuba is doing? And as long as she stays on this side of the line with her defensive buildup she is within the framework of international law?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I suppose if you look at just the general propositions of general international law that this would be correct. I believe, and we have a memorandum on that which we will be happy to send to you, that where security matters are concerned, the Rio Treaty is the law of this hemisphere; that here is a treaty of which Cuba is a member, which has established geographic boundaries for dealing with security questions by the decision of the hemisphere.

[The information referred to follows:]

MEMORANDUM

I. Legal basis for quarantine of Cuba
II. Legal basis for United States air surveillance of Cuba
III. United States obligation to aid Cuba in case of attack
IV. Cuba's status vis-a-vis Rio Treaty
V. Swiss representation of United States interests in Cuba
VI. Status of James B. Donovan and the Logan Act

I. LEGAL BASIS FOR QUARANTINE OF CUBA

Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) reads as follows:

"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent".

Twenty-one countries, including Cuba, are parties to the Rio Treaty and none has disaffirmed it.

On October 23, 1962, the Council of the Organization of American States meeting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation resolved:

"To recommend that the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance [Rio Treaty of 1947], take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed forces, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent".

Pursuant to this resolution, a quarantine against the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba was imposed by the United States with the assistance of other American States. At the same time the Council directed that the Security Council of the

United Nations should be informed of the contents of the resolution in keeping with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

As explained in the attached memorandum on "The Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba", prepared by the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State at the time of the imposition of the quarantine, the resolution of the Council of the Organization of American States, acting as the Organ of Consultation, and the quarantine imposed pursuant thereto, are consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. More recent analyses of the legal questions involved are contained in articles by the Legal Adviser and by the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State. A copy of the latter is attached. A copy of the Legal Adviser's article, published in the current "Foreign Affairs" will be supplied.

II. LEGAL BASIS FOR UNITED STATES AIR SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA

As a general matter, under international law the air space over the territory of a state is subject to the sovereign power of the state. The state controls entry into its air space and intrusions without its consent are unlawful. This general rule is, however, subject to any modifications to which a particular state may agree. In the case of Cuba, these include the Rio Treaty.

In its resolution of October 23, 1962 (quoted, in part, above) the Council of the Organization of American States, acting as provisional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, unanimously agreed to recommend that the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty, take all measures including the use of armed force, to insure that Cuba could not continue to receive military supplies which might threaten the peace and security of the continent and to prevent the missiles with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the continent. By the same resolution the Council also agreed "to call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability".

The overflights are directly related to the objective set forth in the Resolution of October 23. That resolution was aimed at not only immediate dismantling and withdrawal of present missiles, but also assurances that Cuba could not continue to receive military supplies which might threaten the peace of the continent.

Furthermore, the resolution authorized "all measures" in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty. Article 6 (quoted above) provides that in the event of a conflict or other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures to be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent. Article 8 of the Rio Treaty provides:

"For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force".

Since the use of armed force is specifically included as one of the measures under this provision, it is clear that less severe measures, such as aerial surveillance, are also included. The facts of these overflights and the photographs resulting therefrom were before the Council when it considered the resolution of October 23. The member countries acted in the anticipation that these flights would continue pursuant to the resolution and as a means of carrying out the provisions of the resolution.

Aerial surveillance of Cuban military activity including overflight of Cuban territory is also consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter sets forth the principle that:

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations".

Photographic surveillance is not a threat or use of force. Nor is the provision of Article 53 of the Charter which states that "no enforcement action" shall be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council applicable since aerial surveillance is not "enforcement action" as that term is used in Article 53. Moreover, no organ of the United Nations has in any way called this practice into question.

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III. UNITED STATES OBLIGATION, UNDER THE RIO TREATY, TO AID CUBA IN CASE OF ATTACK

Under Article 3 of the Rio Treaty, a treaty to which both the United States and Cuba are parties, the contracting States agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all American States, and that each contracting State shall assist in meeting the attack. The Article also provides that on the request of the State directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System each contracting State may determine the immediate measures it may take to fulfill the obligation to assist in meeting the attack. Article 17 states that the Organ of Consultation shall take its decision by a vote of two-thirds of the contracting States and Article 20 provides that no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent.

In the event of an "armed attack" on Cuba, one of the relevant considerations in determining United States action would be the fact that Cuba has persistently defaulted on its obligations under the Inter-American system. The report of the Inter-American Peace Committee adopted by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Punta del Este in January, 1962, stated the conclusion that "no member state of the Inter-American system can claim the rights and privileges pertaining thereto if it denies or fails to recognize the corresponding obligations". As a consequence, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation declared that the present Government of Cuba has voluntarily placed itself outside the American system and resolved that that Government is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the Inter-American system, and is excluded from participation in that system.

In view of the above, it is questionable whether Cuba could invoke the Rio Treaty in case of attack, and whether the Organ of Consultation would take any action under the treaty if Cuba did invoke it. Furthermore, each contracting state must determine what measures it will take until the Organ of Consultation has met and agreed on collective measures by a two-thirds vote, and in no event may a state be required to use armed force without its consent.

In the last analysis the extent of the United States obligations under the Rio Treaty cannot be decided in the abstract. The question would have to be decided in the light of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Some of the important facts to be considered would be the type of attack, what country made the attack and the nature of the Cuban Government at the time.

IV. CUBA'S STATUS VIS-A-VIS RIO TREATY

Cuba is a party to the Rio Treaty. She has not denounced the treaty and remains bound by its terms.

V. SWISS REPRESENTATION OF UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN CUBA

The Swiss Government represents the United States interests in Cuba with the consent of the Government of Cuba pursuant to a protocol between the United States and Switzerland, signed at Habana January 6, 1961, after the United States severed diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Cuba on January 3, 1961.

The Representation by one government of the interests of another government in a third country is a recognized practice in international relations. In the case of the Swiss representation of United States interests in Cuba, it consists primarily of performing various functions relating to the protection of United States citizens and the property of United States citizens in Cuba, providing assistance regarding the estates of deceased United States citizens in Cuba, receiving and transmitting passport and visa applications, performing notarial services, etc.

While there are no diplomatic and consular relations between the United States and Cuba, the termination of those relations did not result in a cessation of recognition of the Government of Cuba by the United States. The United States continues to recognize as the Government of Cuba, the Government of which Fidel Castro is Premier, and, accordingly, the Government of the United States holds the Castro Government responsible as a Government for its acts.

VI. THE STATUS OF JAMES B. DONOVAN AND THE LOGAN ACT

In his negotiations with the Castro Government regarding the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, James B. Donovan acted as a private citizen and as general counsel for the Cuban Families Committee, a private group which was engaged in negotiations for the release of the prisoners beginning in the summer of 1961 and which

was the successor to the Tractors for Freedom Committee, also a private group organized for the same purpose. Mr. Donovan had no authority to speak for the United States Government nor to represent the United States Government.

The Logan Act (18 U.S. Code, Section 953) provides that "Any citizen of the United States, . . . who, without authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both".

Mr. Donovan's activities do not constitute a violation of the Logan Act. There was no dispute between the United States and Cuba in regard to the prisoners since, although the United States deplored their retention, there were no formal efforts by the United States to obtain their release. Mr. Donovan's negotiations with the Cuban Government were not, therefore, "in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States".

Secretary RUSK. Now, we do not make too much of it because it has certain, perhaps, sarcastic overtones, but, in fact, as a strict legal matter, Cuba is bound by the resolutions of the OAS. It has not withdrawn its membership. It has taken no steps to denounce the treaty. It has agreed to accept the decisions of two-thirds of the hemisphere with respect to the security of this hemisphere.

One could make—it may be a little sterile—but one could make the legal argument that these overflights, for example, are an obligation of Cuba under the Rio Pact.

So that I think we would have to examine the legal aspects of the security system arranged in this hemisphere by all the members of the hemisphere, including Cuba, before we could exhaust the legal aspects of it.

Senator MORSE. I close by saying that I want you to know that I think my committee can be of great help to the State Department in getting ourselves thoroughly briefed on the international law aspects of this. I want to get myself in a position where I can answer this Communist influence in any other Latin American country that wants to hold to this legalistic approach to this problem.

I think you may have some problems in the United Nations about it, too, so I am going to have Dr. Marcy to be of assistance to me, and any help the State Department can give this committee in keeping our buildup of strength on the international law answers——

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator MORSE [continuing]. To some of the Communist claims would be of real service.

STUDY OF U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

I close, gentlemen, by saying that we can go ahead, not on this coverage business, but we are going to go ahead on our study of U.S.-Latin American relations.

Some members of the committee may ask in due course of time that we have somebody from the Pentagon Building or somewhere else come in before the committee, but I will keep you informed, Mr. Secretary, of the progress of this committee, because one thing this Chairman is going to insist upon is that all people who appear before us understand that it is the Secretary of State, acting for the President, who is in charge of the American foreign policy, and that this committee is never going to, as far as I have any power to

influence it, to do anything that will weaken the position of the State Department in the field of American foreign policy. I think I demonstrated that many times and tried to again in this hearing this morning.

I happen to think that this Cuban thing has created a good many critical problems for us, not the least of which is the critical problem of American public opinion.

I think we ought to be of assistance to you in trying to get the American people to be reassured that American foreign policy is being handled on a nonpartisan basis, in keeping with what you have heard me say so many times, it being our duty to see to it that partisanship does stop at the water's edge.

We have this matter—my colleagues have left and are out of your presence—of the transcript of record that the committee made in the so-called Cuban investigation shortly following the Bay of Pigs. I am still of the opinion that it should be kept secret. I have invited Senators to come and read it. I still think it is the best document on the subject, and that a reading of it does not justify any partisan attack.

I wish that you would have somebody over in the State Department refresh themselves on that document, and at a later date advise us, depending on future developments, if you think any part of it ever should be made public or if you ought to take it and expurgate it, as we have other top secret hearings, eliminating parts of it and make that part public.

The trouble with that is I do not think there would be much left if you followed that course of action with this document. But you can be pretty sure that there has been this public discussion of the existence of the document, there will be increasing demands for more and more of it to be publicly discussed, and I would like to have somebody in the Department take a look at it.

I close, gentlemen, by saying that we appreciate this very much. I will close the meeting on the same basis I started it, that it was a briefing. It was an excellent one, and I thank you very much.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are grateful to you.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

SUPPLYING OF NUCLEAR ARMS TO THE CANADIAN FORCES

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—On February 5, 1963, Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker's Conservative government lost a vote of no-confidence in the Canadian Parliament. Directly responsible for this rejection was the Prime Minister's reluctance for Canada to accept U.S. nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker responded by accusing the State Department of "unprecedented and unwarranted intrusion in Canadian affairs." An election held in April was won by the Liberal Party, making Lester B. Pearson Prime Minister.]

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CANADIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:35 p.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator George D. Aiken (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Aiken (presiding), Fulbright (chairman of the full committee), Sparkman, Mansfield, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Williams.

Also present: Honorable Thomas H. Kuchel, U.S. Senator from California; Honorable Edna F. Kelly, U.S. Representative from the 10th District of New York.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Newhouse, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

Senator AIKEN. I think we will begin this conference and hope it won't take too long. I have a very short opening statement which reads as follows:

As we have had reason to note in recent weeks, any serious dissension within the Western Alliance poses a threat to the security of every member of the Alliance. There are, of course, instances in which differences cannot be avoided. The current public controversy between the United States and Canada appears to be a case of dissension that is unnecessary as well as unfortunate.

It is not the intention of this subcommittee and of myself as chairman to prejudge the issue. This meeting has been called for the purpose of eliciting information of two kinds from the executive branch. First, we would like to receive facts relating to the merits of conflicting United States and Canadian views on strategic weapons policy for the defense of the North American continent. Secondly, we wish to explore the manner in which the matter has been handled, particularly with reference to the State Department press release of January 30 on "United States and Canadian Negotiations regarding Nuclear Weapons."

We wish to have explained the reasons which led the State Department to express its dissatisfaction with Canadian views on continental defense by a public statement rather than through normal

diplomatic channels. On the basis of the reaction in Ottawa of the last five days, it would seem that the action of the United States Government has aggravated rather than ameliorated our differences with Canada.

CLUMSY EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE CANADIAN DECISIONS

It seems to me very clear on the basis of our relations with Canada over many years that overt and clumsy efforts on the part of any United States official to influence Canadian policy decisions are likely to achieve results opposite to the ones intended. The United States at this late date has no excuse for insensitivity to the sovereign independence and national pride of our northern neighbor. Our purpose here is to determine whether in fact United States officials have attempted to exercise unwarranted pressure on the Canadian Government and, if so, for what reasons.

The public controversy with Canada is particularly unfortunate at a time when the failure of Britain's application for membership in the Common Market has caused a far more serious division in the Western Alliance. It is difficult to understand why it was seen fit to express official displeasure with Canada by a public rebuke when no such statement was made regarding General de Gaulle's disruption of the negotiations in Brussels. In any case it is clear that a serious controversy between Canada and the United States can benefit on one outside the Communist world.

In fairness it must be assumed that there were compelling reasons for the State Department to act as it did in this matter. We should like to know what those reasons are. Our objective is to help bring about a prompt solution to the controversy to restore the mutual confidence and trust that are essential to both Canada and the United States.

I want to say that while this is a meeting of the Subcommittee on Canadian Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee, that all members of the Foreign Relations Committee have been invited to attend, and we are also honored by the presence of Congresswoman Edna Kelly of the House, who has also evidenced a very strong interest in bettering relations between the United States and Canada.

I think perhaps we should insert in the record at the very start the press release of the Department of State issued January 30, 1963.

[The document referred to follows:]

United States and Canadian Negotiations Regarding Nuclear Weapons

The Department has received a number of inquiries concerning the disclosure during a recent debate in the Canadian House of Commons regarding negotiations over the past two or three months between the United States and Canadian Governments relating to nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces.

In 1958 the Canadian Government decided to adopt the BOMARC-B weapons systems. Accordingly two BOMARC-B squadrons were deployed to Canada where they would serve the double purpose of protecting Montreal and Toronto as well as the U.S. deterrent force. The BOMARC-B was not designed to carry any conventional warhead. The matter of making available a nuclear warhead for it and for other nuclear-capable weapons systems acquired by Canada has been the subject of inconclusive discussions between the two governments. The installation of the two BOMARC-B batteries in Canada without nuclear warheads was completed in 1962.

In addition to the BOMARC-B, a similar problem exists with respect to the modern supersonic jet interceptor with which the RCAF has been provided. Without nuclear air defense warheads, they operate at far less then their full potential effectiveness.

Shortly after the Cuban crisis in October 1962, the Canadian Government proposed confidential discussions concerning circumstances under which there might be provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces in Canada and Europe. These discussions have been exploratory in nature; the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense.

The discussions between the two governments have also involved possible arrangements for the provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian NATO forces in Europe, similar to the arrangements which the United States has made with many of our other NATO allies.

During the debate in the House of Commons various references were made to recent discussions at Nassau. The agreements made at Nassau have been fully published. They raise no question of the appropriateness of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in fulfilling their NATO or NORAD obligations.

Reference was also made in the debate to the need of NATO for increased conventional forces. A flexible and balanced defense requires increased conventional forces, but conventional forces are not an alternative to effective NATO or NORAD defense arrangements using nuclear-capable weapons systems. NORAD is designed to defend the North American continent against air attack. The Soviet bomber fleet will remain at least throughout this decade a significant element in the Soviet strike force. An effective continental defense against this common threat is necessary.

The provision of nuclear weapons to Canadian forces would not involve an expansion of independent nuclear capability, or an increase in the "nuclear club". As in the case of other allies custody of U.S. nuclear weapons would remain with the U.S. Joint control fully consistent with national sovereignty can be worked out to cover the use of such weapons by Canadian forces.

Senator AIKEN. We are very glad to have the Secretary of State here this afternoon. I am sure that he knows the purpose of this meeting. We feel that if we can do anything at all to improve Canadian-American relations or to prevent them from deteriorating further, that now is the time to do it.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman.

Senator AIKEN. Senator Mansfield.

Senator MANSFIELD. Before the Secretary of State is called on, I would like to suggest, in fact move, that any statement coming out of this meeting be made by the Canadian Subcommittee, and the Senator of Vermont only.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Second the motion.

Senator AIKEN. Is that agreeable? Very well, without objection it is so voted.

Mr. Secretary, we are very glad that you could come up here this afternoon. We know that you realize the seriousness of this situation, and we know that you recognize the absolute necessity for full cooperation between our countries, Canada and the United States. Do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE C. McGHEE, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this chance to be here. I did last night prepare a statement, but in view of the developments during the day, I should like to comment informally, and then take up the discussion, whichever way the committee would wish it.

Senator AIKEN. Very well. All we want is to get the picture as clearly as we can, regardless of how you see fit to present it.

Secretary RUSK. I am assuming that is an executive session.

Senator AIKEN. That is right. I will say that there is the usual hoard of press people at the outer door who will undoubtedly expect you and some of the rest of us to say something, but we understand that it is an executive session, and anything that you feel should positively be kept quiet your wishes will be observed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, why I thought we had just solved that by motion that nobody says anything but you.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You are responsible entirely.

Secretary RUSK. I am not clear that the resolution of the committee necessarily applied to me, but I can assure the committee that I feel I have said enough on this subject.

Senator AIKEN. Like the fellow who proposed. And when he was accepted he said, "I have said too much already."

Secretary RUSK. I would not necessarily concede that at the moment, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AIKEN. Will you proceed just as you want.

ESSENTIALLY A DEBATE WITHIN CANADA

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, let me say in the first instance that this is not primarily in its essence a debate between Canada and the United States. This is a debate within Canada about Canadian defense policies.

This has been dramatically illustrated during this day by the resignation of the Defense Minister of Canada in a letter which sets forth his reasons for resigning. I have the text of his letter, if the committee wishes to hear it read.

Senator AIKEN. I would like that.

Secretary RUSK [reading]:

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:[1] For over two years you have been aware that I believe nuclear warheads should be supplied to the four weapons systems we have acquired which are adapted to their use. Throughout this period I believed that they would be authorized at the proper time.

During the past two weeks particularly, I have made it absolutely clear what I considered the minimum position I would accept and several times have offered to resign until it was agreed to. It has become quite obvious during the last few days that your views and mine as to the course we should pursue for the acquisition of nuclear weapons for our armed forces are not capable of reconciliation; thus it is with a great deal of regret that I now find I must tender my resignation as Minister of National Defense.

Until the last few weeks I enjoyed my five and one-half years as a member of your government and trust I have made some contribution to it as to Canada.

Yours regretfully, D. S. Harkness.

INTERNAL CRISIS WITHIN CANADIAN CABINET

Now this itself is a sign of an internal crisis within the Canadian Cabinet. We were informed that before the full Cabinet meeting of last Saturday that a portion of the Cabinet, some 6 or 7 members of the Cabinet themselves had a preliminary meeting before the full Cabinet meeting and informed the Prime Minister that what they wanted was a defense policy and not an election.

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[1] John G. Diefenbaker.

It is also true that this question is one that has created over the last several months a very considerable controversy around Canada. There has been on the one side a very active ban the bomb pacifist abstention group wishing to withhold Canada from prossessing, storing or being the locale for nuclear weapons, and on the other side a strong view from many quarters that Canada should take a full part in the total nuclear planning of the Alliance.

Now this has created a serious problem for the present government, and has been pressing them to a clear definition of their own defense policy, and it has been the inability or unwillingness to come to clear decisions on this subject which has led to the present impasse. In the course of the debate in the Canadian Parliament, it has led to statements which seem to misrepresent a United States view and necessarily resulted in the pressing upon us of insistent questions about United States policy.

This is not an unusual circumstance. This happens from time to time where internal political debates in countries outside the United States do give rise to questions put to us about an American attitude, and there have been occasions where internal debates in this country have had the same effect on other countries.

JOINT CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

For example, even in the case of Canada, there was an occasion in February 1962 during the course of debate in the House of Commons where the Prime Minister made the statement that, "So long as the law of the United States is as it is at present, joint control"—meaning, joint control of nuclear weapons—"is impossible."

Now this immediately led to questions to us about whether or not this was so, because we have joint control arrangements with several members of NATO in the location of nuclear weapons in their particular countries. And so at a press conference on March 1st, 1962, I made a brief statement which I might read to the committee and put into the record as an example of how these things occur. I said:

> Whether Canada wishes to arrange with the United States to have nuclear weapons available for Canadian forces is a matter for Canada to decide. The custody of U.S. nuclear weapons made available for the forces of our allies must remain with the United States. In addition to assuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons, this is one of the ways in which the United States seeks to prevent proliferation of independent national nuclear capabilities.
>
> However, insofar as control over the use of such weapons by Canadian forces is concerned, the United States is willing to work out arrangements for joint control fully consistent with national sovereignty. The U.S. remains prepared at any time to discuss such arrangements with the Government of Canada, and we have of course discussed such arrangements with other governments.

Now on that occasion in March 1962 the Prime Minister telephoned our Ambassador to express his great appreciation for this statement of clarification and asked the Ambassador to give me a personal message to this effect at a time when what I said seemed to be directly contrary to what the Prime Minister had said in the House of Commons.

TOP SECRET NEGOTIATIONS WITH CANADA

Now in this latest episode, the background of the discussion I think had several facets to it. One has been a series of negotiations, private discussions carried out between ourselves and Canada on a top secret basis on the initiative of the Canadian Government.

After the Cuban crisis of last October, the Canadian Government asked us to undertake discussions about the furnishing of nuclear weapons. They emphasized that this could only be done on a top secret basis of their own internal situation, and that if the very presence or the very existence of such discussions should become known, that the Canadians would have to terminate the discussions on their side.

Well, we accepted that and engaged in a series of discussions with them, and relying very heavily, Mr. Chairman, upon the executive character of this hearing, I want to say to the committee that there seems to be no question on the Canadian side about the requirements of defense. There did seem to be a serious internal problem and differences within the Cabinet about how they could handle this within the Canadian Government.

Senator AIKEN. Was it the Prime Minister that insisted that there be secret negotiations?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. And we did not even handle this in most instances by exchange of cables between embassies, but by personal envoys.

When I was at the NATO meeting, Mr. McNamara and I had a meeting alone with the Foreign Minister of Canada and the Defense Minister of Canada, just the four of us present to explore this further.

Senator AIKEN. Are you satisfied that the negotiations were kept secret in Canada up to the 25th of January?

Secretary RUSK. We thought they had been kept secret until the Prime Minister referred to them in the debate in the House of Commons.

OPPOSITION BY MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Senator FULBRIGHT. May I ask, isn't the Foreign Minister one of the ban the bomb people?

Senator SYMINGTON. What was that question?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. [Howard Charles] Green, the Minister of External——

Senator FULBRIGHT. I have heard the Foreign Minister is one of the ban the bomb people. He is a fanatic on this.

Secretary RUSK. I will develop this a little further, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FULBRIGHT. He was in this meeting.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. There is a difference in the Cabinet, and it has centered around the Minister of Defense on one side and the Minister of External Affairs on the other.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the name?

Secretary RUSK. Howard Green.

ACCOMMODATING DIFFERENT KINDS OF CANADIAN PUBLIC OPINION

In these discussions it appeared very clearly—and I hope the transcript will show that this discussion is of highest classification—that what the government would like to be able to do would be to be in a position somewhat different things to two different kinds of Canadian public opinion.

They wanted to be able to say to those who wanted a strong Canadian participation in NATO defense, "We have arrangements with the United States which the United States considers fully effective in Canada's taking its part in North America and NATO defense."

On the other side it wanted to be able to say to the ban the bomb people, "We have no operational nuclear weapons on Canadian soil."

This is what the discussion was about, and we talked about various possibilities of achieving this result. I can assure the committee that as far as I was concerned I was prepared to explore with them whatever possibilities could in fact accommodate them on this point. If we could achieve both at the same time from the point of view of our defense, we would not worry about what their own internal problems were.

The suggestion was made, for example, that we stockpile our nuclear weapons near the Canadian border, that in the event of need, Canadian aircraft would come down and pick them up and take them back and use them in their own defense effort, or that we would stockpile them near the border and that in time of emergency we would get our planes and deliver these weapons to them somewhere in Canada. Another possibility was that a crucial piece of an atomic weapon be retained in the United States, and that these pieces then would be delivered seratim to the particular installations, and inserted at a crucial time.

We could not figure out any way to do that that would meet the time problem, and also and most critically would not risk the chance of an actual nuclear explosion in the process of putting those pieces into the weapons under the conditions in which they would have to be put into the weapons.

I proposed myself, for example, that we put the weapons where they ought to be, put a chain around them, nail them down, have a lock on them, and if the Canadian Government wanted to say to their own people, "We don't have operational weapons," that a bomb under lock and key, if they wanted to stretch the point, it would be up to them to treat it that way.

But we could not figure out, up to the point of this recent debate, any way in which we ourselves could honestly say either to the Canadian or to our own people that the defense arrangements which were contemplated when we helped provide the Bomarcs and the aircraft and the Honest John missiles for Canadian forces had in fact been met.

RUMORS OF SECRET AGREEMENTS

Now these talks were to continue. We did not cut them off. We did not say there is nothing further to discuss. But these talks were to continue when the present debate interrupted the discussions.

Now the second point I would like to make is that we have a problem on a matter of this sort. If a debate somewhere else, and particularly a country as close to us as Canada, throws confusion about our own attitude on key issues of defense, and there are several of those points that came up in the course of the debate in the Canadian House of Commons.

There was, for example, a strong implication that there were secret agreements reached at Nassau which had a bearing on this problem for Canada. Now we have had a problem already throughout NATO with the rumors that there were secret agreements at Nassau which went beyond which has been said to all of our NATO allies about the discussions at Nassau, and since Mr. Diefenbaker had just visited Nassau at the end of the discussions and had come back to Canada, for him to imply that there was some sort of secret arrangements; there was something very damaging from our point of view.

Secondly, he implied in his statement that the current emphasis on increased conventional forces might justify not proceeding with nuclear armament.

NEVER ADVOCATED MINIMIZING NUCLEAR DEFENSES

It is quite true that we have pressed our NATO allies to bring their conventional forces up nearer the NATO force goals than they are at the present time. But we have never indicated in NATO, it has never been our policy that the nuclear weapons or the nuclear defenses should in any way be minimized.

I think the committee of which Senator Hickenlooper is a member is aware that the actual figures of nuclear buildup in NATO in the last year or two are very formidable figures, and we have not wanted in any way to create the impression that our interest in building up conventional forces shows any lack of interest in having the nuclear capability if in fact nuclear capability is required.

Then he implied that the speed of obsolescence of modern weaponry was so great that there should be a further period of delay during which the equipping of these particular weapons with nuclear bombs should be further postponed. Well, now it is true that there has been some discussion of the eventual possible obsolescence of the manned bomber, but there has been no discussion that intimates that this is an operational question any time in the immediate future, and that manned bombers are a threat to the North American Continent from Soviet bases and that this is a type of attack for which we must be ready.

So that here again was a problem posing questions to us: do we believe this. I mean, the Defense Department was besieged, the Atomic Energy Commission, the State Department, with questions about what our attitude on this particular question was.

And then the Prime Minister did revert to the earlier point he had made in the spring, which we thought that we had disposed of already last spring, and that is that somehow the joint arrangements that we have with our NATO allies with regard to nuclear weapons involved a proliferation of nuclear weapons on a national capability, saying we don't want to extend the nuclear club. This is

a confusion of ideas there which again was thrown back to us in terms of United States attitude.

PROBLEM IN DISARMAMENT

This is not the only instance in which we have had some difficulty, if you like, in defending ourselves against different interpretations of American attitude arising out of a debate in another country, and again, particularly I say in this instance with Canada.

We have had this problem in the disarmament field with the present government in Canada and this relates, Senator Fulbright, to I think Minister Green's own very personal and understandable deep concern about somewhere on disarmament.

In our Geneva Conference, Canada is one of the four members sitting there on behalf of NATO. France is not occupying its seat. So that it is very important that the four of us, who are there, try to work as closely as possible together, if the NATO point of view is to be adequately represented with respect to five from the Soviet bloc and the eight neutrals.

During the course of this in general Canada has been cooperative, but there have been key moments at which Canada's attitude has not been very helpful. They have frequently met regularly, that is, during considerable periods, with the eight neutrals in regular sessions creating the impression that they are the ninth neutral on these issues.

There was one occasion when I myself was in Geneva when we met with four NATO members all afternoon about the issues before the meeting the next day, the most intimate consultation. The next morning, without any notice whatever to any of the rest of us in the NATO group, Mr. Green introduced a formal resolution into the general committee, the 18-member committee, which he had not shown to anybody, on the subject of nuclear weapons in outer space and so forth.

We have had some difficulty in getting Canadian support, Canadian coordination with the rest of NATO on the matter whether inspection is required for nuclear test ban in such forums as the United Nations. This type of disagreement is not outside of Canada's prerogative. This is their business to decide how they will do this sort of thing. But under terms of intimate consultation, the impression is left with others that if Canada is saying this, this is also the United States view. We frequently have had the problem of clarifying that Canada is not in any sense speaking for the United States on some of these matters.

DEALING WITH THE PRESS

We, as I say, had a great many questions put to us in the course of the most recent debate. We had the problem of how we would respond to it. In the first place, we could not respond solely by diplomatic communication, because the questions would remain—Canadian press, American press.

I was later in that week scheduled for a press conference. The content of what was in our statement of the 30th could have been elicited readily by questions at my press conference. Perhaps that would have been a better way to do it, let it come out in response

to questions. But the questions were there, and it would be very difficult for us not to answer those questions as far as the United States attitude was concerned.

So that a diplomatic note would not have clarified our point of view in the kind of forums, namely, the public discussion here in the country and abroad as well as in Canada, in which the questions had been raised. Therefore we elected to issue what seemed to us to be a fairly straightforward factual statement on the particular points that have been raised in debate in Canada.

PRIME MINISTER'S DISCLOSURE OF NEGOTIATIONS

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, did you have any inkling that the Prime Minister was going to make the disclosure on the 25th regarding these negotiations that were taking place, or did he communicate with our embassy or anyone else after he made the disclosure?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Explaining why he did it?

Secretary RUSK. Our communication was in fact the debate itself, again a departure from normal practice, because in the usual case a government that is faced with a parliamentary debate—and I must say Britain, for example, is very good about this—will in fact consult us ahead of time about what the government is expecting to say, if an important American interest is involved, and we have a chance then to consult. But in this particular instance we did not have.

Senator AIKEN. I notice that he points out possibly in defense of his position that he was not notified but only an hour and a half before the President's speech on Cuba.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. Do you think that was sort of a retaliation or something on the part of the Prime Minister that he undertook, that he did in fact disclose what you say he himself had insisted be top secret?

Secretary RUSK. I think that particular point, Senator, came up in connection with the discussion of the NORAD alert at the time of the Cuban decision. He did not at the time complain to us about the shortness of the communication with respect to the Cuban matter, nor may I say did not any other member of NATO complain to the government about that problem, because they all saw the utter importance of the relation between public disclosure and the announcement of the action to be taken. But it is true that we told him and we told the other NATO countries about an hour and a half before the President's speech, perhaps a little longer than that, but approximately in that time scale.

I think this covers, in effect, the immediate surrounding. Now let me come if I may, sir, to the question of whether there is a Canadian commitment to accept nuclear weapons for these particular defense systems. In the most exact sense, the contract for the furnishing of nuclear weapons for the Canadian forces was in fact what was being discussed in these negotiations to which the Prime Minister and I both have referred, so that that part of the contract had not been completed. It was that which was being negotiated.

CANADA HAD ACCEPTED THE ARRANGEMENT

But on the other hand, Canada had accepted a role in NATO for its air forces and Honest John missiles. It had accepted an arrangement for the stationing of Bomarc missiles in Canada which cost the United States something over $200 million.

Senator AIKEN. Is this in 1959?

Secretary RUSK. In 1959.

Senator AIKEN. The agreement.

Secretary RUSK. You have the agreement in front of you here, the actual agreement. It was an exchange of notes in 1961 I believe before the final exchange of notes was confirmed, as well as certain aircraft which are adapted to and perform their best role with nuclear weapons.

We have never been told that there was any serious doubt that these Bomarcs, for example, would in fact carry nuclear warheads, because the missile is of a type which makes sense only with nuclear warheads.

So that there is no question at all that it was the general expectation of policy on both sides that the addition of these weapons systems to Canadian defense necessarily require the use of nuclear weapons to make them fully effective. And in some cases, such as the Bomarc missile, to make them effective at all. It was the final stage in that arrangement which was in fact under negotiation, and it was at——

Senator AIKEN. Will you state again what that final stage was?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. The final stage was the actual contractual relation, the bilateral agreement with respect to the actual location of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil and in the hands of Canadians, all located with Canadian forces in Europe.

This was the normal kind of bilateral relations that Senator Hickenlooper is familiar with, in which we arranged for joint control and the financial terms under which these things might be carried forward.

Therefore, when anyone discusses the word "commitment" and we are not inclined ourselves as a government to insist upon this word "commitment," there was not contractual commitment, it is quite true, but there was a clear anticipation that the arrangements that were being made were arrangements for nuclear weapons.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE ANTICIPATED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think it is factual to say, Mr. Secretary, that the contractual arrangements, that is, the use of nuclear weapons, was the only possible logical conclusion to the arrangements that had already been concluded?

Secretary RUSK. We can't see any other answer, because Canada again, on Canada's initiative, raised in NATO that the role of the Canadian air forces in NATO be changed from that of reconnaissance to a strike role, and a strike role requires nuclear weapons. So that the entire logic of the situation was that nuclear weapons were anticipated, and indeed the statement of the Minister of Defense made it clear that this was his understanding all the way through.

Now I do want to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that we recognize with Hollyhock and with some other situations that nuclear weapons in some countries are not very popular and one can understand why. We recognize also that Canada had perhaps a special public opinion problem on its hands, at least for a considerable group of highly vocal and articulate people who were pressing them very hard against nuclear weapons.

We have been trying for the last two or three months to find some answer to that problem which would be consistent on the one side with our own defense, with our NATO defense and the joint defense, but which would, on the other side, give any comfort if possible to Canada's problems from the point of view of domestic policies. We have not been able thus far to find a practical arrangement which would make sense from the weapons point of view, and would be of any relief to them on their side—for example, the suggestion that the nuclear weapons be nearby but located in, located down so in fact they are not operational until somebody uses a key on them, or something of that sort.

We did not feel that we should be a party to a fraud, that we should not ourselves be in a position to certify that the defense arrangements are in good order. In fact, there is a several hour time lag between running down to the United States warehouses to pick them up and take them back or sending Canadian or distributing parts which would have to be installed under conditions of great urgency and considerable technical danger or arrangements of that sort. But we were making a genuine effort to work this problem out.

I, myself, believe had this issue not come up in Canadian debate, there would be any public controversy certainly at this stage between the United States and Canada at this particular point.

AMERICANS AND THE CANADIAN OPPOSITION PARTY

May I say also, Mr. Chairman, because I think this is something the committee ought to be aware of, I have tried to investigate the question as to whether anyone on the American side in any official responsibility took any action to stimulate this debate by being in touch with any of the opposition.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Diefenbaker said they did.

Secretary RUSK. He implied that when Mr. [Lester] Pearson came to New York, he was in contact. This is not so in the case of Mr. Pearson. What did happen was much more natural than that. Mr. Helleyer, who is the shadow Defense Minister of the Liberal Party, did go to visit Europe. While he was there he visited NATO Headquarters. He talked to General [Lauris] Norstad.

We were not aware of this at the time. We gave Norstad no instructions on this. He was talking to him as a SACEUR, as a NATO commander, and General Norstad went with them the entire defense structure of NATO, what countries were doing what, what the various responsibilities were that they foresaw in the NATO defense arrangements. This Norstad would do with Gaits-

kill [2] or with the head of the SPD [3] in Germany. This is something that is not unusual.

Then it is true I think it was Mr. Hellyer [4] or someone asked our Embassy in Canada for certain published material, matters of public information, and these were sent to him at his request. But I have not been able to find that there was any attempt made from any official U.S. source to stimulate the opposition to raise this problem. I think that this is a matter that, as I have indicated earlier, was a matter of sharp division within the present government and between the parties.

PEARSON'S CHANGE OF VIEW

Now the principal change of view on this in recent months has come from Mr. Pearson. Mr. Pearson, perhaps on the basis of what Mr. Hellyer reported back from NATO or otherwise, I leave that to conjecture, has in recent weeks seemed to come out much more strongly for full execution by Canada of what he considered to be commitments under the various defense arrangements, and that has helped to sharpen this debate, particularly where there is a minority government that is susceptible to attack on any particular issue.

It is not our desire that the anti-American feelings that are easily aroused in Canada be made an issue in an election there. This has been the great temptation and perhaps even the practice since about 1911. It was a significant issue Mr. Diefenbaker ran last time, and under these circumstances all parties running, including the opposition, are likely to vie with each other as to who is most independent of the country to the south. So we get no comfort out of this at all, and this was not in our minds at the time that we issued our statement on January 30th.

These are rather informal comments, Mr. Chairman, but I will be glad to pursue the matter further if it is the wish and view of the committee.

PURPOSE OF STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASE

Senator AIKEN. What was the purpose of the State Department release of January 30, No. 59? What did you expect to accomplish by that release?

Secretary RUSK. The principal purpose, Mr. Chairman, was to answer questions which, if we did not answer them as simply and as succinctly as possible, would be answered by false reporting drawn from rumors and comments picked up from a variety of sources in Washington about what the United States attitude was.

Some of the people in the Defense Department were being asked by correspondents about their views, and we had indications that some of those statements were much more severe and sharp than anything that we thought was tolerable under the circumstances.

In any event, the Department could not refuse to answer without leaving the impression that there might have been secret talks at

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[2] Hugh Gaitskill, leader of the British Labor Party.
[3] Social Democratic Party of West Germany.
[4] Paul Hellyer, Canadian Liberal Party Defense Specialist.

Nassau that we did think that the conventional forces made a difference to the nuclear requirement of North American defense, or that the manned bombers were going out at such a rate that these arrangements were no longer needed, and that the kinds of arrangements that we were talking with Canada about were different in kind than those that we were talking with or had made with other NATO countries, in view of the comment made about enlarging the nuclear club, which is not involved in these arrangements at all. So I do not myself see how we could have avoided those questions.

Senator AIKEN. The release was not directed particularly to the people of the United States. Was it directed to the people of Canada or was it directed to officialdom in Washington and Ottawa?

Secretary RUSK. We have the questions coming from Canadian reporters, American reporters, and European reporters. Some of these things that were involved in this are matters of very lively interest in Europe at the present time.

I mention particularly this notion that things were said at Nassau that have not communicated to our allies, which is a very sensitive point.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

Senator AIKEN. Was it considered necessary in order to keep the record clear with the Defense Department?

Secretary RUSK. We thought it was necessary to keep the record clear as far as the attitude of the United States was concerned on these particular points.

Senator AIKEN. But not with our Defense Department.

Secretary RUSK. No, it was not aimed at the Defense Department.

Senator AIKEN. The reason I asked that is, Mr. Secretary, you probably realize that there is a lot of comment that the decisions of the Defense Department are shaping American foreign policy, that the Department of State has been powerless to resist these decisions, most of which have a technical rather than a strategic phase. Have you any comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. We were not pressed by the Defense Department to make this statement at this time.

Senator AIKEN. Was it cleared with the Defense Department?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. It was cleared with them?

Secretary RUSK. We discussed that with them, yes.

Senator AIKEN. I understand from your subsequent statement it was not cleared by the President.

Secretary RUSK. The President did not see the text, no, sir.

Senator AIKEN. He did not see it. Apparently these reports that the Defense Department is making foreign policy goes back to Secretary McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor last June, in which he blasted General de Gaulle's nuclear ambitions without naming him, despite the obviously deep commitment of the de Gaulle government to their nuclear program, and despite the fact that the negotiations in Brussels over Britain's Common Market application

were approaching a delicate stage. Then to make matters worse, Mr. McNamara issued a statement five days later exempting Britain from his criticism of national nuclear deterrents.

Did the State Department clear, or was it allowed to comment either on the speech or on the subsequent statement exempting Britain from the Secretary's speech?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. I saw both of those.

Senator AIKEN. You cleared them both?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN SKYBOLT AFFAIR

Senator AIKEN. And then you had the Skybolt Nassau affair which seemed to be a rather worse blow to Britain's application, and hence to our uppermost foreign policy objective. That is, seeing Britain become an integral part of Europe. Can you tell us the role of the State Department in the Skybolt matter? Did you accede to the announcement of the decision and the manner in which it was announced? In effect, did this matter clear the State Department in the customary manner? I believe Mr. Ball represented you at Nassau.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

First, this matter was discussed by the Secretary of Defense, myself and the President as a matter of national security and foreign policy sometime before it became public. We were in immediate touch with the British about how this looked as a weapons problem for the United States. And to get them to start thinking about what they meant from the point of view of the British arrangements: whether they themselves wished to continue with Skybolt, if so, on what basis, what alternatives might be considered, for example, whether they themselves would use the missile which we use for our own manned bombers with a somewhat shorter range than Skybolt was intended to have, or what else.

Then when Secretary McNamara went to London to talk the matter over with the British Defense Minister, I myself simultaneously went to Paris to talk the same question over with the British Foreign Minister, who was then arriving in Paris for the NATO meetings. There was no lack of contact between Defense and State on the issues raised there.

MEANING OF THE NASSAU MEETING

Now I would think, sir, that the meaning of Nassau in terms of Europe has to be looked at in broader terms than just what might have been its impact upon President de Gaulle, because Nassau brought the United Kingdom into support for a NATO multilateral force for the first time, and a NATO multilateral force is something in which Germany, Belgium, Italy and others have a very lively and keen interest at the present time, the only way in which they can see themselves as full partners in the Alliance on the one side, without a proliferation of national nuclear capability on the other.

Now what was not anticipated was over one weekend, President de Gaulle, surprising his own senior colleagues and his own government, surprising his own ambassador who had been discussing

these matters in other capitals, surprising his own five associates in the Common Market, would step forward in a press conference and say no British entry into EEC and no multilateral force.

For indeed it had been our understanding with the French Government that they were going to take sufficient time to study their own nuclear program, to study the details that would emerge from the Nassau discussions in order to find out the relevance of the Nassau decisions to the French situation, and to find out in fact whether the comparable arrangement with France that was mentioned at Nassau was in fact something that would be of interest to France.

Now President de Gaulle's press conference on the 14th of January cut through all that. It short-circuited these studies which he himself had asked his own government to make on this matter, and caught his own Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and ambassador flat-footed for a period of two or three days, so that I don't believe that the predictions on President de Gaulle were inevitable or flowed directly from the Nassau arrangement. His first reactions to Nassau were quite different.

DECISION TO ISSUE PRESS RELEASE

Senator AIKEN. Just one last short question. The initiative for issuing this release of January 30th, number 59, rests with you. You made the decision that this should be issued?

Secretary RUSK. This is a Department release, and those are all my statements, yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. And you thought it was a good idea?

Secretary RUSK. I still do, and I think, although as I have expressed regret for some of the tone, but I think this will clarify a good many things and will draw the discussion away from relations with the United States back to the merits of the problem both internationally and nationally.

Senator AIKEN. Senator Mansfield defers to the chairman of our full committee, Senator Fulbright.

IMPLICATIONS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, I am not quite clear what the Prime Minister of Canada said that required this. Did he say something in debate that was inaccurate, not in accordance with facts? I don't want you to read the whole speech.

Senator AIKEN. The bottom of page 3116 I think is where he made his disclosure.

Secretary RUSK. There were a number of points there, Mr. Chairman. I think it would require a close study of the entire speech.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Am I correct in saying that your statement was made in order to correct an inaccurate statement that he made? Was that the purpose of it?

Secretary RUSK. I referred to five implications in the speech that created confusion about United States policy. The one, discussions at Nassau, second, the relationships between our emphasis on conventional forces and the particular problem of Canadian nuclear or of NATO nuclear weapons. The third, that the obsolescence of modern weaponry was so great, and I think he particularly re-

ferred to the manned bombers, that Canada ought to delay action with respect to the Bomarcs on that basis. Another one, that any arrangement made to have nuclear weapons on Canadian soil would increase the nuclear family, that is, it would proliferate nuclear weapons.

These I think were running throughout the discussion, and these were points that we felt, since we got questions about what our attitude was on these points, we felt it necessary to clarify.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Were his statements inaccurate?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, I think so.

JUST CORRECTING THE RECORD

Senator FULBRIGHT. Can it be truthfully said that you were just correcting the record, I mean that you felt that he had made an inaccurate statement and was trying to put the record straight?

Secretary RUSK. That was our purpose, but again I want to point out in this connection that our need was to clarify the American record in relation to discussions here and with many other governments other than Canada, and it was not aimed just at clarifying the record in Canada, which was Canada's business.

That is, this created a problem for us. Were there secret agreements at Nassau? This is a question put to us. What was said at Nassau that had a bearing on this question, you see. The answer was nothing.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Had he said there were?

Secretary RUSK. I think I have that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is what I meant. Was there a real misrepresentation on his part which compelled an answer?

Senator AIKEN. Senator Fulbright, it seems to me it might be a good idea for the Secretary to furnish us with the statements made by the Secretary on which he based his belief as to inaccuracy.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You mean by the Prime Minister?

Senator AIKEN. By the Prime Minister, yes, because I have read that through, and I can see where one who was competely familiar with the background and also with the intricacies of the policy would read into his speech something which would not appear to the casual reader like myself. Not being familiar with everything that has gone on before in dealings with him over the last years, I expect I was not skillful enough to read the meaning into it that perhaps might have been apparent to the Secretary.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would be in the same situation. Not having known the background, to read it, it would not mean anything to me. But if it was really inaccurate, I don't know that it would be to too many people other than those actually involved, because we would not know enough to know whether it was inaccurate. What I was getting at of course is the obvious, the necessity of a public statement.

Being aware of the fact that there is an election, it is so easy to make an election upon any foreigners, I mean, even the south and the north have been known to have this problem. It is easy to get elected in some Southern States by citing what is said in New York, and perhaps the same or to a greater extent between nations.

REFERENCE TO NATO STRATEGY

I was only asking a very simple question I thought. Did he say something that was so inaccurate you felt it was necessary to rely?

Secretary RUSK. Here is one example, and I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to provide the specific quotes that relate to these particular points that I made, but here is one referring to the NATO strategy:

> That is a tremendous step, a change in the philosophy of defense, a change in the views of NATO if accepted by the NATO partners. It certainly represents a change in the views of two nations which play such a large part in the NATO organization. They went further as I understand it. They concluded that the day of the bomber is phasing out.

Now this was in a context in which the phasing out of the bomber possibly several years later was used as a basis for saying that the bombers are not the threat that we anticipated they would be when the Bomarcs were installed in Canada, again at a cost to the United States of more than $200 million.

Senator SYMINGTON. This is a defense matter involved in this discussion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This refers, that page, as to what was done at Nassau.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator AIKEN. I will say for the Prime Minister that when he disclosed the fact that negotiations were going on, he used plain understandable language.

EMBARRASSMENT TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator FULBRIGHT. Did you feel that that in fact was a violation of your understanding, that he disclosed these negotiations?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it was of some embarrassment to us because we had not discussed the fact of these negotiations with any of the other governments interested in such problems. We had discussed them with key committees of the Congress. We had held them very closely indeed until we found out what was on the Canadian mind on this particular subject so that since they had insisted that these be held on the closest possible basis for them, I think without consultation to indicate that they had been going on caused some problems. But Senator, I would like to emphasize again that for the last four years, a little longer than four years, there has not been any calculated policy of creating difficulties for the Canadian Government, that we have tried in every possible way to find common positions and common answers on matters of mutual concern.

Now we did not say, for example, publicly what we might well have said at a time a few months ago when we, at considerable cost in relation to our gold position, came to their rescue on their gold crisis. Then this was followed by some unexpected action by them in the tariff and trade field shutting off American imports into Canada. We did not make a public issue of that.

DEVELOPING A POLICY TOWARD CUBA

Now we have talked about our problems with Cuba. They have been cooperative in part, but they have not been willing to sit down and develop a Canadian policy toward Cuba as a problem in this Hemisphere. They have been helpful in keeping certain kinds of spare parts from being transshipped from the United States to Cuba, but it was not until by action that we took shutting off foreign exchange from Cuba that the Canadian trade with Cuba dropped significantly, that is, to the extent that it has in recent months.

They have been increasingly cooperative about Cuba in the last three or four months. We have talked with them about such matters as sales of large quantities of food to China, a matter which has very important political and strategic overtones and effects such things as Chinese action in India, but we have not aired these discussions or differences in public with our Canadian friends, and even on this nuclear business we have been willing to go to considerable lengths in exploring ways in which the defense problem could be met within the political framework that they have described to us as being compelling upon them in Canada.

A CAMPAIGN ISSUE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you feel that the Prime Minister was seeking this kind of an issue for the campaign?

Secretary RUSK. I don't think he was seeking our statement. I think that perhaps from that point of view our statement did make it possible for him to raise that as a stronger issue. But this was an issue that he raised in 1958 when he ran for office.

Senator FULBRIGHT. He did?

Secretary RUSK. This is not an original issue with him. And a month ago in his own party congress, he again emphasized the made-in-Canada brand as it applies to Canadian policy.

Senator AIKEN. He did not raise the nuclear issue in 1958, did he?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I am thinking about the anti-American flavor as one that he had raised before.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Finally you made it very clear, I take it, that you take full responsibility, and this is not the doing of the Defense Department.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all.

Senator AIKEN. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't have any questions.

Senator AIKEN. Senator Mansfield.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, did the President know about this release on the 30th?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RELEASE

Senator MANSFIELD. Did the Secretary of State actually know or is he taking responsibility, because he is the Secretary of State?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that in general this creates an impossible theoretical problem for me. It is very difficult for me——

Senator MANSFIELD. Did you see this release actually?

Secretary RUSK. I have to be responsible for every——

Senator MANSFIELD. I understand.

Senator AIKEN. You have already answered that.

Secretary RUSK. No, Mr. Chairman, I haven't answered it I hope, because a thousand cables go out every day from the State Department with my name to them, and I don't feel I can answer this question. I don't see how I can.

Senator MANSFIELD. I think you have answered it in your own way. Who did release this release?

Secretary RUSK. This was released by the Department in the normal way through our Public Affairs Bureau.

Senator MANSFIELD. Who released it?

Secretary RUSK. The Department, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Who wrote it up?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, with ail due respect, I don't think I ought to get into the breakdown of my own responsibilities among my own colleagues.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I can understand the position of the Secretary. I can sympathize with him. I have no further questions.

Senator AIKEN. I wouldn't swap jobs with him either. Senator Sparkman?

Secretary RUSK. I remember a colloquy in this committee with more than one Secretary of State on this particular point, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I do, too.

RESPONSE OF THE SOCIAL CREDIT PARTY

Senator SPARKMAN. Have there been any further developments today other than the resignation of the Defense Minister?

Secretary RUSK. The only thing that I had was a telephone report just before coming into the committee that the head of the Social Credit Party had said that if there were a clearer defense statement forthcoming, that the Social Credit Party would support Mr. Diefenbaker and retain the government. Could I say this off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. The effect of the telephone conversation was that it was believed that such a statement would——

Secretary RUSK. No. sir. This was entirely up in the air.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought you said that——

Secretary RUSK. The Social Credit Party is the minority party.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is a coalition.

Secretary RUSK. That is responsible for maintaining the Diefenbaker coalition.

Senator SPARKMAN. They said they would support the government if he would issue a clear-cut defense policy.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir, but we don't know whether this was official for that particular group or what Mr. Diefen-

baker's reaction to that would be, so we still may have a dissolution or a vote of confidence.

Senator AIKEN. When did they make this statement?

Secretary RUSK. I just picked it up by phone from Ottawa before I came here.

Senator AIKEN. It was after your release or the State Department's release of the 30th?

Secretary RUSK. It was just this afternoon.

Senator AIKEN. Just this afternoon?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. That they would support the Prime Minister?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. If he made a clear-cut defense policy statement.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Is that regardless of what the policy might be?

Secretary RUSK. I had no embroidery, Senator, on the report.

Senator AIKEN. Senator Williams.

RESIGNATION OF THE DEFENSE MINISTER

Senator WILLIAMS. I just noticed on the ticker, I am not sure that the Prime Minister hasn't resigned.

Secretary RUSK. Then you have later information than I.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What is that? I did not hear that.

Senator WILLIAMS. There is an account on the ticker that somebody resigned.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Harkness,[5] the Defense Minister.

Secretary RUSK. I read his letter into the record.

Senator WILLIAMS. Is that the one that was just announced a few moments ago?

Secretary RUSK. That was announced late this morning.

Senator WILLIAMS. I just noticed when I came over——

Senator AIKEN. It was reported to me by the grapevine, from Ottawa about noon the dissolution of parliament was imminent. Of course, it had been imminent for two or three days.

Secretary RUSK. This could be. I don't have information as late as that. If it happened, I didn't know that.

Senator AIKEN. This was about noon. It came from a Canadian reporter who had been in touch with them up there, Senator Symington.

[Discussion off the record.]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO COUNTRIES

Secretary RUSK. Senator, as you know, the reason for not having nuclear weapons in France has been President de Gaulle's view that if they are in France, he must have complete control over them and that there cannot be any joint control, whereas in connection with French forces in Germany, nuclear weapons are with those forces on a joint control basis.

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[5] Douglas S. Harkness resigned on Feb. 4 as a result of his disagreement with Prime Minister Diefenbaker over nuclear weapons.

We are talking here as far as Canada is concerned, we are talking here about arrangements we have with a number of other NATO countries, exactly the same arrangements involving hundreds of nuclear weapons.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator AIKEN. Mrs. Kelly.

DEEP SEATED DIFFERENCES IN CANADA

Mrs. Kelly has been very active in promoting good Canadian-American relations for many years. Edna.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. I think, Mrs. Kelly, that the resignation of the Defense Minister, which as far as our statement was concerned would have been less likely to occur in the face of our statement, illustrates the depth of this issue within Canada without relation to the U.S.-Canadian aspect to this matter. It is a very deep seated difference in Canada within the government and among the leaders of the different parties.

Representative KELLY. I agree with you completely, Mr. Secretary.

Senator AIKEN. Thank you, Mrs. Kelly.

I was going to recall that at the time of our first meeting with the Canadian parliamentarians, Mr. Pearkes was Minister for Defense at that time, he had supposedly briefed the Canadian parliamentarians a day or two before.

He has not told them anything. They didn't even know that we consulted them on hemispheric defense. They didn't know they had offices in all military and strategic positions down here, that is why when they came down here 2 years later, we sent them out to NORAD to see for themselves that Canadians had something to say about hemispheric defense. But up to that time when we first met with them, most of the members of the House of Commons did not know that they had full cooperation from us.

Senator Kuchel, we are glad to have you here today. Have you anything to contribute or any questions to ask of the Secretary?

Senator KUCHEL. No, thank you, sir.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the committee would be willing, since the statement of January 30th was put into the record, if you would be willing to put my statement of February 1st into the record as well.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, indeed, without objection.

[The document referred to follows:]

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 1, 1963

The following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's news conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:

Secretary RUSK. I wish to make a brief statement at the beginning on the criticism we have received from friends in Canada on account of the press statement issued on January 30. There is a strong tradition of fair play in both our countries and our friendship is too close for a misunderstanding of this sort. I wish to say to all Canadians that we regret it if any words of ours have been so phrased as to give offense, but the need to make some clarifying statement arose from a situation not of our making.

It became necessary as the result of statements made in the course of debate in Ottawa last week. Without notice to us—and we understand how this can happen in

the heat of debate—there was a disclosure then of confidential exchanges between our two governments, and a number of arguments were put forward by various speakers which appeared to offer new interpretations of the policies of the United States.

As a result, a number of questions were raised with our government by Canadian and American reporters, by Members of our Congress, and by ordinary citizens. It became clear that we should have to give some account of our own views. This question, after all, is one which involves the legitimate concerns of both are peoples. Our common effort for the defense of North America, and our partnership in NATO necessarily involve us all. Yet we were well aware of the fact that these issues are politically very sensitive in Canada, and we did not wish to engage in discussion at a level which would seem to imply criticism of any individual or group from any leading officer of our government. Neither did we believe that a diplomatic protest was appropriate. Such a protest indeed might have been called interference in the light of the political context in which the initial disclosure of our talks had occurred.

So we determined on a simple statement of the facts as we understand them. I have already expressed my regret if our tone was wrong, but I believe the facts of the position as we understand them were fairly set out, and certainly if the statement contains any errors, we shall be prompt to correct them.

It should be clear to ail North Americans that of course all final decisions about Canada's role in our common defense are for Canada to make, and we in the United States know only too well that decisions about nuclear defense are particularly testing and painful.

We shall always respect the clear decisions of Canada and adapt our policies as well as we can to those decisions, and we shall continue to believe that in the long run the friendship of our two peoples, which we value so highly not only permits, but requires, open and clear explanations on great common problems.

I should also like to comment informally on the suspension of the nuclear test discussions pending the return to the Geneva conference in about ten day's time.

It is always difficult to understand what is in the mind of the other side in a discussion of this sort, and I am sure that there will be considerable speculation as to why the Soviet Union suspended the present discussions. I am inclined to believe that if there is a simple and sufficient answer, we should concentrate on that, even though their could be other factors in the situation. The basic position of the Soviet Union seems to be that national systems, so-called, are adequate to determine whether surreptitious underground tests are in fact being carried out.

Now, from the point of view of the Soviet Union, thinking about the possibility of underground tests in the United States, this may well be so because the open nature of our society, the enormous difficulty which we would have in conducting secret underground tests, and the ready availability of information, may give them confidence that if there is a test ban treaty, they would know if we in fact were conducting tests. But our situation is different, because we are concerned about the possibility of secret tests in a vast area, much of it sparsely populated, inhabited by a closed society, where the ordinary means of information about what is going on in the country are simply not available. Therefore, to us the idea of on-site inspection is not simply a political question involving the acceptance of on-site inspection in principle, but is the practical problem of establishing arrangements which in fact do provide assurance that agreements are being complied with.

From this point of view the two or three on-site inspections suggested by the Soviet Union are not enough. We, ourselves, do not have instruments at the present time which could make those two or three on-site inspections enough.

If the Soviet Union has such instruments, and they may have, but if they have such instruments, they have not agreed to the urgent invitations of both the United States and United Kingdom to come forward with the technical means which might take the place of on-site inspections.

So in summary, we have on the one site a rejection of the practical necessity and utility of on-site inspections, and on the other side a fundamental need to have assurance that in fact such agreements would be carried out.

From this point of view the recent discussions have not in perhaps the most proper sense been called negotiations. It was our hope and expectation that the acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection by the Soviet Union in December might have opened the way for negotiations in the genuine sense of that word. But the general impression is that the Soviet offer of two or three on-site inspections has been on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. So we return to Geneva to see whether we can make any further progress in this field. We hope so. But at the present time we cannot hold out great expectation that this matter can be resolved promptly.

A COMPLICATED PROBLEM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I would merely like to say this. The Canadian political situation is not only complicated now, it has been complicated for a long time.

This matter of defense and the cooperation on defense has been quite a complicated problem. I myself feel that the statement which was issued by the State Department could have been couched in somewhat different terms, perhaps, I don't know, but mindful of the fact that with great frequency other nations seem to think it is open season on the United States. We have constantly turned the other cheek and said nothing about it, nor have we said some things which perhaps should be known in other countries, and for clarification of the situation—as I say, any lawyer knows that another lawyer can never draw a complaint or a petition to suit him. Some things might have been said a little differently, I don't know, but it is entirely possible this may bring this issue to a head with some kind of more satisfactory resolution.

But I am not so sure that we should always keep, I was about to say, virtuously silent, that we should always keep completely silent on every occasion when we are being put upon by other countries. Perhaps we should say something once in a while in a nice way.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that it is relevant. I would like to thank you for that comment because I think it is important.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me say I regret that the hassle has occurred.

Secretary RUSK. I have regretted that, but I do think the telegraphic reporting on the editorial sampling around Canada shows that very quickly after the statement of January 30th, Canadian attention began to function on the merits of the problems rather than just on the fact that we had made a statement. I think this is very important in terms of understanding the United States attitude on some of these issues. It is back now, I think, generally in the same work in which it belonged at the beginning.

Senator AIKEN. Senator Mansfield.

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN CANADA

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I think the factor which bothers us the most is the so-called rise of anti-Americanism on the Canadian side. According to one of your unclassified reports from Canada signed by Gaspard, the Montreal Star carried a story by Peter Truman date-lined Washington which declares:

> The dam broke here yesterday spilling the heaviest official flood of anti-Canadian sentiment in recent history.

Frankly, I am not aware of the anti-Canadian sentiment in this country. I am aware of a certain degree of inbred, if I may use that term, anti-Americanism in Canada, and the thing which has discouraged me is that whether or not the release was justified is secondary to the fact that it has been used as an instrument to stir up our closest friends against our country. It has become an element in Canadian politics, and it has created a situation which I think in the long run will do neither the Canadians nor ourselves any good.

I would express the hope that if statements like this are released in the future, a little thought would be given, despite the fact that there may be plenty of reason for becoming impetuous and impatient, and that a little more diplomacy would be exercised in carrying out our relations with our neighbor. That is all I have to say.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I say just this?

Senator AIKEN. Senator Sparkman.

STATEMENT GIVEN TO CANADIAN EMBASSY

Senator SPARKMAN. Is this the only way this was handled, just through a press release? You did not send a note?

Secretary RUSK. The statement was given to the Canadian Embassy before it was released here.

Senator SPARKMAN. But in the same form?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. And I notice it is justified by the fact that a number of inquiries concerning disclosure during a recent debate in the Canadian House of Commons had been received. I don't know what are the proper ways of handling these things, but somehow or another it strikes me just a little strange the manner in which this was handled.

My feeling is this. I think our attitude is right. I think Canada ought to be required to come up with a definite defense policy and program, and I think that is true with reference to the other countries. I think we are right in the things we have said about feet dragging with the western world generally. But I think a lot depends on the manner in which we say it.

We have got to be strong, and I realize this creates a tightrope that you have to walk, but I think we have to act in such a way as to avoid the semblance of strong arming or trying to dictate or strong-arm our policies. I certainly hope that this works out all right, and that there is no breach between Canada and the United States, because we are too good friends and too dependent upon each other.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The only trouble is it is liable to re-elect Diefenbaker.

Senator SPARKMAN. You say it may re-elect him?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I said what it does, it may re-elect Diefenbaker. It is not what our ultimate relations may be.

SILENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN INTERVENTION

Secretary RUSK. May I make a brief comment on the remarks that Senator Sparkman and Senator Mansfield have just made.

It is a general and subtle policy and practice as far as we are concerned to act like the Britisih civil servant, to give its loyalty to one government at a time. We try to deal on the most loyal basis with the government with which we are dealing in a democratic country.

But I would like to suggest to the committee that the debate in the House of Commons put the United States into Canadian domestic politics; that silence on our part would have been intervention as well as clarifying our own position. This was a part of the choice we had. We were drawn into intervention by what was happening

in Canada, because the things they were talking about so intimately involved us and our policy, that silence too, would have been taking part in that debate in Canada.

I think on this issue the Defense Minister's resignation completely clarified the problem. This was not the problem on January 30th.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, you were reluctant, and I can understand why perhaps, to tell us who wrote this memorandum. Did you know that the memorandum was being released, or did you find out about it after it had been released?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, again, that puts me in a very difficult position. With respect to anything that is said in the Department of State for which I am wholly responsible, I have to always stay with the position because otherwise again a thousand cables a day go out signed by me for which I am responsible.

Senator WILLIAMS. I can understand that.

Secretary RUSK. It is very difficult for me to get into this particular point.

Senator WILLIAMS. I can understand that, but it leaves me with the impression that you did not know it.

Secretary RUSK. I try not to leave any impression on that point, because whatever the answer is, this one, the next one is just as difficult a question, the next one on that particular issue. In other words, I have accepted and do accept full personal responsibility for that statement, and I don't see how I can go beyond that without getting involved in the question as to which of my colleagues advised me in which way on a whole variety of problems.

Senator WILLIAMS. I wasn't asking that question. It did seem to me that it was important on a measure such as this and as important a communication as this, that at least the Secretary of State would know such a statement or that a statement of some kind was being issued. That is my question. Did you know that such a statement was being issued at that time or did you find out about it after it had been issued? That is what my question is.

Secretary RUSK. I knew about the problem raised in Canada and the problem in making a statement. I was fully aware of all the complications that have been discussed here about the problems of pro and con, and that a statement was called for.

Senator WILLIAMS. But you can't tell us whether or not you were aware of the fact that such a statement was going to be issued at that time?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, I was under no doubt that a statement was going to be issued, that is correct.

Senator WILLIAMS. And you approved of the issuing of this statement?

Secretary RUSK. This statement was my statement.

Senator WILLIAMS. We are back where we were before.

Secretary RUSK. I am sorry, sir.

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

Senator AIKEN. Is there anything further to be said at this hearing? I want to thank the Secretary. I wish you to sit where you are for a minute longer. I want to say that the reason for calling this

hearing was in the hope that we might do something to smooth over the troubled waters. I know the way of the peacemaker sometimes is a bit difficult, but we don't want an issue of personalities to develop into a controversy between governments or between peoples, and inasmuch as you have delegated to me the responsibility of preparing a statement for the press, I have done so to the best of my ability in a limited length of time. I would like to read it to you. It is comparatively mild. It perhaps does not represent all my thinking, but it reads as follows:

Our Canadian Affairs Subcommittee on the Committee on Foreign Relations today met with the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. We discussed at length recent charges and countercharges that have developed in connection with certain problems relating to the defense of the North American Continent and the political relationships between the United States and Canada.

The subcommittee discussed with the Secretary of State problems which have arisen relating to the use of nuclear weapons in defense of the North American Continent. Inasmuch as this issue has been the subject of debate in Canada, it would not be appropriate for me or the subcommittee to comment on this subject.

Americans have always recognized that election campaigns and political debates in Canada are solely of concern to Canadians and Canadians have reciprocated by recognizing the American political campaigns are solely the concern of Americans.

I personally believe that future good Canadian-American relationships depend on recognition of this simple fact.

The subcommittee also discussed with the Secretary the Departmental statement of last week which apparently gave offense to some elements within Canada either because of its substance or because of the procedures by which it was issued. This, however, is an internal American matter, and the Secretary of State has already expressed his regret if the tone of the statement was considered offensive by the Canadians.

I take this opportunity to emphasize again, as I have in the past, that Canadians and Americans on basic issues involving freedom and individual self-determination see eye to eye. No problem of significance can disrupt our basic friendship of more than a century's duration.

Senator SPARKMAN. It sounds very good to me.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, what is your reaction?

Secretary RUSK. I was just trying to consider in view of the unknown situation even at this moment in Ottawa, the less said the better.

Senator AIKEN. This doesn't say much. This is what I had in mind.

Secretary RUSK. I think on the whole this would not add to the difficulties.

Senator AIKEN. I don't see how it could pour any oil on the fire.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator AIKEN. I thank everybody for coming.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

ACTIVITIES OF NONDIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN PRINCIPALS IN THE UNITED STATES

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In 1962 the Foreign Relations Committee launched a study of lobbying by foreign governments. Chairman Fulbright charged that there has been "an increasing number of incidents involving attempts by foreign governments, or their agents, to influence the conduct of American foreign policy by techniques outside the normal diplomatic channels." Although the committee held no hearings in 1962, it issued a staff report which found that the Department of Justice had only sporadically enforced the disclosure requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938.

[In February and March, 1963, the committee held closed-door hearings, and on March 14, 1963 the Senate passed S. Res. 26 to permit the investigation to continue for another year. In June the committee heard testimony in open session. Much of the closed testimony was also published. As a result of these hearings, Senators Fulbright and Hickenlooper introduced S. 2136, designed to close loopholes in the Foreign Agents Registration Act.]

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room S-116 U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Symington, Church and Hickenlooper.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Pincus, Mr. Sifton and Mr. Yingling of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The committee is meeting this morning in executive session to follow up on our open hearing yesterday with Under Secretary of State Ball. Before hearing Mr. Ball's testimony, however, I believe it would be helpful for the committee to address a few questions to Mr. Murrow, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, concerning the activities of that agency in disseminating information about the United States overseas.

On January 10th, I wrote to Mr. Murrow and told him of our interest. My letter to Mr. Murrow will be inserted in the record at this point.

[The letter referred to follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
January 10, 1963.

The Honorable EDWARD R. MURROW,
Director, United States Information Agency, Washington 25, DC

DEAR MR. DIRECTOR: As you know, Senate Resolution 362, approved by the Senate on July 12, 1962, authorizes the Committee on Foreign Relations, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, "to conduct a full and complete study of all nondiplomatic activities of representatives of foreign governments, and the extent to which such representatives attempt to influence the policies of the United States and affect the national interest."

During the past six months, the Committee has had underway the investigative phase of this study.

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We are now planning to move into the second phase of our study—the holding of executive and public hearings to develop a record of information that will permit the Committee and the Senate better to understand the legislative and administrative requirements that arise from activities of nondiplomatic agents.

During this second phase, we plan to take testimony from executive departments and agencies, from nondiplomatic agents, and from other interested parties.

The activities of these nondiplomatic agents as disclosed by our investigation have raised a primary question—the extent to which these agents interfere with United States foreign policy as determined by the Congress and the Administration.

The Committee has realized from the start of its study that public disclosure of the details of nondiplomatic activities—particularly in the public relations field—might have an impact on the USIA effort abroad. On October 9, 1962, Mr. Carl Marcy, Staff Director of this Committee and Walter Pincus, staff consultant, met with your Executive Assistant, Mr. Reed Harris, to discuss this problem and to give your agency an idea of the types of material that might be developed publicly in the course of the Committee's investigation.

As the Committee begins its hearings, we believe it important for the Members to be aware of activities which your agency undertakes abroad that parallel activities carried on in this country by nondiplomatic agents of foreign governments. Further, we believe it important for Committee Members to know those areas of our inquiry where public disclosure might be harmful to the USIA mission abroad.

The Committee has tentatively decided to open its hearings February 4 with public testimony from the Department of State. An executive session of the Committee has been planned for February 5 at 10:00 a.m. to permit State Department witnesses to present material and answer questions deemed inappropriate for the public session.

The Committee requests that you, or whomever you designate, present at this February 5 executive session USIA's views on the subject matter mentioned above. The Committee further requests that any formal statement to be presented on behalf of your Agency be submitted to the Committee 48 hours in advance of the scheduled hearings.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT, *Chairman.*

The CHAIRMAN. The principal purpose is that in asking Mr. Murrow to appear is to acquaint the members of the committee with the nature of our activities overseas so that we may measure them against similar activities taken by foreign governments, diplomatic representatives, information services and nondiplomatic agencies. Furthermore, we are interested to know whether activities undertaken by foreign agents of this country may in any degree aggravate problems in which Mr. Murrow's agency may have in attempting to explain official United States policy abroad.

Mr. Murrow, I believe you have an opening statement which you would like to read to the committee.

Mr. MURROW. I have a brief statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. MURROW, DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

Mr. MURROW. The legislative authority of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) permits a wide range of informational activities, including the kind described by the Committee on Foreign Relations as non-diplomatic activities of the representatives of foreign governments. We believe that most of the Agency's activities in this area do, however, differ significantly from the examples cited in the committee's preliminary study of July 1962, for the reasons stated below.

At the outset, I want to make clear that our Agency encourages a policy of not attributing media products to the United States Government when they will be more acceptable or more effective

without an official stamp, unless law or custom dictates otherwise. This policy was affirmed in a confidential message to all posts on April 23, 1962.

We are, thus, distributing newspaper and magazine articles, books, television shows, motion pictures and newsreels, magazines, newspaper supplements, and radio programs in all parts of the world which carry no U.S. label, official or unofficial.

I should like to emphasize that the use of unattributed materials does not permit or encourage license in output. On the contrary, they must meet standards of quality as rigid as those required for our publicly identified products.

First of all, although not attributed, they must be "attributable." That is to say, although we do not proclaim their origin, we are ready to acknowledge it. This principle was established by the Executive Branch of the Government on October 24, 1953, and is still in operation. We insist that all unattributed materials of the Agency must meet the following standards:

1. Disclosure of the source will not cause serious embarrassment to the U.S. Government or the agencies responsible.

2. The materials will not be seriously discredited if the U.S. Government were revealed as the source.

3. The outlet for distribution—if a non-government sponsor is used as the ostensible source—will not be seriously damaged.

CRITERIA FOR USIA ACTIVITIES

Here are other aspects of our activities which I believe distinguish them from most of the cases under review by the committee:

1. Our work, whether attributed or unattributed, is conducted by diplomatic officials of the United States Government, duly accredited to the host government, conducting their work under the laws and regulations of the host country. Our Public Affairs Officers, that is the chiefs of our USIS missions, are invariably accredited diplomats, often of counselor rank, as are the principal American members of the USIS staffs.

2. Our unattributed activities are almost always carried on with the knowledge, and more often than not the support, of the host governments. In some instances, our work is in fact attributed to the host government.

3. The exchange of persons programs of the United States Government——

The CHAIRMAN. May I say with their consent?

Mr. MURROW. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Attributed to the host government with their consent.

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MURROW. The exchange of persons programs of the United States Government—which the Agency administers in the field—are completely open. We publicize these exchanges, making clear that the people invited are official guests of the United States. This applies to journalists as well as leaders. Most of these guests, including the journalists, are happy to acknowledge the official nature of their invitations.

4. We contract with individuals and organizations for products—articles, motion pictures, radio scripts and shows, books, and so forth—but we do not employ individuals as lobbyists to conduct our work of information and persuasion.

5. Many countries have government agencies which keep running supervision on our work and products, for example, information ministries, cultural ministries, film and television censorship instruments, publication review boards, and the like.

6. In certain friendly countries with complex and sensitive political situations, identification of some of our materials could cause difficulties for the government and our own operations. In these circumstances, the government quietly encourages us to do some of our work without attribution.

In sum, the work we do, whether attributed to the United States Government or not, is nearly always done with at least the authority and approval of the host government, and usually with its active support. By and large, the demand for our unattributed materials is greater than we can fill with our present resources.

We would not want the source of some individual products to be identified, because it would either impair their effectiveness or completely prevent continuing them.

SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF USIA ACTIVITIES

I would like to give the committee some specific examples in this executive session.

1. Public revelation of our support of book translation and distribution activities in the United Arab Republic and Iraq might compel the governments to take action against them.

2. Public revelation of our support of certain newsreels would jeopardize their effectiveness and possibly their existence. I think particularly of one which has wide commercial distribution in the Near East, Far East, and Africa; and one which is produced in Brazil for that country.

3. Public identification of the United States as sponsor of an effective weekly radio program in Mexico might compromise both its effectiveness and its use. We are now placing some 8,000 hours of radio programs on medium wave stations not owned by the United States Government around the world every week, virtually all of it unattributed, and identification of these programs would be damaging.

4. Disclosure of our hand in the information activities of the Vietnamese Government would certainly reduce the effectiveness of the psychological programs in that critical country.

I hope this brief exposition of our methods of operation and the safeguards we employ has been responsive to the committee's interests. I will, of course, be glad to furnish further information and examples of our work. I should also welcome the opportunity to show the committee samples or our films, TV programs, publications and other products.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Murrow.

EMPLOYMENT OF PRIVATE CITIZENS

I notice on page 1 you say about the third paragraph, "Unless law or custom dictates otherwise."

Now, in this country you are familiar with the Foreign Agent's Registration Act?

Mr. MURROW. Yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, does any other country you know of have a similar act?

Mr. MURROW. Not, so far as I know, an identical act, Mr. Chairman, but in some countries we are required to submit our film or television programs for censorship, our books or pamphlets for approval before we are permitted to distribute them.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not, to put it another way, employ a nondiplomatic private citizen in any of these countries to distribute these materials, do you? Do it all through your own——

Mr. MURROW. No sir. In some cases we have local employees. Indeed, in practically all cases. They are engaged, however, in such work as translation, the distribution of material. They are not engaged in what would be termed in this country, I believe, lobbying activities, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they in any case undertake to distributed material without the knowledge and approval of the host government?

Mr. MURROW. There are two principal cases in which unattributed materials are so distributed. One is book programs, the other has to do with the distribution of a newsreel, which is very widely distributed and is not attributed, and in some cases that fact is not known to the host government.

The CHAIRMAN. You spoke of translators and so on.

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir.

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

The CHAIRMAN. Do you employ what is comparable to public relations firms in America, if there are such creatures in other countries, to try to improve our image, as they say?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir, we do not. The only activity that would be even remotely related to that would be our employment upon occasion of local organizations to conduct public opinion polls simply because they have the machinery and the personnel but then, of course, it is not comparable to what you suggest.

The CHAIRMAN. They are not trying to create it?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They are merely trying to find out what it is.

Mr. MURROW. That is precisely right.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is quite a different function.

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir.

NO EMPLOYMENT OF LOBBYISTS

The CHAIRMAN. You say, "We do not employ individuals as lobbyists to conduct our work of information and persuasion." In other words, you do not employ anyone to seek directly to influence the legislatures or the executive of a government?

Mr. MURROW. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you ever make contributions to candidates for office in any of these countries?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir. We do not employ any "nondiplomatic" people for that purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Directly or indirectly?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no funds for that purpose?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you knowledge of any instance in which the activities of foreign agents in this country have increased the problems of your explaining our official policy abroad? You are familiar, for example, with at least the activities of some of the representatives, the most recent one is in the case of Katanga. Did their activities in any way affect your problems abroad?

Mr. MURROW. To a limited extent I would say yes, sir. By a limited extent I mean that some of the information produced by Struelens [1] in this country, appearing in print and on the radio in this country were played back to foreign countries and received some display there.

The CHAIRMAN. Which, in other words, caused you to have to correct the record and to explain, put you on the defensive, is that right?

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir; to a certain extent, yes, sir.

THE CHINA LOBBY

The CHAIRMAN. And there may have been other instances of this. Can you think of other instances of this type of thing?

Mr. MURROW. I cannot. May I consult my colleagues?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURROW. I cannot think of additional recent examples, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not as active now, but at one time there was much in the press about the China lobby and our policy with regard to Chiang Kai-shek, that was before you came in, of course. It has not been active to my knowledge lately, but that would be an example.

Mr. MURROW. It would, I think, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That you would have to spend considerable energy to keep our policy in focus in a foreign country, wouldn't it?

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir.

HIRING PUBLIC RELATIONS FIRMS

The CHAIRMAN. Won't it be better, do you think, for the State Department to spend time and effort instructing, we will say, the foreign press attachés in foreign embassies, if you like, any of their employees—especially I am thinking of these new countries. I am not thinking of Britain and France, but these some 50 new countries—than to let them hire these public relations people outside of the embassies? Would you not think that would be more orderly and more wise a course to follow?

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[1] In April 1963 Michael Struelens, a Belgian, was ordered to leave the United States on the grounds that he was engaging in propaganda activities on behalf of the secessionist Katanga Province.

In other words, in the testimony yesterday, there were instances, apparently, where a foreign government comes into the State Department and says, "We don't understand a lot of these things. Who can you recommend that we hire to press our case on the Hill," or wherever you like. It strikes me it would be more orderly and more in accordance with your own policies to try to instruct these people to do it themselves through the regular diplomatic channels.

Mr. MURROW. I think the fuller and freer the flow of information the better. We recognize the necessity of doing what you suggest when we created in New York a center for foreign correspondents, where they listen to background briefings that are fed up by lines from Washington. We supplied them with a library and background information on our policies.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you try to undertake to inform the people in your field, that is in journalism and so on, so they don't have to go hire a public relations firm to do it?

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your attitude, since you are a well-known member of the journalistic profession, I guess that is correct, mostly television, how do you call the television profession?

Mr. MURROW. I think it is generally referred to as the electronics profession.

The CHAIRMAN. Electronics profession.

ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE JOURNALISTS

What do you think of the practice of accepting free trips, gifts or even direct payments from foreign sources with the tacit understanding, if not the explicit understanding, that you will write or broadcast favorable reports in return?

Mr. MURROW. Well, sir, I cannot recall a single instance where I accepted such transportation or gratuity myself. I think it is a doubtful journalistic practice, and should be discouraged, not by the government but by the editors and managing editors and heads of networks.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if this practice does exist, you think it should be discouraged?

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the hearings will reveal that this has been done.

Mr. MURROW. It has.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You think it has, too.

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir, it has.

CONTRACTORS FOR USIA

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned in your statement some American contractors for USIA. Is this what you say is in regard to publication of books, translations?

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand correctly in no case were they employed as lobbyists to influence legislation?

Mr. MURROW. That is entirely correct, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if that might not be useful to us if you could give the committee a list of some of these contractors so that we can compare them—what we are trying to do here is to compare your activities with those of foreign governments in this country, to see if there is any difference. Have you examined that, are you prepared to do it now or will you supply it for the record?

Mr. MURROW. We can supply it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it might be useful.

Do you know whether some of these contractors who place your newsreel abroad or documentaries, any kind of material, also perform the same function for a foreign government in this country?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir, not so far as we are aware.

PROPAGANDA FILMS ON TELEVISION

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think would be the reaction in other countries, if it should turn out that contrary to our law, the Foreign Agent's Registration Act, that certain other governments have been placing unlabeled and unattributed propaganda films on U.S. television, in U.S. motion picture theaters? We believe, for example, that the Nationalist Chinese Government and the South African Government have done this. We haven't yet proceeded to the point of proving this but our information would indicate that.

Do you think that is a legitimate practice? It strikes us as being contrary to the law in the first place. Would this have any effect upon your activities of placing unattributed material abroad?

Mr. MURROW. I think in some cases, Mr. Chairman, it would. It is very difficult to predict because as I indicated the type and manner of control exercised over our output varies from country to country. This might possibly produce retaliation, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, if your activities, as you have stated them, have all been approved or at least are not disapproved with knowledge, you mentioned specifically some sensitive places as in the Arab world——

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Where they know it but they don't wish to be confronted with that publicly and, therefore, just ignore it, since they are doing that they must think this is to their advantage. I don't know why they should retaliate if they are doing it with knowledge.

You see, in our case, our government is not aware of this, we are not consulted about placing these. They hire the public relations firms and they can do it without saying anything about it.

Mr. MURROW. There are, as I indicated, some places where the government does not know the source.

The CHAIRMAN. In those cases if it happened to be the same country it might be that you might run into some difficulty.

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir, then it is possible.

ACTIONS OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The CHAIRMAN. If it wasn't the same country, merely on general principles they wouldn't like to do anything but it would only be if it involved the particular country in which you are operating, is that right?

Mr. MURROW. I would think that is true. I would think that anything that tended to limit the freedom of operation of such organizations as the French Information Service, the British Information Service might possibly produce adverse reaction, but again I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Offhand, I am not aware of those sophisticated countries engaging in this to any extent. They have very able and experienced staffs of their own. I haven't run across any cases where those two governments have employed public relations people.

Mr. MURROW. Nor have I.

The CHAIRMAN. It is usually the more innocent, newer countries who feel they need this. And one of the most glaring cases, I am sure you are familiar with it, is Trujillo, you remember his effort with Mutual Broadcasting, you are familiar with that?

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir. I am not familiar with the details but I recall the incident.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't approve of that kind of activity?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you don't undertake that kind of activity?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir. We did undertake, Mr. Chairman, and this might perhaps be of interest to you, I don't know. But we did undertake in the Dominican Republic in the course of the last six months a very considerable civic education campaign with some 15 or 16 mobile projectors in the field designed to do only one thing and that was to get out the vote, and this was done in such a fashion that it produced no complaints from any of the candidates.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't take sides, you merely asked them to vote?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir, we did not.

The CHAIRMAN. And this was with the approval of the government?

Mr. MURROW. Yes, this was a combination of get out to vote and anti-Castro material.

VIETNAM PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. You made reference to a public relations program in Vietnam. Does this include dealing with American newsmen working in Vietnam?

Mr. MURROW. We deal with American newsmen working in Vietnam. Yes, sir, we supply them with information.

LETTER OF COMPLAINT

The CHAIRMAN. This is a letter that the committee received, that was addressed to me, Mr. Murrow, signed by the president of the Evening Herald. I will read it to you and I would like your comment on it.

It is dated January 30, 1963 and it says:

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Since hearings will start shortly on lobbying by American firms and individuals for the benefit of foreign countries, I am passing on now information received in a personal letter from the Publisher of the Evening Herald, who has not yet returned from a trip around Africa. Our publisher, Mr. Wayne C. Sellers, is with what is referred to as a "Study group" of the National Editorial As-

sociation. After he reached Johannesburg he wrote in this personal letter in part as follows:

"We had five days in Angola and I was terribly upset by it all. I have never seen such blatant brainwashing and we freeloaded through all of it, including terribly expensive lunches, dinners, cocktail parties, etc. One of the American consulate staff told me at lunch yesterday there was a significant side we weren't seeing. We were taken on a tour of fancy schools, hospitals, and such. I am disturbed that many of our group seems to have fallen for it and I am more greatly disturbed that Ted Serrill, National Editorial Association Executive Secretary, did not explain in advance what was to happen and that Angola businessmen with axes to grind were paying for our visit there. We have not yet had an explanation from him and I am going to challenge him about it. I am gratified that Lowell Jessen of Turlock, California, former California Newspaper Publishers Association president, and one of the few really professional newspapermen, feels exactly like I do. In fact, he dug deeper than I did. We talked about it at length last night.

"I stayed out of some of the Angolan activities and tried prowling around Benguela because I knew I would stay emotionally aroused as I watched what was being done to our group and hearing them say, 'This is really the stuff. These Portuguese and Angolans have the answer. We could use some of this.' (Those aren't literal quotes.)

"What made it worse to me was that American public relations people staged the whole show with the obvious purpose of changing our national policies. The firm is Selvage and Lee and they have an office in Luanda. A member of their staff has also traveled with us wearing a badge showing he is with the South Sioux City, Nebraska, newspaper. He told me he owns it but has been with this firm since leaving the Eisenhower administration.

"The Milburn McCarty firm of 230 Park Avenue, New York represents the Adoula government of the Congo and one of their men was interpreter for Adoula when we met with him.

"The consular official in Luanda said ours was one of the few groups they had not had an opportunity to brief because there wasn't time in our schedule.

"What upsets me so much is that so many of our people who seemed to be so impressed overlook the fact that Angola and Portugal are just as much of a dictatorship as Spain or Russia."

Ordinarily, I would have waited until the return of Mr. Sellers to ask his permission that this information be put before the committee. He probably would have been glad to supply it, but in a somewhat more formal shape. However, because of the time element involved, I thought it better to send this on to you now. After he is back in Rock Hill February 11, 1963, I'll discuss with him whether he wishes to send any additional information to your committee.

TOUR ORGANIZED BY A PRIVATE FIRM

What do you think of that kind of activity?

Mr. MURROW. I am not familiar with this particular venture, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard of other ventures similar?

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir, I have. It is not an uncommon practice, as you suggest.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is in the national interest of this country?

Mr. MURROW. I should think this is a matter of decision by the visiting group of journalists.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand it, this is not similar to your activities?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Here it is a private publications firm, Selvage and Lee, organizing this tour which was paid for apparently by interests in Angola, and the tour was so arranged as clearly to try, according to this man as he calls it, to brainwash them, to create a much more favorable impression on all of the journalists who went there than the conditions really warrant, that they were given

guided tours, so to speak. This is apparently promoted, arranged, by Selvage and Lee which is one of the big public relations firms in the country. You are familiar with that firm?

Mr. MURROW. Yes, sir.

EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think this is in the national interest to allow this kind of activity?

Mr. MURROW. I don't see how it could be prevented. It is not the manner in which the State Department deals with journalists who come here nor the manner that we brief journalists who go abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. But isn't the purpose, if I understand this letter, of such a trip to ultimately influence the foreign policy of this country regarding Angola and Portugal?

Mr. MURROW. I would have thought so, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me this is an extracurricular activity that we shouldn't encourage. In other words, that distorts the real facts, doesn't it, if this is correct?

Mr. MURROW. If that is correct, it does, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It would tend to mislead the people of this country as to what the proper policy should be, would it not?

Mr. MURROW. I think it would. But I see no way of preventing it if journalists or editors are prepared to accept under these conditions, and be, as you put it, brainwashed while they are abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. The theory of this act is not so much prohibiting these activities, it is to discourage it by disclosure, the whole theory of it. It seems to me if this is not a proper practice while we don't throw them all in jail, we ought to make it known, we ought to publicize it, draw their attention to it. This man apparently went without knowing what he was getting into.

Mr. MURROW. It would appear to be the case.

The CHAIRMAN. And was offended by the extreme measures they took, for example, to prevent being briefed by our own government officials, no time on the schedule for that so they run them through a pre-arranged schedule without allowing them to be briefed or instructed insofar as they could by our own officials when they arrived there, if I understand it. I just wondered what your reaction to this kind of activity is? It certainly was designed to influence the attitude and the policies of these editors when they got back home. This is what is called approaching it from the grass roots, isn't it?

Mr. MURROW. I would suppose so.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of these editors, and, of course, I suppose they certainly have the very specialists and so on, would come back and spread the good word; isn't that the purpose of it?

Mr. MURROW. I would think so, yes.

DISTORTED REPORTS BY OFFICIALS

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you wish to make any comments, or ask a question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This letter is interesting and it raises some other interesting elements. I think, perhaps this goes on in this kind of presentation by hired agents. This is what we are

trying to get at, to see what goes on and what doesn't. While I don't have any particular defense at the moment or any particular condemnation of this one way or the other, in my own experience for many years I have seen probably as much the one-sided, biased, distorted, puffing talk on the part of our American officials abroad as to the whale of a job they are doing until when you finally dig up the fact that the thing is on dead center and they are not doing anything or going backwards.

So it works both ways. I have in mind, for instance, what we the public is told repeatedly that the Alliance of Progress is going great guns, what a great success it is. Well, all you have to do is talk to people who know anything about it down there, who see it in perspective. The Alliance for Progress is on dead center, has been and at the moment there doesn't seem to be any way of getting it off. So our own government people are just as guilty of distortion in my judgment in many cases on the side of what the government agencies are doing. They are just as guilty of distortion as the people who are hired and for revenue distorted on the other side.

EXAMPLE OF CONGRESSIONAL VISITS

I am assuming for the sake of argument that this picture was distorted by paid people who for revenue were presenting only their side of the question.

It is a very difficult thing to get at, just cut through and get at the bare truth of this situation. But I do submit that there are government people abroad in many instances are certainly guilty of distortion. When anybody from Congress goes there they are met at the plane and they are whisked immediately to a meeting which is pre-arranged and then go to luncheon where the guest list is all set and only the proper persons are there. The afternoon is entirely taken up by an arranged meeting with the right people in that country, and nothing but praise is forthcoming for the great job we are doing, and then somebody has a long dinner in the evening, and the next morning is a repetition of the same thing. I mean that is the general pattern of occupying time on the part of government officials who go abroad.

I don't excuse this situation but I do say this is a coin which has two sides to it, and it is something that we should be concerned about. In this hearing, as the chairman has pointed out, we are concerned with whether or not the law is being flouted or whether there is a failure to conform to it or whether it needs strengthening, that is where the governments hire local people to represent them here and what the circumstances are.

A GAME PLAYED ON BOTH SIDES

I think there is plenty of room for correction and plenty of room for examination here but this letter is rather interesting because exactly what he says about the presentation that they receive, and—I will use the term brainwashing not that that is necessarily an apt term but he used it in his letter—the brainwashing goes on on the other side just the same as it does on the side of the people who presented it.

For a number of years that I have gone abroad I have insisted that they keep social engagements to an absolute minimum, cut them out entirely. I found most of them are not productive of anything except small talk and compliments, and I have insisted that at least half of my time each day be free. There have been some occasions when I have met with local people and there has been a great to-do around and about, "Who did he see, what did he talk about, who did he see talking about this person and that person?"

It is a fascinating little game and played on both sides. And I would like to see it shaken down so we can get to really feel that we look at both sides of the question. That is the only comment I have on that letter and I don't dispute anything that is said in the letter. I haven't the slightest doubt but what they were given a front row treatment when they got there, and only the finest things were put out. But it happens on the other side, too.

After having delivered myself of that peroration I haven't much to say except to try to get at the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington, do you have any questions?

Senator SYMINGTON. No, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I was late. I welcome Mr. Murrow for the grand job he is doing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry, I don't have your statement. I have it here and I shall read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything else you would like to add?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir, I think not, Mr. Chairman. We will supply you with the list as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much then.

Mr. Secretary, are you ready to resume our——

SHOULD FOREIGN AGENT LAW BE TIGHTENED?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me, may I just ask Mr. Murrow, in your experience have you had occasion to make up your mind on whether or not agents of foreign governments—bear in mind I see nothing wrong in the legitimate hiring by a foreign government of someone in the United States to represent them legitimately and properly on advice. The principle of the thing is not on trial, have you in your experience come to any conclusions as to whether or not there is real compliance with the law, the spirit of the law, by way of disclosure or whether the law ought to be tightened?

Have you gotten into that phase of it at all?

Mr. MURROW. No, sir, I have not, Senator Hickenlooper, because as you know this is outside of the purview of the agency.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't want to pursue it with you if you haven't had occasion to form an opinion on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Murrow.

Mr. Secretary, we discussed in general terms yesterday policies which are now in effect with respect to foreign agent's registration in the United States. In executive session we would like to talk about some specific cases. I understand you have a prepared statement which would present to the committee some specific examples that may have given the Department of State some concern.

Would you care to proceed now?

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. BALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ABRAM CHAYES, THE LEGAL ADVISER, AND ROBERT E. LEE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

Mr. BALL. I didn't have in mind making a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry if I misunderstood the committee's wishes on that. I certainly would be willing to answer any questions the committee would have.

The CHAIRMAN. We will start by asking you to give the committee the description on the non-diplomatic activities which have been carried on by, for example, to begin with, the Dominican Republic under Trujillo.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. To include both their general activities as well as the specific activities of Igor Cassini during the period of 1959–1960.[2]

Mr. BALL. All right, I would be glad to.

ACTIVITIES OF IGOR CASSINI

It is our understanding, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Igor Cassini on the 22nd of June, 1959 signed a one-year contract with the Dominican government which had been under negotiation for two or three months before that. Under the terms of that contract Mr. Cassini was to receive $150,000 plus $10,000 for expenses. The purpose of his being retained was to improve the image of the Trujillo regime in the United States. It is our understanding that he set up a dummy corporation to handle the Dominican account and that he did not register himself or the company as an agent for the Dominican government.

Now, this contract terminated in June of 1960.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you mind an interruption?

Mr. BALL. Certainly not, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did he conduct these negotiations personally prior to setting up the dummy corporation?

Mr. BALL. So far as I know he did. I don't have any specific information on that.

The contract was terminated in June of 1960. The information is not very clear concerning the relationship between Mr. Cassini and the Dominican government in the period between June, 1960, and April of 1961. But so far as we know there was no contract in effect during this period. He proposed the conclusion of a contract in late April, 1961 and in June a second one-year contract was concluded calling for the payment of $120,000 plus expenses with a clause calling for a subsequent two-year contract at $200,000 for the first year, and $150,000 for the second year. In the course of the June, 1961 contract, diplomatic relations between the United States and the Dominican Republic were restored.

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[2] On October 8, 1963, New York society columnist Igor Cassini pleaded no contest to charges that he had failed to register as a paid foreign agent for the Dominican Republic.

CONSIDERATION BY THE GRAND JURY

It is my understanding that the information that we have, or rather the Department of Justice has accumulated with regard to this, has been presented to a Grand Jury, and the Grand Jury has under consideration a possible indictment. The decision of the Grand Jury has been expected daily. It is possible that it will come down today. So far as I know it did not yesterday.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is the Grand Jury?

Mr. BALL. I think it is sitting in the Federal Court in the District.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir, it is sitting here.

Mr. BALL. So I raise with the committee the desirability of disclosing at this point the information which has been presented to the Grand Jury because of the probability that there will be an indictment in this case.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you learn about this contract?

Mr. BALL. So far as our records would indicate we first knew about the contract as the result of an FBI report which was dated in late May of 1961. This was based on information supplied by someone whose reliability could not be determined at that time. The informant reported negotiations in May between Cassini and the Dominican Consul General in New York, a man named Luis Mercado, concerning the contract.

On June 9, 1961——

WHEN THE INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED

The CHAIRMAN. Were you informed of it in 1961?

Mr. BALL. I was not personally informed, I think the FBI sent that information to the State Department, as I recall.

Mr. CHAYES. We can't conclude that anyone other than the desk officer for the Dominican Republic saw the report or had the information.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't do anything about it in 1961, did you?

Mr. BALL. As I explained yesterday, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Did anybody?

Mr. BALL. The administration and the enforcement of this act is a matter for the Department of Justice. The State Department has no enforcement machinery and no powers of enforcement.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but it came to your attention?

Mr. BALL. This was a matter that was under investigation by the FBI. They had this information which was received and reported in the FBI report dated late May, 1961.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the explanation of why Justice didn't do anything about it?

Mr. BALL. They continued the investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it a fact they didn't do anything about it until this committee became interested in it?

Mr. BALL. I don't know when the presentation was made to the Grand Jury. Do you have that information?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't know.

THE CLEAREST KIND OF A VIOLATION

The CHAIRMAN. It seems a little odd to me as long ago as 1961 this came to their attention that nothing was done about it until this committee showed an interest in it.

Doesn't it seem a little strange to you?

Mr. BALL. As I say, I really don't know anything about——

The CHAIRMAN. I agree that is more appropriate to the Justice Department.

Mr. BALL [continuing.] When the presentation was made. We have no information about it.

The CHAIRMAN. This fellow didn't register at all?

Mr. BALL. No, he didn't register at all.

The CHAIRMAN. They knew about it, he made the contract and didn't do anything about it. It is the clearest kind of a violation that you can have.

Mr. BALL. I would certainly think it is clear and I would suppose that the clarity of it will be determined to some extent by the Grand Jury.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be the final thing.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. I have one more, and you may.

STATE DEPARTMENT DEALINGS WITH CASSINI

Did the Department have any dealings with Mr. Cassini between 1961 and 1962?

Mr. BALL. No, the Department as such did not. There was, however, this dealing with him, which I think should be known to the committee. In April of 1961, before even this preliminary information was made known in the FBI report, the Administration was concerned with the problem of trying to reduce the influence of the Trujillos in the Dominican Republic. This had been a project which had been continued for some time. My impression is that it had been undertaken also during the preceding administration.

With that in mind there was a decision made to attempt to influence the Trujillos to give up part of their power and gradually disengage and get out, with the idea that then a moderate democratic regime might slowly evolve there. With this in mind, Mr. Robert Murphy, who was a former Under Secretary of State, and former Ambassador, was asked to carry out a confidential mission.

The CHAIRMAN. By the Department?

Mr. BALL. Yes. He was asked by the Department to carry out a confidential mission, and he went to the Dominican Republic in mid-April, 1961.

Now, it was known at that time that Mr. Cassini was on very good terms with the Dominican officials, and it was thought that Mr. Cassini might be a useful fellow to help make arrangements for this visit and pave the way for access by Ambassador Murphy to the major personalities in the Dominican Republic whom he was trying to get in touch with. So it was set up that he, Mr. Cassini, accompany Mr. Murphy on the trip, and this was done, as I understand it.

AN EXPLORATORY MISSION

Mr. Murphy did see a number of the leading officials in the Dominican Republic, including the dictator, Trujillo, and subsequently Mr. Murphy kept in touch with Cassini until such time as the matter of Cassini's representation of the Dominican Republic was brought to light.

The CHAIRMAN. You say the Department didn't do anything. Who did make the decision to send Mr. Murphy on it, did the Department do that?

Mr. BALL. No, I say he was designated by the Department of State.

The CHAIRMAN. Who, in the Department?

Mr. BALL. At that time I was not personally involved and I am not quite sure, but it was done in consultation with the White House, I think probably Secretary Rusk himself. I will have to ask him. I don't know that specifically.

The CHAIRMAN. Then Secretary Rusk thought this would be helpful?

Mr. BALL. Yes. A mission of this kind. It was an exploratory mission, just to see what the possibilities were of trying to induce the Trujillos to get out. I would like to give you a little of the background.

The Trujillos were, as I need not tell this committee, a very bloodthirsty regime and they were in full command of the military forces during that time. There was always the danger that if any forceful effort were attempted to drive the Trujillos out that it would result in a blood bath and the liquidation of the democratic elements in the country.

On the other hand there were some indications that the regime was losing its strength. The Generalissimo was getting old, and the family were more interested perhaps in money than in power. It was considered at least worth exploring whether they might be willing to get out of the country peacefully and let the moderate democratic elements gradually take over.

We were afraid that if this ever came to a violent revolution that it would be an entering wedge for Castroism, being close enough to Cuba that it would have been a relatively easy place for penetration. On the other hand, if the evolution could be worked out on a peaceful basis it would be better.

WHY WAS CASSINI CONSULTED?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ball, we know the history of that situation. I am interested in the specifics here. We are not interested in reviewing our policy. Mr. Cassini here was employed by Trujillo to keep Trujillo in or at least to promote his interests. How did it happen that he was consulted on a project which, if I understand you, which I did understand, as a matter of fact, back long ago our policy was to get him out? Who thought that Cassini would contribute to the achievement of American foreign policy in this instance?

Mr. BALL. Well, he was identified with Trujillo well enough——

The CHAIRMAN. He was in his employ, wasn't he?

Mr. BALL. That was a fact which, of course, was not then known.

The CHAIRMAN. The FBI knew it, didn't they?

Mr. BALL. No, the FBI—I think the chronology here is useful. The FBI report, as I understand it, was at the end of May, 1961. The mission was in April, and this information had not come to the attention of the administration until this FBI report. Let me say that the FBI report——

REASONS FOR THE FBI INVESTIGATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What was the occasion for the FBI investigation, I mean, why did the FBI investigate?

Mr. BALL. This FBI report in the latter part of May, 1961 simply reflected information which had been given to the FBI by a person whose reliability the FBI was not then able to judge. They simply had an informer who gave the information to the FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. So the FBI's interest in it came as a result of some informer?

Mr. BALL. As an informer supplying the information. This informer simply reported the negotiations between Cassini and the Dominican Consul General.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that date?

Mr. BALL. It was the latter part of May, 1961.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

The CHAIRMAN. When was this mission undertaken?

Mr. BALL. The mission was undertaken in April, 1961.

The CHAIRMAN. Just before that?

Mr. BALL. That is right. Mid-April was the actual trip.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that agreement?

Mr. BALL. April 15, 1961.

The CHAIRMAN. April 15. When did Cassini make his deal or his contract there for $100,000?

Mr. BALL. The contract, the second contract——

The CHAIRMAN. Was when?

Mr. BALL [continuing]. Had been proposed in late April, and this informant who apparently had known of the details——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Late April of what year?

Mr. BALL. 1961.

Mr. CHAYES. It was proposed in late April.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The first contract?

Mr. BALL. No, the second.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When was the first?

Mr. BALL. June, 1959, and terminated June, 1960. The second one was proposed by Cassini in late April, 1961, and actually concluded in June 1961.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did he go on a trip with Mr. Murphy?

Mr. BALL. Yes, he went on a trip with Mr. Murphy on April 15, so the chronology as it appears is this: The trip occurred April 15, 1961. The proposal for the second contract was made by Cassini in late April, 1961, and the contract was concluded in June, 1961.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who arranged for him to go on the trip?

Mr. BALL. Recollections are not clear. It was either the Attorney General or Mr. Bundy who suggested it, knowing of the fact that Cassini was on good terms with the Trujillos.

Senator SYMINGTON. He was not only a good terms, he was then under contract with Trujillo.

Mr. BALL. That was not known.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was not known?

Mr. BALL. No, that was not known.

The CHAIRMAN. Did anybody ask whether Cassini was working for Trujillo?

Mr. BALL. Well, as a matter of fact at that moment he was not.

The CHAIRMAN. He had been in their employ and there was a short interim and this trip undoubtedly contributed to his second contract which was a second——

Mr. BALL. It could very well be so, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask this, just by way of declaration?

OUTSIDE THE REALM OF DIRECT DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

Here is a fellow who is asked to go along on a mission of great confidence, I remember when this mission was undertaken. Here is a fellow who was neither connected with the government or according to this record, no knowledge of any official connnection of any kind that he had with the Trujillo government. What was the background or the basis for thinking that he had such an influence with Trujillo? I mean was no investigation made to find out what his connection was, why he might be considered to have some influence with the Trujillos?

Mr. BALL. Senator Hickenlooper, here is a situation where we were dealing as much as possible outside the realm of direct diplomatic negotiation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand.

Mr. BALL. The whole point of this effort was to go outside. The problem was to find someone who knew the Trujillos well and was known to be friendly with them. I mean, Mr. Cassini was not dealt with as——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the very point. Let's start with the statement that he was known to be friendly with him. What is the basis for that? It would seem to me that it would be a perfectly natural thing that if you got some outsider, and I think they are properly used and often used where they may have some social or other friendship acquaintance with certain people in some foreign countries which gives a little more cordial atmosphere in their approach, it would seem to me the natural inquiry would be why are they buddy-buddy with this group? What is the background of this association that puts them in the position of acceptance of the Trujillo government?

That is the reason I wonder why some inquiry wasn't made as to why Cassini was——

CONCERN ABOUT THE GRAND JURY

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just a short observation.

This morning there is an article in the paper which goes into detail with quite a few of these cases. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first information that I have had on any of the cases of

any kind with the exception of some newspaper report which I read with respect to Mr. Cassini. I think you said something when you started about the fact that inasmuch as the Grand Jury was investigating this maybe it wouldn't be a good idea to give it to this committee.

In the first place, this is an executive hearing, and I think in an executive hearing when you get into a matter of this character as developed in the last few minutes by the chairman and the ranking minority member, that the best thing to do is give it out. Let's know what the facts are. If the committee can't control its own people why then we are in deep trouble. But I believe it can and I am confident this information didn't come from this committee.

Mr. BALL. Senator, I wasn't objecting, I simply wanted to call the attention of the committee to this.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me finish now.

We have this Cuban business where we have inched it. It is like letting out a little bit of information day after day and as a result everybody is mixed up and I want to be honest, I don't think anybody is more mixed up than I am as to just what is going on in Cuba.

I would think inasmuch as this thing is in the paper and based on what you have just said it is clear he broke the law. Let's find out what the facts are, nobody wants to hurt the country. Everybody in this committee, as I see it, in executive session has the right to know what the facts are. That is all I have to say.

Mr. BALL. Yes, I would like to make our position clear on this, if I may. I raised the question of the indictment for the information of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We knew about that. In fact, what disturbs me a little is that you, the FBI, certainly knew that nothing was done about this until the committee shows an interest and then they get busy, and do something. Are we going to have to exercise this kind of surveillance on the Department?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there is just one other thing to call to Senator Symington's attention which he undoubtedly knows. Some of us have been fooling around with this a little bit, not this particular case alone, but there is a Grand Jury investigation going on in this specific case. Some of us believe that we should be ultracautious.

The CHAIRMAN. And not talk about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And not do anything which might be used by any defendant or anybody else in saying that prior information, prior discussion or publicity emanating from here would prejudice that Grand Jury action until it has been concluded, so that is why we have moved with some considerable caution on discussion of this matter.

PRECARIOUS SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. BALL. Mr. Chairman, there is one further consideration which I am sure the committee is aware of but I think it might be worth stating anyway. The situation in the Dominican Republic at the moment is still a precarious one. They have had an election and are about to have an inauguration. But it is anything but a

quiet, settled, democratic country. I think any official statements coming from a member of the Senate, for example, with regard to the mission of Mr. Murphy to try to talk Trujillo into leaving the country might stir up problems for us.

The CHAIRMAN. We weren't planning to do that at all. What we are trying to get at is an entirely different subject of the activity of these non-diplomatic agents. Here is a man who had been in the employ of Trujillo. Then he is picked up by the State Department and sent as a kind of a mentor of a special diplomatic agent.

It seemed most peculiar to me that no one in the government knew about this or at least took any trouble to find out about Cassini's relationships. Here is a fellow who is a foreign agent, not registered, receiving a very large fee—before you came in, I think he announced $100,000, wasn't it?

Mr. BALL. It is more than that.

The CHAIRMAN. Here he goes down accompanying our more or less official agent, which is a very strange way to proceed, it seems to me.

Mr. BALL. Well, except I think the word "mentor" may not be accurate, Mr. Chairman. He was to help him to get introductions.

The CHAIRMAN. And went with him.

Mr. BALL. And went with him. He was not the adviser to Mr. Murphy on this matter. He was simply a fellow who went along to help break the ground. He was known to be a friend of the Trujillos and sympathetic with the Trujillo position. It wasn't that we thought he was on our side. He was known to be their fellow but we simply used him because he was a fellow who could get introductions to the dictator and arrange this on a quiet basis outside of normal diplomatic channels.

TIMING OF STATE DEPARTMENT'S INQUIRY

Senator SYMINGTON. Was the presentation made to the Grand Jury before or after this committee started looking into this matter?

Mr. BALL. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. It was after.

Senator SYMINGTON. It was after?

The CHAIRMAN. We started looking into this a long time ago.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask two questions, Mr. Chairman. If the State Department knew about this one why wouldn't you originate it before the committee started looking at it and, secondly, why wouldn't you tell the committee what was going on.

Mr. BALL. In the first place, the origin of Grand Jury action is not for the State Department nor is the administration of this law for the State Department. This is a matter which is assigned by statute to the Department of Justice.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you turn it over to the Department of Justice before this committee started looking into it?

Mr. BALL. No, they called our attention to it. We didn't know about it. The FBI received word from an informant that some hanky-panky was going on so far as Cassini was concerned. They then were making an investigation. They told us, but they didn't tell us until the latter part of May. In the meantime, this mission

had gone down in April. We knew nothing about this matter at that time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can I ask one more question?

WHEN STATE DEPARTMENT RECEIVED CASSINI REPORT

The State Department knew about this in May, 1961, right?

Mr. BALL. Yes. At the end of May, 1961, we received a report which had been received by the FBI from a unverified informant saying that Mr. Cassini had been negotiating for a contract and had made a contract. That is all we knew and this was then going to be investigated by the FBI which was in fact the case. The FBI then went forward with its investigation to check this out. But actually by that time the mission had all been completed. It was completed in mid-April, and while there were occasional contacts between Mr. Murphy and Cassini after that, that was the end of the relationship.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Murphy break off with Cassini, did he have any reason to do so, or did he do anything about it?

Mr. BALL. Let's see.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Department say——

Mr. BALL. Our files would indicate that Mr. Murphy saw Mr. Cassini as late as June 2, 1961. He may also have seen him as late as August. We only get this from FBI reports.

The CHAIRMAN. But isn't it true even at that late date you didn't take the FBI report seriously enough to do anything about it or suggest anything be done about it nor did the Department of Justice so far as you know?

Mr. BALL. I would have to let the Department of Justice speak for itself.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't, did you?

Mr. CHAYES. I think it also ought to be stated that the way this came into the Department, it came into the Department at the desk level. The desk level really didn't know anything about the Murphy mission or Cassini's connection with it. It wasn't bucked up to the level of people who would have had some knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Who arranged the meeting?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. BALL. This was handled at a much higher level.

Mr. CHAYES. And there was no reason why it should be bucked up given the fact that the desk officer didn't know about the mission or Cassini's connection with it and given the fact that the information as it came in was very ephemeral. That is, it was unverified information. It was just a rumor.

Mr. BALL. I think quite likely, Mr. Chairman, although we will have to make sure this was the case, that this was a situation where the right hand didn't know what the left hand was doing, which is not impossible given the character of the mission.

It was handled outside the normal channels of the Department and the Department generally was not informed about it.

USED SIMPLY TO OPEN SOME DOORS

The CHAIRMAN. Was Cassini given any instructions at all, do you know?

Mr. BALL. So far as I know all of this was handled directly by Mr. Murphy and Mr. Cassini. Cassini was used simply as a fellow to try to open some doors to Ambassador Murphy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How much briefing did Cassini have as to the basic purposes of this mission?

Mr. BALL. This was a high level and we would have to inquire from Ambassador Murphy about it. I really don't know how much he knew but I would have supposed that Mr. Murphy may well have told him what the general purposes were because he told the Trujillos.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He would almost have to, I would think.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Bob Murphy would have talked to him about it.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

MEETING OF MURPHY AND CASSINI

The CHAIRMAN. Here is a memorandum which reads as follows, August 30, 1961:

Mr. Cassini had a conference with Mr. Robert Murphy this morning in Mr. Murphy's office.

Mr. BALL. Excuse me, is this August, you say?

The CHAIRMAN. August 30, 1961.

I was there when Mr. Marco Gomez phoned Mr. Murphy from Ciudad Trujillo, and Mr. Murphy told Mr. Gomez that it would be impossible for him to take the direct flight to Ciudad Trujillo on Thursday but would have to take a different flight.

Then there is some more.

But after Mr. Murphy and Mr. Cassini had discussed the matter they decided that it was better not to reject the company of Morales-Carrion since he had expressed a desire to go and might possibly become resentful against the Dominican Republic if he were rejected. Messrs. Murphy and Cassini decided that it would be better to accept the company of Morales-Carrion to Ciudad Trujillo and to try to convert him, especially since he had been present at the White House conference on Monday which was attended by the President and Mr. Murphy and because of this circumstance was involved in the situation in every way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who had been present at the White House?

Mr. BALL. Mr. Morales-Carrion.

The CHAIRMAN. Puerto Rican.

Mr. BALL. He is now a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

Senator SYMINGTON. Puerto Rico?

Mr. BALL. Of the United States Department of State.

LAX ENFORCEMENT OF OUR LAWS

The CHAIRMAN. This I might say is a memorandum from the Dominican Consul which the staff member of this committee received. It is quite clear to me that the Department of Justice and the Department of State had the knowledge of the FBI but they didn't pursue it and paid no attention to it and continued with Mr. Cas-

sini even after he had signed this contract which he signed in June. He proposed it in April of 1961, he signed it in June. Here he was under this contract of what was the $200,000 and yet he was being in the midst of these——

Senator SYMINGTON. The first was $150,000 the second was $150,000 and it was going to $200,000 if he was successful in his mission.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think in that he had a contingent fee clause if we recognized him and made peace, he would get another $80,000. This is the grandest performance of having a fellow in the employ of Trujillo sitting in conferences with Murphy and I don't know whether he was at the White House or not, but there is an example to me of very lax enforcement of our laws and I think very questionable practices.

THE DICTATOR'S PAID AGENT

Wouldn't you agree to that, Mr. Secretary? To have a paid agent of a foreign dictator sitting in as a confidential member of a——

Mr. BALL. Actually, I don't think it is quite as anomalous as it sounds, Mr. Chairman. As I say this was not a matter in which I was involved, but the dictator himself was conversant with what we were trying to do. The fact that his paid agent was conversant with it was an extension.

The CHAIRMAN. The dictator knew he was a paid agent but you didn't.

Mr. BALL. We know he was a man who was very friendly with the Trujillos.

Senator SYMINGTON. That doesn't answer the question the Chairman asked.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think he was there in behalf of the United States or as an advocate of the Trujillos?

Mr. BALL. I think Mr. Murphy regarded him as an advocate of the Trujillos just as he dealt with the Dominican Consul in New York with whom it was known Mr. Cassini was very friendly.

UNDER NO ILLUSIONS

Let me make clear something that I think is essential to an understanding of this. I don't think there were any illusions at any time that Mr. Cassini was acting for the United States. Mr. Cassini was a man who was known to be friendly with the Trujillos with whom Mr. Murphy could deal in order to get to the Trujillos. This was my understanding of the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe it is. But it says after Mr. Murphy and Mr. Cassini discussed the matter they decided it is better not to reject Morales-Carrion. Here is Morales-Carrion who is an employee of this government. Cassini is consulted by Murphy, "Shall we take Morales" and so on. I must say this is strange.

Mr. BALL. Let's suppose that instead of Cassini this had been Ramfio Trujillo, for example, and we were talking about an approach to his father.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be very clear who he was. This fellow is a double agent, you might say.

Mr. BALL. He wasn't our agent. He was simply someone——

The CHAIRMAN. If he had been registered and says, "I am working for Trujillo and I am his paid boy," and if it was on the record as it should have been under the law, don't you think it would have made a difference?

Mr. BALL. Although I don't want to speak for Mr. Murphy, I rather imagine he would have done the same thing. The other people he was consulting were the Dominican Consul and there was no question of the ambiguity of his position. He was working for the Dominican Government and the Trujillos. This was brought home to persuade him to do what was good for the Dominican people and for the United States interest at the same time.

I think that where the confusion arises here is to think that Cassini was used on the assumption that he was an American representative or an American agent. He was used on the assumption he was one of Trujillo's friends who could be helpful.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't think there is any confusion. It is just in the interest of getting information. This is a rough one. You have got to go home and explain these things.

Mr. BALL. I was simply trying to put it in the perspective of the times.

A DANGEROUS KIND OF ACTIVITY

The CHAIRMAN. But didn't Cassini really initiate this business as an act of Trujillo?

Mr. BALL. I don't understand that he initiated it. I think that the idea of sending Mr. Murphy down was not any initiative of Mr. Cassini. That is not my understanding of it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. It says:

> Mr. Marco Gomez is already up to date on the general plan of the decision taken in Washington, but Mr. Murphy showed Mr. Cassini the confidential memoradum prepared by the State Department on the Dominican situation.

Mr. BALL. Excuse me, may I ask where that report is from?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, for your information this is why I say that this all started with our own staff. This came from the confidential files of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. BALL. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the report of their government. And I would think it is very embarrassing to any government to find this kind of going on here. Their Consul reports to Trujillo what is going on up here, and their boy Cassini is right in the middle of the State Department, White House and so on arranging these meetings. To me this is a pretty dangerous kind of activity.

Mr. BALL. Well, this is one of the problems——

The CHAIRMAN. This is the translation of a document procured from the Dominican Republic which neither you nor the Department of Justice bothered to do. This is why we really got upset about it, about the casual way in which this whole thing was handled. To go out and bring in a paid agent of that foreign government and give him a confidential memorandum of the State Department on our policy while he is working for the other fellow doesn't seem to me to be very wise policy.

I don't want to bore the committee, it is a very interesting memorandum. It is four pages, and I don't want to take up the

time but this came from the confidential files of the Dominican Republic, and this is the origin actually of the action of the Justice Department. It didn't start with them. It started with our investigation.

MONEY CASSINI RECEIVED

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, what was the total amount of money that Cassini received from the Dominican Republic, was it in the neighborhood of a quarter of a million dollars all told?

Mr. BALL. The information I have relates to what he had contracted to receive under the first contract in 1959. There he contracted to receive $150,000 plus $10,000 of expenses. Under the second contract which was made in June, 1961, he was to receive, I think, $120,000 plus, I think, an additional but conditional $200,000——

Mr. CHAYES. It is an additional contract. That is, there would be a follow-on contract at an increased rate if he achieved recognition.

Mr. BALL. That is recongition of the Dominican Republic.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So it is a little more than a quarter of a million dollars plus expenses with a potential additional $200,000.

Senator CHURCH. When I was practicing law I didn't work for the right clients.

SPECIAL SUGAR LOBBYISTS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us anything else you know about the activities of representatives of Trujillo? I mean they had some special lobbyists in sugar matters, didn't they?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us a little rundown? I don't want to pass too quickly over this, but can you give us a little rundown about what you know of their activity?

While you are looking for that, it is quite clear you would not have known anything about Cassini if this committee had not gone into it, you wouldn't have known until today nor would have the Department of Justice.

But go ahead. What other people, do you know anything about anybody else who was hired by Trujillo to influence either the Congress or the executive branch of this government?

Mr. BALL. So far as the Department knows there was a representative of the South Puerto Rican Sugar Company which was an American company doing business there who was active on behalf of his firm.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was it?

Mr. BALL. Mr. Walter Surrey.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you know about that?

Mr. BALL. We could give you the information in a minute.

Mr. Chayes who has investigated this matter in the Department tells me that Mr. Surrey had discussions in the Department particularly in connection with a dispute which is now in litigation. This involved an equalization fee on the restored Dominican portion of the quota which had been cut off after the resolution of the Organization of American States against the Dominican Republic. This is a matter which has been under some discussion primarily

because the South Puerto Rican Sugar Company would have benefitted more by a restoration of this amount in the form of an equalization fee than it would have through any assistance that might be given the Dominican government.

The CHAIRMAN. Did this South Puerto Rican Sugar Company employ a public relations firm in the Dominican Republic, too, to generate the sentiment on this subject?

Mr. BALL. I don't think we have any information on that.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't have any information?

Mr. BALL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know that Mr. Surrey was a paid agent?

Mr. BALL. We knew that he was representing the South Puerto Rican Sugar Company?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, he was the lawyer for this company.

Mr. BALL. And registered as a lobbyist for the company.

Mr. CHAYES. He came in as a lawyer.

Mr. BALL. He had represented the South Puerto Rican Sugar Company I think for a number of years.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who is this?

Mr. BALL. Mr. Walter Surrey.

TOMAS PAPPAS

Senator SYMINGTON. Who is Mr. Tomas Pappas?

Mr. BALL. Mr. Tomas Pappas is a gentleman of Greek extraction who is a financier in Boston. The only connection I know of him with the Dominican Republic is that in the days after the assassination of the dictator he went to what was then called Ciudad Trujillo to discuss the possibility of purchasing some of the Trujillo sugar properties. But so far as I know that was the only connection he had.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, if I may just read this:

> Mr. Pappas has been working for Mr. Cassini on the Dominican situation and has been very useful because of his powerful connections in Washington. * * *
>
> In closing we suggest very earnestly that he be given the greatest possible cooperation in connection with his commercial proposals in the Dominican Republic.

This was quite a deal, wasn't it?

Mr. BALL. The proposals here?

Senator SYMINGTON. That is the essence of a bribe.

Mr. BALL. The purchase of the Trujillo properties——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything to say about Mr. Surrey or any of the other of the lobbyists——

Mr. BALL. Could I add one word, Mr. Chairman, about Mr. Pappas, because I think that this may be useful for the committee's records.

Mr. Pappas was in Ciudad Trujillo, I think, in September or October of 1961 at a time when the Department of State sent the present Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Mr. George McGhee, on a mission to the Dominican Republic. He found Mr. Pappas there. He told Mr. Pappas that he thought it would not at all be in the United States national interest for Mr. Pappas to try to buy these Trujillo sugar properties, and he discouraged the deal and, as I understand it, Mr. Pappas gave up the operation at that point and went back to Boston.

OTHER AGENTS FOR DOMINICAN SUGAR

The CHAIRMAN. Would you give for our information what you know about any other foreign agent involved in the sugar business? There were some others, weren't there?

Mr. BALL. On behalf of the Dominican Republic?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BALL. So far as the Department of State was concerned, our records would indicate we didn't have anybody else. None of them approached us. Now, there may well have been others who were active in talking to the Congress, but they didn't talk to the State Department. This is based on an examination which Mr. Chayes has just had made and in which we have talked to all the desk officers and checked the records of the Department on visitors, and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever hear of a man named Mike Dean?

Mr. BALL. I have heard of him.

The CHAIRMAN. But you don't know. Did he have anything to do with the Dominican sugar problem?

Mr. BALL. My recollection of him is that he was regarded as a friend of the Trujillos and had some financial connections down there. So far as our records would indicate, the Department had no contact with him. Is that right?

Mr. CHAYES. That is correct, at least on sugar.

Mr. BALL. On sugar matters, at least.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know that he received, I think it was approximately $100,000, I believe, to represent them. You don't know?

Mr. BALL. In the sugar matter or for other reasons?

The CHAIRMAN. Sugar was his principal undertaking.

Mr. BALL. So far as our records would indicate he didn't call on the State Department in connection with it.

IMPACT ON DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to conclude that the one reason why you think this matter is not very important because the State Department didn't know anything about it?

Mr. BALL. No, Mr. Chairman, I thought I made clear yesterday that we do not regard this as unimportant. What I was suggesting yesterday was that, as far as the direct impact of these people on the officers of the Department is concerned, our investigation would indicate that they haven't been, except in certain cases, very active. While they may have had a major impact on public opinion or on the Congress or in some other way they haven't directly through their contacts with the Department had an impact on our people.

The CHAIRMAN. You really don't know much about it, do you? That is why it is hard for you to evaluate it becasue you are not informed about their activities.

Mr. BALL. So far as the Department of State is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BALL. This is necessarily the angle of vision which we have. It is based on an examination of what representations they have made, what calls they have made, and what attempts they have

made to establish contact with the Department and to peddle their particular line of goods.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, I have just been through a year's hearing on stockpiling where certain people, Democrats and Republicans, all they wanted was a fair advantage and based on what I was trained by my not prominent father who was a Democratic judge and by my prominent father-in-law who was a Republican Senator, if we don't stop these people from utilizing the government to make a buck, a fast buck, the people in the country are going to lose confidence in their government regardless of party.

And suppose we get into this thing and just wring it dry concerning these people who have utilized political pressure to make a dollar often at the expense of the best interest of the United States—it just makes me sick. I have been through it in another field now for months, lying and cheating and profiteering and where are we going to go as a government if this stuff goes on ——

[Discussion off the record.]

PERSONAL INTERESTS OF SPECIAL AGENTS

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, I notice here an article in July 22 of 1962 by Tad Szulc of the New York Times which so far as we know was the first public statement. This is dated July 21, it says:

> Robert D. Murphy, former Under Secretary of State, made a confidential trip for President Kennedy 6 weeks before General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, was assassinated. The retired diplomat was accompanied by Igor Cassini, the New York society columnist. The White House confirmed today that such a mission was undertaken in April of 1961 by Mr. Murphy after Mr. Cassini advised Joseph P. Kennedy, the President's father, that a revolution would explode in the Dominican Republic

It is a long article that goes on but it looks very much as if Mr. Cassini initiated this project, and as far as his employment and pay apparently neither the Department not the Justice Department knew anything about it until our staff member got into this affair and discovered it because he was not registered and we believe that neither of you knew that he was a paid agent.

Mr. BALL. We certainly didn't know it at the time of the mission.

The CHAIRMAN. We think you should know it and whenever you deal with people like this you ought to know just where they stand and what their interest is.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. You are a lawyer and a very able lawyer. Before you came into government wouldn't it be normal to say to a man before you took him on a mission, "What is your relationship in this? Are you getting a cut? Why are you interested?" This is just normal business procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary said yesterday so far as he knew that these agents had no direct impact on the Department. But it strikes me this fellow undoubtedly must have had some if he is influential enough to inspire a confidential mission, to suggest it and then accompany it and participate in it, although he is a paid agent of the government involved. I must say this is most unusual.

Mr. BALL. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cassini has never been inside the Department of State in his life.

The CHAIRMAN. That doesn't matter as long as he participated in meetings in the White House or somewhere else.

Mr. BALL. Oh, no, he was never in Washington at that time, so far as I know.

The situation was this, that he was known in New York to be a friend of the Trujillos. He was a great friend of Luis Mercado who was the Dominican Consul General.

AN EXTRA-DIPLOMATIC MISSION

The CHAIRMAN. Let me put it this way: If you had known about his contracts and pay would you still have employed him and used him in this confidential mission?

Mr. BALL. I would like to ask Ambassador Murphy because I think——

The CHAIRMAN. What would be your views, would you take a fellow like this along?

Mr. BALL. I think it is conceivable he might have taken the Consul General himself.

The CHAIRMAN. That is quite different. He is an acknowledged diplomatic representative.

Mr. BALL. This was a strictly extra-diplomatic mission in the sense it was outside of normal channels. It was an attempt to work out something which couldn't have been worked out through normal diplomatic channels.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, would you have shown a known paid agent for the Trujillo government confidential plans of the State Department?

Mr. BALL. I would like to know what the confidential plans were. This is the first I have known about it. So far as we are concerned a great deal of discretion was left to Ambassador Murphy, a highly experienced diplomat with a distinguished record over many years, to undertake a mission which by its very nature was outside of diplomatic channels and of an extraordinary character.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me quite clear that it was initiated by Mr. Cassini. He thought of it. It says:

> The White House confirmed today that such a mission was undertaken in April by Mr. Murphy after Mr. Cassini advised Joseph P. Kennedy, the President's father, that a revolution would explode.

It seems to me, you say you are not subject to influence, yet here is a fellow who comes in and presents to you this thing. You didn't initiate the project of sending Murphy, Cassini initiated it.

Mr. BALL. On this, Mr. Chairman, this is simply a newspaper reporter's account, and I would——

The CHAIRMAN. But it says the White House confirmed it.

Mr. BALL. Confirmed that the mission had been undertaken.

The CHAIRMAN. And after Mr. Cassini advised Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. BALL. I wouldn't have read it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is the way it reads. I don't think there is any doubt about the way it reads and I think it is quite logical that under all the other circumstances we know that is exactly what happened. You didn't think of doing this. Mr. Cassini thought of doing this, and this is the way he earns his pay. He has got to do something for this $200,000 and if he is powerful enough and influential enough to inspire a mission of this kind he really deserves something.

[Discussion off the record.]

AN UNATTRACTIVE SITUATION

Mr. BALL. This was a matter which Ambassador Murphy undertook with a great deal of discretion on his side. I don't want to speak for him because I haven't had the opportunity of talking with him about this matter and I don't want to be unfair to him. I would agree with the committee's impression of the appearance of this thing. In retrospect it is an unattractive situation, where a man of this obvious bad character gets involved in something of this sort. But I don't——

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't know whether he has a bad character or not, but I just think the facts themselves and the record make it look very unfortunate. If you get it out and wash it out, that is it, you go to something else. But if it is going to be one of these hedges, I think it is going to end up in hurting the administration. I know very little about that except what I have heard this morning.

A REVIEW OF THE FILES

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to go on with some other subject. I wonder if you could review your files and give us all that you know about anybody connected with the Trujillo lobby.

Mr. BALL. We will take a look and give you all we have.

The CHAIRMAN. And prepare a memorandum on all you know about this sugar thing. This sugar thing, as you know, is an extremely expensive program, and it not only may have brought direct influence in the Department, but also somewhere else in the government.

Mr. BALL. My impression, Mr. Chairman with respect to the whole sugar lobby is that most of this work was not done with specific reference to the State Department, because our investigation would indicate that there were relatively few direct contacts made with anybody in the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to know all there was if you can, and how you knew who was involved in it, there were some prominent people. People like Mr. Chapman, he is an old friend of mine, as he is of most of us around here, but did he ever come to the Department, did he ever say anything to anybody? There were 20 of them appeared before the Congress, and that was public knowledge. Did these people do anything in the Department, did they consult with your desk officers or anybody else?

Mr. CHAYES. The investigation which I made would suggest—and we went right after this question—that the answer to that is no. The approaches to the Department on the sugar bill were confined, on the whole, to the ambassadors. Ambassadors handled the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is the proper way for it to be done.

Mr. CHAYES. And other people handled other aspects.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like a formal statement from you as to what you know.

Mr. CHAYES. Right.

[The statement referred to follows:]

SUGAR

I. General

The importation of sugar into the United States is regulated by a quota system, with quota imports carrying a premium above the world price. Quotas are established annually by statutory enactment. The Department's role with regard to the development of sugar legislation consists primarily of making recommendations to the President as to the form of the legislation and as to the allocation of quotas for foreign sugar to particular producing countries. In the development of the Sugar Act of 1962, the Department recommended the abolition of the country quota system. This recommendation was embodied in the Administration's Bill presented to Congress. Department representatives appeared in support of this Bill at hearings before the appropriate Congressional committees.

Since Congress traditionally makes the final decision on allocation of quotas, foreign sugar interests concentrate their principal efforts on that body. The Department has no independent knowledge as to the Congressional activities of registered foreign agents, although it is clear from Congressional testimony that there was extensive activity of this kind. Representations to the Department of State are primarily carried out through normal diplomatic channels. There have been, however, a certain number of contacts in the Department with non-diplomatic representatives of foreign sugar interests.

II. Specific contacts with the Department of State

The following are some of the representatives of foreign sugar interests who have contacted the Department:

(1) *Walter S. Surrey*, of the law firm of Surrey, Karasik, Gould and Greene, represents the South Puerto Rico Sugar Company, a company in the Dominician Republic. Mr. Surrey has called on a number of Department officers, including the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, to discuss the Dominican Republic's sugar problems and sugar legislation in general. Mr. Surrey also represents French West Indies sugar interests and visited several officers in the Department in support of a quota for these islands.

(2) *Oscar Chapman*, of the law firm of Chapman and Friedman, represents the Mexican Sugar Producers Union. He contacted at least one Department official at a social function to state his views concerning sugar legislation. Mr. Chapman's firm also until recently represented Haiti and he has talked to several Department officers concerning sugar legislation during discussions of various Haitian problems.

(3) *Robert C. Barnard*, of the law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb & Steen, talked to a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Acting Chief of the Foodstuffs Division in the Bureau of Economic Affairs in an effort to gain support for a quota for Australia.

(4) *Charles H. Brown*, representative of the sugar industry of Fiji, called on at least two people in the Department to solicit support for a quota for the Fiji Islands.

(5) *Albert Nemir* sought the Department's help in furthering the cause of the permanent sugar quota for Brazil.

The following foreign agents contacted the officer in the Department particularly concerned with sugar matters, the Chief of the Foodstuffs Division, in the period January 1, 1961 to June 30, 1962:

Name	Nationality and interest	Number of meetings
Mr. Sandys Bao	Chinese, Taiwan Sugar Corp	2
Sir Robert Kirkwood	United Kingdom, West Indies Sugar Fed	4
Mr. George Bishop	United Kingdom, British Guiana Sugar Interests	2
Mr. Percy Wheen	Australia, Colonial Sugar Refining Co	1
Mr. M.N. Pittie	India, Sugar Manufacturers Assoc	2
Mr. Fred Mallam	Australia, Colonial Sugar Refining Corp	1
Mr. George Bronz	United States, Irish Sugar Assoc	1
Mr. R.C. Barnard	United States, Australian Sugar Producers	2
Mr. Henry Holland	United States, Colombia Sugar Producers	2
Mr. Charles Brown	United States, Fiji Sugar Producers	1
Mr. John Lane	United States, Peruvian Sugar Producers	1
Mr. Albert Nemir	United States, Brazilian Sugar Producers	1
Mr. L. Blaine Liljenquist	United States, British Honduras Sugar Producers	1

In 1961, the discussions of these agents with this officer were generally concerned with country sugar allocations. In 1962, the agents concentrated on attacking the State Department's legislative proposal and in arguing for country quotas maintained at the premium price. Arturo Manas, who prior to the Castro regime was a lawyer in Havana representing sugar interests in Cuba and on the Board of Directors of the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute, visited this officer to urge that the entire Cuban sugar quota not be allotted to other countries on the ground that the Cuban Government would one day change.

Several non-diplomatic agents of foreign governments have contacted the Department concerning sugar problems, unrelated to the proposed Sugar Act.

(a) The law firm of Dawson, Griffin, Pickens and Riddell, registered representative of the Indian Sugar Mills Association, wrote to request that the Department support elimination of the Department of Agriculture regulation which established a standard of 99 degrees polarization as the cut-off between raw and direct consumption sugar. The Department replied that it had informally notified the Department of Agriculture of its support for modification of this standard to permit importation of high polarization sugar in certain circumstances.

(b) Mr. George Bronz, registered representative of the Irish Export Board, requested the Department's support in efforts to persuade the Department of Agriculture to amend its proposed sugar import regulations. He claimed that these regulations would have the effect of prohibiting the importation of Irish Chocolate Crum, a specialty sugar product. The Department of State notified the Department of Agriculture of Mr. Bronz's position, but took no further action.

(c) Walter S. Surrey contacted several Department officers to protest the United States withholding of $22 million in Dominican Republic sugar fees during 1960 and 1961. Mr. Surrey represented the South Puerto Rico Sugar Company in a suit against the United States for a share of this money. At one time, he suggested that the money be used for worker housing near a sugar mill owned by the South Puerto Rico Sugar Company. On another occasion he solicited Department support for a proposal that the South Puerto Rico Sugar Company sell its claim to a share of the $22 million to the Dominican Republic. At still another time he sent to a Department officer a copy of a proposed amendment to the Sugar Act providing for the return of the $22 million.

(d) Michael B. Deane, representative of Dominican Republic sugar interests, visited the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs and the Dominican Republic desk officer, for example, to state that he had been given exclusive rights to find a buyer for the Trujillo-owned sugar properties and to inquire into the possibility of an investment guarantee program for the Dominican Republic. He also called the Dominican Republic desk officer several times concerning the recovery of the $22 million in sugar fees.

III. Other activities

The Department is aware that representatives of foreign sugar interests have been very active in contacts with Congress. For example, several Congressmen visited Costa Rica in 1960 as the guests of the local Chamber of Sugar Producers. They were accompanied by two United States journalists and a registered Costa Rican agent, Miss Dina Dellale. The Department believes that Miss Dellale arranged the trip to promote Costa Rican sugar interests. Our Embassy in Costa-Rica informed the Department that at the end of the visit, the spokesman for the group stated that the group would strongly recommend acceptance of Costa Rica's sugar-quota request.

In 1961, another group of Congressmen (including one who had made the earlier trip), together with two United States journalists (including one of those on the earlier trip), visited Costa Rica, again as guests of the local Chamber of Sugar Producers. The Department understands that this visit was also arranged by Miss Dellale.

PHILIPPINES WAR DAMAGE

The CHAIRMAN. Let me-pass on to another subject, the Philippine War Damage Bill, are you familiar with that?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us something about that?

Mr. BALL. So far as the Department is concerned we don't find evidence that the Department was ever approached by any agents.

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The CHAIRMAN. Didn't the Department send up a bill and ask me to introduce it by request which provided for the payment of this, I think, $73 million directly to the Philippine Government?

Mr. BALL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That was your policy, wasn't it?

Mr. BALL. 1960.

The CHAIRMAN. 1960?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us a very quick resume of what actually happened to that bill?

Mr. BALL. It was introduced into Congress, it was not acted on before Congress adjourned. In 1961 the Department changed its position to support payments directly to claimants.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you change your position?

Mr. BALL. The shift was made for these reasons: First of all, that some of the claimants, principally religious institutions, had already received compensation equivalent to the balance due them on claims approved by the War Damage Commission through the provisions of the War Claims Act of 1948. These amounts were roughly estimated at $15 to $20 million. They would be deductible from the $73 million appropriated and would be returned to the Treasury and this would represent a considerable savings.

Second, since some individual claimants had already been compensated up to the legal maximum, it was desirable to give comparable treatment to the other claimants who had not been fully paid.

Third, that government to government payments ran the risk of being regarded as foreign aid, and we wished to make clear that the war damage legislation was what it was; namely, the fulfillment of an old moral obligation we had to the Philippines.

Next, that payment to individuals through an agency of the United States follow the method prescribed by the original legislation and provided safeguards to assure that bona fide claimants would receive prompt and full payment.

And finally, that by making direct payments to individuals we would be redeeming a pledge that was made in World War II and by approaching the problem at its source we remove an irritant to the United States-Philippine relations which might not have been removed to the same degree by the payment to the Philippine Government.

NO OUTSIDE INFLUENCE

The CHAIRMAN. So within a reasonably short time you completely changed your approach. Can you tell us, was there anyone who approached the Department in behalf of these claimants?

Mr. BALL. Our information is that no one approached the Department on the Philippine War Damages.

The CHAIRMAN. So you were completely free of any outside influence?

Mr. BALL. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, I know of no outside influence.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware of any lobbying that was done in behalf of this bill anywhere in the government?

Mr. BALL. I am not personally aware.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you, Mr. Chayes?

Mr. CHAYES. No, I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no information in the Department about it.

Mr. CHAYES. There may be. No calls were made at the Department with respect to this legislation. The bill as passed, that is the direct payments bill, is the classical way that we have dealt with this kind of problem.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand then why originally you proposed the government-to-government payment?

Mr. BALL. That was done in 1960 under a prior administration. The reason it was changed in 1961, as I understand it, is to reflect these considerations I mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Who introduced the new version, the new approach?

Mr. BALL. This I don't know.

Mr. CHAYES. I don't know that either.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S BILL

The CHAIRMAN. Was the bill prepared in the Department?

Mr. BALL. We will have to get you this information.

Mr. CHAYES. I will find out.

The CHAIRMAN. The bill I introduced was prepared by the Department. They sent it to me and I introduced it by request, I had nothing to do with it.

Mr. CHAYES. The 1960 bill, is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, is that not right, Mr. Marcy?

Mr. MARCY. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who introduced it?

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't introduce the second bill.

Mr. BALL. Mr. Zablocki, I am told.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Zablocki introduced it. Did you prepare it for Mr. Zablocki?

Mr. BALL. We will get you this information. I don't know.

Mr. CHAYES. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You ought to know it. Are these reasons you thought up after the fact or were they before the fact?

Mr. CHAYES. No, it is my impression——

The CHAIRMAN. Who prepared this memorandum just recently?

Mr. CHAYES. This was prepared within the Department.

Senator SYMINGTON. Maybe Mr. Lee knows something about it.

Mr. LEE. Not well enough to state it. My impression is that it was the Department's bill that he introduced but I can't say that with certainty, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BALL. I am sorry not to have this information.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you give that to Mr. Zablocki to introduce? Isn't ordinarily a bill of the administration given to the chairman of the respective committees to introduce, isn't that the normal thing?

Mr. LEE. He is the chairman of the Far East Subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but Mr. Morgan is chairman of the committee.

Mr. LEE. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any particular reason?

Mr. LEE. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Zablocki approach you about this matter?

Mr. LEE. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Who does know, this involved $73 million, a gift.

Mr. BALL. Let me get this information, Mr. Chairman. I am embarrassed not to have this for you today. I should have it. This was not a matter at that time that came within my direct supervision and knowledge.

INTERESTED IN DEPARTMENT'S REVERSAL

The CHAIRMAN. The reason it interested me, in the first place I had no interest in it other than I was asked to introduce it. All of a sudden the Department completely changed around. This type of thing doesn't seem to me to be a partisan matter. I see no reason why a change in administration from Republican to Democratic would have any effect on a policy of this kind. It doesn't affect either party and it was a complete reversal of the position. There was great controversy in the House. Congressman Barry called me on it and he was very strongly in support of the original bill and then I think—eventually we were told, "If you don't take the Zablocki bill you won't get any bill at all."

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know who was working on Mr. Zablocki?

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am trying to find out, did you prepare it for him or did he ask to prepare it or did he prepare it?

Mr. BALL. I will find out, I will try to prepare a memorandum on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us the dates? Can you find this out in the Department?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us the dates. We would like a memorandum on the history of that bill. And when and who introduced it and if anybody approached you.

[The information referred to follows:]

PHILIPPINES CLAIMS LEGISLATION

During World War II the United States pledged compensation to those Filipinos whose property was damaged and destroyed during the war. At the time these losses occurred, the Philippines was American territory, the only American territory which suffered large-scale physical damage during the war. In 1946, the Philippine Rehabilitation Act was passed establishing the United States-Philippine War Damage Commission. Congress appropriated $400 million for payment of compensation directly to individuals whose claims were approved by the Commission. The Commission approved $461 million in claims. $338 million was paid out of the initial appropriation, $12 million being used for administrative costs. $73 million in claims was therefore outstanding.

In 1960, the Department drafted a bill authorizing the payment of the $73 million. Senator Fulbright introduced the bill as S. 3238. The bill departed from the original legislation filed by various members of the Congress in that it provided for payment directly to the Philippine Government. This was proposed in order that an amount which had been advanced to the Philippine National Defense Forces shortly after the war, and was then in default, could be deducted from the $73 million recommended. The Philippine Government had approved repayment of this loan under

the Romulo-Snyder Agreement of 1950. Deduction of this amount was feasible only if the payment of compensation were on a government-to-government basis.

The State Department supported S. 3238 in House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee never scheduled hearings on the bill during the 1960 session. Neither House acted on the bill during that session.

Representative Zablocki also introduced a bill in 1960 authorizing the $73 million compensation, but his bill provided for payment directly to individual claimants (HR 4311). The bill was reported favorably by the House Foreign Affairs Far East Subcommittee and later by the full Committee, but neither House considered it.

In early 1961, the United States and Philippine Governments successfully negotiated settlement of the amount in default, and in April of that year the settlement was actually achieved with payment by the Philippine Government of $20 million. In 1961 Representative Zablocki also reintroduced his bill providing for direct payment to claimants. At this time the Department re-examined its position concerning the method of payment. It appeared that if any bill were to succeed in Congress, it would be one which provided direct payments to individuals as the original legislation had done. Furthermore, the basic reason for shifting to a government-to-government payments basis had disappeared because the debt owned by the Philippine Government had been paid. These were the basic reasons for the Department's support of Representative Zablocki's bill and its decision not to request reintroduction of the government-to-government payment bill. Moreover, in its re-examination the Department concluded that in the circumstances then existing direct payment to individual claimants would actually be preferable for the following reasons:

(a) Certain claimants (chiefly religious institutions) had already received compensation equivalent to the balance due them on claims approved by the War Damage Commission through the provisions of the War Claims Act of 1948. Such amounts (roughly estimated at $15–20,000,000) would be deductible from the $73,000,000 appropriated and would be returned to the U.S. Treasury, representing a considerable saving.

(b) Since some individual claimants had already been compensated up to the legal maximum, it was desirable to give comparable treatment to the other claimants who had not been fully paid the approved amount.

(c) Government-to-government payment ran the risk of being regarded as "foreign aid" in Congress, and the Department wished to identify the war damage legislation for what it was: the fulfillment of a moral obligation.

(d) Payments to individuals through an agency of the United States followed the method prescribed by the original legislation and provided safeguards to assure that the *bona fide* claimants received prompt and full payment.

(e) By making direct payments to individuals, we would be redeeming a solemn pledge made in the darkest days of World War II and thus remove, by approaching it at the source, an irritant in U.S.-Philippine relations. It was believed that payments to the Philippine Government would not have accomplished this to the same degree.

(f) Provisions could be included to insure claimants would not suffer from the recent devaluation of the Philippine pesos by paying them in terms of the dollar value of the original claims.

Representative Zablocki's bill was again reported favorably by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, but was held over by the House Rules Committee until the 1962 session without being considered by either House. In 1962, although a rule was granted by the Rules Committee and reported favorably to the House the bill was defeated.

Reaction in the Philippines to that action was immediate and harsh. In order to minimize hostile reaction in a country long friendly to us and meet what the Executive Branch had recognized as a just obligation, Speaker McCormack promptly took the initiative to get the Zablocki bill reintroduced with several minor modifications to meet objections raised to it on the House floor, and a companion measure was subsequently introduced in the Senate. In the House, Representative Halleck, as minority leader, expressed his concern over the Philippine reaction and also quickly moved to help obtain passage of the new measure. It was promptly and favorably reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

At that time Assistant Secretary Dutton discussed the war claims legislation with the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, particularly concerning the fact that the House bill and the measure introduced previously in the Senate had significant differences. Dutton indicated the usefulness of prompt action by the Senate as well as the House, if at all possible, in order to meet the continuing adverse effect in the Philippines after the measure's defeat in the House.

After the House acted favorably on the measure pending there, the Foreign Relations Committee reported out the private claimants bill at a session at which a representative of the Department was not present.

A thorough investigation has revealed no contacts between nondiplomatic agents of the Philippine Government and the Department concerning this legislation.

THE KATANGA LOBBY

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about the Katanga lobby?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is that, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. The Katanga lobby. What do you know about that?

Mr. BALL. This is a matter on which my knowledge is supplemented by Mr. Chayes, who has been more directly involved with it, and I think we can give you quite a little. The Katanga lobby, the representatives, of the so-called Government of Katanga in the United States, was a gentleman named Michel Struelens, or Michael Struelens, spelled either way, who came into the United States in October of 1961 indicating that he headed the Katangan Information Service and that he was the official representative of the President of Katanga.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he a citizen of this country?

Mr. BALL. He was a Belgian national, as I recall, but he did not have a Belgian passport, is that right?

Mr. CHAYES. He did have a Belgian passport, yes. He traveled on a Belgian passport. He didn't live in Belgium because of some problem.

Mr. BALL. He had some problem of claims or some sort of litigation in Belgium and he didn't want to go home.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he a fugitive from justice?

Mr. BALL. I don't know whether he was fugitive from any criminal charge or civil litigation.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he a Belgian civil servant?

Mr. CHAYES. I think he had been a civil servant during the colonial period.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the time he came here? What was his status?

Mr. CHAYES. No, he was a representative of Katanga. He was in the employ of the Katanga, as they called it the Katanga National Government, as we called it the Katanga Provincial Government.

A DIPLOMATIC AGENT

The CHAIRMAN. Would you call him a diplomatic representative?

Mr. CHAYES. We did not. We didn't give him a diplomatic visa. He was given originally an I Visa which is a visa given to press people although he contended that he should have had a diplomatic visa. We didn't regard him as a diplomatic agent. We objected to his performing diplomatic functions and he registered as a foreign agent under the Act.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. We would like whatever you know about him.

Mr. BALL. After arriving in this country, he was in touch with the Department of State on several occasions. He first came in to present his credentials because he always purported to be a kind of

quasi-diplomatic agent even though we never recognized him as such.

In July of 1961, he talked with the officials in the Department about the situation in Katanga and attempted to persuade them of the Katangan version of the Congo problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did he talk to?

Mr. BALL. He talked to the African Bureau which I think was Mr. Fredericks, wasn't it?

Mr. CHAYES. He talked to a number of people in the African Bureau. He talked to Mr. Vance. He talked to Mr. Fredericks.

Mr. BALL. Mr. Vance was at that time the Congo desk officer, Mr. Fredericks was the Deputy Assistant for African Affairs.

Mr. CHAYES. At times he talked to Mr. Eisenberg.

Mr. BALL. Mr. Eisenberg was one of the officers in the African Bureau.

Then early in 1962 he came into the Department again on three occasions to talk about both Congo policy and his visa, and in September of 1962 he met with the Director of Central African Affairs to discuss his status in this country and also talked about Congo problems.

CONTACTS WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT

In addition to that I believe I can give you more detail. His first contact with the Department was in November, 1960, where he was received by Mr. Ferguson who was at that time the Director of the West African Desk and also by Mr. Woodruff of the Congo desk. He delivered a letter addressed to the Secretary of State from Mr. Tshombe which identified Mr. Struelens as the head of the Katangan Information Office and stated he would eventually assume consular duties in the United States for a time. Mr. Tshombe asked that courtesies be extended to Mr. Struelens.

In March of 1961, Mr. Struelens and Mr. Lavellee, who was then the Congo Desk Officer, met in New York informally. On July 28, 1961, Mr. Struelens, accompanied by three other officials of Katanga, including Mr. Tshombe's brother, a gentleman named Mr. Kambola, and Mr. Pwetto, called again at the Department on Mr. Vance, the desk officer, and Mr. Lavellee. This amounted to an approach in support of the Katanga cause in the Congo. He also suggested that the parliamentarians in the Katanga parliament be included in the Congo parliament.

Mr. Struelens returned to Katanga in August, 1961, and in the course of his trip in Africa, Mr. Struelens met Mr. Eisenberg in Brazzaville. Mr. Eisenberg was at that time the Deputy Director of the office of Central African affairs. They met again in Elizabethville, and at that time Mr. Eisenberg gave Mr. Struelens a note of introduction to Dr. Linner, who was the Chief United Nations representative.

MEETING ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE CONGO

Those were the contacts with the Department up until January of 1961, when Mr. Struelens talked with Mr. Chayes, who is our Legal Adviser, and it was agreed that while Mr. Struelens was in Washington to attend some hearings of the Subcommittee on Inter-

nal Security, a meeting might be profitably arranged between Mr. Struelens, Mr. McGhee, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Mr. Chayes.

This meeting occurred on the 9th of January. In addition to the gentlemen I have mentioned, Mr. Hirshman, an assistant to Mr. Struelens, was present. They discussed the problems of the Congo. Mr. Tshombe made a strong representation on behalf of the Katanga, and he discussed again his visa problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand that all the time you took the position he was not a diplomatic agent?

Mr. BALL. We took the position he was not a diplomatic agent, that the Katanga was simply a province of the National State of the Congo.

The CHAIRMAN. Just what status did you consider him to have while he was here?

Mr. CHAYES. A registered foreign agent, that is his status.

The CHAIRMAN. Here in his own registration, Name of Government, part or official, agent therefore, he says "Katangan Government."

Nature of Registrant's connections, Katangan Information Service, and he says, "Pursuant to an agreement between African Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels and President Tshombe of Katanga I have been officially placed at the disposal of the President of the Katanga Government who asked me to manage this office," and then he goes on and then as often happens under name of persons subsidy, financial assistance received, he says, "None other than 10(a)," and in all of these requirements about has he published speeches or made publications he says, "None." I thought it was rather generally known that he engaged in a great deal of it.

Mr. CHAYES. This is his original registration statement dated December 9, 1960, before he had engaged in any activities, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he ever file a supplemental?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, he did and I think they were very complete, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Complete?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes. They did not, at least in our judgment, provide any basis for prosecution or for violation.

The CHAIRMAN. He was claiming he was a diplomat.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, but he also registered under the Act.

The CHAIRMAN. Which, if he had been a diplomatic officer, he wouldn't have had to.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

DEPARTMENT DEALINGS WITH A FOREIGN AGENT

The CHAIRMAN. Is it department policy to object to a foreign agent's performing diplomatic functions?

Mr. CHAYES. We did object to the functions that he performed by way of issuing visas, which are functions that only a diplomatic agent, someone who has that status, can issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, you met with him and conferred with him as if he was a diplomatic agent?

Mr. CHAYES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't normally do this with a foreign agent, do you?

Mr. CHAYES. We may if he has matters to talk with us about.

Mr. BALL. We would meet with a foreign agent if we thought it could advance the United States' interest by discussing problems with him.

Mr. CHAYES. Moreover, one of the subjects we talked to him about was we didn't want him issuing any more visas.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you use Mr. Struelens as a channel to communicate with Tshombe?

Mr. CHAYES. Do you want to comment on that?

Mr. BALL. No, you are more familiar with it.

Mr. CHAYES. I should say this. We knew what we said to Struelens would get to Tshombe, because he had, and we knew it, a direct Telex connection with Elizabethville.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then the answer to the question is yes.

Mr. CHAYES. The answer to the question to that extent is, yes. We did not use Mr. Struelens as our representative in communicating with Mr. Tshombe.

The CHAIRMAN. But as a representative?

Mr. CHAYES. No, not as a representative.

Mr. BALL. As a channel.

Mr. CHAYES. As a channel. We knew he would report whatever we stated to him to Tshombe. We had no illusions he was acting for us. He was acting for Tshombe.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that was clear, I guess. Is there anything further you want to add on the Katanga activity?

Mr. BALL. No, unless you think it is useful, Mr. Chairman, to put the details about the visa in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think so.

EFFECT ON AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

Do you think that Mr. Struelens had any effect upon public opinion in this country?

Mr. BALL. I think he had a considerable effect upon public opinion in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how he did it?

Mr. BALL. He did it in a variety of ways. He had friendly relations with a great many people in public life, with editors, and heads of various groups of one sort or another. He worked with some of the right wing groups. He had connections with radio commentators and fed them a great deal of information.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any information as to how he disbursed funds?

Mr. BALL. Only what he reported.

The CHAIRMAN. What did he report?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't have that here, but——

The CHAIRMAN. You said they were very complete.

Mr. CHAYES. They were very complete.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he itemize as the law requires to whom he paid money?

Mr. CHAYES. As I recall he did, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am shown one of these, this is in the subsequent registration statement, November 6, 1961 it states, "Describe fully all activities of the registrant for and in the interests of all

foreign principals named under Item 6," he says, "All usual functions of an information officer."

Do you consider that a complete statement of his activities?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, with the exception of the word "usual," I think it probably is. He did act largely as an information office. He made a lot of speeches, distributed literature. He promoted tourism, and he contacted people in public life and in the press of this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you examined his expense account?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't remember having done so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was substantial, was it not?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, it was.

CENTRAL AMERICAN CONNECTION

The CHAIRMAN. I notice he has spending travel expenses for Mr. F. Gallo.

Mr. CHAYES. Mr. Gallo was a gentleman from South America, it may have been Costa Rica or Nicaragua.

The CHAIRMAN. Guatemala, wasn't it?

Mr. BALL. Was it?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why he paid his expenses?

Mr. CHAYES. Our information suggests that he paid those expenses in connection with an effort to secure recognition by a South or Central American government for the Katanga government.

The CHAIRMAN. That is hardly a usual function of an information agent, is it?

Mr. CHAYES. No, it is not.

The CHAIRMAN. And there are a number of others, are they similar—there is a Mr. Duschinsky.

Mr. CHAYES. I don't know his name. But there were a number of other people—a dentist, I remember, and some other people—involved in an effort to secure recognition from a South American country for the Katanga government.

Now, I should say that in fairness to Mr. Struelens this issue has never been resolved at least publicly. He maintains he was simply instructed by Tshombe to pay these expenses and he paid these travel expenses without further inquiry as to what the matter involved was. We have always disputed that. We thought Mr. Struelens did have knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask the Department of Justice to investigate it?

Mr. BALL. Yes, we asked them to make a full investigation and they did and the FBI investigation was quite extensive. The judgment was that it didn't disclose enough to justify any kind of legal action.

NO CRIME AGAINST AMERICAN LAW

Mr. CHAYES. Well, assuming that everything stated had been true, even assuming that we could show that the proposal was to bribe a foreign official in order to secure recognition, there was no

crime against American law in that activitiy. We did investigate it very thoroughly and we investigated also——

The CHAIRMAN. He didn't so state in his registration statement, did he?

Mr. CHAYES. He didn't make any such expenditure, either.

The CHAIRMAN. He paid his expenses, his travel expenses.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And if it was for this purpose, he doesn't state the purpose, of course. There isn't anything to indicate why he paid various people's expenses?

Mr. CHAYES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice it says total regular monthly expenditures, $52,380.

Mr. BALL. He had an office he maintained.

The CHAIRMAN. All this money came from Katanga?

Mr. BALL. Oh, yes.

Mr. CHAYES. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand the law, if there is legal action it can be based upon inaccurate or insufficient, incomplete statements, can it not?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, in this case, Mr. Chairman, we for a variety of reasons were very careful in looking into the adequacy of his registration and the Justice Department advised us that there was not any basis for action in this regard. I would suppose also that this is a fuller statement than you would usually get.

The CHAIRMAN. So just because everybody else violates the law they didn't want to pick him out?

Mr. CHAYES. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. From what I hear he was in better shape. He was open and avowed. He came out to our state and made a considerable impression on a lot of people.

Mr. CHAYES. That should be added. He made an awful lot of personal appearances and was, I can testify from my personal contact, a very engaging person.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently Mr. Cassini is, too, from what I read, although I haven't met him.

Senator SYMINGTON. But apparently he didn't file.

The CHAIRMAN. He didn't file at all.

ISRAELI LOBBYING

Do you have any information about Israeli lobbying?

Mr. BALL. Yes. This is a very special situation because of the fact that so much of the activity on behalf of Israel is not activity which is financed by the Israeli Government but is actually something which springs from the conviction of a great many Americans who put up a good deal of money. So it falls in a very special category.

Now, the one former registered agent that we know of is a gentleman named Mr. Kenen, who is the editor of a publication known as the Near East Report. Mr. Kenen has called at the Department from time to time but his visits are normally for the purpose of obtaining information on what the Department's position or attitude may be one question or another, and then he very frequently com-

ments in his publication on the administration's attitude toward various Israeli problems.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you got a memorandum covering the activities of Mr. Kenen and the other agencies?

Mr. BALL. Yes, we can give you that.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us a complete statement?

Mr. BALL. Surely.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as you know, I would like to have both Mr. Kenen's.

Mr. BALL. All right.

ISRAELI FUND-RAISING ACTIVITIES

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't there a UJA?

Mr. BALL. Yes, United Jewish Appeal.

The CHAIRMAN. What are those?

Mr. CHAYES. There are local groups. The American Israeli Friendship Society, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee are the ones which are more normally interested in foreign policy with respect to Israel. The UJA is simply a money-raising organization for Jewish charities.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Jewish agency for Israel registered as a foreign agent?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't know whether it is or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you find out?

Mr. BALL. Yes, we surely will find out.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it you duty to know what goes on in this or any other country of these agents who are here?

Mr. BALL. We have a great deal of information. I can give you a memorandum on this of 16 or 17 pages about the activity of the Jewish organizations, and——

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we would like to have, all that you know.

Do you have any estimate there of how much money these agencies collect and how much last year or for the last ten years?

Mr. BALL. I think we must have that in the Department. We can get it for you, sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get how many bonds they have sold in this country?

Mr. BALL. Certainly, we have all of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Are these gifts to the United States Jewish agencies or any other agency tax deductible?

Mr. CHAYES. I think they are charitable gifts. The bond purchases are not.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us a description, I have never seen one, and never found any place you could get it—it seems to me you ought to know it because these people are very large participants in foreign aid, are they not?

Mr. BALL. Yes. The foreign aid to Israel is substantial. We can give you a statement on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have a statement on the foreign aid and also how much they have collected privately.

Mr. BALL. We can do that.

[The information referred to follows:]

SUGAR

I. General

Substantial efforts are exerted in behalf of Israel by numerous Jewish groups within the United States. Many of these organizations have frequent contact with the Department of State. With one exception, however, they have no agency relationship with the Government of Israel and therefore do not come within the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

The primary work of these groups, viewed as a whole, is financial assistance for Israel, and in this work they have been extremely successful. Many of them also attempt to gain support—by the general public, by Congress and by the Executive—for policies favorable to Israel and, in certain cases, against the Arab States. The Department is aware of the activities of these groups. Its files revealed the information concerning their efforts given in this and the accompanying memorandum ("Private Financial Assistance to Individuals and Organizations in Israel from the United States").

Most of these Jewish charitable groups receive contributions from the general public. Like all charitable organizations which raise money from the general public, they are not required to file annual financial or other statements with any Government agency. The only information available to the Department concerning internal organization and financial activities of these groups, therefore, comes from publications of the organizations themselves or secondary sources, such as newspapers and magazines.

The only such Jewish group which is registered under the Act is The Jewish Agency-American Section, Inc. The activities of this group are also discussed in the accompanying memorandum.

The many Jewish organizations in the United States which contribute money for charitable work in Israel are considered by the Justice Department to be exempt from the Foreign Agents Registration Act either because they have no foreign principal or because they come under the Section 3(d) exemption (". . . soliciting or collecting of funds and contributions within the United States to be used only for medical aid and assistance, or for food and clothing to relieve human suffering . . ."). The Justice Department has investigated possible violations of the Act by a few such groups, but in each case has determined that registration was not required.

II. Contacts with the Department of State

The Department has had few contacts with registered agents of the Government of Israel. Representatives from Robert R. Nathan Associates, a registered agent, have occasionally contacted Department officers, usually to discuss Israeli economic matters. Material published by The Jewish Agency-American Section, Inc., and the Israel Office of Information, both of which are registered, is also often received in the Department.

Many Jewish groups which have no agency relationship with the Government of Israel are active in its support, and their efforts often include contacts with the Department. In fact, the State Department in the early 1950's suggested that the numerous American Jewish organizations particularly interested in Israel form a committee to channel and reduce the number of individual contacts between the Department and these groups. The Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations was formed to meet this end. Representatives of this organization have frequently contacted State Department officers, as have representatives of the following other Jewish groups: The American Jewish Committee, B'nai B'rith, The American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (renamed The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee), The Jewish War Veterans, The Zionist Organization of America, and The Union of Orthodox Rabbis.

On a number of foreign policy issues, various Jewish groups have been active in presenting Israel's position to the Department. The refusal of Egypt to allow Israeli ships to pass through the Suez Canal, and the Arab boycott, are two examples. A World Bank loan for the expansion of the Suez Canal resulted in numerous protests to the Department in the three months January to March, 1960, and most of these were from individual Jews of Jewish organizations in the United States.

Isaiah L. Kenen is one of the most active representatives of any Jewish group in contacts with the Department. Between 1948 and 1951, he was a registered agent. The State Department was informed by the Justice Department that he terminated this relation in 1951 and is now associated with the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc., a New York corporation discussed in the accompanying memorandum. (This organization is to be distinguished from The Jewish Agency-American Section, Inc.) He also

is editor of *Near East Report*, a publication which generally supports the policies of Israel, and active in several other Jewish organizations.

ISRAELI BOND SALES

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to know if there is any other country that has similar organizations that collect money for the use of their governments?

Mr. BALL. Certainly not of this magnitude. So far as I know, this is a unique situation.

The CHAIRMAN. It is unique.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you really give us a precise rundown and with the figures? I think it is your duty to know about this.

Mr. BALL. I am sure we have this information and we will give it to you.

Mr. CHAYES. Actually you can say right now, we have it here, that Israel bond sales continue to gross about $70 million annually but maturities begin rather heavily in 1963. So that is the level of——

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that private investments?

Mr. BALL. It is private investments.

Mr. CHAYES. Private investments in bonds.

Mr. BALL. These bonds are regular bonds which are sold in this country, and then some of them are cashed in the form of local currencies when the bond holders go to Israel on trips.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is not a government contribution then?

Mr. BALL. No. This is not. This is purely individual.

Senator SYMINGTON. What I would like to see would be, if I may, Mr. Chairman, the government contributions in grants and loans to Israel, to all the Arab countries, to the Mohammedans and the Hindus—we will leave the Buddhists out of there.

Mr. BALL. Do you want it on a per capita basis?

The CHAIRMAN. These are very involved. I want those supplied for the record. We don't have time to go through it all now.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will give us this information. What I want to know very precisely is the actual relationship between the Jewish agency and the Government of Israel.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it is a charitable government gift? I want to know whether or not the funds which are collected, not through the bond sales, through the gifts, whether or not these are administered and who administers them and just how that money flows into Israel and what happens to it when it gets to Israel.

Senator SYMINGTON. I withdraw my request.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, I think this committee ought to know whether the State Department does know it or not, we want to know about it.

Mr. BALL. We have this information. We are very aware of this whole problem, Mr. Chairman. We have no difficulty in giving it to you.

[The information referred to follows:]

Private Financial Assistance to Individuals and Organizations in Israel From the United States

I. General

Private aid to individuals and organizations in Israel by Jews in the United States is channeled through a large number of agencies. Since virtually all of these organizations solicit contributions from the public, they are required to file only an initial statement with the Internal Revenue Service, and no reports thereafter with any Government agency. The Department's information concerning them is, therefore, derived only from publications of the groups themselves and from secondary sources.

As far as is known to the Department, deductions for contributions to all of these groups, except The Jewish Agency-American Section, Inc., are allowed by the Internal Revenue Service under Section 170(c) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. In a few cases, the Internal Revenue Service has questioned this status on the ground that the expenditure of the funds overseas was not controlled by the organization in question. In at least the major case of this type, the United Jewish Appeal, Inc., the State Department assisted the Internal Revenue Service in its inquiry. In conjunction with this inquiry, there was a major reorganization of the agency's structure. The Internal Revenue Service then reaffirmed the deductible status of contributions to the United Jewish Appeal, Inc.

The major portion of the assistance provided by Jewish organizations for use in Israel is raised by two methods: the United Jewish Appeal campaign and the sale of Israel bonds. In 1960, the most recent year for which we have complete figures, approximately $88,800,000 was donated to United States Jewish agencies for overseas programs. A substantial share of this amount was spent within Israel. In that same year, sales of Israel bonds in the United States equalled about $41,400,000.

II. The United Jewish Appeal, Inc. (UJA)

The United Jewish Appeal, Inc. (UJA) is a nonprofit membership corporation organized under New York law. It was established in the 1930's for the purpose of raising funds for the relief of Jewish refugees overseas and in the United States. Like the campaigns of the Catholic Charities and the Community Chests in most communities, the campaigns of the UJA are designed to substitute one major fundraising drive for many small ones. It raises the majority of its funds through local Jewish Welfare Funds and Federations. The corporation directs an annual fundraising campaign throughout the country and provides publicity and information services, speakers, films and promotional material. In each community a portion of the funds raised is used for local welfare purposes, and the remainder is turned over to the national organization.

The UJA does not operate any service programs directly. These are conducted by the organizations which share in the UJA proceeds the United Israel Appeal (UIA), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), and to a much lesser degree, the New York Association for New Americans (NYANA) and the United Hias Service. After deducting administrative expenses and contributions to the NYANA and the United Hias Service, the UJA funds are divided as follows: UIA receives 67% and JDC 33% of the first $55 million raised each year. Beyond $55 million, UIA receives 87.5% and JDC 12.5%. From 1948 through 1960, the UJA provided about $580 million to the UIA and $112 million for JDC programs in Israel.

A. United Israel Appeal (UIA).—UIA is one of the two major recipients of UJA funds. It channels the funds received from the UJA directly to the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc., a New York corporation. This agency was reorganized in 1960, and now has a board of directors of twenty Americans and one Israeli. Except in acting as a conduit for a portion of UJA funds, UIA's only activity is a small amount of publicity work.

In the first year after its reorganization (1960–61), the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. provided over $28 million toward costs of over $66 million for programs operated by the Jewish Agency for Israel (Jerusalem), an Israeli organization. These programs included immigration and transportation to Israel, agricultural settlement, housing, higher education and others.

The Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. uses an American staff, stationed in Israel, appointed by and responsible to the Agency to review the budgets of the programs which it finances. Dr. Isador Lubin, as American economist, also acted as a consultant of the Agency to review the 1961–62 budget.

In 1952, responsibility was delegated by the Israel Parliament to The Jewish Agency for Israel (Jerusalem) for direction and implementation of all phases of a program for absorbing immigrants into Israel. This organization is not a part of the

Government of Israel and has no direct connection with it, although several Government officials are active in the organization. There is a United States section of the Jewish Agency for Israel (Jerusalem). This section is the Jewish Agency-American Section, Inc., and is registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

This organization controlled the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. until the latter's reorganization in 1960. At the present time, the Jewish Agency for Israel-American Section appoints seven of the twenty-one Board members of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. The Jewish Agency for Israel-American Section also formerly acted as a channel for funds from the Jewish Agency for Israel (Jerusalem) for cultural, educational and public relations work in the United States. This responsibility was transferred, however, to the American Zionist Council.

When The Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. was a branch of The Jewish Agency for Israel-American Section, The Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. began a short term program of borrowings from commercial banks in the United States to finance the programs of the Jewish Agency (Jerusalem). In 1954, the UJA attempted to consolidate these debts by long-term borrowings. A substantial portion of these loans was used, however, to meet new needs of the Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) between 1954 and 1958. At the beginning of 1961, the UJA debt was $1 million and The Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. borrowings equalled $19.3 million. In 1961 $65 million of this debt was refinanced through a series of loans obtained and underwritten by the UJA. The debt is being repaid at the rate of 10% per year for ten years. The 1963 UJA budget allocates $9.2 million for debt service and repayment.

Repayment of this loan is apparently channeled through The Jewish Agency for Israel-American Section. The financial statement of that organization filed with the Department of Justice for the six months period ending September 30, 1962 included a receipt from "borrowings" of $9.2 million and an expenditure "for the account of The Jewish Agency for Israel" of approximately the same amount.

B. American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC).—JDC, also a New York corporation, provides aid for Jews in Israel and in other parts of the world. It reports having assisted about 228,000 persons in 1960. In 1960, it received $17.5 million from the UJA.

JDC's program of service to sick, aged and handicapped immigrants in Israel accounted for the largest share of its appropriations: $9.8 million in 1960. An additional $6.8 million was expended for other programs in Israel. Outside of that country, relief, health and educational programs for Jews in Moslem countries, particularly in North Africa, accounted for $4.6 million of assistance in 1960. Aid is also provided in thirteen European countries, Poland and France being the most significant. JDC grants assistance both directly to individuals and to health, education, religious and welfare institutions. A JDC representative works in each country in which Committee funds are used to control their distribution.

III. Other United States Jewish agencies which collect funds for use in Israel

A special United States organization, the Jewish Agency Committee on Control and Authorization of Campaigns, seeks to channel most funds for Israel from United States Jews through the UJA in order to avoid a multiplicity of overlapping campaigns. It has no authority to prevent other campaigns, but a successful national fund-raising drive is difficult without its support. Among the other Jewish agencies whose campaigns it does approve are the following:

(1) *American Committee for the Weizmann Institute of Science* provides funds for that institution, including $1,645,000 in 1960.

(2) *American Friends of the Hebrew University and American Technion Society,* each raise funds in the United States for the educational institutions in Israel which bear those names. The former received $3.5 million in 1960; the latter obtained $1.7 million in the same year. The University-Technion Joint Maintenance Appeal also received $665,000 for these schools in 1960.

(3) *American Red Mogen David* is the Israel counterpart of the Red Cross. It raised $237,000 in 1960.

(4) *America-Israel Cultural Foundation* raised $1.2 million in 1960 for some forty groups in Israel, specializing in the fields of music, theater, dance, art and literature.

(5) *Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America, Inc.,* which received $10.2 million in 1960. It provides funds for medical services, youth programs and other services in Israel. The Hadassah-Hebrew University Medical Center, opened in 1961, is one of its major accomplishments.

(6) *Jewish National Fund,* provides money to cultivate land in Israel. It received $2.7 million in 1960.

(7) *National Committee for Labor Israel and Pioneer Women, the Women's Labor Zionist Organization of America, Inc.*, raise money for the welfare activities of the primary labor union in Israel, Histradrut. The former received $1.8 million in 1960; the latter obtained $810,000 in that year. Histradrut has no direct connection with the Government of Israel, but the Mapai, the dominant political party in Israel, is closely affiliated with Histradrut. The union has about 800,000 members and owns a number of companies, particularly in the fields of manufacturing, transportation and agriculture.

(8) *National Council of Jewish Women*, received $731,000 in 1960 for various overseas welfare programs.

(9) *United Hias Service* aids Jews to migrate to countries throughout the world. It raised $1,240,000 in 1960.

(10) *Women's American ORT* provides funds for vocational training in Israel, Western Europe and Moslem countries. It received more than $1 million in 1960.

IV. Israel bond sales

Three Israel Government Bond Issues have been floated since 1951: Independence Bonds, Development Bonds, and Second Development Bonds. The proposed allocation of proceeds of sales of the Second Development Bonds was as follows: agriculture, 21%, industry, power and fuel, 34%; housing and educational construction, 10%; transportation and communication, 15%; general reserve, 17%. These bonds are registered with the SEC and available to ordinary investors.

The following table sets forth the sales of Israel Bonds in the years 1951–1961.

SALES OF ISRAEL BONDS, 1951–61

[In thousands of dollars]

Year	Total cash sales	Sales in United States	Sales abroad
1951 (May 1–Dec. 31)	$52,647	$52,647	
1952	47,521	47,521	
1953	36,861	32,000	$4,861
1954	37,247	31,000	6,247
1955	42,301	36,000	6,301
1956	54,089	45,287	8,802
1957	49,335	40,201	9,134
1958	46,236	37,493	8,743
1959	52,265	42,488	9,777
1960	51,950	41,401	10,549
1961	57,214	45,162	12,052
Total	527,666	451,200	77,466

The CHAIRMAN. We are curious but not aware of it. There are a lot of it we don't know.

DEVELOPMENTAL WORK

I don't know of any other case that I think is the fact—although I am not ready to say this, I think that before we again examine the foreign aid bill something of this type of thing ought to be known. I can't see, if the contributions are ultimately finding their way into the government's program, how they are considered charitable in the sense of supporting a church or why they should be considered charitable contributions.

Mr. CHAYES. My understanding is they don't go to government agencies in Israel. They go to other agencies that may be engaged in the same kind of developmental work that a government would be engaged in.

The CHAIRMAN. Developmental work?

Mr. CHAYES. But they don't go into the government budget.

The CHAIRMAN. Into the Treasury?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But the actual program to which they are devoted is part of the government development program, is that not true?

Mr. CHAYES. That may be true, but any kind of foreign investments might well be also.

Mr. BALL. We will get this information in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean if somebody gave some money to the HHFA, the United States Government, it wouldn't go directly into the Treasury of the government. It would be possible to direct it into the agency, and would you consider that a governmental activity?

Mr. CHAYES. But the HHFA is a government agency and my understanding is these funds do not go to government agencies but that they go to private, non-governmental groups.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the point I want you as a legal expert to develop, exactly what is the relationship between the agency that receives the voluntary gifts in Israel. I mean, I don't know what this connection is. But Israel is a pretty tightly run community, isn't it?

Mr. CHAYES. It is a well-organized place, yes, sir.

OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY IN ISRAEL

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I was told about 70, or 80 percent of the property in Israel belongs to the government.

Mr. CHAYES. No, I don't think that is so. There is a central labor organization called the Histadrut which owns a great deal of property and it may run that high.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a government agency?

Mr. CHAYES. It is not a government agency.

The CHAIRMAN. What is its relationship to the government?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't know. It is a national labor federation like the AFL–CIO but a lot more developed.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you find out just what that relationship is?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes. It is a labor organization and something of a political organization.

The CHAIRMAN. The time is getting on. We would like for you to prepare that statement for us for our information.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

[The statement referred to follows:]

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AID TO ISRAEL

The attached table indicates the United States economic assistance to the Near East countries, including Israel, and to India and Pakistan between 1946 and 1962.

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NEAR EAST COUNTRIES, INDIA AND PAKISTAN FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN FISCAL YEARS 1946–62

Country	1961 population (millions)	Total grants and loans [1] (millions)	Per capita grants and loans	Total Public Law 480, titles I, II, and III [2] (millions)	Total economic assistance (millions)	Total per capita economic assistance as of June 30, 1962
UAR	26.7	$175.5	$6.6	$518.5	$694.0	$26.0
Jordan	1.7	275.6	162.0	49.3	325.9	192.0
Syria	4.7	37.1	7.8	68.8	105.9	22.5
Iraq	7.3	19.1	2.6	2.4	21.5	3.0
Yemen	4.0	14.1	3.5	8.8	22.9	5.7
Lebanon	1.7	63.5	38.0	16.9	80.4	47.3
Saudi Arabia	6.0	46.6	7.8	0	46.6	7.8
Total Arab States	52.1	632.5	12.1	664.7	1,297.2	24.9
Israel	2.2	628.6	285.0	276.0	904.6	411.0
India	442.0	1,988.9	4.5	2,228.0	4,216.9	9.5
Pakistan	94.5	1,280.2	13.5	682.5	1,962.7	20.7

[1] Includes Export-Import loans but excludes Public Law 480 loans.
[2] Title I figures based on sales agreement.

THE CHINA LOBBY

The CHAIRMAN. We have already discussed the Katanga, the Philippine War Damage. Do you have anything on the China lobby? Can you give us a memorandum on it?

Mr. BALL. We will give you a memorandum on it, yes. As a matter of fact, this is not as active as it once was, as you know, and the China lobby, as it used to be known, has very largely disappeared.

The CHAIRMAN. It has?

Mr. BALL. But which doesn't mean we are not getting a number of approaches from the Chinese Government or from some individuals, but we will give you a full memorandum on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us a memorandum on that.

[The information referred to follows:]

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

I. General

The term the "China Lobby" has primarily denoted those individuals and groups that have promoted the Chinese Nationalist cause among the United States public in the years since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and particularly since the intensification of the Chinese Civil War in 1945. Most of these individuals and groups are not registered agents of the Republic of China. Their contacts with the Department of State have sharply declined in recent years. This fact can be largely attributed to the death or retirement of several important members of the "China Lobby," to the abatement of controversy within the United States on the alleged "loss of China," and to the present Administration's reaffirmation of United States commitments to the Republic of China.

The Republic of China has formally employed the services of at least one public relations firm which has registered as an agent of the Chinese Nationalist Government. This is the Hamilton Wright Organization, Inc. of New York which held the Republic of China account between 1957 and 1962.

II. Specific contacts with the Department of State

At the present time, desk officers concerned with Chinese affairs in the Department receive no evidence in their day-to-day work of the operations of any group which might be termed a "China Lobby."

In the past two years, Department contacts with the Hamilton Wright Organization appear to have been limited to an invitation to desk officers in early 1962 to attend a showing of a film about Taiwan prepared by the Wright group for exhibit in the United States. Officers who attended were aware of Wright's role as a Republic of China agent.

The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations is probably the most militant group in the United States today interesting itself in a political objective of the Republic of China. Yet it did not even send the Office of East Asian Affairs in the Department a copy of its manifesto, signed by several hundred Congressmen, against the admission of the Communist China to the United Nations last fall.

III. Activities of non-registered individuals or groups

Available information concerning the "China Lobby" indicates that it was never a formal organization, but rather comprised a network of personal acquaintances and informal relationships which, in one way or another, sought to obtain for the Republic of China a favorable image among the officialdom and the general public of the United States.

At its inception, before the beginning of World War II, this lobby was primarily concerned with the positive objective of obtaining economic and military assistance for the Republic of China. Its peak activity appears to have come in the years between 1944 and 1953 and was aimed at shaping a United States policy which strongly supported the Republic of China and opposed Communist China. Its emphasis has now apparently switched to the prevention or refutation of publicity in the United States hostile to the interests of the Republic of China. As the Chinese Communists have steadily become more bellicose and doctrinaire and as the United States commitment to the Republic of China has proved to be firm, the "China Lobby" has had less reason to be concerned and less cause to be active.

There is little in published form concerning the "China Lobby." The most detailed treatment of it appeared in the April 15 and the April 29, 1952 issues of "The Reporter." In its July 20, 1954 edition, "The Reporter" carried an article giving some additional detail. More recently, Ross Y. Koen, an American, made the "China Lobby" the subject of his Ph.D. dissertation, and in 1960 published a book on the subject ("The China Lobby in American Politics," Macmillan, New York). Immediately after its appearance, the Republic of China took exception to statements made in the book and prevailed upon the publisher to withdraw it.

During the years of its peak activity, a chief spokesman for the "China Lobby" was Alfred Kohlberg, a New York entrepreneur engaged in trade with China. He waged a one-man battle through tracts and letters throughout the 1940's to counter doubts expressed within the United States about the efficacy of Kuomintang leadership. Kohlberg's death in 1960 removed one major source of "China Lobby" strength.

Between the outbreak of World War II and the present, a number of organizations were established for the advancement of certain specific causes benefitting the Republic of China. The earliest of these was the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China, and in more recent years the Committee of One Million, Aid for Chinese Refugee Intellectuals (ACRI), and the American-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc. (In 1962 the last-named group was renamed American-Afro-Asian Exchange, Inc., with an executive committee membership virtually the same as that of the Committee of One Million.) An important figure in several of these organizations is the Executive Secretary of the Committee of One Million, Marvin Liebman, a New York public relations man.

These organizations, however, appear to concern themselves principally with the specific purposes for which they were organized and incidentally with maintaining a generally favorable impression of the Republic of China in the United States.

THE GERMAN LOBBY

The CHAIRMAN. How about Mr. Klein in West Germany?

Mr. BALL. Do you know Mr. Klein very well?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any information about it?

Mr. BALL. I had a certain amount of information about him, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Supply us with a memorandum on all you know about his activities.

Mr. BALL. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand he is rather prominent among the registered agents.

Mr. BALL. Particularly in representation of German interests, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the Haitian lobby, do you know who represents them and what they have done?

Mr. BALL. Yes, we have some information on the Haitian lobby.

The CHAIRMAN. What we would like, if you can put it in manageable form, is a memorandum from you giving us all the information you know about the activities of these particular people.

Mr. BALL. Very glad to.

[The information referred to follows:]

JULIUS KLEIN PUBLIC RELATIONS, INC.

I. General

Major General Julius Klein (USA Ret.), doing business as Julius Klein Public Relations, Inc., has been registered with the Department of Justice since September 7, 1956 as agent of various German principals. The first was the "Society for the Promotion of Protection of Foreign Investments, e.V." The current listings show the Frankfurter Bank (apparently acting for a committee representing German industrialists, civic and political groups) and the State of Hesse. Receipts from these two sources in the six months preceding September 1962 somewhat exceed $150,000. Other registrations as agent of foreign principal for Klein include the Republic of Panama, 1953–54, and EURATOM, 1959.

Klein was formerly National Commander of the Jewish War Veterans of the United States. During World War II he served in the Pacific under General MacArthur and Admirals Nimitz and Halsey. Senator Wiley stated that he was "the author of the original Army combat public-relations plan." After the war, he was a special assistant to Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and an advisor to Secretary of the Air Force Symington. He also served as National Defense Consultant to the Republican National Committee.

II. Department of State contacts

The files of the Department of State reveal a number of recent occasions on which Klein or his associates have approached the Department on matters pertaining to the conduct of foreign relations.

(1) On April 28, 1962, Julius Epstein, then in the employ of Klein, wrote to the Secretary of State in regard to an unpublished Soviet memorandum to the Bonn Government of December 27, 1961. The Department does not know how this memorandum came into Epstein's hands. Epstein quoted the following portion of the memorandum:

"The former American President Eisenhower stated in his talk with N.S. Khrushchev that it was the economic power of the Federal Republic and her capability to press hard the Western powers in the world markets, especially the United States, which had caused the American Government to induce West Germany to rearm. The President declared that if the Federal Republic had not been included in the rearmament race, she would undoubtedly have increased her economic potential and would have gained even more profitable positions in world trade, to the detriment of her NATO allies."

Epstein urged that the Department produce a denial of these statements. On May 15, 1962, Klein wrote a very similar letter addressed to the German desk of the State Department in which he also urged official United States denial of the statements attributed to Eisenhower in the Soviet memorandum. An officer of the State Department wrote to Klein and Epstein that these allegations were entirely groundless. He also pointed out that these allegations had occasioned little comment in Germany and expressed the view that Klein's recommendation would only serve to give them currency.

(2) On August 9, 1962, General Buchanan and Harry Beaudoin, both of Julius Klein Associates, called on two officers of the Department to express their concern about an article in the August 4 issue of the *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, written by the paper's Washington correspondent. This article referred to impending investigations

into foreign lobby activities and attributed to the Department a statement that Klein might be subject to prosecution.

On August 10 Klein himself telephoned Mr. Hillenbrand (then Director of the Office of German Affairs) to register further concern over the *Stuttgarter* article. On both occasions, Department officials pointed out that the newspaper had no basis for attributing the statement in question to the Department.

Our investigation shows that the article resulted from the following circumstances. A German correspondent visited the Department to inquire about a *Newsweek* article on foreign lobbying activities which mentioned Klein, among other foreign agents. The correspondent asked whether a foreign agent could be prosecuted if it engaged in activities not covered by its registration statement. The Departmental officer replied that such a prosecution was possible under American law. He made no specific reference to Klein, nor did the question specifically include Klein. Nevertheless, the correspondent wrote in his article that "at the U.S. State Department it has been indicated to German correspondents that the lobbyist firm of former Major General Julius Klein may possibly be subject to court action."

On August 11 Klein wrote a letter along similar lines to Assistant Secretary Tyler, this time to protest a *Newsweek* article on the activities of foreign lobbyists which apparently had given rise to the *Stuttgarter* piece. On August 15 General Buchanan telephoned Mr. Hillenbrand to express further concern over the unfavorable comments in the German press on the activities of the Klein organization. Following this discussion, an officer of the Department called the German correspondent to protest the erroneous reference to the Department. The correspondent apologized and agreed to submit a correction to the newspaper. The newspaper later retracted its attribution of the statement to the State Department. On August 20 Klein wrote to Assistant Secretary Tyler thanking him for the Department's handling of these complaints.

(3) In October, 1961, Klein called on Ambassador Dowling in Bonn and showed him three classified German cables, which, Klein said, had been given him by sources in the German Government. The first two of these were from the German Embassy in Washington and reported on briefings by Assistant Secretary Kohler on United States bilateral exploratory talks on Berlin with Foreign Minister Gromyko in that same month. The third cable was from the German Permanent Representative to NATO in Paris and reported on a conversation between him and American Permanent Representative, Ambassador Thomas Finletter. Our information is that Klein sent these cables to Julius Epstein, his employee in New York. At some time during the summer of 1962, almost a year after the cables were orginally obtained, Epstein's employment with Klein was terminated. Epstein took copies of the cables with him when he left Klein's employ and thereafter wrote two articles quoting at length from the cables. The first appeared in the weekly newspaper *Rheinischer Merkur*, of August 31, 1962. The second appeared in *Der Spiegel* of September 12, 1962.

(4) On September 20, 1962, Senator Dirksen wrote to the Secretary of State to complain about unfavorable publicity regarding the activities of his Illinois constituent, Julius Klein, which was being circulated in Germany by Curtis J. Hoxter, head of a New York public relations firm which represented the Austrian Government.

Department files contain a number of reported conversations with Department officers, initiated by officials of the German Embassy itself, who have expressed considerable irritation and concern with the activities of Klein. It is alleged by these German officials that Klein's special access to the chancellery in Bonn assures his continued operations despite the problems he creates.

III. Other activities

Klein had numerous contacts with members of Congress. To cite one example, the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations sent Klein to Europe in 1954 as a special, nonpaid consultant. Upon his return he submitted a report concerning United States European policies.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS AS TARGETS FOR FOREIGN AGENTS

Mr. BALL. And there is one that was mentioned earlier, this is the whole matter of the relation of Selvage and Lee to the Portuguese Government in the Angola situation which is a matter where I think a number of questions are raised by that whole relationship.

Mr. CHAYES. We ought to say, just to help make clear, that the Department does do something in this area, that it was in connection with the activity of a Haitian representative who was unregistered. He made some approaches to the Department, and the Department called this to the attention of the Justice Department and instituted an investigation which is now under way.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now under way?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes. I think what this demonstrates is that the Department officers are the target of the activities of foreign agents such as those who sit at the Dominican desk and here at the Haitian desk, or wherever it may be, the African people in the case of Angola and Katanga, those officers are very sharply aware of the Act and of the requirements of the Act and of the status of the people who are dealing with it. Each time there has been a case of this kind, with the exception of Cassini who was unregistered and where there were special circumstances, we found that our people have been highly aware of the fact that the persons who approached them were foreign agents, if they were.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be very useful to the committee to have all the information you have on their activities, whether or not they have to approach you or whether they have influenced you or not. We want to know what you know about those agents.

On that Philippine bill, I am particularly interested in that because it involved this committee's action. We had controversy and I want you to make it as complete as possible as to why you changed your position and also particularly who, if anybody in the Congress or otherwise, approached you about this matter, anybody in the Department, if you can find that out. As I say I was involved in it myself having introduced the original bill and I want it as complete as you can give it to me.

PROTESTS AGAINST ACTIVITIES OF AGENTS

Do you know of any instance in which a non-diplomatic agent's activities have ever been protested by our Ambassador to a foreign government? Have you ever asked an Ambassador to protest the activities of a foreign agent?

Mr. BALL. We would expect them to do so if their activities——

The CHAIRMAN. I was just wondering whether there were any incidents?

Mr. BALL. I am sure there have been instances where an Ambassador has reported that a foreign agent had been there and was causing some difficulties.

The CHAIRMAN. What I was thinking is if you protested the activities of a foreign agent here in Washington to the foreign country and had our Ambassador requested his recall or termination of his activities?

Mr. BALL. I think there may have been cases where the Ambassador has suggested to the foreign government that the agent was not being helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean.

Mr. BALL. Yes, I think we can do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us some example of that?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be interesting to know whether or not you have. You can easily demand their recall if it is diplomatic.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, all you can do on the other, I suppose, is to suggest it.

THE PROBLEM OF LICENSING

Mr. BALL. This, of course, Mr. Chairman, was one of the things I had in mind yesterday when we were talking about the problem of licensing. One of the difficulties, as I am sure the representatives of the Department of Justice will tell you, in the administration of the Act at the present time is, if there is a deficiency or apparent deficiency in the registration or if the foreign agent appears to do something which appears to be at least marginally wrong, the only action that can be taken now is for the Department to try to proceed criminally against that agent. Now, this is a very difficult thing because of the presumptions that exist in criminal cases which are very hard to prove. One of the possibilities that might be available if there was any licensing procedure there might be a real sanction because if the Department revokes the license then the agent couldn't do business without being in direct violation of the law and this gives the kind of control over the agent that we do have over diplomatic representatives.

We can now ask governments to recall them home and in the case of an agent we can ask the Department of Justice to revoke a license. Now, this wouldn't be done capriciously or arbitrarily but it would still give a kind of control which isn't available now. I simply suggest it.

The CHAIRMAN. I must say after thinking about your suggestion, I had not thought about it, it appeals to me, and was it our understanding yesterday that you would develop this?

Mr. BALL. Yes, I said I would.

The CHAIRMAN. In the way of suggesting as to how to implement it.

Mr. BALL. I will not only do that but I will discuss it with the Department of Justice and see if we can't make a more solid approach to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Without more thorough consideration it appeals to me as a sanction short of criminal prosecution.

Mr. BALL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is very difficult but yet would go a long ways toward achieving your purpose because then if he continued to act——

Mr. BALL. Then he would be in direct violation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then there wouldn't be much difficulty on the criminal side.

Mr. BALL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I am inclined to think this is good and I hope you will put somebody on it.

Mr. BALL. Well, Mr. Chayes is on it.

DETER EXTREME ACTIVITIES OF AGENTS

The CHAIRMAN. And come up with the best suggestion you can in this connection, because I agree when you get into criminal prosecutions in this field it is a very difficult thing to do. That isn't, of course, what this committee is aiming at at all. What we are trying to do is to lay the groundwork for the committee to improve and strengthen the law, if we can, and the process of the hearing itself, might prove to deter some of the more extreme activities of these agents.

Mr. BALL. If you take the chronology of some of the other disclosure legislation, for example, the disclosure in the Securities Act, where you can issue a stop order against the sale of securities, here you have a sanction in which the Securities and Exchange Commission can invoke it and then it can be litigated but it is not the same thing as starting a criminal action.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BALL. And here, I think effective disclosure legislation probably needs some easy sanction like a licensing arrangement.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. It appeals to me. Offhand, I must say this would be a great improvement, and in that connection, also, the disclosure which is the whole basis of this law is more adequate, I mean disclosure and they are not doing it.

Mr. BALL. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think I have time to go into it today but one of the members has already evidenced an interest in whether or not your own was adequate disclosure, so you will have to be asked about it.

Mr. BALL. I would be delighted to discuss this one.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to go into it now because he couldn't be here today, but you have already, I am sure, become aware of the fact that he is interested in it.

Mr. BALL. No, as a matter of fact, I have an interest myself is satisfying the committee.

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

The CHAIRMAN. All right. At a later day we will go into that. We have no time for that. I have to be on the floor in about 30 minutes on this rules change of which you are aware. But I think it has been very interesting and very helpful especially, if we can get these memoranda in complete detail—they will be helpful to us. You may have some information and probably do that we don't have to help complete our information about this.

Mr. BALL. I take it, if we submit this, the question as to what is regarded as confidential or not is something that we might discuss with the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. What I hope to follow, and I have consulted with a number of members, is that these executive hearings will not be made public until you or anyone involved, has an opportunity to look at them and say whether or not this is of a classified nature.

Mr. BALL. Good.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of it may be. I have no intention of trying to publish something that is classified or that shouldn't be published. The press asked me about it and I said if any of the execu-

tive sessions are made public it will only be after editing. This is the procedure we followed in the past. Of course, I have no authority to make any executive record public without the consent of the whole committee. This is a rule of the committee that we wouldn't do that. We consider our executive records very secret.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. CHAYES. I think in these memoranda where we will be commenting on the activities of foreign governments and will, therefore, have an effect on the relations of foreign governments, it may be that we could be more helpful if the memoranda were supplied and at least initially on a confidential basis.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is for the information of the committee to help us.

RESULT OF FOREIGN AID COMMITMENTS

You may think we are making too much of a thing of this. I think we are not. I have a feeling that with the commitments such as the foreign aid and others this has inspired much more activity than used to be customary in this country, and I don't like it. I didn't like the kind of activity that went on in relation to the sugar bill. I mean they were around here in Congress bothering us, very extensively, I guess you know that.

Mr. BALL. I am wholly sympathetic with this, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They may not bring it directly to bear on you but they have ways of getting around it and when you see these enormous fees, what do you think they do with that money? Do you think they are expected to pocket all of that money for themselves? It just isn't sensible that a foreign government is going to pay a fellow just for his own purposes this kind of money.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. I think for this morning, unless you have something else, that is all. I hope you will take these memoranda seriously, they can be of great help to us.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else at this time?

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4 p.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman), Senator Sparkman (acting committee chairman), and Senators Mansfield, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The subcommittee was briefed on the current situation in the Canal Zone by Rcbert J. Fleming, Governor of the Panama Canal Zone, and Howard Haugerud, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army of the Department of Defense.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Church (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Sparkman, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

The subcommittee was briefed on future plans for the financing of the United Nations by Francis T. Plimpton, United States Ambassador to the U.N. and U.S. Representative.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman and Hickenlooper.

Martin T. Birnbaum, of New York City, NY, gave testimony in relation to the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session in room S–116, Capitol, at 10 a.m..

Present: Senator Church (subcommittee chairman) and Senator Williams.

The subcommittee was briefed on the operations of the United Nations Special Fund by Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]

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MINUTES

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 3:30 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman) and Senator Aiken.

The subcommittee was briefed by Ambassador Raymond Thurston on the current situation in the Republic of Haiti.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

SHRIMP BOAT INCIDENT

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—On February 21, 1963, the United States charged that two Cuban planes had shelled an American shrimp boat, the *Ala*, in international waters a day earlier. The two crew members were unharmed in the incident and were rescued by a U.S. destroyer. President Kennedy ordered the Department of Defense to take any action necessary to prevent similar attacks on American shipping.

[Cuba denied these charges and insisted that its planes had merely flown low over the *Ala* during a search for two hijacked Cuban fishing boats, which were reputedly carrying arms to anti-Castro groups within Cuba.]

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:40 p.m., in room S–116 U.S. Capitol Building, Senator John J. Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Lausche, Symington, Aiken, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Holt of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order.

I regret we have such small attendance, but I knew we wouldn't have very good attendance with a number out of town, some with other plans, not knowing of this except on such short notice.

We have with us Mr. Sterling Cottrell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and accompanying Mr. Cottrell is——

Mr. WEXLER. Arthur Wexler.

Senator SPARKMAN. Arthur Wexler, who is in the Office of Congressional Relations.

We are glad to have you gentlemen with us.

Mr. Cottrell, you know what we are interested in. There is a great deal of interest up here and some excitement over this report of the MIGs firing on the American shrimp boat, and we thought it would be a good thing if we might get from you as soon as we could such information as might be available.

And if you would proceed, we would appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF STERLING COTTRELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY ARTHUR WEXLER, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

Mr. COTTRELL. Thank you very much.

I think the facts of this attack have been set forth by the Defense Department this morning and they have a statement to the effect that about 5:35 last night our people noticed on the radar the presence of a group of MIGs across the 24th Parallel. They scrambled United States fighters who went to the spot and as they approached the spot, observed the MIGs making passes at a small

fishing boat. On seeing the U.S. planes, the MIGs turned and scooted for Havana, or for Cuba.

Our planes then went down and investigated and found a 75-foot fishing boat, a boat without any superstructure, no flag, two crew members, in the water. They called for other assistance from the United States Navy and two men from a Naval vessel came up, picked the two crew members off the ship, who were unharmed and who in subsequent testimony indicated that they had been shrimp fishing, had about 800 pounds of shrimp in the hold at the time.

They encountered bad weather and had been adrift for a couple of days. Their battery was out and, their radio was inoperative. They were floating around when these MIGs approached their boat, according to their testimony, and two of the MIGs made passes at the boat. They fired and hit astern of the boat on one pass, hit the water in front of the boat on the second pass; then the American planes turned up and the MIGs broke it off.

Senator AIKEN. What time did the Navy take them over?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't have the precise time, but that is a matter of record. I can get it for you, if it is important.

These are the facts of the case. The reports were coming in last night. We were seeking all sources of information on it, and at 8 o'clock in the morning I had the operations center instructed to make me a brief, all of the cables, putting all the clarifications of the facts as they came in, so we had the full story , and we drafted a note to the Cuban Government to be relayed through the Swiss. If you are interested, I just grabbed a copy of that at my office.

THE SHIP WAS NEVER HIT

Senator WILLIAMS. When did this incident take place?

Mr. COTTRELL. It started at 5:35 last evening. This was the time our radar picked up the blips on the MIGs.

Senator AIKEN. You say the stern of the boat hit? Was hit with a rocket?

Mr. COTTRELL. No I didn't. They fired astern of the ship. The ship was never hit.

Senator AIKEN. I thought you said they were hit on the stern.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought you said so, too.

Senator LAUSCHE. Who fired?

Senator WILLIAMS. The MIGs.

Senator LAUSCHE. Cuban MIGs?

Senator WILLIAMS. That is right. They were MIG–15s and 17s and we believed, and I believe but I don't have any evidence, that they were probably Cubans and not Russians because the Russians generally are flying the MIG–19s and 21s. The Cubans are usually firing the 17s and 15s.

Senator WILLIAMS. You say "firing"—is that machine gun firing?

Mr. COTTRELL. This isn't sure.

AMERICAN INTERCEPTORS

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, we have got Secretary McNamara before the Armed Services Committee and I would like

to ask a few questions, if I might, and then go back, if that would be all right with you.

Senator SPARKMAN. If it is all right with Senator Williams.

Senator WILLIAMS. Sure.

Senator SYMINGTON. How far away from Cuba was that?

Mr. COTTRELL. Forty miles.

Senator SYMINGTON. International waters?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. How high were the MIGs?

Mr. COTTRELL. Started at 11,000, then came down passing over the vessel.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did they do that before our interceptors came in?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you sure of that?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. When did we pick them up on radar?

Mr. COTTRELL. 5:35.

Senator SYMINGTON. And where were they then?

Mr. COTTRELL. They were 40 miles, just passing the 24th Parallel.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were they going away from the ship or coming in to the ship?

Mr. COTTRELL. When they made the passes at the shrimp boat, they were turning back toward Cuba.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were they turning back because they saw the interceptors? That is my point.

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't believe so, because they didn't break off until our planes appeared. They were making passes at the time at the shrimp vessel.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, this an executive session. My impression was that the Secretary of Defense felt that they came out, that they saw interceptors, that they went back and in the process of going back, they fired at the shrimp boat.

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know. This is possible, I suppose. It depends on how you read the traffic that comes in.

Senator SYMINGTON. How low were they?

Mr. COTTRELL. When they made the passes? This wasn't determined in any traffic I saw.

IDENTIFICATION OF CUBAN PLANES

Senator SYMINGTON. How do you know they were 15s and 17s instead of 21s? I don't think there are any 19s there.

Mr. COTTRELL. I think this came from the identification of our own pilots.

Senator SYMINGTON. Our own pilots must have been pretty close.

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. As I understand——

Senator SYMINGTON. How close were they?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Is that all the information you have on this?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't have any information other than what the Department has already put out.

Senator WILLIAMS. Did our pilots fire on them?

Mr. COTTRELL. They didn't come close enough to fire on them.

Senator SYMINGTON. He doesn't know how close they came.

Mr. COTTRELL. That is true.

Senator AIKEN. Could our pilots have overtaken them? What kind of planes did we have?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know the relative speeds of MIGs or the American planes.

Senator AIKEN. What connection does the Department see between this incident of last night and the announcement of the Russians that they were removing several thousand troops from Cuba?

Mr. COTTRELL. I personally don't see any connection with it. They have been out before in this kind of operation.

DISAPPEARANCE OF A TANKER

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask two more questions: Could our pilots have fired at them? Would they have been permitted to?

Mr. COTTRELL. You would have to ask the military about that, Senator, because of the rules of engagement we are not operating under, and I can't quote those rules of engagement now.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, you don't know whether they could have fired or not, is that right?

Mr. COTTRELL. That is right; I don't know.

Senator SYMINGTON. One final question: Is there any suspicion they may be responsible for the disappearance of the tanker?

Mr. COTTRELL. The sulfur?

Senator SYMINGTON. Sulfur, yes.

Mr. COTTRELL. That I can't answer, either. That would be speculation.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Senator AIKEN. How far was the incident last night from where the tanker was sighted, the debris was found?

Mr. COTTRELL. I am sorry to keep telling you I don't know, but I haven't plotted the two.

Senator WILLIAMS. How far were they from Havana?

Mr. COTTRELL. Forty miles from the Cuban coast, coming off from a point—if I can see the map—in the Florida Straits, half-way up. Havana I think is over there [indicating].

AMERICAN PLANES FROM KEY WEST

Senator WILLIAMS. Where did our planes take off? Were they in the air just cruising the area?

Mr. COTTRELL. No, they were scrambled in Florida for this operation. They are on alert all the time. With radar ready to scramble when they see the——

Senator SPARKMAN. They took off from the base at Key West?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator WILLIAMS. Took off at Key West and were there by the time they got over there?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, they were strafing the ship. It is a short distance for jets, of course.

Senator AIKEN. You say there have been other incidents?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. The Cuban MIGs have been in the area and have been flying parallel to and in proximity to patrol planes of ours from time to time.

Senator AIKEN. Incendiary bullets or rockets?

Mr. COTTRELL. No.

Senator AIKEN. That could have caused the sulfur thing to explode?

Mr. COTTRELL. I suppose. This is pure speculation on my part, but I suppose it is possible that a flight of MIGs came out with rockets and happened to hit, for instance, a radio installation on a ship, which would prevent it from sending an SOS to explain what happened. It could, I suppose, build a case that that might have occurred.

Senator AIKEN. How long before it did previous incidents take place, or where there incidents? Had there been any firing on boats before?

Mr. COTTRELL. No, no. This is the first case of Cuban aircraft firing on any ships that we know.

Senator WILLIAMS. Any question that these shrimp fishermen were too close to Cuban shores?

Mr. COTTRELL. No, they were on the high seas and had a right to be.

MOTIVE FOR FIRING ON THE SHIP

Senator LAUSCHE. What was the motive you people ascribe to the firing?

Mr. COTTRELL. This is a difficult one, and again, it is anybody's opinion, and I will give you mine for whatever it happens to be worth.

I would think that the Cuban Air Force would probably be checking along their waters for any vessels that might be coming, such as this Alpha-66 crowd who are a Cuban group who have privately rented certain boats and they have been engaged in activities against the Island of Cuba, so that I would presume that the Cuban Air Force would be checking traffic, and it may be that they came down to check this boat that was dead in the water. This is just supposition. I am not even sure this is right, but they could have been checking the boat. It is not quite understandable why they didn't just check it out and why they shot at it. This is the thing that is curious.

Senator SPARKMAN. There was no radio contact between the planes and the ship?

Mr. COTTRELL. No. The ship radio was out.

Senator SPARKMAN. Batteries dead?

Mr. COTTRELL. Battery dead.

THE SHIP WAS DRIFTING

Senator WILLIAMS. You say she had been drifting two days and the Coast Guard hadn't found it out?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. Of course. I don't know how responsible the Coast Guard should be for all the waters in between.

Senator WILLIAMS. I understand, but she was drifting.

Mr. COTTRELL. Nobody had located her.

Senator LAUSCHE. This ship was drifting two days?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was it out of order?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. The crew reported they had had trouble and bad weather, that their radio had gone out. They had no power and they were sitting there with their shrimp catch.

Senator WILLIAMS. And we don't do any patrolling in that area at all, do we?

Mr. COTTRELL. Some, but you would have to ask the military how much. I am not sure of that particular area. Forty miles. You would have to ask somebody else.

Senator SPARKMAN. You said there was no flag flying. How could their pilots have identified this ship as a ship other than Cuban? How did they know they were not firing on one of their own?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know. This is one of these unanswered questions. They also couldn't have known that it was American, either.

NO PREVIOUS FIRING INCIDENTS

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, a little while ago there were some questions about previous incidents. I want to make it clear, if I understand correctly, there have been no firing incidents. The incidents you referred to were airplanes patrolling this area, checking on ships, is that right?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. You see, we have patrols that go along this area and MIGs have been up in the same general area with these planes, but to my knowledge they have not shot at these planes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, we were told some time ago that——

Mr. COTTRELL. Buzzing, yes, but——

Senator SPARKMAN. What?

Mr. COTTRELL. Mr. Wexler said buzzing incidents, and I said yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. But no firing.

Mr. COTTRELL. As far as I know.

Senator LAUSCHE. No firing between planes?

Mr. COTTRELL. This is my understanding.

Senator SPARKMAN. Or from plane to ship?

Mr. COTTRELL. This is my understanding.

WHY AMERICAN PATROLS DID NOT LOCATE THE SHIP

Senator WILLIAMS. That is what puzzles me. I don't understand how you have been doing much patrolling and this ship drifted for two days and nobody saw her.

Senator SPARKMAN. He said he doesn't know whether we patrol that far out. That was 40-some-odd-miles from the Cuban coast.

Senator WILLIAMS. How far was that from our coast?

Mr. COTTRELL. Let's see; about 90 miles across——

Senator SPARKMAN. The report said 70 miles.

Mr. COTTRELL. From the Florida coast.

Senator WILLIAMS. About half-way.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, 70 miles is measured on an angle. It is nearly half-way, you are right.

Mr. COTTRELL. Roughly, half-way.

COULD THE PATROL PLANES FIRE BACK?

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question: Our fliers who keep surveillance on Cuba are instructed, I believe we have been told, that if they are fired upon, to fire back. Now, does that or does that not apply to our patrolling planes such as these that were out?

Mr. COTTRELL. I would have to pass that to the military on this business of rules of engagement. I haven't read them and I——

Senator SPARKMAN. I realize it is a military question, but I felt you——

Mr. COTTRELL. I am not passing the subject because I don't want to answer, Senator Sparkman. I might say, so that you understand this, I have been on this job since January 8 and I have been on Vietnam, running the task force on Vietnam for the past year, so there are lots of the details on the thing that I still have to learn. So it is not that I am trying to avoid your questions.

Senator AIKEN. Which is more fast-moving?

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I can tell you which there is more mail on. It is the one that is close to home.

NO WEATHER IMPEDIMENTS

Senator LAUSCHE. What was the type of weather in the last two days?

Mr. COTTRELL. I can't confirm that.

Senator SPARKMAN. What was that?

Senator LAUSCHE. The weather.

Senator SPARKMAN. It had been bad for a couple of days before.

Mr. COTTRELL. A couple of days previous, but there were no indications in any of the traffic I read of any weather impediment or any——

Senator WILLIAMS. How long had this ship been out at sea?

Mr. COTTRELL. Let me see. I read when it left; I can't think of the exact date. If it is important, I can find it.

Senator WILLIAMS. When was it due back?

Mr. COTTRELL. There was no indication when it was due back, either.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I say, my understanding of those shrimp boats is, they go out and they are supposed to fish until they get their fill and then come back.

NEITHER SIDE KNEW THE SHIP WAS THERE

Senator LAUSCHE. How long was that ship supposed to be idling out there in disorder?

Mr. COTTRELL. Several days.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are we to assume then that neither the Cubans nor we knew of it being out there?

Mr. COTTRELL. I think this is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that the Cubans flying suddenly saw this ship and came down on it?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it reasonable to assume they were there for two days and neither we nor the Cubans knew of this boat being in that position?

Mr. COTTRELL. I suppose that is a reasonable assumption.

Senator WILLIAMS. And we were patrolling these waters all the time.

Senator SPARKMAN. No, no; patrolling the waters near the Cuban coast.

Mr. COTTRELL. Something that might be helpful——

Senator SPARKMAN. He said that he did not know if they patrolled this far out.

Mr. COTTRELL. You see, when they looked for the Anzoategui, our Naval vessels I understand checked out some 400 ships in that general area, looking for that ship, the Anzoategui.

Senator SPARKMAN. That one ship.

Mr. COTTRELL. And there are all kinds, as I understand it. I am not from Florida and I don't know the traffic, but my impression is there are a great number of fishing ships scattered all over.

CROSSING THE 24TH PARALLEL

Senator WILLIAMS. You say the Cuban MIGs have been patrolling this area routinely?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator WILLIAMS. And therefore you have been picking them up on radar before this?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator WILLIAMS. Do you go out each time if you see them on radar?

Mr. COTTRELL. Only if they come into the area and it appears that they are crowding us. Here again, I don't know my facts on it, but I do know that the reason why these MIGs were scrambled is that they came over the 24th parallel and this may be a standard operating procedure of our Air Force to scramble any time the MIGs come out this far.

Senator SPARKMAN. What is the significance of the 24th parallel? Is that——

Mr. COTTRELL. I assume——

Senator SPARKMAN [continuing]. A safe international boundary? It is south of——

Senator WILLIAMS. Where is the 24th?

Mr. HOLT. This [indicating] is 15 and this is 30.

Mr. COTTRELL. I saw that only in the traffic that came in last night and I am not aware of any of the regulations concerning the 24th parallel.

Senator SPARKMAN. But apparently it is a line of demarcation that is used.

Mr. COTTRELL. This apparently is a danger line.

Senator SPARKMAN. And then when they cross that, we begin to get suspicious?

Mr. COTTRELL. We scramble.

WHY THE CUBANS MISSED

Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't the issue whether or not these Cuban MIGs could reasonably have assumed that was one of those ships that might be trying to do harm?

Mr. COTTRELL. It is possible. This is what we suggested. This is just my supposition, that we were checking out a vessel that was dead in the water and this may have made them suspicious, I don't know, but they were down there looking at it. What we can't explain is why they shot at the darn thing, not shot at it, but fore and aft of it, because unless they are very bad marksmen, they probably would have hit it.

Senator LAUSCHE. How close were they supposed to have gotten to the ship?

Mr. COTTRELL. This would not appear in the traffic, how many feet they were above, but they were firing passes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did they fly over it?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, they were firing passes.

Senator LAUSCHE. So they would have had to have been exceedingly bad marksmen to have missed, if they intended to hit it?

Mr. COTTRELL. I think so. I was a Naval pilot during the war, and I think I could hit a fishing boat if I wanted to. That doesn't prove anything. They could have been bad marksmen, flying jets, and I think we could consider as Cubans—one doesn't know what the proficiency is.

SMUGGLING ARMS OUT OF CUBA

Senator AIKEN. Do you think the Czech rifles that have been taken in South America were transshipped to Cuba?

Mr. COTTRELL. Well, first, I don't know whether that is a very strandard practice myself. Maybe others could answer more authoritatively. But I doubt it, because it is difficult enough to get off the Island of Cuba except on boats, and the Cuban run from Havana to Mexico City—I can't see a large smuggling operation out of Cuba at the present time. There may be some, but I haven't seen evidence.

Senator AIKEN. How long have you been back here from Vietnam?

Mr. COTTRELL. Since January 8, so I am not the greatest authority on the subject.

Mr. WEXLER. He was with the Vietnam Task Force here in Washington.

Mr. COTTRELL. I was the Director of the Task Force on Vietnam during the past year and we were working out there.

Senator AIKEN. You were sent over there for experience and now you have been called back here to do a job.

Mr. COTTRELL. Well, yes.

Senator AIKEN. It is about time.

MIG'S IN CUBA

Senator WILLIAMS. Have these two crewmen seen any MIGs or American planes flying over during this two days of drifting?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, they did, they saw one American patrol which they waved at and the plane went away and didn't see anything. And then the MIGs came on.

Senator AIKIN. Those are the only planes that they saw?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many MIGs were there?

Mr. COTTRELL. The reports indicate four or five. We have some reports indicating five and some four. The pilots identified two MIG-15s and three 17s in the report, indicating there were five.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you know when the MIGs were brought into Cuba?

Mr. COTTRELL. No, I don't.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you know whether they had them before last July?

Mr. COTTRELL. No, I don't. Most of the history of Cuba before January 8 is something I haven't had time to go into in detail.

Senator LAUSCHE. The point I am trying to make is that there is a situation confronting us now that didn't confront us last July, and that is those MIGs down there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I don't know this, but I believe they have been buying MIGs for quite a long time. That is my impression. That has been just more or less an ordinary sale.

Senator LAUSCHE. Except that Secretary Rusk testified here that they had 70 more high-powered planes in January then they had last July, and McNamara issued the statement a week ago that they now have 102 more planes than they had last July.

STATEMENT ON THE INCIDENT

Senator WILLIAMS. You said you issued a statement and you started to show it to us a momment ago.

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. As I started to tell you, we got the facts last night and got these reports in, asked for reports on the crew members from the interrogators, and wanted to know exactly what they had to say about it. We asked to have the American pilots interrogated to get all the facts they could give us. And these things came in during the evening.

So when we got the facts this morning, I and my assistants drafted a note to the Cuban Government and checked it out with the Secretary and others, and it has been dispatched.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the note to the Cuban Government?

Mr. COTTRELL. I will read it for you, if you like. This hasn't been announced or made public, but this is an executive session.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is executive session. The transcript is being taken but it is for the use of the committee and will not be made public.

Senator LAUSCHE. Confidential.

Mr. COTTRELL. This will be released sometime today. I am not sure when they will release it. Perhaps the President may, or Pierre Salinger may, before the President speaks this afternoon, but this is the thing that has been cleared.

We are requesting the Swiss in Havana immediately to present the following note to the government in Cuba:

At approximately 5:35 p.m. February 20, 1963, two MIG military aircraft having Cuban markings, one carrying the No. 38 on its fuselage, deliberately fired on a disabled private U.S. shrimp boat named the ALA, at coordinates 24 degrees 3 minutes North, 80 degrees 20 minutes West. This location is in the Florida Straits about 60 nautical miles from the nearest point on the Cuban mainland. Upon arrival of six U.S. Navy aircraft at the scene of the attack, these two Cuban military aircraft as well as other Cuban MIG military aircraft"—we said "other" because of this four and five thing, two different reports—"that had subsequently joined them departed toward the South. The U.S. Destroyer *Kretchmer* was dispatched and rescued the ALA's two U.S. citizen crewmen.

The Government of the U.S. protests this unprovoked and willful attack on the high seas upon an unarmed and disabled private U.S. fishing vessel and upon U.S. citizens by Cuban military aircraft. This flagrant and deliberate violation of international law warrants prompt and unequivocal explanation from the Cuban Government.

The Government of Cuba is informed that the Government of the United States will take those measures necessary to protect the life and property of its nationals on the high seas against such attacks.

As you know, our diplomatic representation in Havana is through the Swiss and this was sent to Bern and then down to Havana, and this may not be delivered to the Cubans until late this evening.

FATE OF THE SHIP

Senator SPARKMAN. What happened to the ship? You said the Navy rescued the crewmen.

Mr. COTTRELL. The ship was anchored. They bailed it out. It had some leaks, but not caused by aircraft fire. It was leaking because of storms and the fishermen requested the U.S. Navy to do something to save the 800 pounds of shrimp. So they put pumps in and anchored it at these coordinates. I don't know whether anyone is on it as a caretaker or not.

Senator SPARKMAN. Had there been other crewmen on the shrimp boat?

Mr. COTTRELL. No, these are the only two.

Senator WILLIAMS. They wouldn't anchor the ship 40 miles out and leave it just to drift, would they?

Mr. COTTRELL. No, but apparently they had fouled their anchor on a reef and it was out there in that area, so this is probably anchored to a reef.

Senator WILLIAMS. Was it in a regular shipping lane?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't believe so.

Senator SPARKMAN. They notified the owner, I presume?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. In fact, I understand that one of these newspaper fellows said the owner was waked up at one o'clock in the night. He felt very much disturbed.

TRYING TO DRIVE OUT OUR SHRIMP BOATS

Senator LAUSCHE. Did your men have any discussion with your superiors as to the justification of inferring that the sulfur ship might have been fired on?

Mr. COTTRELL. No. We never speculated about that. Someone mentioned this a minute ago. As I said, it is possible that, in my personal opinion, a ship like that possibly could have been attacked by a series of aircraft and the radio perhaps knocked out and the

thing blown up, burned at the waterline and sunk without them being able to relay any information about it, but this is pure speculation.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you had any discussion about our government in the past suffering similar experiences at the hand of other nations which were trying to drive our shrimp fishermen out of the waters?

Mr. COTTRELL. I haven't been part of such cases.

Senator LAUSCHE. You are not familiar with that?

Mr. COTTRELL. I am not personally, no.

Senator WILLIAMS. Did you check to find out exactly when this boat left Florida?

Mr. COTTRELL. No. As I said, I recall that in the traffic there was a statement of the date it had left Florida, and I could provide it to you.

Senator WILLIAMS. Will you check and see just when it did leave and supply that?

Senator LAUSCHE. For the benefit of my colleagues——

Senator SPARKMAN. Let's be certain that he got that last request. Get the date and let us have it for the record.

Senator WILLIAMS. The exact time, yes.

Mr. COTTRELL. Is there something else, Senator?

Senator SPARKMAN. No, that was it.

Mr. COTTRELL. We can do that. Bob Hurwitch has the file and he can check it.

Senator AIKEN. What time does it get dark on the Cuban coast this time of the year?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know.

Senator AIKEN. About 6:30?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know.

CONFLICTS OVER TERRITORIAL WATERS

Senator LAUSCHE. Several years ago I understand that there was a country that fired on one of our ships and hit it. Pat, you will recall that there was a bill pending under which we were to compensate one of the injured crewmen. Was such a bill before this committee or was it before the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee?

Mr. HOLT. I don't believe I recall it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then it was Interstate and Foreign Commerce. We have had experience where foreign governments have contended that our fishermen came into their waters and the ships were seized, fish confiscated, and I think in one instance, one ship was fired upon.

Mr. HOLT. I am not sure about the fish being confiscated, Senator. There is a problem with Mexico, Ecuador and Peru and to a lesser extent with Chile. Mexico claims territorial waters at 10 miles. Ecuador, Peru and Chile claim territorial waters at 200 miles. Neither of these claims do we recognize.

Fishing boats go down the Gulf Coast off Mexico occasionally getting within the 10-mile limit, and Mexicans pick them up, take them into a port, confine the ship or hold it for a while, and then

let it go. The same thing has happened from time to time in the Pacific—Colombia, Ecuador, Peru.

Sometimes they fire on the ship to make it stop and come into port. I do not know of an instance in which one has been hit.

Senator LAUSCHE. What are supposed to be the territorial waters in these straits down there? What mileage is it?

Mr. COTTRELL. Three-mile limit.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has Cuba made any claim of a broader band than three miles?

Mr. COTTRELL. Not to my knowledge, Senator, but I don't believe so in any of the experiences I have had since January.

Senator LAUSCHE. There is no question, then, but that this disabled ship was outside of the territorial waters of Cuba?

Mr. COTTRELL. It was on the high seas. No question about that.

SHRIMP BOAT CONVENTION WITH CUBA

Senator SPARKMAN. We have a shrimp convention with Cuba. Does it play any part in this?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know.

Senator SPARKMAN. I should think not, if they were fishing—Pat, this shrimp convention would not play any part for fishing out on the high seas, would it?

Mr. HOLT. As I recall this shrimp convention contemplated conservation measures and presumably limitations on catches.

Senator SPARKMAN. Setting up a commission.

Mr. HOLT. This kind of thing. And the Interstate Commission between the United States and Cuba to take measures for conservation.

Senator SPARKMAN. Bilateral agreement.

Senator WILLIAMS. Was this the normal area for this boat to be fishing for shrimp?

Mr. COTTRELL. As far as I know, yes.

SEARCH FOR THE SULFUR SHIP

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, may I ask about this sulfur ship. I heard this morning that they saw some flares somewhere in the islands down there and that our ships were making a new search to find survivors. Are you familiar with that at all?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. I understand they found some things that have floated up that they suspect might come from that sulfur ship and are checking it out now.

TYPE OF PROJECTILE USED

Senator LAUSCHE. Are they able to tell what type of pellets or projectiles came out of these firings yesterday?

Mr. COTTRELL. There were two reports, one that they were rockets and the other by the crew members indicated that it might be machine guns.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then if it were a machine gun, it would be bullets, is that right?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, bullets.

Senator LAUSCHE. And if it were rockets, what would have been the size of the projectile or whatever was fired?

Mr. COTTRELL. Well, I suppose they are about four feet long and perhaps as big in diameter—I am thinking of rockets that we used when I was a pilot. But I am not certain of the exact dimensions of the rockets on these.

Senator WILLIAMS. Did the Navy not leave a boarding party in charge of this boat?

Mr. COTTRELL. This I don't know. There may be a caretaker aboard, but I am not certain.

Senator WILLIAMS. When a boat is out in the main shipping lane, about half-way, is it not almost international law that you don't anchor a boat and go off and leave it?

Mr. COTTRELL. I suppose so. There may be a caretaker, and I just don't recall the traffic.

Senator WILLIAMS. And if the battery was in it, why didn't she put lights on? It was just drifting.

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't think there is anything here from which we can assume that this was a shipping lane. You said something about a reef. If it was a reef near enough to lay an anchor——

Senator WILLIAMS. I am just trying to find out.

Senator SPARKMAN. I realize that, but probably we should not assume it is a fishing lane, but ask the question.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think one of the queries is, how is it that nobody for two days knew of this ship being out there?

WAS IT A BONA FIDE FISHING BOAT?

Senator WILLIAMS. Did you search the ship and are able to say specifically that it was nothing but a fishing boat? I am like Senator Aiken from Vermont; I am in favor of us doing something and I recognize we might get caught should we do it, or is this a bona fide fishing boat?

Mr. COTTRELL. This was my first thought, too, and I checked it out, and have assurances of no hanky-panky, and the rest of the evidence indicates that these are legitimate fishermen. The names of the crew members are interesting. Benjamin Washington and Paris Jackson. And I don't know whether they are colored or white, but I suspect—it sounds like they must be colored chaps. I shouldn't say this. They had the shrimp aboard. As far as I am concerned, I don't see a possibility that there was anything—actually there is an owner, too, involved in this thing. That doesn't mean anything.

Senator SPARKMAN. You did say, did you not, that the owner was a bona fide fisherman?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. Abbott Shipping Company.

In my opinion, this was a bona fide shrimp operation.

DELIBERATELY TRYING TO MAKE AN INCIDENT

Senator WILLIAMS. Is there a possibility that that which the MIGs were shooting at got by and they just got the wrong target?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know. I doubt it, because they came down, made passes first and then turned around and made their firing passes. This is a mystery, why in the devil they felt it was necessary to fire fore and aft of this ship that was dead in the water.

Senator AIKEN. Is it possible they were deliberately trying to make news, make an incident?

Mr. COTTRELL. Possibly. The most rational explanation is that there are some flat hat Cubans in MIG–15s that were out, saw a vessel and went down and were going to let them have is across the bow.

Senator SPARKMAN. Why do you suppose the flag was not flying?

Mr. COTTRELL. They didn't have one aboard.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did not have one.

Mr. COTTRELL. Did not have one aboard, even.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I thought they were required to fly——

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, but I guess the shrimp boats that go out of that place might have been sloppy about their identification.

DELAY IN RELEASING THE NEWS

Senator SPARKMAN. Say, here is something that I think you ought to explain to us, because you heard the question from the newspaper fellows. I think I know your answer.

The first indication of this was at 5:35 yesterday afternoon. Of course, there were further developments and it was probably well up into the night before you got the statements from the fliers, from the owner of the boat, from the crewmen, and so forth. But their immediate reaction, you saw, was, why the long delay in releasing this news?

Mr. COTTRELL. Well, there is nothing insidious about it. In fact, I was very much involved in the thing. I am Coordinator for Cuban Affairs and every time something happens they call me wherever I am.

Senator SPARKMAN. How late did you work yesterday?

Mr. COTTRELL. I debated last night when the news came in as to whether I would go down and sit in the Operations Center all night and comb this stuff or whether I would delegate it to somebody else to get this traffic in. We have some very bright guys in the Operations Center that I knew and trusted, so I said look, you call me any time tonight that there is anything startling in this affair, other than the collection of facts.

And I said, what I want is for you fellows to get to the Center in the Pentagon and elsewhere and get as quickly as you can statements from those crew members and from the pilots by 8:00 tomorrow morning. I gave them these instructions: you are to take all this raft of telegrams that are coming in on this thing and sort out the corrections, get the accurate story and give me a sheet of paper at 8:00 that has the accurate story as of 8:00 of all the information you have been able to gather, because I was not going to make a decision in the middle of the night that we ought to charge in Cuba or what we should do until we had the absolute facts.

There are times in this hectic business when there are all kinds of reports coming in. In fact, I was on Vietnam—this thing is about double the Vietnam hectic kind of an operation, on Cuba.

Reports from refugees, reports from respectable Americans, reports flooding in about this, that or the other thing happening in Cuba. If we acted on each one of these things, we would be flying off in all directions, and many of them turn out to be poppycock. So that we must have all the facts before we decide what we are going to do in this.

This is the way it worked out. So I am very happy to take any responsibility I think as it was the rational thing to do and it has worked out this way, as far as I am concerned.

UNOFFICIAL SPOKESMEN

Senator WILLIAMS. The way the release was made, this perhaps has nothing to do with this incident, but a few days ago the leadership was called down to the White House to discuss the Cuban problem and all sworn to secrecy, and then the next thing——

Senator SPARKMAN. That is, John—I saw that in the press, but if you want to use that term, use it very, very loosely.

Senator WILLIAMS. Well, at least——

Senator SPARKMAN. Certainly there was no oath-taking.

Senator WILLIAMS. I know that, but just the same as here, certain things were off the record. But the next afternoon an unofficial spokesman for the Department released the news that they were going to remove, I think, 8,000 troops from Cuba. Who was the unofficial spokesman?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know. There are so many spokesmen on this thing.

Senator WILLIAMS. Would you tell us who it was and get the information? I was just curious——

Senator SPARKMAN. The first I heard of it was at lunch that day. Senator Stennis, the chairman of the subcommittee, said that it was released from the Soviet Embassy. Now, I never saw anything further in the newspapers. Newspaper fellows told me it said from diplomatic sources.

Senator WILLIAMS. Maybe that was it. But anyway, would you advise us who the John Doe was that did it? I don't question it, I was glad to see the release, but I would like to know who he is.

Mr. COTTRELL. Fine. I can assure you right now it wasn't I.

Senator WILLIAMS. I would like to know.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think you will see your newspaper reports said diplomatic sources.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is right. But we have this Canadian memorandum—at least, no one exactly knew—we knew who took the blame for it, but nobody knew who made the memorandum and released it. Sometime I would like to get that fellow who knows all the answers up here.

Mr COTTRELL. You won't find any one man that knows all the answers.

Senator WILLIAMS. But there was one man that knew this.

LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV

Senator SPARKMAN. I think Senator Aiken wants to say something on this.

Senator AIKEN. The fact is, some of us were invited down to the White House on short notice and the President read the letter to us from Khrushchev and asked us to keep still about it. Well, it must have been about 10 minutes before ten o'clock the next morning that the ticker carried a news story purported to have originated in Moscow. For a while I thought it actually came from Moscow, but actually it appeared that before the pressure got too strong on all who were there the night before, the State Department scooped us all.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think there was a reason. John, if you remember, the President told us——

Senator AIKEN. I think it was the right way.

Senator SPARKMAN [continuing]. Told us that the telegram had just been received and in fact apparently they had not fully decided just what the full import was.

Senator AIKEN. But they——

Senator SPARKMAN. And furthermore, that there was a ship on its way to Havana that would dock that night or the next morning, and he thought it might be risky to publish this to the world ahead of time.

Senator WILLIAMS. The ship was docked. Did they take them off, or hasn't the ship——

Senator SPARKMAN. It is at the dock now.

Senator AIKEN. Still there.

Senator SPARKMAN. And now others, I believe.

All right, Senator Lausche.

LOCATION OF THE CUBAN PLANES

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you know what the operational rule is concerning our planes going into the air when they learn of Cuban MIGs or other planes being up?

Mr. COTTRELL. No. I haven't read the rules of engagement and that is where you will find it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, what is your understanding of the situs of these planes when they pick them up on radar?

Mr. COTTRELL. The status?

Senator LAUSCHE. The situs. That is, where were they?

Mr. COTTRELL. Where the MIGs were?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. COTTRELL. They were at these coordinates that I have read to you.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were they up at the 18,000-foot level?

Mr. COTTRELL. You mean the altitude. I think they were on 11,000 feet when they were picked up.

Senator WILLIAMS. Did you plot the area of the ship at the time they were picked up?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, sir, toward the Florida coast. First, this was the way it came about.

They came in toward Florida, passed the 24th and at 11,000 feet our people scrambled, the MIGs turned, made their passes and were passing the shrimp boat when our planes came in. The MIGs saw them and scooted for Cuba.

Senator LAUSCHE. I was going to ask, are you able to tell how much time elapsed between the moment that we picked them up on radar and the moment we contacted them so that they were within sight of our planes?

Mr. COTTRELL. No. I don't recall there was a time lapse, or if it were given in the cables.

Senator WILLIAMS. About how long would it take?

Mr. COTTRELL. Well, let's see. Seventy miles on the angle—a matter of minutes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is that for our planes to get down there?

Senator WILLIAMS. That is right, for our planes to get there.

AMERICAN PLANES ON ALERT

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question: How could altitude be determined by radar?

Mr. COTTRELL. They can determine from radar the exact altitude of any blip that comes on the radar.

Senator SPARKMAN. You have two different streams, one that takes it horizontally and another one that takes it vertically.

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, and I don't know what the radar was in this, but this is possible.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you got an angle.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do we have any knowledge of how long these MIGs were in the air before the firing occurred?

Mr. COTTRELL. No.

Senator LAUSCHE. The reason I am asking is just to try to find out how alert we were. I thought we had planes in the air all the time.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, we have got them there on the alert all the time. That is what you mean by being scrambled, isn't it?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. They are on strip alert. They are controlled by radar. The radar blips appear, these fellows take off, and they vector them into the target.

Senator SPARKMAN. Those are fighter planes, and then in addition we have regular patrol planes——

Mr. COTTRELL. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN [continuing]. That make their runs at stated times or probably not at regular times, but——

Mr. COTTRELL. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN [continuing]. On frequent runs.

Senator LAUSCHE. From what you have said, am I correct in my understanding that they were coming toward our coast and——

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. And toward this disabled ship and they went past it——

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. Turned around——

Mr. COTTRELL. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. And did our pilots see all that?

Mr. COTTRELL. No. I think when they arrived on the scene, the MIGs had turned and were strafing the fishing vessel.

Senator LAUSCHE. What I had difficulty with——

CUBANS FIRED BEFORE SEEING AMERICAN PLANES

Senator SPARKMAN. I think this will account for it. They went up and radar picked them up as they crossed the 24th parallel. They went a short distance further, not very far, and turned and started back, and it was on their return trip that they passed over the ship and then did they turn again?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. And came up and bracketed the ship with the shots.

Senator WILLIAMS. What is the speed of these——

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know exactly.

Senator SPARKMAN. And our planes came inside.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see. Then there is no justification in assuming that after these Cuban planes saw our planes in the area that they did the firing.

Mr. COTTRELL. No. My impression from reading the traffic is they were doing the firing before they saw our planes.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, they did it without knowledge that our planes were approaching.

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. I believe that is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. That clears that up.

Senator SPARKMAN. I saw one of the reports on the press which said that our planes got in sight in time to see the flares from the rockets, I believe is the way it was said.

Senator LAUSCHE. From rockets?

Senator SPARKMAN. Whatever it was that was fired.

Mr. COTTRELL. The pilots of our planes claimed they were rockets that were fired. They specified eight. One of them counted eight rockets. The crew members didn't say rockets. They said they shot us fore and aft of the boat.

Senator AIKEN. I don't imagine they were on deck looking up watching for them anyway.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't guess they were trying to determine that.

PURPOSE OF THE PATROLS

Senator WILLIAMS. These patrol planes that are cruising that area, what are they looking for? Aircraft or what? Ships?

Mr. COTTRELL. There you have me. I can't give an accurate answer on that.

Senator WILLIAMS. I mean, there is a purpose for the patrol and not just joy riding. What is the purpose of the patrol?

Mr. COTTRELL. You will have to ask the Defense Department.

Senator SPARKMAN. John, I think we have been told that they patrol the shore line of Cuba pretty well all the time and then we have overflights in addition to that for photographic purposes.

Senator WILLIAMS. I understand that, but I mean these patrol planes that are patrolling to see what is going on in the area——

Mr. COTTRELL. I understand the question but I just don't know the answer.

Senator WILLIAMS. I was wondering if they were just looking for aircraft or surface craft or—I don't understand how they lost this boat for two days.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think they are looking the field over.

Senator AIKEN. Looking to see what has been moved around since the day before. I think we have been doing that for over two years.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think one thing that is bothering Senator Williams is the fact that this shrimp boat was out there so long, but the shrimp boat, if I understand it, was outside the regular patrol area. Our planes wouldn't have been out there now if radar hadn't picked up these MIGs crossing the 24th parallel, and as quick as they crossed it, we went after them.

Senator AIKEN. When you are up 10,000 feet, you can see 50 miles down there.

FURTHER DETAILS ON THE INCIDENT

Mr. COTTRELL. My deputy on the phone has given Mr. Wexler some answers to some of the questions. The fishing vessel left Fort Myers on the 10th of February and was disabled by a storm on the afternoon of the 17th.

Senator SPARKMAN. And yesterday was the 20th.

Mr. COTTRELL. That is three days. Then the MIG–15s were first introduced into Cuba in 1961. These crewmen were picked up at 8:45 p.m. by this destroyer last night.

Senator AIKEN. 8:45.

Senator SPARKMAN. Fired on at 5:35 and picked up at 8:45.

Is that 8:45 p.m. eastern standard time?

Mr. COTTRELL. I guess so.

WAS IT AN OFFENSIVE ACTION?

Senator LAUSCHE. I was going to say to me it looks as if, one, the subject of provocation here and offensive action against our country; two, the potentialities of the Cuban fleet in the air, whatever it may be, to penetrate our land and drop bombs. That is, I don't know whether they have atomic bombs or hydrogen bombs in Cuba. Rusk said that if they have them, they could deliver them with the planes they have. So that you have two things here. One, was this an offensive act against our country, and two, whatever the answer is to the first, what are the dangers to Miami and other places if this fool down there goes wrong?

Mr. COTTRELL. I can't answer the second one.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am not asking you. I am just——

Mr. COTTRELL. The first one, though, Senator, you remember there was no flag on that shrimp vessel. The Cubans had no way of identifying it as an American boat.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, you just can't understand, though, their firing fore and aft, was it?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were they playing or just having a bit of fun?

Senator SPARKMAN. That is a terrible way to have fun, isn't it? Well, thank you.

Senator AIKEN. I hope Mr. Cottrell is successful in his work.

Senator LAUSCHE. John, may I ask you what is your analysis of it?

Senator WILLIAMS. I didn't find out enough about it to make any analysis and I wonder if you really have enough information yet.

Mr. COTTRELL. From my point of view—maybe I am looking at other angles, too. I am concerned——

Senator WILLIAMS. I don't say that critically.

Mr. COTTRELL. Whether or not they have found this boat three days, to me, from my point of view—from the foreign relations point of view if it were out there for three days—I don't know.

NEED FOR TESTIMONY FROM THE MILITARY

Senator LAUSCHE. I do want to make a suggestion to the chairman, that we have been listening to the civilian representatives of the State Department. We have not heard any testimony from the Defense Department on any of these issues that have arisen, and I think that as a member of this committee, the time has come when we ought to hear from the military men on several of the things that have happened down there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, the chairman will be back Monday. Tomorrow is a holiday. Then comes Saturday and Sunday. So I will check that with the chairman——

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me take it up with the chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, if you will. And we certainly appreciate your coming, Mr. Cottrell. Now, the press is coming in here and I would be very glad if you would stay and answer most of the questions.

Mr. COTTRELL. I will abide by your advice, though I have no desire to get out front.

Senator SPARKMAN. No, but we have a desire to relieve ourselves as much as possible.

Mr. COTTRELL. You are more experienced than I am with the press.

Senator SPARKMAN. However, I know very little to say to them more than what you said right there.

Senator AIKEN. The cameras are just outside the door.

Senator SPARKMAN. They will get you there.

Mr. COTTRELL. I would like to preserve my amateur standing as a Foreign Service officer who is not seeking publicity.

Senator AIKEN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

AUTHORIZED TO RETURN FIRE

Senator LAUSCHE. George, I think as for myself I want to decide whether the course taken of sending this note is proper or whether we should have precipitately——

Senator AIKEN. It was already announced on the ticker that the note was being sent.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me it was proper to send the note. I do feel this, and this is something for the military, as I suggested in my question earlier, if our fliers are not authorized already to return fire in cases like this, I think they ought to be authorized. Our surveillance planes have that authority, that direction, that instruction. I think our planes, these scrambled planes,

ought to have the same. If they find U.S. property being attacked or assaulted, they ought to have full authority to fire.

Senator AIKEN. However, if the boat wasn't flying any flag, how do you know it was U.S. property?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, that is really an embarrasing fact. No flag, no sign of identity on the boat to indicate whether it was a refugee runner——

Mr. COTTRELL. I think there are a lot of things——

Senator SPARKMAN. It could have been one of the off-beat boats that run from Miami over there.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where did you get the information that there was no flag on this boat?

Mr. COTTRELL. From cables that came in during the night from the Navy, from Key West.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has that been corroborated by the men who run these shrimpers?

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. What cable—I have seen so many of them——

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that a right designation, shrimper?

Mr. COTTRELL. There was a statement, and I can't remember which cable, to the effect that there was no flag flying and that the crew members did not have an American flag on board.

Senator WILLIAMS. Does this owner have more than one boat?

Mr. COTTRELL. I don't know.

Senator SPARKMAN. I wonder if they are not out there, Pat. The President's press conference starts in a few minutes.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the above entitled matter was adjourned.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Lausche (Subcommittee Chairman), and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, and Mundt.

The subcommittee was briefed on the current situation in Laos by Ambassador Leonard Unger.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MARCH 1, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session in room 4219, NSOB, at 10:10 a.m.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

John A. O'Donnell, registered foreign agent for the Philippine Sugar Association and National Federation of Sugarcane Planters, appeared and gave testimony in connection with the committee's investigation of the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

For a record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[The committee recessed at 12:55 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MARCH 4, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in executive session in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Church (Subcommittee Chairman), and Senators Aiken and Carlson.

The subcommittee was briefed by Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, on the activities and procedures of UNESCO and the Soviet pamphlet issued under UNESCO auspices.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered into executive session at 12:05 p.m. in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Gore, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Gore, the committee unanimously approved for report the nominations of Sidney R. Yates, to be Representative of the United States on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, and Jonathan B. Bingham, to be Representative of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Hickenlooper, the committee approved for report a Foreign Service list of appointments and promotions transmitted to the Senate on January 15, 1963.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Hickenlooper, the committee approved for report the nominations of Archibald S. Alexander to be Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Carl Rowan, to be Ambassador to Finland; Edward M. Korry, to be Ambassador to Ethiopia; Charles D. Withers, to be Ambassador to Rwanda; William J. Porter, to be Ambassador to Algeria; and Dr. James Watt, to be Representative of the United States on the Executive Board of the World Health Organization.

The committee passed over temporarily consideration of various interim appointments in the diplomatic corps for report to the Senate.

The committee approved for report the nomination of Charles Baldwin, currently Ambassador to Malaya, as United States Representative on the Economic and Social Commission in the Far East of the United Nations.

The committee next considered the formation of consultative subcommittees. The chairman pointed out that such committees were originally set up as counterparts to the geographical divisions within the Department of State, plus the Department's Organization of Public Affairs, and that they meet for the information of their members. He said they do not take a record, they do not have any employees, and no bills are referred to them for action and recommendation. The last is accomplished, he said, by special subcommittees. Such subcommittees, he added, may take a record where

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the full committee authorizes it specifically. He also pointed out that there was a mechanical problem of coordinating hearings of subcommittees and the full committee, which was why the full committee had to be consulted also on subcommittee hearings.

It was the consensus of those present (without a formal motion being agreed to) that hereafter subcommittees should meet for informational and consultative purposes without a record, and at their discretion, but when a formal meeting of a subcommittee was desired, the full committee should be notified, and the chairman could authorize such meeting on his own, or after he had, at his discretion, consulted the full committee. In such cases, a record would be kept of the formal meeting.

For a record of the proceedings, please see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 1:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (Subcommittee Chairman), and Senators Mansfield, Lausche and Hickenlooper.

The subcommittee was briefed on the current situation in Brazil by Ambassador Lincoln Gordon.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MARCH 8, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Symington, Church, Smathers, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The committee took testimony from I. Irving Davidson, of Washington, DC, a public relations consultant, in connection with its investigation of the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

[The committee recessed at 12:30 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened in room 4219, NSOB, in executive session at 3 p.m.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Morse, Long, Symington, and Aiken.

Mr. Davidson resumed his testimony to the committee.

For a record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[The committee then recessed at 6:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Symington, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Testifying on the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States were Walter Pincus, staff member, Washington, DC; Walter Sterling Surrey, Washington, DC; and Monroe Karasik, Washington, DC.

For a record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 1:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MARCH 25, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Testifying on the activities of nondiplomatic agents of foreign principals in the United States were Hamilton Wright, Sr., and Hamilton Wright, Jr., New York City, NY.

For a record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 1:55 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Long, Symington, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Testifying on the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States were Richard Klemfuss, New York City, NY; Walter Pincus, staff member; and John Nagel, New York City, NY.

For a record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 5:30 p.m. after a break in recess between 12:45 and 3:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MARCH 29, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 2 p.m. in executive session in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Symington, Aiken, and Carlson.

Those testifying on the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States were Walter Pincus, staff member; and Michael B. Deane, Washington, DC.

For a record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee reconvened in executive session at 12:16 p.m. in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Church, Symington, and Carlson.

Without objection and by unanimous consent the committee voted to report favorably the nomination of W. Averell Harriman, to be Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and the bill (S. 647) to authorize payment of a claim made by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, without amendment.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:17 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 4:00 p.m., in the Cloakroom of the Senate Chamber.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Long, Gore, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Smathers, and Hickenlooper.

The chairman called a meeting of the committee to consider action to be taken in connection with hearings on non-diplomatic agents of foreign governments. The chairman presented to the committee the question of whether a public hearing should be held in the case of Mr. O'Donnell's representation of Philippine interests. The committee agreed to hold such a public session at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, April 18. The chairman was instructed to so inform Mr. O'Donnell so that he might appear under subpoena.

The chairman then discussed with committee members a letter from Mr. Ralph Dungan of the White House relative to appropriate procedures to be followed in informing the Philippine Government of the proposed hearing, and amendment of existing Philippine war claims legislation. The substance of a letter to the Secretary of State on this subject was agreed to. Certain suggestions were made regarding draft language amending the Philippine war claims bill. In brief one amendment would be designed to make it clear that payment of $73 million directly to the Philippine Government would be in full settlement of all Philippine war claims. The second amendment concerns insertion of a proviso to make it clear that none of the funds received by the Philippine Government were to be used to pay former employees, agents, or assigns of the Philippine War Damage Commission.

Subsequent to this meeting the chairman approved and signed a letter to Mr. O'Donnell and the letter to Secretary Rusk.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, APRIL 12, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and Williams.

The committee took testimony from Kenneth T. Downs in connection with its investigation of the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

For the record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Church, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

The committee heard testimony from Dr. John E. Nardini and Dr. L. J. Zbranek in connection with its investigation of the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room S-166, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, testified in connection with the committee's inquiry into the nondiplomatic activities of representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

Mr. Dutton was excused at 11:30 a.m. and the committee proceeded to other business.

On the motion of Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Morse, the committee approved for favorable report the nominations of Brewster H. Morris to be Ambassador to Chad, David Elliott Bell, to be an Alternate Governor of the Inter-American Development Bank, Edwin M. Martin, to be the U.S. Representative to the 10th Session of the Economic Commission for the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, and Walter M. Kotschnig, to be U.S. Representative to the 18th Plenary Session of the Economic Commission for Europe of the Economic and Social Council of the U.N.

For a record of the proceedings see the official transcript.

The committee then proceeded into open session.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN
AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:30 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Symington, and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Smathers and Hickenlooper.

James P. Grant, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the Department of State, briefed the subcommittee on the current situation in Jordan.

No transcript was kept of the proceedings.

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2:35 p.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The committee heard Ernest Schein, attorney, in connection with its inquiries into the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 5:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered into executive session at 11:55 a.m. in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman), and Senators Lausche, Smathers, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Lausche, and without objection, the committee approved for favorable report the nominations of Chester Bowles, to be Ambassador to India; E. Allan Lightner, Jr., to be Ambassador to Libya; Admiral Jerauld Wright, to be Ambassador to China; Henry A. Byroade, Aaron S. Brown, Fulton Freeman, and Graham A. Martin, to be Career Ministers; and various promotions and nominations in the Foreign Service, dated April 4, 1963.

Other business was put forward to the next meeting.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MAY 2, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 3 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Church (subcommittee chairman), and Senator Long.

The subcommittee heard Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, on United Nations financing.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

MONDAY, MAY 6, 963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Smathers, Hickenlooper, and Williams.

The committee took testimony on the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States from Martin Thomas Camacho, Arlington, MA

[The committee recessed at 3 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee resumed its testimony on the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States at 3:30 p.m.

Present: Chairman Fulbright.

Among those heard were James Copland Morris Lee of New York, NY.

For a record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 7:45 p.m.]

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MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 7, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:00 a.m. in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Humphrey, Lausche, Church, Smathers, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The Chairman announced the committee would first consider the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 60) providing for acceptance by the United States of an instrument for the amendment of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization, and the International Coffee Agreement (Executive H, 87th Congress, 2d session).

During its discussion of the joint resolution, the committee heard from James Wachob, of the Office of International Administration, Department of State.

On motion by Senator Humphrey the committee by voice vote approved the favorable report of S.J. Res. 60 with Senator Lausche recorded in the negative.

The committee next considered the International Coffee Agreement. On motion by Senator Lausche, the measure was approved for a favorable report on a voice vote, with Senator Carlson recorded in the negative. Senator Carlson also announced Senator Williams as opposed.

The Chairman announced the next order of business to be the bill (H.R. 5207), to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act, of 1962, and for other purposes.

W. J. Crockett, Assistant Secretary for Administration, and James R. Johnstone, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Foreign Buildings, appeared on the bill.

Further proceedings on the measure were put over until the next meeting.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

SITUATION IN HAITI

MONDAY, MAY 13, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Stuart Symington presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington (presiding), Hickenlooper, Aiken and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Holt of the committee staff.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, I apologize for the tardiness, I have already been at the Defense appropriations hearing. Senator Hickenlooper has a meeting he wants to get to on the floor on a bill.

Would you tell us, Mr. Secretary, what you have on your mind?

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. BALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY KENNEDY CROCKETT, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CARIBBEAN AND MEXICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I don't have a prepared statement; we are obviously watching with very great concern and attention the developing situation in Haiti. This situation is developing in intensity, I think, quite rapidly, although just what form any outbreak may take is hard to tell.

We are in a position where on Wednesday of this week, the term of President Duvalier expires. Now he was elected for a six-year term in 1957.

In 1961 he sent the legislature home and called for elections of a new legislature, and on the ballot of each one of the candidates he had his own name placed. So, after the legislature was elected he took the position, quite illegally, I think, that this had been a referendum in his favor that he was therefore, entitled to another six-year term which would mean he would remain in office until 1967.

This was obviously an extralegal arrangement. I think this has tended to bring events to a head more quickly than they might otherwise have come.

The President is sitting in his palace at Port-au-Prince. He left there yesterday under very heavy guard for the first time in 2 or 3 weeks, he has been out of the building. He went down the streets with all of the rooftops lined with militia, and a very heavy personal cordon around him, and then came back again. But most of the time he sits in his palace as one of the men who recently saw him described as sitting there with his hat pulled down over his ears and two guns on the table.

The palace and the grounds are filled with soldiers behind machine guns, and he is to some extent ambushed in his own palace.

Meanwhile, he sends out his personal guard and with orders to liquidate this or that political figure who he thinks is conspiring against him. He really seems to be in a rather psychotic state, but there is no indication that he himself is going to leave; excuse me, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No. That is all right. I have a matter starting on the floor at eleven o'clock and, Mr. Chairman, if I may ask one question.

Senator SYMINGTON. Please continue.

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the situation regarding the succession? Have they had any presidential election or anything of the kind? If the 15th comes and goes, suppose he is not the president any more, who is the president? What is the situation there?

Mr. BALL. Well, if the 15th comes and goes, the present indications are that he will assert that he is the president, that the 1961 vote was a referendum extending his term until 1967.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So there has been no election or form of an election?

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Other than that so-called 1961 election?

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was just wondering what the succession was there.

Mr. BALL. Under the constitution as I understand it if something happens to President Duvalier or if he should resign then the Chief Justice has the right to designate a government. He holds office for three months and calls for elections.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who does?

Mr. BALL. The Chief Justice. As Acting Head of State.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, under the theory of the international lawyers—if they have a theory, I don't know—if the 15th comes and goes, could the Chief Justice on the 15th or whenever the termination under the constitution of the term of office of the President occurred, disregarding the 1961 referendum, under the legal theory, legal authorities, could the Chief Justice assert his power as the head of state at that period of time?

Mr. BALL. I think the constitution is not as clear as it should be on this succession question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It would not be a question of succession, it would be a question of the caretaker government under the constitution with the Chief Justice as head of state.

Mr. BALL. I think this is correct. I think the likelihood of the Chief Justice doing this even with considerable encouragement is very light. He is not a man of strength and he is a man who is the nominee of Duvalier, and he is not a very strong reed to lean on. I think if he were to assert that authority under the present conditions Duvalier would have him liquidated, and unless he could be given some assurances of protection, I think he would be extremely unlikely to do so.

BARRICADED IN THE PALACE

Now, it is a difficult situation in which to operate because of the fact that these people are not very accessible to our own diplomatic representatives or the diplomatic representatives of the other governments.

They are really barricaded in the palace, and the foreign minister has been traveling, he was in the U.N. and in fact, in the State Department on Saturday. The rest of the government is by and large keeping pretty well out of sight, and it is a terror-ridden community right now.

Port-au-Prince is filled with wild rumors and everyone is extremely suspicious. The Tons Tons Macoutes which was the band of organized thugs that the president set up is capable of moving in and killing people and burning their houses down if the president wants to take any reprisals against them.

So these people are not notable particularly for courage as their outstanding characteristic and there are very few of them who seem to be willing to display any of it right now in the face of that threat.

To a very large extent the disaffection and the turmoil that is going on in the country would seem to be localized in origin. There are two Communist parties there, the PLPP and the PEP. The PEP is the more hard line of the two and is based on the largest trade union there. So far as we can tell, both of the parties have been lying rather quiet during these declining days of the Duvalier regime.

HAITIANS LIVING IN CUBA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me for interrupting, I am working against time here.

Mr. BALL. All right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I heard this morning on the car radio coming downtown that thousands of Haitians are in the process of migrating back to Haiti from Cuba.

Mr. BALL. I would like to give you our best estimate of that situation, Senator Hickenlooper.

As I understand it, Senator Keating made the statement on Meet the Press yesterday, I didn't hear it, I read the paper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Keating wasn't quoted on this thing.

Mr. BALL. I think he was the source of the statement as I understand it. Now, what he said, if I am correct, that there were some 30,000 Haitians in Cuba who go back and forth all the time and they were being organized into a hard cadre for purposes of taking over Haiti.

Our best information is that there were under the 1953 census in Cuba, that there were something like 27,000 Haitians then living in Cuba. Most of these were poor workmen, poor peasants who went over there more than 25 years ago. To a very large extent they are second generation, they are not first generation Haitians. They went over to cut the cane in the field, and in most cases their fathers did and they stayed on. There has been very little movement to Haiti in the last 20 years. We have no intelligence at all suggesting that any of these Haitians are being trained into cadre in Cuba

nor is there any indication of any large scale movements one way or another from across the straits there. It is only about 50 or 60 miles, but we have had, as you know, an elaborate naval scrutiny of the situation, and I think that any movements of any size at all would have been detected and there have been some small boat movements.

AID FROM THE SOVIET UNION

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, while Senator Hickenlooper is here, there are a couple of questions I would like to ask. Is there any chance Duvalier will ask for some help from the Soviet Union?

Mr. BALL. There is always a chance. We are watching it very closely.

Senator SYMINGTON. If he did, what would we do?

Mr. BALL. If there were any indications of the creation of a socialist government we would have to move. I mean we could not let the situation go.

Now, we have the BOXER sitting in the channel 50 miles from Port-au-Prince, one hour by helicopter time. It has 2,000 Marines on board, and there is a plan, if we go up to another DEFCOM today, to have within 15 hours another group that could be moved in.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, just to be sure we understand each other, this administration has no idea of in any way permitting anything to become activated in Haiti comparable to what happened in Cuba?

Mr. BALL. I can assure you on that, Senator Symington.

POSSIBILITY OF TAKING ACTION IN HAITI

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you on this and I don't know, maybe this ought to be off the record.

Mr. BALL. I take it this is all in executive session. We could have a chance to look at it before any of it is released.

Senator SYMINGTON. There won't be any release of it.

Senator CARLSON. There won't be any release.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there what might amount to a controlling reason or an important influential reason for not taking more positive action prior to the 15th of May?

In other words, the OAS has been in my judgment completely verbose and inactive in connection with the assumption of any responsibility in this thing, which is very disappointing. That the OAS has merely palavered on this thing and engaged in some doubletalk and so on, but I could envision some positive reasons for the 15th of May being a deadline when the term of office of this man is up, rather than overt action at any time when there is any question or when without doubt the term still continues.

Mr. BALL. If we had any possibility of a serious organized resistance which we could actually give encouragement to in Haiti at the moment, so that there could be an invitation to the United States to come in, this would create one situation.

For us to come in in the absence of any invitation from anyone who has a claim to power in Haiti, bears all the earmarks of the Marines going into Haiti again with very unfortunate overtones in

Latin America and we would be charged with intervention even by our friends.

We have been in touch with the OAS governments and the ones who are closest to us, and they are very much opposed to any movement before there is a situation either of evidence of Communist possibilities there or of a kind of bloodletting that would mean they would have to go in simply in the name of humanity. But short of that we——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Bloodletting has been quite extensive, hasn't it?

Mr. BALL. It has been extensive but it hasn't been of the kind that indicates just general use. It is individuals who have been persecuted and killed. This is true. There haven't been large massacres, that kind of thing.

Now, this is a very awkward situation for the United States because the easiest thing for us to do would be to move into this situation. If we could move in with OAS support——

SITUATION WITH THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT

Senator CARLSON. On that point have we been cooperating with the Dominican Government there either to stir up trouble in their effort to go in there?

Mr. BALL. Let me describe the situation with the Dominican Government.

First of all, the Dominican Government has moved up to the border something like 1,500 men. They are distributed at different points, 800 of them are distributed at the nearest point to Port-au-Prince. They had a great difficulty in getting the army up there. They had to take them up in banana trucks because none of the moving power of the army, the vehicles, are in order.

The army is of very dubious loyalty if they once get across the border. I don't think President Bosch has any intention of invading Haiti but he wants to create an impression of the intent to invade in order to stir the situation up.

If we were to give assistance to him in invading, first of all, the Dominicans are hated in Haiti because of the long history of bloodshed back and forth. They would be the worst possible people to come into the country and try to establish anything.

In the second place, if the army went into Haiti for any period of time, I think there would be a real possibility of a change in government in Santo Domingo because President Bosch's situation is not that secure. The fact is that Santo Domingo has so many problems of its own that we are very reluctant to see it get mixed up in the problems of its neighbor.

Now, the other consideration is that that would look like an invasion across the border of more than any movement that could be justified in world opinion and it would be likely an encouragement for some of the other movements across the border in South America if we were to give them open encouragement about it.

WHAT ARE WE WAITING FOR?

Senator SYMINGTON. What has to be done in Haiti to justify our moving in to prevent the collapse of Duvalier and the rise of Com-

munists? What are we waiting for? I don't ask that critically but I only ask it for information.

Mr. BALL. We are waiting hopefully for the situation where we can do it with some Latin American support, at least the color of OAS support to take the curse off——

Senator SYMINGTON. Are we operating with OAS?

Mr. BALL. Night and day, not only with that but with the governments.

Senator SYMINGTON. What does that mean? Is there any government against our going into Haiti?

Mr. BALL. Everybody is against our going into Haiti because they would regard this as intervention. There are all shadings ranging from, say, Venezuela which is most sympathetic with our going in. Unless there was, as I say, indication of a Communist movement which we could demonstrate, I mean of a possible Communist takeover, or the call for help from someone who is claiming to form a government within Haiti and has——

CREATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you have this story in the Times this morning about that?

Mr. BALL. This is a story of a provisional government being set up in Puerto Rico. Quite frankly, the characters involved in this are not very effective. [Louis] Dejoie, who has been pushed into this partially by President Bosch and the Dominican Republic is an opportunist and an adventurer who at one time arranged for a deal with Castro to have an invasion of Haiti from Cuba, and he is not the kind of fellow who would be likely to improve the situation. If we were to give support to this provisional government I think we might end up with just as bad a mess on our hands as we have now and perhaps with greater possibility of a Cuban involvement.

Senator CARLSON. Did I not read on this point that Venezuela and one other government would recognize this provisional government?

Mr. BALL. I haven't read this.

Senator CARLSON. No, but it is said they thought they would.

Mr. BALL. This is a matter, I don't think they would without discussion with us. There is another difficulty here, these people are not in Haiti. There is no indication they have any real support among the population. Exile groups are hard to establish in the country because they have been away for some time and for the most part they are not the people around whom support could be mobilized.

There are some individuals in Haiti we are trying to work with closely if something could be done from within, so that they could have any claim of territory at all, and then call for help. This could be an occasion where we could move in and clear the situation up and I think get some OAS support for doing so. We would like at least to have some token units say from the Venezuelans and one or two of the other countries if we can do it because it will help the situation in Latin America enormously. We are very reluctant to go in and take full responsibility for this country because it is really hopeless and if we get enmeshed in running Haiti we are

going to be there a long time. The Marines were there for 19 years before and we don't want to get ourselves into a position like this. So what we———

THE CASTRO PROBLEM

Senator SYMINGTON. The alternative, however, if it happened, namely a Castro-Haiti would be so disastrous to our world prestige it would be unthinkable.

Mr. BALL. Senator, we would move within an hours', . . . everything is set up on this basis.

Senator SYMINGTON. How would you know? I can remember the steady down the road aspects of the Castro problem. How would you know that what was happening was happening until perhaps it was too late? That is the point.

Mr. BALL. Senator, I would say that we will resolve all doubts in favor of taking action if there is the slightest appearance of it.

Now, as I said a moment ago, there are no intelligence indications of any serious training of cadre in Cuba. If we had to make a guess on it we would say that we think it is unlikely that Castro is going to take this one on because he would be taking on a great deal of trouble and might create the situation in which he and his own position would be in jeopardy as far as the United States was concerned which up to this point he has been rather reluctant to do.

Senator CARLSON. Assume the Communists in Haiti take over. They have an organization there.

Mr. BALL. Senator Carlson, any suggestion of a Communist government or socialist republic or anything of that kind we wouldn't hesitate.

Senator SYMINGTON. How do you define a socialist government?

Mr. BALL. Well, as you will note, the call that they have put out here, I mean that ex-President [Paul] Magloire has indicated might come on either the 15th or the 22nd is that four present ministers in the Duvalier government would constitute themselves as a socialist republic, and immediately try to take over. If this would be done, obviously we would have to move promptly.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have any of these three any Communist background?

Mr. BALL. Yes. I would think at least two of the four have some Communist background, isn't that right, one we are fairly certain of.

Senator SYMINGTON. Which one is that?

Mr. BALL. Boyer.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about this Dejoie?

Mr. BALL. That is another group, that is the San Juan group there, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. [Pierre] Fignole?

Mr. BALL. That is also the San Juan group.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then this Magloire.

Mr. BALL. He is the former president who is in New York.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am just trying to run this article down.

CIA IN HAITI

Let me ask this. Is the CIA active in Haiti?

Mr. BALL. [Deleted] it is a hard place for them to operate, I think.

Mr. CROCKETT. [Deleted.] Mr. Chairman, we have had some problems recently. Duvalier has established a full police state. He has enforced a curfew from 8:00 p.m. in the evening until 5:00 in the morning and these nefarious activities are usually carried out better at night. He has under surveillance all of the elements of opposition or suspected elements of opposition that exist in the country, and contacting them is a good way of liquidating a potential asset [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. He has killed quite a few people, hasn't he?

Mr. CROCKETT. We are not certain, perhaps in the last 6 weeks 100 to 150. But we are not certain. These sort of things are pretty hard to pin down.

AFRICAN COMMUNISTS IN HAITI

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it true that African Communists are moving into Haiti?

Mr. BALL. We have no evidence on this and we would be inclined to doubt this very much. Let me indicate why. This is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, if not the most densely populated with people all over. It is almost possible for anyone to come in who is in any sense a foreigner who is not immediately identified. The language of the country which 90 percent of the people speak exclusively is not French but Creole. If the French-speaking Africans come in they are immediately identified as foreigners and in the present state of affairs their presence would be known promptly, if they weren't killed. So that this is another reason why the possibilities of a Castro involvement are not as great as they might be.

It is partly a language problem, it is partly even if the second generation Haitians come back and still remember Creole they would still be identified as foreigners because they would have been away for a long time. It isn't a country, for example, as in the Oriente province in Cuba where you have vast areas where people can hide, they can't. This is a country teeming with people, and the attempts that the lands party be led to anything have been found and killed.

HAITIAN ARMY

Senator SYMINGTON. How big is his army?

Mr. BALL. He has about 2,000 men in the army and then there is a militia on top of that, how many in the militia?

Mr. CROCKETT. The militia may have as many as 10,000.

Senator SYMINGTON. And the 2,000, do they include the goons?

Mr. BALL. No, they are on top of that. How many is that?

Mr. CROCKETT. About 1,000.

Senator SYMINGTON. He has an army of 3,000 approximately?

Mr. BALL. He has many of them against him. They are not organized as an army, they are more like a Chicago gang, they are

thugs, they are in uniform and hard to identify. The army itself is of dubious loyalty to Duvalier now because he has removed most of the key officers, and either sent them into exile or killed them. A lot of them were in a similar state in the embassies. The militia can be counted on even less because they haven't had the discipline or the tradition that even the army has had. So what he has got is a hard core of, I don't know maybe 1,000 men, wouldn't you think, on which he can count and even those he can't count on in not betraying him and turning on him so he is not in good shape.

AIRPORTS IN HAITI

Senator SYMINGTON. If we hesitated and somebody else went in there would be a problem.

Mr. BALL. Well, I can't imagine—we have got as I say an aircraft carrier right there. We have got that channel filled with ships so we know what is going back and forth. The airports we know what goes on.

Senator SYMINGTON. How do we know that? Port-au-Prince has a pretty good airport.

Mr. BALL. There are maybe 30 airports in the island that are useful for C-47s. For anything more than that there aren't, would you say?

Mr. CROCKETT. Port-au-Prince is the only one of large size and it is not jet capable. It would take DC-6s or 7s.

Senator CARLSON. Aren't we rebuilding that airport with our money?

Mr. BALL. There is a project now going forth. It is not built.

Senator SYMINGTON. You say it is not jet capable. What is the length?

Mr. CROCKETT. I don't know. It has no jet capability and it hasn't a night——

Senator SYMINGTON. I was just wondering, you say we know what is going on in the airport. How do we know that?

Mr. BALL. We have got planes of our own at the airport. We have what, two helicopters and——

Mr. CROCKETT. We have some of our mission crews that are around.

AMERICANS IN HAITI

Senator SYMINGTON. How many Americans are still in Haiti?

Mr. BALL. Of the official Americans, has the air and naval mission gone out?

Mr. CROCKETT. All of the dependents, but the principals themselves have not.

Mr. BALL. They are being taken out. The government requested we take out first the naval mission and then the air mission, and they have a right to make that demand under the arrangements in which they were put. Some of these people are being moved over to the MAAG to give them a little cover. But I would guess there must be 250 Americans.

Senator SYMINGTON. 250 official Americans?

Senator CARLSON. Did they request we take the civilians out?

Mr. BALL. We have taken them out.

Senator CARLSON. I know you have.

Mr. BALL. They didn't request that. What they have requested is we take the air and naval missions out, but not the civilians.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who requested that?

Mr. BALL. The Haitian Government asked we take out the air and naval missions but they were entitled to do under the arrangements, as I understand it, in which they were put in. But they have not made any further request. The evacuation was on our own initiative because we simply felt as long as we had that many dependents and American nationals down there that we had hostages in the country and we wanted to create a situation where we had freedom of action.

SEIZURE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you about the seizure of the medical supplies and other things there, or the sequestration of them so we didn't have access to our own supplies.

Mr. BALL. Can you answer that, Mr. Crockett?

Mr. CROCKETT. I will do the best I can, Senator.

We have had a request from the Haitian Government to withdraw our naval mission. Our naval mission was in effect a Marine mission. It is Haitian supplies you are referring to, I believe. I have seen something in the paper on this and in the present situation where we have not yet withdrawn our mission, we have not yet established how much of that we are going to need as a MAAG group. Meanwhile, there has been some problem with them having access to the various places where they work as a mission but they haven't been seized.

I think we will get them without any question. We are just——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point I am trying to get at is, have they denied us access to these medical and other supplies?

Mr. CROCKETT. My understanding is that they have, sir. I am not evasive, Senator. I am just not certain of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This is one of the things that tend to create a little uncertainty in me. I ask you have they and you say it is your understanding. Doesn't the State Department know whether they have or they haven't? I mean what is this indefinite thing?

Mr. BALL. Senator, the Department has been informed, I am sure our desk officers knows this story. Frankly, I don't know it, but the Department knows it, I am certain, and measures have been taken to insure the health of the people down there. I am also certain——

Senator SYMINGTON. Knowing you and respecting you as I do, I know you don't want to come before this committee and not tell us exactly what is going on in Haiti.

Mr. BALL. I know that.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have just been through the agony of this Cuban thing and got out an interim report last week and so for heavens sake don't let anybody be cute, whatever Senator Hickenlooper or Senator Carlson and I want to know tell us, because we have a very serious problem already so far as our constituents are

concerned regardless of what you hear to the contrary and I don't want to see it compounded.

Mr. BALL. We will get up to the committee the full story on this medical situation which I don't frankly know now.

[The following information was subsequently supplied for the hearing record:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 15, 1963.

Hon. J.W. Fulbright,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the course of Mr. Ball's testimony in Executive Session on May 13, Senator Hickenlooper inquired about the status of a problem created by the refusal of Haitian authorities to grant our Naval Mission access to certain medical supplies stored in office and examining room space in the Military Hospital at Port-au-Prince. A current check with our Embassy at Port-au-Prince has confirmed that access to these supplies is still being denied by Haitian authorities despite repeated representations made by Ambassador Thurston through the Haitian Foreign Ministry. Our Ambassador will continue to press vigorously for a satisfactory resolution of this problem and I will report to you any progress made.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK G. DUTTON, *Assistant Secretary.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 16, 1963.

Hon. J.W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR.CHAIRMAN: With reference to my letter of May 15, I wish to inform you we have now been advised by Ambassador Thurston that on the morning of May 14, Haitian officials authorized United States Naval Mission personnel in Port-au-Prince to remove the medical supplies stored in the Military Hospital there. Completion of the transfer of these supplies, which is anticipated during the course of May 15, will constitute full resolution of this problem.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK G. DUTTON, *Assistant Secretary.*

CLEANING UP THE SITUATION

Senator SYMINGTON. Bourke, I would like to ask this question. What do you think is going to happen, your own personal opinion, and that of the people you respect, between now and, say, Saturday, if the cutoff date is Wednesday.

Mr. BALL. It is always difficult to make firm predictions of a situation which is as chaotic as this one. My guess would be very little. In a way I would hope that enough happens to give us the basis for cleaning up the situation, but I think that what is most likely to happen is that we will go by the date of Wednesday without anything substantial occurring, and that by the end of the week we will still be in a situation where nothing is crystalized.

This may not be the case, what we are doing is to be prepared for every eventuality to the very best of our ability. We spent a good deal of yesterday, I may say on this, Sunday night and Sunday during the day. We are working closely with the Defense people, and keeping coordinated on an hourly basis so that we know, and they know exactly what we are doing, and we know what they are doing.

So, there would be the minimum reaction time here, and as I say, I think the reaction time right now you might say is about an hour. We could move within that, I mean we could be there within that time. But at the same time, we are trying to bring about a situation in which, if it is necessary to move, we move with the color of OAS support or at least the color of the cooperation of certain of the OAS countries, so that this can't be represented in the eyes of the world, particularly in Latin America as American intervention following at all the pattern of the Marines going in at an earlier occasion.

REACTION OF THE OAS

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Why are the OAS so sticky about it?

Mr. BALL. Well, for several reasons, Mr. Chairman. First of all——

The CHAIRMAN. Just as bad as Trujillo, isn't it, worse?

Mr. BALL. This is a situation, which, first of all, is a little foreign to the OAS because this is not a Latin or Portuguese speaking country. They regard Haiti with a considerable sense of apathy. They frankly, I mean, are not very interested in it. That is one consideration. The second is they are always concerned not to have anything done which might be a precedent for action which would affect them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BALL. So that anything that smacked of American intervention here our enemies would use to great consequences in Latin America and I think that even our friends would be greatly disturbed by it.

We have been in consultation with the governments of the countries in Latin America which we think are most sympathetic so that we can under the right circumstances bring about this color of Latin American participation. But I think it is very important we do that, because we could lose more than we gained if we moved precipitously without that aid.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO DUVALIER

The CHAIRMAN. You may have been asked, but what is the alternative to Duvalier? Is there anybody you have any confidence in at all?

Mr. BALL. Very little. We never had a situation where the human material with which we have to work is as poor as it is. There are some refugees in New York [deleted]. We have sorted out the ones who are the most reliable. There are a handful of people in Haiti itself who have some possible promise. We are trying to give what assistance we can to them.

As I said a moment ago, Mr. Chairman, the atmosphere of terror is such that there are not many people who are willing to move down there.

The CHAIRMAN. I can understand that. But it is almost impossible to find anybody you really have confidence in that you can back?

Mr. BALL. That is right.

I said ealier to the committee that this group that has set up a provisional government or announced the creation of a provisional government in exile in Puerto Rico——

The CHAIRMAN. Magliore?

Mr. BALL [continuing]. Magliore is not participating. It is four men. There is a man Dejoie, Fignole——

Mr. CROCKETT. [Max] Bolte is the third one and the fourth one's name escapes me.

The CHAIRMAN. They are in Puerto Rico?

Mr. BALL. They are in Puerto Rico, but Dejoie has been back and forth to the Dominican Republic and he has been trying to get President Bosch's support. He is a very dubious character from our point of view, because he at an earlier time tried——

Senator AIKEN. That is an understatement.

Mr. BALL [continuing]. In 1959 to organize a coup in cooperation with Castro.

The CHAIRMAN. Good, good.

Mr. BALL. They had a landing on the coast which was quickly liquidated.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, we have asked him questions here.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, I couldn't be here.

Senator AIKEN. You are not about to recognize the government in exile, are you?

Mr. BALL. Not at all.

Senator AIKEN. Not with those characters?

Mr. BALL. Not with those characters?

CONTRASTING HAITI AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The CHAIRMAN. Have you covered what might be the ultimate solution to this assuming you can get somebody, aside from the individuals? Is there any idea of being merged with the Dominicans, is that feasible?

Mr. BALL. It isn't feasible.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not.

Mr. BALL. No, it is not for several reasons. First of all, there is a century old antipathy between these two, they literally hate one another. The disparity of the standard of living between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is very striking. The Dominican Republic must have a per capita national income 5 or 6 times that in Haiti.

Any country that tried to take on Haiti as a country——

The CHAIRMAN. I hope we don't have to take them on.

Mr. BALL. That is what I say, Mr. Chairman. One of our real concerns is we don't get stuck with this responsibility because it would go on for years and years. We had the Marines there for 19 years and the economic situation is worse than it was. This is a country that has been slowly retrogressing ever since Napoleon left there in the early 19th century and it has gone deeper and deeper into the mud.

FRANCE AND HAITI

Senator AIKEN. Has Mr. de Gaulle shown any interest in assuming responsibility?

Mr. BALL. He has shown none.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you suggest it to him?

Senator AIKEN. Have you suggested it to him?

Mr. BALL. The only French influence that is strong there at all is in the two Communist parties, because these Communist party connections run back to Paris rather than either to Cuba or directly to Moscow, and this stems from the fact that some of the younger Cubans have studied there for some time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Younger Cubans, Haitians?

Mr. BALL. Haitians, and the educated Haitians, of course, read French so that the Communist propaganda that has come in has come from their France, sometimes transshipped by Martinique.

Senator AIKEN. Assuming the Communists do attempt to take over Haiti, is the United States prepared to step in to see that they don't by whatever means is necessary?

Mr. BALL. Within an hour.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sure it is a good idea? Maybe it is a good idea to let them have it. [Laughter.]

Senator AIKEN. Have they finished the airport?

Mr. CROCKETT. I don't believe we are working on the airport yet, we are still negotiating on the terms.

AN OAS TRUSTEESHIP

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But here is the dilemma. You say that if there is a Communist takeover or if it is so imminent that it is a practical certainty, or something—whatever you said, I don't want to put words in your mouth—that we would move within the hour.

If we move we would have to have a plan for the establishment of orderly government and orderly governmental forms. Now, it would seem to me we ought to have that plan, if we had to move otherwise than for a Communist takeover. We apparently don't have it.

Mr. BALL. Yes; we have alternative plans, Senator Hickenlooper. One of the plans is for the creation of an OAS trusteeship on a temporary basis.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. BALL. This has been worked out in considerable detail.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the OAS won't go for that yet.

Mr. BALL. I think they would go for a trusteeship in the face of a Communist situation. This is the case where I think we would get OAS support, and this material has all been positioned in our embassies in the Latin American countries so that they could be consulted very quickly, not only there but through the consulate here. Now, the OAS mission is going back again tonight so that there will actually be an OAS presence there.

The CHAIRMAN. Going to Port-au-Prince?

Mr. BALL. Both to Port-au-Prince and to Santo Domingo, with a broader terms of reference mission than the one they had down there.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is there anything else?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to discuss this just a little bit more.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Because I think this is another situation which has such ominous portent at the moment, I don't mean to say you don't realize it, I am sure you are as aware of it as anybody else, and probably more so, but we have this situation where I think that the time is probably long since past when the United States has got to assert overt leadership. I am not as familiar with the Latin American OAS feeling as a lot of people over in your shop are.

I have had some modest exposure to the private opinions of many of the people, in many of those countries down there and I may be completely wrong about this, but I have had a great many of them just almost sit down and say, "Why don't you do something? Why don't you make us do these things? You don't put the real coercive behind-the-scenes force on us to make it, and we as Latins are not going to do it unless you do."

I have had that sort of thing told to me. I couldn't say dozens but I suppose I have had 12 or 15 rather perceptive people in those countries and so on criticize us because they think, "Most anybody knows we are going to procrastinate down here, that is our nature and that is our business. If you people don't do this we are just going to be at loose ends and keep going around here and you have got to lay down on this thing and"—I don't know——

Mr. BALL. I would suggest that those same people who told you that will also be the people who would be very quick to say, "There is America intervening again and we can't have this colossus of the north messing."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that, and some of those people have said exactly that to me. They said, "Of course, for political purposes we have to criticize. It is a political thing in our country, we have to shout about colossus in the north but nevertheless we will never get any place unless you do it and we will do it. We will make our noise and we will do it."

They have said, a number of them have said, "Of course," and of course, this poses all kinds of alternatives, they have said, "Of course, you must not do it publicly so that we are put in a subservient position, we have to save face and we have to come around to it with the proper behind-the-scenes force and you mean business and all of that stuff done, let us save face, but we have to have that push because otherwise we don't do it."

Maybe that is like people in a political election, you know who come around and say, "Buddy, old boy, I am for you," from here on out then you find out they have been working for the other fellow, I don't know. Human nature is a rather complex mechanism.

Mr. BALL. We could twist the arms of these people a lot, but I think we are not going to be able to get the Latin Americans to move in any way with us on this situation unless we have got something that we can demonstrate is, gives them the political answers.

The hard and lamentable fact is, Senator, that the OAS is not a very strong, sturdy structure. It is unfortunately the best we have.

MEASURING THE EVILS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that that is a modest understatement. If I knew all the answers that would be one thing, but I don't. But what I am talking about is, this is a situation of desperation. It probably in and of itself, standing alone, doesn't have anywhere near the physical danger impact of Cuba, but taken with Cuba, and taken with the whole situation, especially in the Caribbean area, I think this is fraught with fantastic danger.

Mr. BALL. We are in this dilemma. We have to measure the evils of waiting until the situation develops to the point where we can move with some support from the rest of Latin America. The evils of moving ourselves into a situation and getting ourselves bogged down in Haiti with the full responsibility of carrying it in the eyes of the world, our Latin American friends and letting the Communists ride the propaganda slogan of intervention, so that our position in Latin America is seriously undermined even more than it is. Now this is a hard choice to make and it is a choice where it seems to us that what we must do is what we are doing, that is be prepared to act immediately.

In the meantime work as hard as we can with our Latin American friends to bring them around to some realization of the implications of the situation, trying to get their support as best we can, using the persuasive elements that are at our command here, which are necessarily somewhat limited, and wait for the right timing in which this matter can be brought to a head where we can move with some color of support from the rest of Latin America.

Now, what makes this a particularly exasperating situation is the fact we do have such poor human material to work with in trying to put any effective lever of leadership into the country where we don't want to move from bad to worse, which is perhaps possible, if we get some other gangster to replace Duvalier.

The CHAIRMAN. Then he would be your gangster.

Mr. BALL. Then he is our gangster and we are stuck with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR DUVALIER

Senator CARLSON. Was not Duvalier our man in the first place?

Mr. BALL. He looked pretty good. He moved in, he was a medical doctor.

The CHAIRMAN. He went to Michigan, didn't he?

Mr. BALL. He went to the University of Michigan, yes. Then he apparently fell under Duvalier, it is very curious what happened to him. The impression we have right now the man is a real psychotic. He is an abnormal person.

The CHAIRMAN. He sounds like it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I hope it doesn't take wholesale massacre, mass slaughter down there to get these people to take a stitch in time to save nine and I certainly can understand the great desire or the great desirability of getting OAS support, at least

color of support that is substantial. But there have been some times when your friends and neighbors won't help you, you have got to do something for yourself once in a while.

Mr. BALL. That is right. This is what we are prepared to do.

The CHAIRMAN. What will it be that would cause you to do this, the outbreak of rioting?

Mr. BALL. Well, there are two or three——

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the occurrences?

SITUATIONS THAT COULD TRIGGER INTERVENTION

Mr. BALL. There are two or three situations that could trigger this and I may say if anyone of these occurred perhaps we might not have all OAS support but some of the Latin American countries, Venezuela, for example. If what occurred was these 4 men announcing the creation of a socialist state, which is one of the things that has been rumored is going to occur either on the 15th or 22nd, on this one we wouldn't hesitate a minute. If there were the kind of breakdown which started really wholesale bloodletting then I think everyone——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Attacks on foreign embassies?

Mr. BALL. Attacks on foreign embassies, any of these things and, as I say, we are on a 1-hour basis, that is the *Boxer* is in the channel now, and it has 2,000 Marines and it has helicopters and it has got 5 tanks and some artillery and they can get it ashore in an hour's time in Port-au-Prince.

The CHAIRMAN. In an hour.

UNARMED TROOPS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The trouble is you have 20,000 troops in Haiti.

Mr. BALL. Except they are not really troops.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But they have arms, and they can shoot.

Mr. BALL. Well, on that, Senator Hickenlooper——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Half of them are for Duvalier and half are not.

Mr. BALL. They have arms but almost no ammunition because Duvalier is following an old Haitian custom. He has got all the ammunition stashed away in the basements of the cellars under the palace and has issued just a very meager ration of ammunition to any of the forces. So while there is quite a little bit of hardware around, I mean guns and so on, they haven't got anything to shoot in them, and this is——

The CHAIRMAN. He is afraid to let them have it for his own reasons?

Mr. BALL. He is afraid to let them have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have any tanks?

Mr. BALL. They have one P–51 which they have only gotten off the ground once in 18 months. They have a couple of half tracks but no usable armor or anything. It is a pretty poor excuse for anything, and the fact is he has fired all of his generals, either sent them into exile or killed them and they have taken asylum in the embassies and the whole officer corps has been systematically depleted in the last few weeks as there has been one rumor of coup

or conspiracy after the other. The morale is practically non-existent in the officer corps.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there any promising material in the officer corps? They have been better——

Mr. BALL. Yes, there is a man named Lt. [Francois] Benoit who is presently in asylum in the Colombian Embassy. He is a very attractive fellow by all accounts and our people have been in touch with him. He is only 21 years old. He went into asylum in the Colombian Embassy one night and the following day there was the attack on the chauffeur driving the children of Duvalier and Benoit even though in asylum was accused of fomenting this and Duvalier murdered his parents and burned their house down.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With them in it, weren't they?

Mr. BALL. Well, they were in it, whether they were dead at the time or not, I don't know. Now, there are one or two people like this and we are in close touch with them. Unfortunately, none of them has any support.

A DISINTEGRATING SITUATION

The CHAIRMAN. So you will move in, if they attacked embassies, if there is a bloodletting, if there is announcement of a socialist state.

Mr. BALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But then if none of these things happened, it just drags on.

Mr. BALL. It is a disintegrating situation.

The CHAIRMAN. It is.

Mr. BALL. It is steadily falling apart. I can't believe this situation can go on very much longer with the president barricaded as he was described by one man we have had see him, what, about a week ago, that he was sitting at his desk in the palace with his hat pulled down over his eyes with two guns on the desk, two revolvers, and the palace garden and grounds are filled with soldiers behind machine guns. He sits there and really, as I say, saying to anybody who comes in "They will have to kill me to get me out of here."

The CHAIRMAN. The public service of the country itself is at a standstill.

Mr. BALL. It is just cracking down.

EXTENT OF POPULAR SUPPORT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there any evidence that the population at large outside of the cities is exercised about this?

Mr. BALL. No. Outside of Port-au-Prince which is the center of this, the country is going about its normal business or lack of business, it is a subsistence economy. To the peasants this is just one more incident in a long series of them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This is just a rumpus in Port-au-Prince?

Mr. BALL. There is a little garrison up in Cap-Haitien up north. How loyal it is, it remains to be seen. But this is not a systematically organized country. There is a fairly well organized police system and secret police system apparatus through the country. But to the presant it makes very little difference.

The CHAIRMAN. He is like us, if there is a change he doesn't expect it to be better. They never have had much better, have they?

Mr. BALL. It has been a very sad story because this was the richest jewel in the French crown. At one time in the latter part of the 18th century Haiti produced more revenues for France than any other colonial possession it had.

The CHAIRMAN. What out of, sugar?

Mr. BALL. Sugar and this stuff they have made dye out of.

The CHAIRMAN. Indigo?

Mr. BALL. Indigo.

Mr. CROCKETT. Indigo.

The CHAIRMAN. It is exhausted.

Mr. BALL. You go back into the jungle and see these magnificent 18th century French villas and chateaus and just falling apart, but they are richly furnished and sometimes you see in a peasant's hut in Haiti furniture that was fine 18th century furniture.

AMERICAN AID TO HAITI

Senator CARLTON. What about the quotas? It is very low. They were always asking for more quotas. When I was there quotas was one of the things they wanted.

The CHAIRMAN. How much money have we put into Haiti in the last 5 years roughly?

Mr. CROCKETT. It is getting somewhere close to $90 million in the last 10 years or so.

The CHAIRMAN. Ten years. That doesn't include loans from the bank?

Mr. CROCKETT. I think that is a global figure, I think it is EX-IM bank credits, everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Everything. Anything else?

What do you want me to say to the press? They expect something.

Mr. BALL. I think you might simply say I came up to give you a current report.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't want me to say anything about being in an hour's position of moving out?

Mr. BALL. Oh, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Just say it is a serious situation and you briefed us.

Mr. BALL. Watching.

The CHAIRMAN. They will probably ask us about it.

Mr. BALL. I told them that it was up to the committee to say what they wanted.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 14, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Gore, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Mundt.

Testifying in respect to the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States were Major General Julius Klein and Leslie Laszlo Farkas, of Chicago, IL.

[The committee recessed at 1:50 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee resumed its study of the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States with testimony from Major General Julis Klein.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senator Gore.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[After the testimony of General Klein, the committee adjourned at 4:40 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MAY 15, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 11:15 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Humphrey, Long, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The Chairman announced the order of business as consideration of the bill (H.R. 5207), to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, and for other purposes.

Senator Symington proposed an amendment to the bill regarding the payment to the Republic of the Philippines of the unpaid balance of awards for war damage compensations. The amendment carried by voice vote.

Senator Symington then moved the favorable report of H.R. 5207, as amended, and the Chairman announced that without objection it was so ordered.

The Chairman said the clerk was authorized to poll the absentees on the report of H.R. 5207.

He also said the record was to show that the proxies of Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, and Lausche had been recorded in favor of the report of H.R. 5207.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The committee took testimony from Gottlieb Hammer, of New York, NY, on the activities on nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

[The committee recessed at 1:35 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2:40 p.m. in room 4219, to resume its testimony on the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senator Aiken.

The committee heard Isadore Hamlin, of New York City, NY.

For a record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 5 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MAY 27, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in joint executive session with the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary at 10:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Morse, Lausche, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

Also present from the Committee on the Judiciary were Senators Kefauver, McClellan, Hart, Dirksen, Hruska and Keating.

Also present were Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

The Chairman announced the meeting had been called at the request of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Kefauver) to discuss whether the production of certain documents called for by subpoenas issued by the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly in Colombia and having to do with information on the price of drugs in that country would be contrary to the foreign policy of the United States.

After discussion, it was informally concluded that the return on the subpoenas be withheld for an additional 30 days until the subject could reviewed further in the Foreign Relations and Judiciary committees.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The joint meeting was adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 28, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 11 a.m. in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The Chairman announced as the first order of business the bill (S. 777) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and for other purposes.

After discussion, Senator Morse moved that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency be given $15 million on which to operate for the succeeding two fiscal years. Senator Lausche offered a substitute motion that the amount be reduced to $12 million, and on a call of the roll, the Senators answered to their names as follows:

Yeas: Senator Lausche, Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Williams.

Nays: Senator Sparkman, Senator Humphrey, Senator Mansfield, Senator Morse, Senator Gore, Senator Church, Senator Symington, Senator Dodd, Senator Smathers, Senator Aiken, Senator Carlson, Senator Mundt, the chairman.

So the substitute was lost, 3 to 13.

On recurring to the original motion, the chairman asked for a voice vote, and the said motion was agreed to.

Senator Morse then moved that the committee request the Committee on the Judiciary, acting through its Subcommittee on Monopoly and Antitrust, to suspend further action on its drug investigations in Colombia until the Committee on Foreign Relations could have a further meeting on the subject, and extend the return of its subpoenas by thirty days. The motion carried on a voice vote.

Whereupon the committee reverted to its consideration of S. 777.

Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was called in to testify.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the bill was ordered to be reported favorably, as amended, on a voice vote.

William J. Crockett, selected to be Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, and Robert C. Strong, named to be Ambassador to Iraq, appeared on behalf of their nominations.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection the two nominations were approved for report on a voice vote.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 2:15 p.m.]

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MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 28, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (Subcommittee Chairman), and Senators Sparkman, Smathers, and Carlson.

The subcommittee was briefed on the situation in Haiti by Ambassador Raymond Thurston.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Humphrey, Morse, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson, and Williams.

The Chairman announced that he wanted the committee to give some thought to public hearings on the committee's current study of the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

After discussion, Senator Morse moved that a subcommittee consisting of the Chairman, Senator Hickenlooper, and Senator Symington be appointed to make the decision for the committee as to which individuals should be heard in public in connection with the study.

It was further decided that Richard Klemfuss, former director of the Dominican Republic Information Center, New York, should be heard in open session.

Senator Morse's motion was agreed to without objection.

The committee then proceeded to the consideration of the bill (S. 777), to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, on reconsideration. The authorization for funds contained in the bill, and previously approved by the committee, was amended, on motion by Senator Lausche, to read $20 million for two years, or $10 million per year, for the two-year operation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, by unanimous voice vote. The bill was again ordered to be reported favorably.

Senator Morse raised the question of further committee action on the problem of the sale of drugs in Colombia, previously reviewed with the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary. On motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Symington, and without objection, it was concluded that the full committee should schedule executive hearings on the matter of drugs in Colombia with witnesses to come from the Justice and State Departments, as well as representatives of the American drug industry before it makes further representatives and judgments to the Judiciary Committee, but that members of the Judiciary Committee be invited to sit in. The Chairman made it clear that the committee was not getting into a debate on whether or not it had jurisdiction in the matter, but was undertaking these

hearings for consultation and advice as to whether or not it was likely to injure our foreign relations. With this understanding, the motion was approved by voice vote.

The committee agreed to report an original resolution to print as a Senate document a staff study entitled "Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership, II", on motion by Senator Church, seconded by Senator Morse, unanimously approved.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12 noon.]

BRIEFING ON CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 5, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators, Morse, Lausche, Church, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better get under way. We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of State to brief us on the current situation, I suppose, in the various areas. This he will do in his usual masterly fashion, so you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much.

First, may I say how much I appreciate the courtesy of the committee in moving the hearing from yesterday to today. I had failed to show on the same occasion a year ago, and I felt I could not do so this time. The weather prediction caused me to take a train yesterday morning.

Mr. Chairman, I would like, rather than to take the committee's time in an inordinate manner with a general review, to make some comments on 3 or 4 matters of major importance, particularly in the NATO and the Soviet Union areas, and then let the discussion develop on the basis of questions by the committee with respect to other parts of the world. I also am intending to get into some nuclear questions.

NEED FOR BRIEFING ON NUCLEAR SITUATION

I would strongly urge the committee, Mr. Chairman, to have a full and top secret briefing on the nuclear situation. I do not believe this committee has had that full briefing. I think it is very important that it have it because the situation has changed considerably in the past few years, both from the point of view of the Soviet Union and that of the United States.

We could arrange this in 2 chapters to suit the convenience of the committee. We could have a partial briefing here in Washing-

ton, and then, if possible, if the commmttee could come to Omaha and NORAD [North American Air Defense] for a full operational briefing on the nuclear situation, I think the committee might find it of great advantage.

There are matters involved there that have to be lived with by the foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of government, and I think this committee would find it not only of great interest and relevance to other questions before the committee, but also in some respects a sobering, but in other respects an encouraging, situation that would be portrayed here.

But I will leave that for you consideration, Mr. Chairman. I want you to know that, first, we cordially invite you to undertake such a briefing and, secondly, I personally would like to urge the committee as to the importance of such a briefing.

The CHAIRMAN. That might be a very interesting project. We will certainly consider it. I had not thought of it before, but I am sure the committee would be interested to consider it at some appropriate time. Maybe we could arrange to do it.

Is there any particular time or is any time——

Secretary RUSK. No. I have discussed this with the Defense Department, and we could adjust this entirely to the convenience of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. How long would it take?

VISIT NORAD IN OMAHA

Secretary RUSK. I think, for example, just as a suggestion, if we could fly you out to Omaha, say, on a Friday morning and spend a Friday afternoon out there, I think we could do everything that is necessary in an afternoon, preceded by a briefing here in Washington——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Before you go. But I really think it is of great importance for the committee to do it.

Now, it does involve some heavy responsibilities in the security field. You would be getting into things that you just cannot talk about. But I think that the things that you see you must think about, along with us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. So I hope it can be arranged. We can do this so far as Omaha is concerned.

Senator AIKEN. Has the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency been briefed out there?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Foster has been.

Senator AIKEN. Just him?

Secretary RUSK. And, I think, perhaps, Mr. Fisher, but not the general group.

The CHAIRMAN. If we could do it, we could leave, say, on a Friday morning and come back when?

Secretary RUSK. We could get you back that evening. I would suggest, for your convenience, an overnight stop and then come back the next morning. We could take you out in a jet, one of the President's jets, so it is a very comfortable 2½-, 3-hour flight.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Secretary RUSK. So that I think you would find it a most revealing briefing.

The CHAIRMAN. We certainly will give it some thought.

IMPORTANT NEW DEVELOPMENTS

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, a number of us have been out there individually, and I am just wondering if new considerations of policy or of technological development prompt you to make this recommendation now or whether it is——

Secretary RUSK. I think there have been very important developments, say, in the last year or two. For those who have not been there fairly recently, it is important to see how the situation and our information about the situation has developed recently.

Some of the measures that we laid on some time ago, we are now getting the harvest from in terms of information, and I think that there are significant new features.

I do not know when you were there, Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. A year or two ago.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I think you would find another visit very important, and also if the committee went or a group of the committee went, we could lay on a more systematic or better briefing than would be possible for just 2 visitors coming at a time.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you recommend it?

Senator CARLSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would recommend it. After a discussion around this committee table yesterday, I became more confused than ever, and I would hope to have these things clarified a little.

I would like for you to come to the middle West. If you want to come out, it is not my State, but I can make arrangements.

BRIEFING AT DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. One thing you could do, Mr. Chairman, is, in any event, have the type of briefing we can furnish you here in Washington, and then you could decide if you wished to undertake the Omaha trip.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I hope, perhaps, the committee could come to the Operations Center of the State Department for a briefing where we have security and other arrangements that would make it convenient for you to to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. You would prefer we come down there where you have security?

Secretary RUSK. We have visual aid materials, facilities, and we have comfortable quarters, an air-conditioned room, where we could take the time necessary, and it is also a secure area so far as even sound is concerned.

Senator SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, I have been to Omaha like several others individually. It is a most interesting thing. But I gather from just seeing it, the impression that I got was, that it would show what the status of alertness was that we were in, and it would have more to do with the military. I did not get any idea there was any foreign policy connected with it. Is this something new or do we——

Secretary RUSK. I think it depends on how full the briefing was that you got, Senator.

Senator SMATHERS. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. This goes much beyond the alert situation. It has to do with the enemy situation, with the Allied Western capabilities, with the major issues in terms of the choices that are open, and there are many policy questions that just pop out of that briefing——

Senator SMATHERS. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Actually when you go through it. I think you would find it very interesting.

A TWO-STEP BRIEFING

The CHAIRMAN. Being one who has never been to NORAD, I do not know how many members of the committee have been—does anyone happen to know? You two. Has anyone else here been?

Senator LAUSCHE. I was there a number of times, but that is while I was Governor. These are new matters?

The CHAIRMAN. These are new matters.

Secretary RUSK. The situation has changed considerably since then, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AIKEN. Why don't we have a briefing here and then decide?

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will instruct the clerk to try to work out with Fred Dutton an appropriate time for a briefing that we can go down to. Is it feasible to do it in the afternoon?

Secretary RUSK. At whatever time is convenient to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be easier for us—I mean, it does not make any difference to you?

Secretary RUSK. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be easier some afternoon than in the morning because there are so many conflicting committee meetings for various members, a lot of meetings, Finance, Atomic Energy, and so on, and some time at 4:30 or 5 we might get more of the members together, don't you think? It is very hard to get them all away from the Hill in the morning. Four o'clock on a quiet afternoon, if there is one, would be better.

Secretary RUSK. We can have cars here that would be at your disposal down and back.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be easier.

We are talking about a briefing on NORAD. Have you ever been to NORAD?

Senator MORSE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is another one who has not been.

He is talking about a 2-step briefing. One, here in Washington, and if we then like the idea, we all go to Omaha.

Senator MORSE. I think it is very important.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is fine. We will at least work out the first one.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

ISSUES AT THE NATO MEETING

I think that I might begin then with some observations on certain issues that came up at the Ottawa meeting of NATO.

It has been our practice in the past, to devote the spring meeting to political discussion of the general world situation, but this time we had the defense ministers there as well, because 2 or 3 very important military questions did come up. I might dispose of those first.

After Nassau, the British and we have moved ahead to commit the British V-Bomber Force of approximately 180 V-Bombers, and 3 U.S. Polaris submarines, with a complement of 48 Polaris missiles, to SACEUR,[1] that is, to NATO for targeting and direction by General [Lyman] Lemnitzer.

At Ottawa we confirmed those arrangements, and confirmed also that they would work more or less as follows: The V-Bombers and the Polarises would be assigned to General Lemnitzer's command; he would appoint a deputy to himself for staff responsibility to advise him on the employment of his nuclear forces, and these forces would be coordinated with other nuclear capable forces at his disposal, such as certain dual purpose fighter squadrons from the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, Belgium, soon Canada, the Netherlands, that might also play a nuclear role in the event of a nuclear strike.

ELIMINATING NATO ALLIES' SUSPICION

The important political aspect of this turns on the fact that SACEUR would now have for the first time under his direct command weapons which have a considerable reach into Soviet territory, and can be applied directly against those weapons in the Soviet Union which threaten Western Europe or and of immediate relevance to Western Europe, and that this targeting will be done by an Allies staff group under General Lemnitzer's command, and that the targeting and the operational plans for that force would be coordinated with our own forces at Omaha, again with an Allied staff.

Now, this has been politically important because up until recently it has been necessary for the United States to go to our Allies and say, "We are covering the targets which are threatening Western Europe." Now they have a chance in a very discreet way to participate directly in these operations and see for themselves what the nature of the threat is, what targets ought to be covered, and how the targets, in fact, are being covered.

I think we will eliminate any residual suspicions or fears that, perhaps, they are not being targeted; and, secondly, that we somehow may be giving much higher priority to those targets threatening the United States as compared with those threatening Western Europe. I think this is a very important political development in the Alliance as well as a very useful military development.

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[1] Supreme Allied Command, Europe.

POLITICAL PROBLEM WITH FRANCE

We did get into something of a political problem with France on this point because France, given its present attitude toward NATO and toward integrated forces, was sensitive to the point that if this proceeded as a major political development in the Alliance, that France would be isolated in a position of not agreeing that something important had occurred and that, indeed, this might be put up by the British or some others as a possible defeat or setback for French policy in its national nuclear effort. So the French were unwilling to go along with the idea of referring to an Inter-Allied Nuclear Force, of giving it a special label.

Fourteen of the members present hailed this step as a very important step for the Alliance. The French, in effect, said that this is not a very big change at all, but we decided that, in balance, we and the British and others would take the substance and let the form go, and not make a big fuss with the French, whether we call these forces by a special name or whether we simply go ahead with the new arrangements. That was the undercurrent to our discussion leading up to Ottawa and the reason why the communique at Ottawa did not make more of the point of the assignment of these V-bombers and Polarises to SACEUR.

STUDY OF NATO FORCES

A second defense step that was taken at Ottawa was to launch an urgent study under the leadership of the Secretary General of the forces assigned to NATO. This was with respect to their status, their relationship to NATO force goals, the plans of the individual countries for providing support for those forces and the budgetary implications for NATO force goals over the next five years, because we felt that the NATO force goal situation has been quite unsatisfactory.

The United States, broadly speaking, is about the only country which is fully meeting its NATO force goals at the present time. Some of the others have been taking important measures to bring their forces up to the force goals. The Germans, for example, have been doing rather well. The Dutch have improved their forces somewhat. Canada is in reasonably good shape on their contributions.

But, nevertheless, we have felt that the total effort in the Alliance was far from satisfactory, and a great deal more needs to be done. So we have asked the Secretary General to lay on a status report, as a matter of greatest urgency, so that we can begin to shape some of those decisions between now and the December meeting of the Ministers in Paris this year.

We believe that this will be a difficult political operation because there has been considerable reluctance on the part of a number of NATO countries to move their defense budgets upward, and yet we feel we must press further on this, and that this is one of the ways to highlight where the deficiencies are, and to decide what ought to be done toward correcting those deficiencies.

In general, I would say that either we are wrong in maintaining our own forces at the agreed force goals or the others are wrong in

not bringing their forces up to those force goals, and that somehow this double standard ought to be dealt with.

A third point that came up was bilateral discussion with the Canadians on the nuclear weapons situation. By the way, Mr. Chairman, I hope I will have a chance to designate certain portions of this transcript as top secret, particularly on these nuclear matters when the meeting is over.

The CHAIRMAN. As you go along you had better indicate that. But, just as a precaution, you know that this record is not to be published; it is an executive record.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Nevertheless, it might be wise to indicate that as you go along.

Senator MORSE. He should be offered the privilege though when he is all through to amend his designations.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. Perhaps Mr. Marcy and one of my colleagues could go into this.

CANADIAN COMMITMENT

In our talks with the Canadians about the nuclear situation, we have made considerable progress in getting the Canadians to move ahead on the commitment and implied commitment which had existed before the present government came to power.

It now appears they are prepared to accept nuclear weapons for their own fighter squadrons in NATO, that they are prepared to accept nuclear weapons for the BOMARC installations in Canada itself; that they are prepared to let us have nuclear weapons for our forces at 2 bases in Canada, the fighter squadron groups up in Newfoundland, and we expect that also certain storage facilities will be made available to us in the months ahead.

This is something of a delicate problem for Mr. Pearson[2] because there has been considerable resistance to nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. But he, in his first test in the House of Commons up there, passed it successfully on his general policy in the defense field with the help of certain members of the Conservative Party, such as the former Defense Minister who crossed the aisle to support him on this subject. Nevertheless, he has a sensitive political problem and we want to move ahead with it by stages, and are quite encouraged by the progress made thus far.

We did not at the Ottawa meeting get into the discussion of the multilateral nuclear force but I would like to make some comments on that if I may, sir.

INCREASED SOVIET MISSILE CAPABILITY

Several elements have come into play in focusing attention on the possibilities of the multilateral force in NATO.

First, there has been considerable increase in Soviet missile capability against Western Europe and the United States, and the assertion by the military authorities of NATO, especially General Norstad, in the first instance, is that NATO itself needs a substantial MRBM force for targeting against those weapons threatening

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[2] Lester Pearson, Canadian Prime Minister.

Western Europe. His proposal on that amounted to some 400 MRBMs, and his preference was that they be based on the ground in NATO countries.

This was viewed with considerable skepticism in the Alliance as a way of accomplishing this military objective because it had been discovered earlier that NATO countries were very reluctant to station MRBMs in their own countries in the thickly populated areas in Western Europe sitting there as an attractive target in case of a nuclear exchange.

Germany was prepared to accept a considerable number of these but there were others in the Alliance who were concerned about multiplying still further the number of nuclear weapons in Germany because of some of the political attitudes toward Germany that have been there since World War II.

They felt that this might also open the way for German claims to a national nuclear force over which the Germans themselves would have control.

Nevertheless, the NATO military authorities have been insisting that there is a requirement for MRBMs for NATO itself.

Secondly, I think that a political factor entered the picture, partly as a chain reaction beginning in 1958 at the time when we ourselves reestablished our special relationship with Britain in the nuclear field. This gave a considerable impetus to a French national nuclear program, a program on which they had been working before that, but on which they stepped up their activity at about that same time.

When our special relationship was reestablished, and the French national program was launched, the French program was accompanied by an effort by President de Gaulle to assert a special position of the three nuclear powers as the leaders of the free world. In 1958 he proposed the Directoire as a committee of three; ourselves, Britain and France as the authentic leadership of the entire free world.

This was rejected by President Eisenhower; it was later again rejected by President Kennedy, on the ground that the free world had not elected the three of us for this role, that it was not suitable for us to assert that special position, and that this would be a move toward disintegration of the solidarity of the alliance.

GERMANY AND ITALY

Now, nevertheless, the claim that being a nuclear power gives special political status and privilege made itself felt in Germany and in Italy, particularly, and in some of the smaller countries as well, who were resistant to the idea.

We do find Germany and Italy reaching for something like a comparable status with the big three on political questions. They have been asserting this very insistently and effectively, at least for the period that I myself, have been in this chair.

It was not until December of last year that we got the French to agree that on German-Berlin questions there should be full and free consultation with the Germans rather than taking them up as a matter of tripartite special responsibility, and the Italians, of course, are extremely sensitive about any arrangements whereby

the four of us appear to assert any special leadership inside the Alliance.

So we have that political problem.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where would you put the MRBMs.

Secretary RUSK. May I come to that in just a half second, Senator?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. The only thing I wanted to do was to understand the story this morning about Admiral Ricketts over there.

Secretary RUSK, Yes, I will be coming to that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

Secretary RUSK. Then, a third factor which is beginning to make itself felt in Germany and in Italy particularly, is that European industry is getting very much concerned about whether it is going to fall behind and become a second-rate industry unless it gets into the nuclear and space field. We do have evidences of industrial pressures in Germany and Italy to get into both these fields in the prospect that otherwise they might fall behind technologically. This is something that has not yet been asserted by the governments as a pressing demand, but nevertheless the undercurrents are clearly there.

A CHAIN REACTION

Then, I think also that when we have disclosed to the Europeans information that we have on the Soviet position and the nature of the Soviet threat to Western Europe and to our own country, this inevitably causes governments to want not only to look at but to participate in nuclear affairs to an extent that they have not before.

I think it is entirely possible that had we not in 1958 renewed our special relations with the British, perhaps this chain reaction would not have started, but I am inclined to think we would have these growing pressures in any event because of the Soviet situation and some of these industrial and political factors that I mentioned.

Now, back in December 1960, Secretary [Christian] Herter raised in NATO the possibility of a MRBM naval force which would provide some of the weapons which SACEUR was asking for and which the Europeans were interested in, and would at the same time have advantages over the land based missiles which were then being discussed. This matter has been probed further by Ambassador [Livingston] Merchant in a number of informal discussions.

No governments have made commitments on the matter as yet because we have not yet ourselves wanted to make a flat commitment to any particular project until it had been discussed enough with other governments to see what was feasible.

DIFFICULTIES WITH CONSULTATION

Here we ran into some very interesting political problems. Here was a matter on which it was possible for the Alliance genuinely to

consult in the very inception of an idea, where we could sit down with them, and put together some ideas on a basis of, in effect, genuine partnership.

But the Alliance finds it difficult to take part in that kind of consultation. Since 1945, they have been used to responding in one way or another to American plans, an American plan put together as a complete plan from A to Z.

When they had an opportunity to sit down and create an idea, they found this very difficult because the present Alliance did not see these problems in the same way, and they found that consulations were not nearly so easy as they had supposed.

Second, one of the issues in this discussion has been how we share more fully with our Alliance the responsibility for general policy in the Alliance and, specifically, nuclear policy. I think it would have been contradictory for us to go into such discussions with a plan completed here and put it to them and say, "Take it or leave it, this is the way it is likely to be."

In the course of discussions of the most informal sort over several months the general shape of a plan has been developed which would involve a surface force of up to 25 vessels, each vessel carrying eight missiles. That is a total of 200 missiles.

These would be relatively inexpensive warships compared with submarines.

Last fall we were talking about the multilateral force in terms of surface vessels. The Nassau agreement diverted attention toward the submarine as a possible mode of possible platform for such missiles, and there was considerable discussion about the difference between submarine and surface potentiality.

ADVANTAGES OF SURFACE VESSELS

We have now come back to the surface vessels for a variety of reasons.

One, we can move more rapidly to complete building of surface ships.

Second, other countries can participate in the actual construction of the surface vessels themselves, whereas we would have to do all of the work on the submarine component, and our own submarine program is keeping our present facilities completely occupied.

Third, we have felt that the mixed manning aspect of the force would be much easier to handle in surface vessels than in submarines because the other nationalities are much more familiar with the techniques of surface craft, and because in the special circumstances of the narrow seas and shoal waters around the European continent under the protection of a friendly shoreline, there would be some operational advantages for the surface vessels as compared with submarines.

Our own submarines were designed to operate under any conditions, including operating in range of a hostile shore. That would not be the situation in vessels stationed in Europe, where they would have the benefit of considerable air cover and navigational aids and matters of that sort on which the Polaris would not be dependent.

CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Now, we have had considerable discussion about the element of control. On that I would like to be just as clear as possible. That is, who would be responsible for making the decision to fire these weapons.

We have said that as far as the United States is concerned we must participate in any such decision. Bearing 95 percent of the nuclear strength of the Alliance, the fact is that we should participate and, therefore, we should not let the theory and the fact become separate.

We could not ourselves accept so great a separation of power and responsibility as to yield that decision or yield participation in that decision to a majority of some combination of alliance.

This has been a little difficult for some of the others because, the Germans, for example, say, that it is not a U.S. veto, if one wishes to call it that, that they are concerned about. They are looking ahead to the situation in which you may have a weak government in Britain or in Italy. They are quite frank about this, Mr. [Harold] Wilson in Britain, or whoever it might be in Italy that they are concerned about, a veto on the European side, so that the credibility of such a force would be greatly diminished.

Well, we have said in effect that how the European component itself decides to cast its decision or cast its vote in coming to such a decision is something we are prepared to talk about and the Europeans can talk about among themselves.

But in any event we feel it is necessary for the United States to take part in that decision, and to be responsible for the decision.

U.S. ASSENT IS REQUIRED

Senator AIKEN. We participate without a veto.

Secretary RUSK. Our decision would be required.

Senator, here is the point, it seems to me. I think to concentrate on the word "veto," I used it myself just a moment ago, gets this out of context a bit.

This is a decision that somebody is going to have to make and all we are saying is that that "somebody" includes the United States and our assent is required.

Senator AIKEN. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. Speaking just as an American, and thinking about a situation in which you are talking about the incineration of much of the northern hemisphere, and an America that possesses 95 per cent of the nuclear power of the Alliance, it seems to me just built in, inherent in, our own requirements as a nation and in the factual situation in times of crisis, that we participate in the decision and this decision won't be made without the United States.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would others have the power to veto?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we are talking about a force of 200 missiles.

The total context which Mr. Khrushchev described as 40,000 nuclear weapons in the United States he was not necessarily exaggerating when he used that figure. I could imagine a situation in which there could be some delay employing this force if the United

States thought that it had to deploy nuclear force, use nuclear weapons, and someone else disagreed with us.

But my guess is that is a delay of minutes, and not a delay of any serious substance.

A EUROPEAN VETO

Senator LAUSCHE. My question is, would Italy have the power to veto?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we are not far enough along to know yet how the voting on the other side would be arranged, on the European side. I think it is entirely possible that they might want to work out among themselves an arrangement by which the European voice is given with a majority vote of some sort. All we are saying is, "No matter how you work it out on your side, we are going to be present in the decisions."

Senator SYMINGTON. What countries would be part of the crews?

Secretary RUSK. The present prospect is that Germany, Italy, Netherlands, possibly to a small degree, Greece and Turkey for political reasons, and we think Britain.

THE BRITISH SITUATION

Let me again be very candid with you about the British situation. Since Nassau they have been giving broad approval to the idea of a multilateral force. But the domestic political situation in Britain has taken a turn in recent weeks which has put some brakes on the British position on this.

The Labor Party has come up with the statement that if they come to power, they will renounce the British national nuclear force.

Now, the Conservative Government, I think, must feel that this is an issue which they would like to take to the country in an election.

Therefore, I think the Conservative Government at the present time is somewhat reluctant to muddy this issue by too much discussion of the multilateral force if the Laborites are going to make a direct issue on a national nuclear deterrent.

This is a judgment on my side that has not been stated to us in these terms by anyone in Britain, but they have recently raised some operational questions at the naval level. Admiral Ricketts has finished his talks with them today, on these operational questions.

Actually those operational questions are in no sense new. They have been under discussion for the last several months, the British have been involved in those discussions, and my guess is they are raising, at the technical level and the military level, some questions which are really political in orientation.

So we think that the British will, in fact come along when the time comes to get a working group together and sit down and work out the details, but before that working group assembles, we would be down to consult in great detail with the committee and with the other appropriate committees of the Congress on the details.

TECHNICAL SECRETS OF THE BOMB

I might just make one or two other comments about what this idea involves. In the first place it does not involve giving to any of our allies who do not already have nuclear weapons, technical secrets. I mean by that we would not go beyond existing legislation in the technical secrets in connection with the bomb itself.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think the McMahon Act would have to be changed?

Secretary RUSK. I think the McMahon Act might have to be changed on the one group custody in which U.S. personnel are also present as part of the custody.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you would have to have the treaty approved to make the deal.

Secretary RUSK. The entire matter would have to come to the Congress; the President has already announced that this entire matter would come here before we would make any commitment abroad.

ITALIAN CREWS

Senator SYMINGTON. Is the Communist Party the largest or the second largest party in Italy?

Secretary RUSK. I think it is the second largest at the moment.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you would have Italians on these crews?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. The plan would be to have Italians on the crews. But these would be highly selected personnel. They would have to train together for 2 or 3 years. If this idea were to go forward, I should think these crews would be come the elite of the elite as far as the armed forces of these other countries are concerned.

The warheads themselves would be present in a complete package. They would be under custody, including U.S. personnel custody, at all times under regulations which would prevent any intrusion into the warhead itself. If overhaul or repair were needed those would be delivered to an American base for overhaul and repair, in which case the completed warhead would be substituted, there would be no technical disclosure.

Secondly, the arrangements, not just on paper, but in fact, would be such that no government not having nuclear weapons could issue an order to any of its military personnel to fire any of these weapons.

In other words, it would not be possible, quite apart from not being legal, it would not be possible under the arrangements that we have in mind for a German Government at some future time to issue an order to a German commander or a German officer to fire a weapon. The orders would go through the agreed channels and could only go through the agreed channels in which our decision to fire would necessarily be involved.

GIVING AWAY THE POLARIS SUBMARINE

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, I think the administration claims it already has authority to give away the Polaris or give it to an-

other country, so long as it does not have the warhead attached. Isn't the principal secret of the Polaris in the delivering mechanism?

I think there is some difference of opinion on that between the Atomic Energy Committee—and the administration as to the right to give away an atomic missile piecemeal.

Secretary RUSK. The Polaris so far has been pledged only to Britain. Now——

Senator Aiken. Yes. But they have told us that they have authority to deliver it to other Western European countries without coming to Congress for that authority. That is, so long as it is not delivered with the warhead.

Secretary RUSK. Well, it was my understanding, Senator, that the McMahon Act does not cover the delivery missile itself as far as the strict law is concerned. When you are talking policy, I always believe that the Congress and Executive must move together on these questions.

Senator Aiken. So long as they can deliver it without the warhead or they can give it to most any Western European country, and as I say, you are going to run into a decided difference of opinion with the Atomic Energy Committee in that respect.

Secretary RUSK. Before any commitments are made in this field as far as the MLF is concerned, we will be here to talk with the committees, including the Atomic Energy Committee, of the details of any possible arrangement.

I think actually, in terms of the Polaris submarine, the most sensitive secrets have not to do with the hardware but with operational techniques and practices and plans.

Senator AIKEN. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. And that this itself will require that any NATO multilateral force would have to work out its own operational techniques and its own plans.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask one more question.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

CONTROL OF SUBMARINES

Senator SYMINGTON. In 1957 or 1959, I forget which years, I personnaly negotiated thoroughly this 2-key idea we had on THOR, and reporting back what my friends told me, the military in both countries, both theirs and ours, that it was just a lot of nonsense, to the Armed Services Committee.

He said, "In case of any trouble we can always knock our man in the head and fire the missile, if we think it is essential to the security of Great Britain."

Wouldn't that problem be proliferated, you might say, on a submarine with nuclear weapons? How are you going to have any control over it regardless of what your wishes are?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think we have that problem and have had it for some years right now.

I mean, the committee will, among other things, learn the details of the fact that in the last 2 years, although there has been a lot of talk about, a lot of emphasis on conventional forces that are far as NATO is concerned our megatonnage in nuclear weapons, in

NATO, has been doubled in 2 years and the actual number of weapons has increased by 60 percent.

Now, this is an act of war against the United States if this should occur, if we want to treat it as such.

This is a problem but it is an existing problem. As a matter of fact, I would be more comfortable about the seaborne multilateral force arrangements in this regard than I am about, these large numbers of nuclear weapons that are now located in Europe, that are there on the two-key or other arrangement.

Now we are, as you know, developing additional techniques in the safeguarding field which will make it certain under the new arrangements which begin to go into operation by the end of this year that it would not be possible for them to knock over the man and then fire the weapon nevertheless, because the message has to come from somewhere else to give critical information that makes it possible to fire the weapon. I think we can lick that one before the MLF actually comes into being which is a 5, 6 year time factor.

ITALY'S INDUSTRIAL INTEREST IN POLARIS

Senator AIKEN. Isn't it true that Italy, rather than requesting Polaris missiles, wanted the knowhow so as to go into the business of building Polaris missiles, and we know that Italy today is selling material and implements to countries that are prohibited for sale by the United States.

Secretary RUSK. The Italians, I think, have shown more interest in the purely, shall I say, the industrial aspects of this than any other country.

Senator AIKEN. They would like to go into the commercial business.

Secretary RUSK. For example, at Ottawa, the Defense Minister spoke to me about a Skipjack submarine. I told him I didn't think this was feasible. This is not really on for the present. We couldn't take that up. And he immediately said, "Well, then, what about a nuclear propulsion plant for a commercial vessel, because we are not interested in the military aspect as much as the technological aspect."

This is a technological pressure. Actually, under our peaceful uses for atomic energy commercial vessels are available, all the information on it has already been made public, so there is no great problem on that. But there is increasing pressure to get into this on the industrial side.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. We feel that it is very important that we not take any steps in connection with the multilateral force that will, in fact, increase a national nuclear capability, and this not just as a matter of law but as a matter of fact. Now that means that the arrangement had to be such, as I indicated earlier, whereby no other government could itself tell its own personnel to fire these weapons.

AN APPETITE FOR NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES

It also means that we hope, by developing a nuclear partnership on that basis, to forestall the growth of appetite for, ambition for, national nuclear forces.

If you look just at the moment at the alternatives to such a multilateral force that are open to us, I don't believe that the alternative is to sit right where we are.

[Deleted.]

THE ULTIMATE FINGER ON THE TRIGGER

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, first of all, I want to say that as long as we are there committed primarily to the defense of Europe with our weapons, I agree wholeheartedly we must not relinquish the veto. But I fail to see how the multilateral proposal is designed to meet either the increasing German misgivings as to their second-class status or the principal motivation that has led de Gaulle, as I read de Gaulle, to insist upon the necessity for building an independent nuclear deterrent of his own; that motivation, as I understand it, being that in this nuclear age, it is really nonsensical for any one country to rely ultimately on any other country to sacrifice itself for interests that it may not regard as vital to its own national existence.

And if I were in France, I would raise the same questions Mr. de Gaulle is raising. I don't see how the multilateral force reaches this, because we retain the ultimate finger on the trigger, and that is the very objection that has caused de Gaulle to conclude that France must develop an independent nuclear deterrent of its own.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, don't press me to say what I would do if I were a Frenchman, but since I am American, I think we have to look at this from the point of view of what American national interest calls for in this situation. There is, I am sure, no question about that.

Senator CHURCH. There is no disagreement there.

THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW

Secretary RUSK. It seems to me from the American point of view we cannot accept the idea that separate nuclear action within the Alliance is possible, because the nature of nuclear war is such that if some of these missiles go off, they all go off, and if Europe wants an independent position then the United States must have an independent position, and the deployment of forces must recognize that and there must be a separation in the deployment of forces.

Senator CHURCH. I agree.

Secretary RUSK. In other words, I think this is a very far reaching issue. I made——

Senator CHURCH. I agree. But it is fundamental, and it seems to me that our plan is not directed toward the basic motivation that is leading France to establish its independent deterrent and may well lead these other countries to do likewise, but on the contrary may only whet their appetite to do likewise.

Secretary RUSK. This depends on really what is in their mind.

I don't believe myself that Europe is prepared to go down the trail in which we have already invested $100 billion and are investing $15 billion a year, to give themselves a nuclear force which can adequately deal with the Soviet Union.

Therefore, I do think that Europe, leave out de Gaulle for the moment, that Europe itself is committed to the notion that in nuclear matters the United States is utterly essential to Western Europe. We have had repeated indications of that. The very facts of the situation, I think, are clear on this point.

I think President de Gaulle also understands that. He is already talking about how his potential and very small force can be best coordinated strategically with U.S. and NATO forces.

Europe is not going to turn aside to an independent partnership with President de Gaulle with a prospect of 20 or 40 or 100 nuclear weapons, and thereby abandon the United States nuclear power in the process.

RUMORS ABOUT AN INDEPENDENT EUROPE

Now, I did say very frankly to NATO at the Ottawa meeting, I had heard discussion and rumors across the Atlantic about an independent Europe. They must fully understand that the other side of the coin of an independent Europe is an independent United States and we had thought in 1949 we would all, both sides, proceed on the basis that the defense of Western Europe and North America is indivisible, that the security of one is dependent upon the security of the other, and we feel that defense interdependence is the only basis on which they can proceed.

But they should be under no illusion that an independent Europe can lead to anything else than an independent United States, and there were many expressions of appreciation around the table that we had made that point utterly clear in this situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand that, but in support of Senator Church's position, we look with a fishy eye on what General de Gaulle wants.

We take away from Britain the Skybolt, that eliminates their national force, and in order to sort of put the soothing syrup on this we cut in the Greeks and Italians and very possibly the Germans into a nuclear picture, and we do it in a theoretical concept and still controlling that weapon on that boat.

Secretary RUSK. They are in on a group basis, and without a national capability. They are in as a part of a genuine partnership in which we all go or none go.

I don't myself see how we can be comfortable about the development of national nuclear forces, the use of which would necessarily involve the United States, because the enemy, Mr. Khrushchev, will make that clear. From our own point of view, it seems to me that we must retain for the United States the maximum position in this field.

INCONSISTENT POSITIONS

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me inconsistent to say, on the one hand, we must retain exclusive control over nuclear power with the American finger on the trigger, and on the other

hand say we are therefore offering the Europeans a proposal that gives them genuine partnership. The two positions are inconsistent and contradictory, and this is the objection that the Europeans are raising and will continue to raise as their own capacity to develop an independent deterrent force.

Secretary RUSK. Well, on the second point we don't see any signs of their readiness to invest the enormous resources that are required to give them a genuine independent capacity.

I really think that what President de Gaulle has been reaching for is something which gives him some claim to a privileged political status, something that raises France up one notch above his own closest friends in Europe and that this is primarily a political operation, and is not really related to the military realities, and that we would not be able to talk about the independence of France and the national policies of France at the present time unless he were perfectly confident that the American nuclear umbrella remains over NATO in the process.

I just have no doubt myself that he is relying as much as anybody else on the American connection through the Alliance.

Now, he emphasizes his attachment to the Atlantic Alliance but he never mentions NATO. He doesn't like NATO because that calls for an integration of forces.

But no one has found President de Gaulle pulling away from what is called the Alliance as such.

But he wants an alliance of separate states, with separate armed forces, 19th century type, without the type of integration which has been going on in NATO since 1952.

THE COST OF SUPPORTING NATO

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, this last comment of the Secretary, there are many points I could list later, but there are 3 points that disturb me very much, although I found your discussion very helpful.

I would like to have information on these 3 points on at least a later date: One, is your earlier comment about the failure on the part of European countries to carry out their military commitments to NATO which I think is very serious.

The last comment you made in regard to de Gaulle when you say that you don't feel he is pulling away from the Alliance, well that becomes a matter of definition. I think he has pulled away from the Alliance. He pulls away from the Alliance when he follows a nationalistic course and falls so completely short of manning his share of the Alliance. I don't know what would be meant by saying that he is not pulling away from the Alliance unless we mean he is perfectly willing to stay in the Alliance if he is allowed to run his own show independent of the Alliance.

The second policy question that I would like to have a lot more information on before I am going to give any support to NATO, and I am not supporting NATO at the present time, is cost. I think we have to have itemized before this committee exactly what the American taxpayer is paying in connection with this cost in relationship to the other NATO countries.

You don't think that the NATO countries are going to spend the money to develop an independent nuclear force, but we are spending it for them, and I think the time has come for us to have a showdown with them and paying much more than they are now paying. I am not going to support continuing pouring these millions and millions of American dollars into protecting Europe with their not paying a fair share.

POSITION IN REGARD TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

The third thing is somewhat indirectly related but it is related, Mr. Secretary. I want to know what the position of the State Department and this administration is in regard to Portugal and Spain, although Spain is not part of the NATO alliance but we treat her as such.

I want to know if there has been a shift in the State Department policy toward Portugal. It appears to me that here has been. Portugal is not paying her way, and that we are permitting Portugal, the Azores, Angola and Mozambique to apparently cause us at least to modify our program by following a policy of silence toward her conduct apparently for fear we would lose her if we speak out against her policies.

There are three general fields that have caused me to leave you on NATO for I don't intend to support the present NATO program when the foreign aid bill comes up here, and I want to tell you that in my judgment there are millions and millions of Americans on my side of this issue.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, on your first question, when we in this country talk about the Atlantic Alliance, this to us is the same thing as NATO. In other words, we think of these two as necessarily the same commitment, the same organization, the same effort.

DE GAULLE'S REASONING

President de Gaulle in his own mind has separated these 2 elements. He continues to support what he calls the Atlantic Alliance but he does not support NATO as an organization of the defenses of the Alliance.

There are, I think, 2 or 3 reasons for that. He does not himself accept the notion of integrated forces. This is partly because he is rebuilding and having to rebuild his army from the ground up. You see, it is just a little more than two years ago when President de Gaulle was calling for the women and children of France to fill the highways in order to prevent a military takeover of France. It is hard to remember how brief a time this has been.

Here is an army who has been out of France since World War II, fighting in Indochina, fighting in North Africa, losing the battles, and he feels they have become denationalized in the process. So he has brought these forces back to France. He wants to keep them in France until their roots take hold in France again before he wants to commit them to outside organizations or station them outside of France again.

Now, even within the framework, it has been indicated to SACEUR, to General Lemnitzer and to General Norstad before that, that although certain divisions were not technically assigned

to NATO that NATO planning could take for granted that these divisions would be available in the event of war, similarly with his Mediterranean fleet. He pulled it out of NATO but the exercises of the NATO forces in the Mediterranean and the French fleet are going forward with the highest military cooperation at the military level.

I don't say that in apology for General de Gaulle but simply reporting it to you as a matter of fact.

Now, back in October, President de Gaulle was, I think, the first and the clearest in his reaction to the crisis over Cuba. He sent a message saying, "We understand your requirements. If this means World War, France will be with the United States."

Senator LAUSCHE. When was that?

Secretary RUSK. This was in October, at the time of the missile crisis, and he repeated this to me when I was last in Paris about 3 or 4 weeks ago.

I think there is no question about where he would stand in the event that the Alliance got into serious difficulty with the Soviet Union.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND NATO

Senator LAUSCHE. How do you distinguish between the Atlantic Alliance and NATO?

Secretary RUSK. We don't, sir. But President de Gaulle does because he does not want to integrate his national forces into the forces of NATO because he wants somehow to persuade the French armed forces once again they are fighting for France and they are not denatured in some international arrangement.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there now any organization known as the Atlantic Alliance by treaty or by law?

Secretary RUSK. By treaty, but the organized defenses of the Alliance are NATO. And President de Gaulle has on the one side turned away from the defense organization called NATO. On the other side he has not come forward with proposals which he has hinted from time to time he would make about the reorganization of NATO.

We have asked him several times for his ideas on that and he has never come forward with it. My guess is that he is waiting until he gets an actual nuclear force in being until he makes these proposals.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, he does not confine it to the military. He takes the same view in the economy, that is in his rejection of Britain and his comments about the Anglo-Saxons, in his treatment of tariffs, and everything else. It isn't just military that he takes this attitude, is it?

Secretary RUSK. I think it is true that he put in an effective veto on the UK membership in the Common Market.

TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. He is most restrictive, isn't he? I mean, he has directed France to that moment in our tariff negotiations. All along the line he shows no real disposition to move toward what you call a genuine partnership.

Secretary RUSK. I think on the trade side it is a little too early to come to a full conclusion on that. The point that the French were fighting for in the Geneva negotiations was reduction of tariffs to the same level rather than by the same percentage.

He made the point that in the case of the American tariffs there are a number of our tariffs substantially higher than the European Common Market tariffs and these all ought to come down to the same level, whereas our feeling is they ought to be reduced by the same percentage.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not going to argue the details about it. He doesn't pick out the isolation of forces being contrary to a partnership but he is fairly consistent throughout his policies that he doesn't accept this, isn't that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Well, in matters such as aid to underdeveloped countries, in the matter of fiscal arrangemnents——

The CHAIRMAN. Aid to former undeveloped countries, only to French.

Secretary RUSK. In the Indian consortium, Pakistan and Greek consortium, it is not limited to French colonies but the bulk of it has been.

The CHAIRMAN. He wouldn't pay his part in the U.N. on peacekeeping, he refuses that. All along the line he shows a disposition not to want to move.

Secretary RUSK. We have had word if we will keep our mouths shut and not make an issue over that that they will find a way to make contributions for the Congo that will, in fact, meet their obligations under the U.N.

We don't know exactly how this is going to work out but they are going to try to find a way to get out of being in the same position as the Soviet Union when it comes up under Article 19 in next year's Assembly.

Incidentally, the Belgians have recently just agreed to pay their assessment.

On fiscal matters, I must say the French have been very cooperative with [Treasury] Secretary [C. Douglas] Dillon in our gold situation. So, it is a mixed bag, Mr. Chairman. On some matters they are cooperative. On others they are difficult.

But they did come along with the final result in GATT,[3] which we thought was quite satisfactory from our point of view, that the burden would be on those who objected to the differentials in tariffs to show that those differentials were an actual barrier to trade and I think this will reduce itself to a limited number of specific cases and points during the course of those discussions.

GERMANS MORE DIFFICULT ON AGRICULTURAL ISSUES

But I think that in some respects one would not say that France was more difficult than, say, Germany, for example, on the agricultural side. Germany is much more of a problem for us than France in terms of agricultural products in Europe these days.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand why you say that. The French never have admitted any. They just have all along excluded them.

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[3] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The Germans admitted them but they are beginning to exclude them and they are no worse than the French are.

Secretary RUSK. If we could get, for example, European agricultural prices nearer the French level rather than the German level or the level the Germans are insisting upon, our markets for agricultural products in Europe would be much better safeguarded.

Now, the Germans were the ones, for example, who recently in the last few days caused these additional problems on chickens. Not only did the Ministers of the Common Market not accept the Commission's report for reduction but they actually increased it a cent.

The CHAIRMAN. I know about that.

Secretary RUSK. We, as you know, have invoked the consultation procedures of GATT on this point. Our hope is that before these formal consultations occur we can get this worked out, because our purpose here is to do something about the chicken market.

If we just move in the direction of withdrawing compensatory concessions of some sort, in other words, some sort of retaliation, we can effect retaliation but we can't help chickens, so what we are trying to do is get this chicken market opened up.

CHINESE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator SYMINGTON. Before we leave this nuclear area, I would like to ask one question.

If we are getting what is increasingly obvious our desire to keep nuclear weapons away from our Alliance and the Russians have been obviously successful in helping the Chinese Communists develop weapons, and we end up with a situation where 3 countries have nuclear weapons, do you think it would be better for us than if, say, it were on the basis that the West Germans or the French have nuclear weapons?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I may be a little primitive on this point, but I think it is axiomatic that a nation which has nuclear weapons has an interest in no other nation having them, and from our point of view that the United States is better off if other nations do not equip themselves with nuclear weapons.

I would apply that to the Chinese or neutrals, or anything else.

Senator SYMINGTON. Even if the Russians and Chinese got together because of the death of one of the people, do you still think we would be better off?

Secretary RUSK. The Russians have gone far beyond anything we have done in this field, if you set aside for the moment our wartime and later partnership with the British in the nuclear field.

Our information is that the Soviets did help the Chinese build a plutonium plant, we think, back in 1959 and 1960. We know that that plutonium plant is in operation. We do not think the Soviets have given the Chinese help in the nuclear field since 1960, but they have helped the Chinese move beyond the point of no return, in effect, and the Chinese are now in position to produce nuclear weapons, whatever Moscow's attitude would be, so the Russians have passed that point on their own.

Now they are raising objections to the multilateral force on the ground that this is a multiplication of the national nuclear capabil-

ity. I think this is partly because they don't know yet the details of the arrangements which would make it clear that this is not the case.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ISRAEL

While we are again on this matter of proliferation, I think the committee ought to know that we are somewhat concerned about the possibilities of nuclear weapons in the Near East.

We are watching very closely the Israeli development. They have committed themselves categorically in this field, and we do have the opportunity to have a look from time to time, but this is still not completely satisfactory from our point of view.

Senator LAUSCHE. They have committed themselves categorically in what way?

Secretary RUSK. In not only public declarations but in official statements to us, government to government.

Senator SMATHERS. To have them or not?

Secretary RUSK. Not to make nuclear wepaons. But I know that——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who has made that commitment?

Secretary RUSK. The Prime Minister.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of what?

Secretary RUSK. Of Israel.

Now, we have been keeping an eye——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is the same group who told us they were not building an atomic plant out there, and they were.

Secretary RUSK. That is why we attach considerable importance to the opportunity to go in and have a look from time to time and we just can't imagine anything more disastrous from our point of view than if Israel were to explode a nuclear device. I can't think of anything that would drive the Arab world more tumultuously into the arms of the Soviet.

Senator MORSE. What does the Arab world think about it?

Secretary RUSK. The principal possibility would seem to be Egypt. We are convinced ourselves that they do not have this capability. They do not have the facilities. We are trying to, and this should not be mentioned in any way whatever, we are trying privately to work out a qualitative arms limitation in the Near East in order to avoid this kind of race. We think maybe in the next month or so we may have some indications whether this is possible.

But Egypt, we believe, is not in the nuclear weapons business at the present time. We think we have good information on this, although they are developing some ground-to-ground missiles of medium range capability, as are the Israelis, for that matter.

GERMAN SCIENTISTS IN ISRAEL

Senator MORSE. What is the story about it bringing in German scientists supposedly to help them develop open nuclear power?

Secretary RUSK. In the first place the numbers are much lower than some of the press stories indicated. This is primarily in the missile field, and the peaceful uses of atomic energy field which is open to surveillance and inspection. We don't believe they have the plutonium capability, for example, to move to nuclear weapons.

Senator LAUSCHE. What does Israel have now that you are watching it? There must be something that causes you concern. What is that something?

Secretary RUSK. The reactor in Negev which is built with French cooperation, would be capable, when it becomes operational, of producing at a very, very slow rate the fuel that would be possible to use in an explosion of a nuclear device. But this is a reactor which was designed primarily for the production of power, but we are going to have to press for safeguards on this reactor when it becomes operational next year.

SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHINGS

Senator SYMINGTON. We plan, don't we, to have a reactor in India? What would be the reaction of the Chinese to that?

Secretary RUSK. That would be under the well-known safeguard so it could not move in the weapons direction without our knowing something about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is under the international agency, isn't it?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is [Adlai] Stevenson giving out something today about Soviet tests in the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. No, that refers to some space launchings. There are 6 blanks in the United Nations listings of space launchings. We are all supposed to register there all launches, and we know of 6 Soviet launches they have refused to report to the U.N. We have told the Soviets about a month ago that we will have to report this to the U.N. if they don't, to give them a chance to do it.

They have not done it. In fact, they have come back in the last 2 or 3 days with an attack on us for the use of space for military purposes so in replying to that we are simply going to notify the U.N. that the launches of such and such a date were Soviet launchings.

I might say, though, Senator, on this matter of testing we are inclined to believe that the Soviets are preparing for a further round of atmospheric tests. It appears they have decided to go ahead in their nuclear program. We think they will be testing again and this is one of the reasons why they show very little interest in exploring any further this nuclear test ban possibility.

That, coupled with the probable fact that they are not interested in talking about nuclear testing while their talks with the Chinese are coming up in early July.

But we would not be surprised if they did conduct additional atmospheric tests within the next few months.

WHAT CAN BE SHARED WITH NATO?

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Rusk, I would just like to get my mind clear on the thing you were discussing before. The secret information on these bombs and missiles is not to be divulged, is that correct?

Senator RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is not to be divulged because the law prohibits you from doing it.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, the starting point. What we would do, Senator, is before we make any commitments in this field is to come down and make a full disclosure——

Senator LAUSCHE. Presently you cannot divulge, can you, under the law?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir, except to the British where we have an amendment to the McMahon Act.

Senator LAUSCHE. What are you waiting to share with these NATO nations?

Secretary RUSK. Costs, direct participation in the entire force by their contributions to a mixed man force, share with them the strategic problems of targeting under the SACEUR commander, the NATO commander.

Let me say on the question of costs, Senator, if——

Senator LAUSCHE. If you would just leave that out for the moment.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

A WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM

Senator LAUSCHE. What are they wanting you to do that you feel we cannot do?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think the principal thing that I think the Germans would like would be to have such a force under some sort of majority voting arrangement.

Senator LAUSCHE. With the United States within one vote?

Secretary RUSK. They have proposed, for example, that a weighted voting system whereby the United States plus any other participant could decide to use these weapons.

This would not be acceptable to the other members of NATO. We have simply said that, "However you other countries want to work it out among yourselves, we would expect to participate in the decision," and my guess is that what will happen is these particular 200 missiles will come into a force where perhaps three or four of the principal participants would expect to act together.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now this principle that you have mentioned is applicable only to the 200?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And all other matters would be excluded from this particular operation.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, although there is, of course, a most intimate connection between what these 200 missiles would do and what the rest of the nuclear forces would do. It is very hard to separate those out.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all I have.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary——

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

INTOLERABLE PROLIFERATION

Senator CHURCH. Let's suppose that inasmuch as the multilateral force doesn't go to the heart of the de Gaulle objection, that France proceeds to develop its independent force, knowing it doesn't need to have the mighty force that we have, it needs to have only a sufficient force to operate as an independent deterrent against the

Soviet Union inflicting sufficient damage so that it takes the motive out or the benefit out of an attack upon France, and France reasons, "We want this force just as insurance so that we can be certain in the case of a calamity that France will not be attacked."

Isn't Germany going to reason much the same way, and Italy, these other European countries, and if they do then aren't we faced with precisely the kind of proliferation that you regard and I regard as intolerable, so long as we are there and wholly committed to their defense?

Secretary RUSK. Unless they are ready to move in the direction of a multilateral force this would be the principal alternative that would be open, that they would go down the national nuclear force trail or that Germany and France would get together on some combined independent nuclear force.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Which would go a long way, I think, toward breaking up the Alliance under present circumstances.

Senator CHURCH. But does the multilateral proposal constitute an adequate substitute that will deter them from taking this course?

Secretary RUSK. I think it will, Senator, for at least a very long time to come.

GERMAN SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERAL FORCE

The present leadership in Germany is very much interested in the multilateral force, and the present leadership does not want to go down the trail of a national nuclear force.

This is true of Adenauer, it is true of Schroeder, von Hassel, Erhard,[4] that is those who would be in charge for the foreseeable time.

It is certainly true of the Social Democratic Party, the SPD, and I would think in order to forestall the development of fresh pressures from elements in Germany who are there, who might say, take a leaf from a man like Strauss, for example, that we ought to give those Germans who would prefer not to have a national nuclear force, a political basis from which they can reject that solution, as well as the solution of a bilateral deal between themselves and the French in this field.

So, I think this could be a very important political substitute for the prestige and the participation that would be built on a national nuclear force. If this were not so, then I think that the Germans would not be ready to come in and make a substantial financial contribution that it is going to require of them.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

DIVISION IN NATO

Senator MUNDT. Is NATO unanimous with the exception of France in its desire to have this kind of arrangement you have been discharging?

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[4] West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder, Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel, and Vice Chancellor Ludwig Erhard.

Secretary RUSK. I think there are countries like Noway, Denmark, Belgium, who would prefer to see the situation as it was, say, back in 1952, '54, that is a total reliance upon the U. S. nuclear force, without any nuclear participation on the European side.

But I think the others do feel that this is a very important political step. Indeed, Mr. [Paul-Henri] Spaak in Belgium feels that although Belgium would prefer sole reliance on the United States, that this might well be a very important political safeguard as far as a future Germany is concerned, to get Germany involved in a way that would deny to Germany a national nuclear capability.

Senator MUNDT. The point I had in mind was a sequel to what Senator Morse has mentioned. I think it is pretty tragic the way they have failed to come up with their non-nuclear commitments.

If there was real insistence on their part to get it there might be a quid pro quo "before we could even consider this you have got to meet your other commitments."

SUPPORT FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Secretary RUSK. One of the principles in multilateral forces discussion on which we would want a commitment is that the multilateral force expenditures would not be at the expense of the necessary conventional forces.

Senator, I did not get a chance to comment on that second point that you raised.

I have here a chart showing the size of armed forces, the total defense expenditures and the defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product of all the NATO members 1960, 1961, and 1962. This will show why we are concerned. It shows an uneven performance by the NATO members. But if I could leave this, it is a secret paper at the moment, but I could leave this with the committee, members of the committee might wish to study it.

Senator MORSE. I would like to have it left with Dr. Marcy because I am asking Dr. Marcy to prepare for me on a confidential basis a research study on this matter of costs of NATO, and the proportion of the costs that the American taxpayers are paying. Such study as I have already made in my judgment, supports my contention that we are just going to have to have it out with our NATO Alliance in regard to this matter of costs.

They are not in my opinion justifying any longer the share the United States is paying, I don't think you have to sweep it under the rug, you have it right on your lap and you have it on your lap in the year 1963. I get around the country, too, and I am satisfied that this is a burning issue of this country.

THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF NATO

I think the Secretary knows that I first insist on my facts and I check those facts against what the policies of my country are and I want to be in harness with you. But I am not in harness with you in the present trend with NATO, and the Senator from Arkansas raised another point we can't get into this morning, and that is the whole economic aspect of NATO.

George Aiken and I and others around the table, but George Aiken and I and Charles Tobey, assisted NATO through the Senate

and at that time they were talking about economic integration as well as military integration at the very time the treaty was ratified.

I don't want to spend more time on it here. I only wanted you to know what is bothering me and I am interested in one comment you made that we ought to keep our mouths shut. That is an idle dream on the part of you, Mr. Secretary, if you think we are going to keep our mouths shut on foreign policy in this country. It belongs to the people and the people are going to speak out to their representative on it and you are not going to be able to sweep it under the rug and you have to face up to the matter.

PORTUGAL'S FAILURE TO CARRY HER LOAD

On the Portugal matter, I want to urge you, and I think it is important that the Secretary get the transcript of record of the study that this committee has been making on lobbying activities on the part of foreign governments and take a look at one very interesting section that involves Portugal. Whether they speak for Portugal or not, alleged lobbyists for Portugal have been doing an interesting job of managing the news over here in respect to Portugal.

We discussed it the other morning, Mr. Chairman, and I think the Secretary should read it, because that is another one that is going to descend on you in the not too distant future.

I am very much concerned about the policies with respect to Portugal and her failure, in my judgment, to carry her load, but I am not going to say more at this time.

I want you to know that I am anxious to be of help but I have got to exercise my own independence of judgment on this job and I just do not like the trend of the whole NATO program.

KEEPING ONE'S MOUTH SHUT

Secretay RUSK. Senator, may I immediately clarify the point I made about keeping one's mouth shut.

This was related solely to the point that if the United States Government doesn't press the French publicly on this matter of paying their U.N. assessments that they expect to find a way to do it, and I would not be presumptous enough to broaden that to the Senate or to these other agencies we are talking about.

POLITICAL PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO

Senator LAUSCHE. To have further clarification——

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. [continuing]. You feel that in the interests of the security of our country and the people of the world that proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be suffered?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Secretary LAUSCHE. And to the extent that you can achieve that objective, you are proceeding, making minor concessions as you probably approach them, is that correct?

Senator RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, as between the two courses, one, to reveal the secrets, and the other to allow the European nations on

their own to develop nuclear weapons, which of the two courses is the best to follow?

Senator RUSK. Well, I think we have a fair chance of heading off the development of further European nuclear forces without revealing the key secrets in the technology of nuclear weapons; for example, if we take them into a force like the multilateral force in which their political partnership is a substitute for a national nuclear force.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are any of these nations asking directly that we supply them with secret technical information?

Senator RUSK. No sir; not even France. General de Gaulle has made quite a point that he never asked us for nuclear assistance. That does not mean that he would not. One of his troubles is we have not come forward and offered them to him, but he has never, neither President de Gaulle nor the French Foreign Minister, has ever asked us for nuclear cooperation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me, if the Senator will yield, aren't they a whole lot like the little kid who stands outside the pastry shop with his nose up against the window looking at the cakes, and so on, and he can say that he never asked the man inside to give him one, but he is just standing there waiting for him to give it to him.

FRENCH CONCERNS

Senator LAUSCHE. If France does develop the nuclear weapons, what is your opinion as to what its attitude would subsequently be about other nations being permitted to share in the secret knowledge?

Senator RUSK. This goes back to that axiom I stated earlier. The French have been very insistent to us that under no circumstances will they assist Germany to get a national nuclear capability, and the French are also concerned, as we are, with the Israeli situation, and working very closely with us on it.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask you something about the nuclear test ban, especially since you are so firm about this nuclear testing ban.

There was an article by [John] McCloy a year ago last April in Foreign Affairs in which he gave four reasons—I remember well three of them—why he thought Khrushchev would be willing and anxious to make a deal with us. You must know about the tremendous effort that is being made to sell this nuclear test ban willy-nilly to the American people, and on the basis that any nuclear test ban is better than no nuclear test ban.

Don't you feel honestly that one of the reasons that Khrushchev is not going along and doing the obvious thing, which would be to say to us, "I will control my side if you control yours," is because somebody is saying to him, "If we just let this thing go the way it is going with the United States, pretty soon we will be able to give you a treaty that we can cheat up to our heart's content?"

I would like your honest and candid opinion on that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. In the first place, this is not the administration's position that any kind of test treaty——

Senator SYMINGTON. I did not say that. I am talking about the tremendous campaign going around the country.

Secretary RUSK. I think there are several reasons why the Soviets are waiting. I mentioned two of them. I think it is very probable they are going to do some more testing; that this is a very difficult problem for them in connection with China, and if they are having any talks with China in July, that may attempt in some way to close the gap, they do not want to move on a test ban before that.

I think also that if they read the draft treaty, I am sure they have done so, very closely, they will realize that if the Chinese test that the treaty is just an exercise, because there is a provision in the treaty if someone not a signatory tests, that this relieves the signatories of responsibilities under the treaty if they elect, in other words, they have a free hand, you see.

If they think the Chinese are going to explode a nuclear device, as we think they might during the latter part of this year or some time next year, then they may say to themselves, "Well, this whole operation is a little fictitious because this treaty is going to come apart as soon as the Chinese test."

So there may be several things in their mind. But I do not believe that they think that by waiting they will get a test ban under which they can cheat freely. I think that is our responsibility to see that this does not occur.

NUCLEAR DETECTION AND INSPECTION

At the present time, they are not even willing to talk about 2 points that could be factually clarified, the point that national nuclear detection means are adequate. They say they are. We say they are not.

Secondly, that international inspection of any sort is the same thing as espionage. We say if they would sit down and actually work out the details of the inspection arrangement, they would find out this was not espionage, you see. But they won't even sit down and have that type of discussion.

So I think for the present I have to report that it appears to us for the present time they seem to be on dead center in this situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. You think possibly some part of that is because of the extreme sophistication of the most recent tests that they have made from the standpoint of getting an anti-ICBM capability, which could destroy much, if not all, of our deterrent?

Secretary RUSK. It is possible that the military and the scientists have said to Mr. Khrushchev, "We have got to have some additional tests."

SOVIET NUCLEAR ADVANCES

We do feel that they are moving ahead into an additional nuclear weapons program. They are stepping that up, and they may feel that they have to have some more tests in connection with that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you rephrase that to say that, perhaps, their military and their scientists are saying to Mr. Khrushchev, "We are getting very close now," based on what we know of their recent tests, "to where we can materially affect the deterrence capabilities of the Free World and, therefore, let us test so we can have this thing on the same basis, let us say, as Hitler had the Schussnig in 1938 and 1939?"

Secretary RUSK. I cannot be categorical about that, Senator. I will say the briefing I had on that subject indicated that our people had not thought they had made a major qualitative advance in their most recent series. But in this field, who can tell.

One of the reasons, by the way, that we think that a nuclear test ban would make sense is because, as this race goes on qualitatively, it becomes increasingly chancy and unpredictable as to who does come up with the idea that does provide a major breakthrough, and this increases the dangers, as well as the enormous costs involved in this whole operation.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the committee's time schedule is, but I would like to make a few comments——

The CHAIRMAN. I think 12:30 we ought to stop.

Secretary RUSK. On another aspect, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

KHRUSHCHEV'S LEADERSHIP

Secretary RUSK. I think we are in a period when what is happening in Moscow is of considerable importance to the rest of us. We do not believe that Mr. Khrushchev is in any personal trouble within his own leadership. But we do believe that Mr. Khrushchev and his own leadership have some very serious problems on their plate, which is producing a period of reappraisal and review of policy, and that shows itself in a number of ways.

They are very much preoccupied with their problems with China. I have discussed that here before, and won't elaborate in detail. But I think since I was last before the committee there have been even additional signs that China is a major problem for the leadership of the Kremlin.

It must be, for example, quite a startling thing for them to face, after putting almost $1 billion of military aid into Indonesia, to have the Communist Party swing over to Peiping, as it has done in the last several weeks or months.

The Communist Parties in other parts of the world are showing more interest in Peiping's orientation. I think it is of significance that the Eastern European countries, whether taking advantage of the problems with China or what, are showing more independence on economic matters. The rejection of a number of them of their assigned role in the Soviet bloc economic cooperation program, I think, is a very interesting development of the last several weeks.

Their setback in Iraq and in Syria, in Guinea, Mali, the Congo, the problem last October in Cuba, all these, I think, are forcing upon the Soviets a considerable re-examination of their policy.

Now, if they move to try to close the gap between themselves and Peiping, as they may elect to do, it seems to us that this could very well mean a period of pretty sobering and difficult problems

for us in the Free World. If this would mean, for example, a freer hand for the Chinese in Southeast Asia or if it meant a more aggressive attitude by the Soviets themselves in situations like Berlin or any resumption of a more aggressive weapons program in Cuba, questions of that sort that would create problems for us. So I think that the discussions that are going on now, and for the next 2 months, in Moscow will be of great importance and would be worth very close examination.

POINTS OF AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS

We have in this period been giving some thought to whether there are any points whatever on which some agreement with the Soviet Union could be reached as far as the West is concerned. If there were some clear points on which it would be in our own interest to reach agreement, we would think that this might be a timely moment in which to establish that fact.

But I must say that at the moment the prospect is not encouraging. We have talked about the nuclear test ban matter.

We, with the full knowledge of the French and the British and the Germans, have put to the Soviet Union the possibilities of an agreement against the transfer of nuclear weapons to other national capabilities in which one paragraph would make this commitment on behalf of the existing nuclear powers, and another paragraph would have everyone else sign up that they would not receive such weapons and not manufacture them. This is showing no progress at all.

SOVIET POSITION ON LAOS

In the case of Laos, Mr. Khrushchev told Mr. Harriman, I think you perhaps have already had a report on this, that he was supporting the Geneva Accord, but that he had made a commitment on behalf of a third party, and that this is not very easy. In other words, he tried to leave the impression that he was not necessarily in full control of the situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you mean by the third party?

Secretary RUSK. The third party being the North Vietnam or Pathet Lao or someone down there, you see.

We are going to push very hard on the Laos question because there was a point where they did make a flat and public and clear commitment about an independent and neutral Laos.

We can understand the possibility that Mr. Khrushchev might have lost some of his influence, if not all of it, among the Pathet Lao, but we have not been able to understand the attitude of the Polish representative on the ICC[5] who has been entirely uncooperative in the last month in carrying out the clear responsibilities of the ICC under the Geneva Accords.

We have hit the Poles very hard on this directly, as well as through Moscow. They have brought their representative on the ICC back to Warsaw. We had a report this morning that he was going back to Laos with instructions to be more cooperative. But if the Soviets cannot control the Pathet Lao possibly, at least, they

[5] International Control Commission.

ought to be able to control the Polish delegate to the ICC, so we look upon that as something of a test.

SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA

On Cuba we continue to press them on the business of Soviet military personnel. I would not wish to offer this comment to this committee as firm information this morning, but the Soviets have been telling us in public broadcasts, as well as in very informal conversation, that their combat units are not there, that their military personnel are training, and so forth.

I think you would be interested in the fact that we have, through intelligence on the ground, largely confirmed this in connection with one of their camps where one of those battalion combat teams were present.

We have taken steps in the last, well including this morning we have taken steps, to check on some of the other camps to see if we could discern any significant change there. We are not buying this information yet, but they are trying to create the impression that the organized combat units are not there; that the military personnel are there on a training basis.

We have continued to push them on the fact that any military presence there is contrary to our own policy, and the policy of the hemisphere, and any such presence is a major obstacle to any improvement of relations between ourselves and Moscow.

So we do not see particular points—there is no give on Berlin, for example, although they have been doing very little about Berlin in recent months.

Unless we were to move on some such point as going ahead with the civil air transport agreement that would provide 2 or 3 flights a week as between New York and Moscow or some relatively minor point of that sort, we see very little prospect of finding points in which there is a genuine agreement.

NATO-WARSAW PACT NONAGGRESSION TREATY

The Soviets have raised the question of a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty. In the West we have always looked upon this as something which had come at the end of the trail when a number of other important matters had been buttoned up. Otherwise, such an arrangement would be false and fictitious and might also be misleading as far as the West was concerned, and the attitude of Western public opinion. It is a matter of no great substance. The Soviets themselves say it is a matter of no great substance, but they have, on occasion, said that psychologically it would be a good thing if something like this could be done.

On the substance of a Warsaw-NATO Pact treaty, we almost never have a meeting of NATO without reaffirming the defensive nature of NATO, and saying the kind of things which the Soviets would like to put in treaty form. But we are skeptical of that, and inclined not to go through just the motions at the present time.

I think if we moved in that direction and had a Berlin crisis 2 or 3 weeks later we would all feel and look like fools, and we have no assurances from the Soviet Union that they are not going to precipitate a Berlin crisis at a moment of their own choosing.

I mention these events in Moscow, Mr. Chairman, because we are trying to keep in contact with them during this period. We think that what is happening in Moscow is very important to us. We just do not know and cannot know how these various discussions in Moscow are coming out, but they could be of considerable consequence to all of us.

SOVIET DILEMMA OVER CHINA

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Supposing they do not succeed in closing the gap with China, so to speak. Do you think this might offer an opportunity to close the gap with the West? They must be in a dilemma particularly with regard to this leadership of the so-called World Communist Movement because the Chinese have obviously been making progress.

Secretary RUSK. I think it is possible, Mr. Chairman, that this China question is so utterly fundamental to Moscow that they will not be able to close the gap unless the Chinese themselves back away from their position in a major way, and that the Soviet Union may then be more interested, in effect, insuring its flanks in the other direction.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant.

CHANGING ATTITUDES OF EASTERN EUROPE

Secretary RUSK. One interesting possible indication of this is in the relatively rapid improvement of relations between the Eastern European countries and some of the countries of Western Europe, and the noticeably more relaxed attitude of those Eastern countries toward the United States.

We have had the Bulgarians on their own initiative raise the question of settling certain financial claims. The Hungarians and the West Germany are now establishing some very interesting contacts about exchanging people and some trade. The Polish-West German Trade Mission Exchange was really quite interesting.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. There is a story that even the Czechs, who have been the most subservient, have been showing more independence.

Secretary RUSK. Yes; the story on Slovakia was very interesting. We had considerable discussion of this at the Ottawa meeting, and those countries that are closest in contract with Eastern Europe have seemed to be unanimous that some very important things are happening in Eastern Europe.

The Greeks, for example, have most interesting impressions as to what is going on in Bulgaria and in Hungary and Rumania, and they have pretty good contacts and information there.

I might say, by the way, that on the Hungarian issue in the General Assembly, there were two elements that affect the handling of credentials up there. One is that the Hungarians have made considerable advances on their earlier position in terms of amnesty, more freedom of contact inside Hungary, more relaxed attitude toward their own people, and an entirely relaxed attitude as far as the Hungarian Government is concerned about Cardinal Mindzenty so far as his freedom is concerned.

RUNNING OUT OF VOTES AT THE U.N.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, those of us who have practiced law a little from time to time learned after a short experience practicing law before the court that when the judge nods and agrees with you right along in the presentation of your case, and he is on your side, that is just the time when he is fixing to beat you, and when he makes his decision it does not correspond with the nodding that goes on from the bench.

I wish I could be more optimistic about the so-called gestures of the country.

Secretary RUSK. That brings me to the second point which I am sure a practicing lawyer would appreciate, Senator, which is that we ran out of votes on this issue in the U.N.

In other words, I personally had to intervene with the Greek Foreign Minister to get his vote the last time when his vote was crucial, and he said he just could not do it again because of his own situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could not do what again?

Secretary RUSK. Could not vote with us to come to no decision on Hungarian credentials in the U.N.

I hope this question does not boil up into something more than it is. Now, the Hungarian representatives have been sitting there all along debating, voting and everything else. We have succeeded, as a matter of a political expression of attitude, in preventing the formal adoption, approval, of the Hungarian credentials. It is not affecting in practice anything that is happening in the General Assembly.

Now, the fact is at the present time in the Credentials Committee we simply do not have the votes, and rather than have us defeated on an actual vote, we have felt we ought simply to enter our full reservation on the Hungarian credentials, and not force it to a vote in which we would be licked. We do not want the Soviet bloc, with the help of a lot of others, including friends of ours like the Greeks, to inflict a defeat upon us in a matter under the atmosphere and the environment of the present developments in Hungary.

GREEK VIEW OF EASTERN EUROPE

Senator MUNDT. Why would the Greeks vote against us on a matter like that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK, They are legitimately convinced, Senator, that some very important things have been happening in Hungary, and that of all the Eastern European countries, the situation in Hungary is better from our point of view than in any other country except Poland and, therefore, it is their political judgment that we ought not to continue this attitude of hostility of picking Hungary out when Hungary has been moving, from their point of view, rather rapidly down the trail of relaxation, and if you wanted to pick out an Eastern European country to express your opinion about, you wuld not pick out Hungary at this time. That is the Greek view of this matter and, indeed, I think it is fair to say, and I am not going to ask Senator Hickenlooper to nod his head at this, I think it is fair to say that these pressures that have been mobi-

lized in the United Nations and the reservations that have been entered there since 1956 have, in fact, had some influence on Hungary's effort to get their record clean.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN SPLIT

The CHAIRMAN. This idea, regardless of many of these other things, we are having troubles, as you have already outlined in great detail with our own Allies. The people who we have helped a lot more than the Russians have helped the Chinese, in effect are showing their independence.

I saw a story that the Chinese are now beginning to throw into the Russians this racial question, tying it in with ours. There was a story in the Times about this. You never know how true they are, but the Chinese are trying to raise the racial question against the Russians that they are white, too, and, therefore, all the Asians and all the Africans ought to be lined up with them, while they condemn us for our troubles, they are also trying to take advantage of it with regard to the Russians.

But if they have these difficulties, and they are serious—I do not know whether they are or not—with the Chinese, and they are not able to reconcile their leadership with the Chinese—the Chinese have a historical superiority complex against all white people, this is nothing new, it goes back a very long time—and they do not succeed in closing the gap, as you phrase it, why isn't it logical that they would either have to be subservient to the Chinese, we will say, or make some kind of an adjustment with the rest of the world?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think there is a possibility that the Moscow-Peiping dispute could lead toward a detente between Moscow and the West.

The CHAIRMAN. They are a lot closer to the Chinese than we are.

Secretary RUSK, The chances are stronger, in my present view, that it would move the other way, because there are enough pro-Chinese Russians around the Kremlin to possibly tilt the balance in that direction when these issues come to a real deadlock between the two capitals. In other words, I tend to be a little more pessimistic than optimistic about what might come out of these Russians-Chinese talks at the present time.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINESE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, if I may question along the line you are questioning, what is the chance of our getting along with the Chinese? We always seem to be writing the Chinese off in articles on policy. Is there any chance——

Secretary RUSK. We have had not the slightest indication in all the years the two administrations have been talking to them in Prague and in Warsaw, of any serious effort to move toward any moderation of policy except at the price of a surrender of Formosa.

Senator SYMINGTON. Except at what?

Secretary RUSK. Except at the price of surrender of Formosa. Even when Western countries and Western organizations were trying to find out discreetly whether they could help Red China in dealing with their cholera epidemic last year, their answer was to

charge us with having started it through biological warfare. In other words, their feeling of hostililty could not be more pronounced, you see.

So I think the chances are that given the sort of stakes that the Soviet Union has in what it has got and in its relations with the rest of the world, that the chances may be more favorable for the Soviet Union being with China at the present time.

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, you made one point, if I may change the subject—you made one reference that interested me.

Yesterday I had an exchange with the Russian Charge d'affaires, and in the course of the conversation he brought up the matter of a treaty between the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the present atomic powers, against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and he gave me the impression that the Soviet Union would be agreeable to such a treaty, and that they would rely upon the obvious national interest of all parties as effective enforcement. I just toss it out. I am writing a full memorandum on the conversation for you. I just wanted to mention it.

Secretary RUSK. I appreciate that.

They have raised as a major obstacle to such a treaty this multilateral force idea. This is partly because I think they do not yet understand, because we have not gotten far enough to complete the arrangements or make them public, they do not understand that one of the purposes of the multilateral force is to avoid a national nuclear proliferation, you see. But in the background is the fact they have been the worst sinners on this very point because they put the Chinese in position to go ahead——

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. By helping them with their plutonium plant. So, in a sense, it is too late for them to fight against proliferation with respect to the very country that is of the most interest to us, you see.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. This is where the difficulty lies.

BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIETS

Senator MORSE. What would happen, Mr. Secretary, if we moved in the direction of some private bilateral conversations with Russia in case it starts to develop that she is not going to close the gap with Red China; what would be the effect of those private bilateral conversations with Russia on some of our Allies?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have tried to keep in that kind of contact. The Soviets, from Mr. Gromyko on down, have been very reluctant to talk about China and their relations with China.

But, nevertheless, we have tried to leave the impression that we are prepared to explore specific points of possible agreement during this period. I had a very long conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin [6] just before he went back for consultation. This was a very

[6] Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoli Dobrynin.

timely period to do that. But there was no indication of the possibilitly of any major advance.

Even in the case of Laos, for example, I said to Mr. Dobrynin, "If it is true that you are having trouble making your influence felt decisively with the Pathet Lao, at least you will understand some of the problems we have had with General Phoumi last year. But don't hesitate to tell us frankly that that is the case, and then you and we and the British and others can try to find some way in which together we can influence the situation there in the direction of the Geneva Accords and find a way to block out the Pathet Lao or the North Vietnamese to a degree."

You see, in other words, we have invited a degree of frankness they have thus far not come forward on.

KEEPING U.S. ALLIES INFORMED

Senator MORSE. At the present time, am I right or wrong in my understanding at the present time that we do not have private bilateral conversations with the Russians on matters that are not known to our NATO Allies?

Secretary RUSK. We try to keep our Allies generally informed. I would not say though that we feel an obligation to repeat everything that is said.

But we are not discussing with the Russians points that our Allies do not know about, and our Allies know our general attitude on these points. But we do not feel that our conversations with the Soviets should be carried on, with our Allies looking over our shoulders.

FUTURE ARRANGEMENT WITH SOVIETS

Senator MORSE. I am speaking hypothetically now and for the future, but it might very well develop that we may have more in common with the Soviets than with some of our present European Allies if things go from bad to worse, and I was only wondering if we had a few private conversations with the Russians, unknown in content to the Allies, that well might have a salutary effect on de Gaulle or might infuriate him more.

Secretary RUSK. I think he would use that to reenforce his present policy. That is what he would do if he had a sense that we were trying to work out some deal at the expense of Europe with the Soviet Union.

Senator MORSE. If he did, if it resulted in such an arragngement with the Soviet Union, he would not be very happy to see us go through with it, and he would be sort of anxious, in the meantime, to try to work out a deal with us.

COOPERATION WITH FRANCE AND ITALY

Senator MUNDT. Under present circumstances, Mr. Secretary, do you feel more secure in your or our friendly relationships with France or with Italy?

Secretary RUSK. Or with Italy?

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I think that if there is a real showdown with the Soviet Union we could count on both of those countries at the

present time. I must say in the day-to-day operations of NATO, the NATO problems, we have much more cooperation with Italy than with France.

Senator MUNDT. That I recognize. But it seems to me that the sturdiness of de Gaulle would be that he would just have to be on our side, and I am concerned about the sturdiness of Italy.

Secretary RUSK. Well, de Gaulle has a fairly weak situation in France. De Gaulle is in a position of weakness. That may be why is asserting what he does.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I have to go, but I do not want to break up the meeting.

PAYING A HIGH PRICE FOR FORMOSA

Senator SYSMINGTON. It looks to me like we are paying a pretty high price for Formosa. Would you care to comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. I think that if we were to abandon 11 million people on Formosa to China, this would inflict a scar on us and our Allies all over the world that would be very hard to recover from.

Senator MUNDT. It would be like the second American Revolution.

Secretary RUSK. There are very deep-rooted commitments there of a moral as well as of a political nature.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am only asking the question. The Canadians sell them half a billion dollars worth of wheat.

SECRETARY'S RETURN

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, we have before us a checklist of 22 different items for discussion on matters which we would like to be brought up to date. We have not reached the first one yet.

The CHAIRMAN. I know.

Senator AIKEN. Has the Secretary asked to come back?

Secretary RUSK. I was going to suggest——

Senator AIKEN. We have only 22 items here.

The CHAIRMAN. We expect now—after all our Memorial Day and everything else—to be going right along. You are going to be on another subject with us, on foreign aid in which, I am sure, a lot of these problems will be discussed, and you will be around, I think, quite a lot.

Secretary RUSK. I would like to come back at the earliest opportunity, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be here until October, according to the best estimates I have seen.

Senator AIKEN. I was home last week, and the one thing that everybody talks about more than anything else is what happened to our Cuban policy. The people are probably more concerned about that than anything else—you know that as well as I do.

The CHAIRMAN. We can have him at a very early time as far as I am concerned.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Can I just ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to break it up.

FORMOSA AND OKINAWA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With regard to the question which Senator Symington just asked about Formosa, it seems to me that in the Orient there are two glittering, shining spots which are compared to Berlin, and which are sores in the physical area of Communist influence. One is Formosa, which has made some of the most astounding and startling economic advancements over there—land reform, economic and industrial development and everything else—that have been made in the world, outside of Western Europe. The other is Okinawa which has come from sort of an aboriginal distance prior to World War II, to where it is quite a modern area under American tutelage. It seems to me they are very, very important. They are pretty much of a sore spot in the Communist World.

Secretary RUSK. There is no question about both those places.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I cannot brag too much about South Korea.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary.

SITUATION IN INDONESIA

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps we should get to this at another meeting, but I think it is going to be interesting to see what happens in Indonesia in the weeks and months ahead, because the shift of the Communist Party in Indonesia to Peiping has helped to stir up the fears among a lot of Indonesians toward China, and we found this has come up in discussions between the Malayans, the Filipinos and the Indonesians, about the possibility of some sort of a loose political association.

It has also had some bearing on our recent oil negotiations with Sukarno where we came to a settlement which the companies are very pleased about, and where in the background was the China threat, and there was the fact that we made it very clear to Indonesia that this was a matter of effect fundamentally on our whole relationship with Indonesia.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask right there, it is extremely interesting, is Sukarno apprehensive about the Communist Party moving toward China?

Secretary RUSK. He is very apprehensive about China and he is very frank, talking about this with the Filipinos and Malayans, and recently with Wilson Wyatt.[7]

He has not been that frank before because he thought he was tied in with Moscow, you see. So it is just possible there could be some further development in that situation that would not be too bad from our point of view.

You notice there have been some anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia, and this has been embarrassing to the Communist Party there.

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[7] Former Lt. Gov. of Kentucky, sent by President Kennedy to renegotiate American oil contracts with Indonesia.

CONFISCATION AND EXPROPRIATION IN INDONESIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not want the record to at least fail to touch upon the fact that a certain amount of personal horn tooting ought to be done about a little amendment we put in last year with respect to confiscation and expropriation which had something to do with Sukarno making an arrangement over there.

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I should apologize for not mentioning that particular amendment, because that amendment, in the background, was a very useful piece in our discussion with the Indonesians on it. But I do think that amendment is at its best, in the preventive stage rather than in the operational stage.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. As prevention it was quite effective.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The preventive stage is what it is for.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can I just mention one question about Cuba?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to say there is some place in the Bible that says—off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

AERIAL INSPECTIONS OF CUBA

Senator SYMINGTON. Have we resumed on-site inspection in Cuba, low-level airplane inspection and, if not, do we plan to?

Secretary RUSK. While I was sitting here this moring, sir, I had a note that 4 planes were in and out, and there was no reaction. This is low-level.

Senator SYMINGTON. Low-level?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. But I would appreciate it if you—if Cuba does not make this public, we may not, so I would appreciate if you would keep this private.

Senator AIKEN. Our planes?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are these the first ones?

Secretary RUSK. The first ones in some time. But this is apart——

Senator SYMINGTON. The first ones for months?

Secretary RUSK. I do not know when the last one was. It was a couple of months ago.

Senator AIKEN. We had to wait for Castro to get home. [Laughter.]

Secretary RUSK. This was a part of checking in those other Soviet camps.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is sure pleasant to talk to you. You make me feel better.

Senator AIKEN. Some time we would like a little more information.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 1963

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ACTIVITIES OF NONDIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN PRINCIPALS IN THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee appointed to make further determinations in the committee's current investigation of the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States met in executive session at 4:15 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Symington and Hickenlooper. Also present were Senators Sparkman and Aiken.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 12, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

The committee received further testimony on bill S. 1276, the Foreign Assistance Act for 1963, from David E. Bell, Administrator, AID.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript and published hearing.

[The committee adjourned at 1:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JUNE 17, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4 p.m. in room S–126, Capitol.

Present: Senator Church (Subcommittee Chairman), and Senators Smathers, Carlson, and Mundt.

Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, discussed the staffing of international organizations to which the United States belongs with the subcommittee.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Smathers, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The committee took testimony from Samuel Efron, of New York, NY; Bernard M. Fagelson, of Alexandria, Va.; Monroe Karasik, of Washington, DC; and Walter Sterling Surrey, of Washington, DC, in connection with its investigation of the activities of nondiplomatic agents of foreign principals in the United States.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 2:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JUNE 24, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:45 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, Senators Sparkman, Morse, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Williams.

The committee took testimony in connection with its study of the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States from Gottlieb Hammer, Maurice Boukstein and Elaine Rosenbaum, all of New York, NY.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:25 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JUNE 24, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Lausche (Subcommittee Chairman), and Senators Morse and Carlson.

The subcommittee was briefed on the Buddhist revolt in Vietnam by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Chalmers B. Wood, desk officer at the Department of State for Vietnam.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 3:05 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Dodd, and Carlson. Senators Kefauver and Dirksen also attended.

The chairman announced the meeting had been called to receive testimony from government and private witnesses on the problem of distribution and sale of drugs in Colombia and other South American countries. Specifically, he said, the question before the committee was whether the production of documents called for in subpoenas issued but withheld by the Committee on the Judiciary might be harmful to the national interest (as affecting the nation's foreign policies).

Senator Gore asked if the committee was acting in an advisory capacity and was told by the chairman that this was a consultative meeting, and that the committee was meeting in an advisory capacity.

Testimony was presented by Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; John T. Duffner, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General; Herman C. Nolen, Chairman of the Board of McKesson & Robbins; and Thomas G. Corcoran, Attorney, Washington, DC.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the staff was directed to draft a letter to the interested agencies giving the substance of the two joint meetings of the Foreign Relations and the Judiciary Committees for advice. It was also stated that a report of the current meeting would be made to the full Foreign Relations Committee at its next session, but that none of this was inhibitory to the Committee on the Judiciary should it desire to follow its own line of actions in the matter.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official record.

[The committee then adjourned at 6:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10 a.m., in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

The chairman presented a letter from Senator Morse recommending a 30-day delay in the service of subpoenas in the matter of sale and distribution of drugs in Colombia, and read a letter prepared to the Committee on the Judiciary proposing same. The letter was approved for sending by unanimous vote.

Following discussion, the committee, by voice vote, approved the bill (S. 1512) to authorize one additional Assistant Secretary of State, and for other purposes, for report, as amended.

On motion by Senator Mundt, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee, by voice vote, approved for report the resolution (S.J. Res. 64), to amend the joint resolution providing for United States participation in the International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and by unanimous voice vote, the committee approved for report an original resolution providing for participation by a Senate delegation in the next meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association at Kuala Lumpur, Malaya.

The resolution (S. Res. 148), to express the sense of the Senate on banning all nuclear tests that contaminate the atmosphere or the oceans, was passed over for further consideration.

The bill (S. 1305), to authorize the appropriation of $1,500,000 as an ex gratia payment to the city of New York to assist in defraying the extraordinary and unprecedented expenses incurred during the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations, was next in order. On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Lausche, the measure was put over without prejudice.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Following further discussion, the committee adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

SITUATION IN VIETNAM

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—During the spring of 1963 the Kennedy administration felt optimistic over the military situation is South Vietnam, but became troubled over growing religious protests which threatened Vietnam's domestic stability. On May 8, Vietnamese Buddhists gathered in Hue for a religious celebration. The government imposed its ban against displaying religious flags, although Catholic flags had been displayed during the recent ordination of President Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc, as archbishop of Hue. When Buddhists protested the ban, local troops fired into the crowd and killed several demonstrators. Some ten thousand Buddhists then gathered in Hue to demand the same legal rights for Buddhists as for Catholics.

[Although the Kennedy administration pressed Diem to reach a compromise with the Buddhists, he made only limited concessions. Buddhist monks and nuns staged hunger strikes, and students clashed with government troops. Then on June 11, Quang Duc, a 73-year-old Buddhist monk, immolated himself on a Saigon street as an act of protest. In the wake of these disturbing events and the generally deteriorating situation, U.S. Ambassador Frederick Nolting was replaced in Saigon by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.]

TUESDAY, JULY 9, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Mansfield, Long, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Newhouse and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased to have our Ambassador to Vietnam, Mr. Frederick Nolting.

The President has asked Ambassador Nolting to return to Saigon and I understand he is leaving this afternoon. He has just completed a two-year assignment, I believe, in Saigon, and according to the press will be replaced by a former colleague, a member of this committee, Mr. Lodge.

Mr. Ambassdor, we are very pleased to have you.

Will you proceed in your own way. If you do not have a statement, you could start out with a discussion about a very interesting part of the world which we all are anxious to hear about.

STATEMENT OF HON. FREDERICK E. NOLTING, JR., U.S. AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM, ACCOMPANIED BY CHALMERS B. WOOD, DIRECTOR, WORKING GROUP, VIETNAM

Mr. NOLTING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As always, I am pleased and honored to be before your committee. I do not have a prepared statement but if you would permit me to talk generally——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

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Mr. NOLTING [continuing]. On the basis of a little over 2 years experience there, and in which I hope your special interest and questions will be developed.

I would like to say that the recent unfortunate matters arising from the Buddhist affairs occurred mostly after my departure and, therefore, I do not have first-hand eye witness information on those matters. I will return to those, if I may, in a moment after talking about the general trend of the situation as I see it in Vietnam over the last 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you leave Saigon, just as a matter of interest?

Mr. NOLTING. On the 23rd of May.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. You had been gone nearly two months?

Mr. NOLTING. Six weeks, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

REASONS FOR AMERICAN ASSISTANCE

Mr. NOLTING. As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, the situation in Vietnam in 1961 was slipping badly. The government writ did not run anywhere near throughout the country. The ability of the government to exercise any control or provide any services in many parts of the territory of South Vietnam was nil and in other parts was greatly restricted. This condition has resulted from the conscious and announced intention of North Vietman to take over the south and by the acceleration of military and semi-military means in addition to active propaganda subversion, and all the other instruments of Communist aggression.

Surveying the situation our government at the request of the Government of South Vietnam had decided on certain conditions to increase our assistance.

An effort was started then in early 1962, which I myself considered to have been extremely prompt and efficiently carried out, certainly with more vigor and more promptness than I would have expected possible. The result of American assistance in the advisory and materiel field in all branches of the effort resulted in an upswing both in morale of the Vietnamese people and in the performance of the Vietnamese armed forces, security forces and government functions generally, so that for the beginning in early 1962 with some ups and downs but generally ups, the situation in my view has progressed steadily in a favorable direction in terms of many indices.

INTELLIGENCE FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE

I might talk a bit, if I may, about how we draw this conclusion.

There are many phases of this effort and many indices that we try to use to get a weekly view of how things are going. One of the earliest of these was increased intelligence coming in from the countryside. Before the increased American and Vietnamese effort, there was barely any reliable intelligence on Viet Cong units, what they were doing, where they were, whom they were beating up on.

Little by little, as confidence was restored the information came in from the peasants and incidentally the evaluation of intelligence

improved, with our help, and now it is coming in in great quantity, and being utilized very promptly by the armed forces.

The strategy which was adopted, and this I think is important, was in the context of an over-all agreed plan for the restoration of law and order and the introduction of measures to bring the people into closer support of the government.

THE MILITARY STRATEGY

The military strategy involved two prongs. The first was to train and equip the regular forces, army, navy, air force, marines and rangers, to hit the major units of the Viet Cong, to disrupt and to keep them from building up a third phase which is generally the formation of regiments, and divisions and the attack on a major area. This was prevented, I think by prompt action and probably in the nick of time.

The other part of the strategy is the gradual pacification of the country, the turning over of the security duties to the people who live there. The strategic hamlet program was devised and put into operation with that in mind. So that these two phases are on the one hand to use the military forces to disrupt and crush insofar as possible the organized armed units of the Viet Cong, and the second and perhaps the more permanent phase is to consolidate the territory through the means of the hamlet.

At the present time the number of people living in strategic hamlets is, I believe, about eight million which, together with the people living in the cities that are already under government control, makes a total of about two-thirds of the total population of Vietnam under government control.

The general picture, Mr. Chairman, as I see it and leaving aside for the moment the question of the Buddhist tensions, has been moving up and I would like to say my observation is that the government has taken advantage of the restoration of control and the ability to reach people by reaching out with measures in social, political and economic fields designed to accomplish this aim of bringing the people into closer contact with the government and giving them some real benefits.

STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM

The strategic hamlet program has been often described as a military measure. It is afar more than that. It should be more than that, and in my judgment is more than that. It involves, if you know the election of the officials of the hamlets, the introduction of economic measures which we are supporting, and those are generally based on self-help projects in which the people of the hamlet through their full elected councils decide upon.

There may be a connecting road from the hamlet to the nearest next road or canal. It may be a small dispensary, it may be a wing to the schoolhouse or a new schoolhouse or other measures. It also involves the introduction of better farming methods, of better seeds and fertilizers and so forth.

We have established in the USOM [1] a new branch for the purpose of putting directly into the strategic hamlet areas the economic and technical help which heretofore we had tried to get to flow through the regular ministers of the government, and that was too slow. So, now we are going directly on the basis of undertakings signed generally with the province chiefs to introduce these measures.

The general picture, Mr. Chairman, that I am trying to give as my view of the situation in Vietnam is one of improvement, slow, painful, with ups and downs but with the trend moving steadily upwards.

THE BUDDHIST QUESTION

To what extent the Buddhist question and the tension that that has aroused will undercut this trend I frankly don't know. Of course, it is our hope that the agreements reached with the Buddhist on the 18th of June will be faithfully carried out and that this matter can somehow be composed. Even if that is, in my judgment it will leave some scars, and will make the job more difficult. But if it can be composed, even with leaving some scars, it is my judgment that the formula that has been devised for the continued prosecution of the anti-subversion campaign, will pay off and will result in a holding of the territory of South Vietnam by the government and people of South Vietnam who very definitely want to be free and don't want to be ruled from Hanoi.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very, as you know, involved and long subject and rather than just talk away ad lib I suggest that you may ask questions to develop some of the points.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if you would explain to us since you mentioned it at the end, this Buddhist trouble and what is behind the Buddhist trouble? How do you explain it?

Mr. NOLTING. Well, the releasing cause was the incident in Hue on May 8th when I was still there. This was celebrating the Buddha's birthday, was a big demonstration with banners and so forth. In my opinion, the government of Vietnam made a series of errors in handling this demonstration. First of all, they tried to impose the decree which had been honored mostly in the breach in the past, of having national flags flown along with religious flags.

GRENADES THROWN AT CROWD

The Buddhists rescinded this, security forces were called in, the Buddhists moved toward the radio station. They was a lot of confusion on both sides but the final upshot was that certain grenades were thrown, and about 8 people killed, and the security forces which were brought in also used some armored vehicles to try very slowly, I am told, to push the crowd back but the crowd couldn't move because of the congestion and some people were killed by it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who threw the grenades and what people were killed by the grenades, any military or all Buddhists?

Senator HOLTING. The Government of Vietnam claims that the grenades were thrown by Viet Cong agitators. We think this is

[1] United States Operations Mission.

false. We think the grenades were thrown by some frightened or very foolish security forces, probably civil guardsmen.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have concrete reason for thinking that or is that just a guess?

Senator HOLTING. It is not conclusive, Senator, but the fragments——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not disputing it in anyway, but I am trying to——

Mr. NOLTING. One of our medics saw a couple of the bodies and he concluded that the fragments were from shrapnel grenades and not the type of the Viet Cong generally use. The government was informed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who got killed by the grenades?

Mr. NOLTING. There were four children.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was it military personnel or civilian personnel?

Mr. NOLTING. They were people in the crowd, civilians.

The government, however, on the basis of its first reports from Hue, issued a statement that this was done by the Viet Cong, got themselves hooked on what I think was a false position, certainly none of the people in Hue believed it, and having taken that position they wouldn't back down from it, or backed down too slowly.

The matter didn't stir up very much for the next two weeks, and it was only at the time of the funeral, after I had left there that the agitation began to break out in many other places including Saigon.

THE DREADFUL MARTYRDOM

That was followed, of course, by the dreadful martyrdom which really hit the fan, and caused not only increased agitation in Vietnam but international.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, so far as that martyrdom is concerned—it is a horrible thing to think about and see pictures of—that is not unique there, is it? Maybe in the last few years but hasn't it been rather traditional among Buddhist zealots there for centuries on periods of protest and things like that that they cut themselves to pieces, and they do other heinous things to mutilate themselves or kill themselves. Isn't that a dramatic demonstration that has gone on for centuries out there?

Mr. NOLTING. It is the Oriental means of dramatizing a protest.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't mean it is done every day, but there is nothing unique about that particular thing. I don't mean to minimize that particular situation, but so much of our publicity is that it is something new and never been done before. It seems to me it has been done over the ages, things of that kind.

Mr. NOLTING. In most ancient countries it happens from time to time. I think it was yesterday, I believe, one of the men to be put on trial for complicity in the alleged complicity in 1960 attempted coup d'etat killed himself.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He killed himself?

Mr. NOLTING. This is not an unusual thing although in this particular case, particularly the burning of the Bonzes, it dramatized

the situation and brought to a head this question in a fashion which has undoubtedly caused a very dangerous situation.

MOST RECENT SUICIDE

Senator MUNDT. This most recent suicide wasn't just one of the men, wasn't he a famous writer?

Mr. NOLTING. He was billed in the press as a famous writer, I must confess that I didn't know. He had written about 30 books, I am told. I knew that he was a writer. I knew his name but I had not known that he was a particularly famous one.

Senator MUNDT. Blown up in our press as though he was quite an important person.

Mr. NOLTING. He was a minister in the government quite a while ago under the French.

Senator, on your question, it seems to me that this martyrdom is something that might certainly be repeated without—it wouldn't surprise me if it were repeated because this is the way they think.

Senator LAUSCHE. What were repeated?

The CHAIRMAN. Their martyrs. Men who burn themselves.

Mr. NOLTING. You might have another martyr, Senator, is what I meant. Whether it necessarily proves—surely martyrdom doesn't prove religious persecution.

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

Senator LAUSCHE. What about the incumbent government yielding to all of the demands, didn't that imply that there was truth in the claims made? There were five demands made and all five were granted.

Mr. NOLTING. To a certain extent they were all granted, yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the demands were on the basis of religious persecution.

Mr. NOLTING. Diem—Ben, you must correct me if I am wrong here, again I am doing this secondhand after having arrived here—but I believe in signing the agreement Diem specifically said that this did not admit the major premise, namely, there was religious persecution. On the contrary, he said there was not. There had always been religious tolerance, that this was written in the constitution, and that he wanted to meet the situation but he didn't want to admit and would not admit that religious persecution in fact existed.

I might also add that the question of religious persecution or religious discrimination even had not in my view, in my observation, or that of the Embassy, been evident before. It was, it is, a country where I believed and I think most observers believed over the years that there was great religious tolerance. I have observed many times in the villages of Vietnam crosses by one house in front of the gate. The next one would be a Buddhist house, the next one a Buddhist house, the next one a Christian with the cross and they were not grouped in separate compartments, they were living together. There was apparently no feeling of religious difference or religious discrimination at all.

There are many indications of that. Several of my children have friends and within a family two or three will be Christian and the

rest will remain Buddhist, and this is not a cause of dissention even within one family in Vietnam.

So that, quite frankly, I was not only very disappointed but very surprised to see this issue coming into the situation in Vietnam. I believe that it, if carefully and wisely handled by the government and if responsibily handled by the Vietnamese association of Buddhists, can be composed and I believe we can move forward on the present course.

But that, I think, remains to be seen, and it is one of the principal things, of course, that I will be trying to work on when I get out there.

RELIGIOUS POPULATIONS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. What is the percentage of Buddhists there? Are they the large majority?

Mr. NOLTING. Putting it the other way, the percentage of Christians who are readily identifiable is about ten percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Ten percent?

Mr. NOLTING. The remaining 90 percent are, I would say, emotionally or basically Buddhist, but it is not a militant faith, and a lot of Buddhists don't do much about it. It is also a group of people, some of whom are Confucians and they say, "I am not really anything but I go for the Confucian philosophy." Some of them are Bao Daists which is a sect, some of them are Hoa Hoas which is another sect, some of them are ancestor worshippers.

The number of true believers in the Buddhist faith is very hard to estimate. I was discussing this with President Diem just before I left, and he said that nobody could tell for sure how many true Buddhists there were, that at the time of the last census on this question in the French days, the French asked everyone whether they were Christian. If they were Christian they checked them off as Christian, if they were not they put them down as Buddhists.

How true that is, I don't know, but I certainly think that emotionally the majority of the people in Vietnam feel themselves to be Buddhists.

INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA AND CHINA

Senator AIKEN. So to what extent is Russian influence increasing or decreasing?

Mr. NOLTING. Is what, sir?

Senator AIKEN. To what extent is Russia entering into the picture and that question might also be asked of China. Is the influence of either of these countries increasing or decreasing or is this whole thing primarily a family affair with probably outsiders furnishing the means to conduct their operations?

Mr. NOLTING. Well, it is our impression that Ho Chi Minh, who is the head of the government in North Vietnam, as you know, is trying very hard to ride the rail.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. In terms——

Senator AIKEN. Ride the rail between what?

Mr. NOLTING. Between Red China's influence over his country and Russian influence. He is trying to take a middle position, and

he has taken a middle position generally in the ideological or methodological conflict between them.

Senator AIKEN. Meaning he works them both, he works both sides?

Mr. NOLTING. He tries not to take sides in this dispute.

Senator AIKEN. But accepts help from both sides?

Mr. NOLTING. But accepts help from both. Up until about 2 years ago the help was about equally divided as between Russia and China. This is including everything, military, economic and technical assistance.

Senator AIKEN. Including advisers?

Mr. NOLTING. Including advisers.

Senator AIKEN. And any armed forces?

Mr. NOLTING. They have no armed forces in North Vietnam that we know of other than the natives, native Vietnamese. Recently, however, the aid figures and the adviser figures have shifted in favor of the Chinese. There are proportionally fewer Russians and eastern Europeans and proportionally more Chinese helping the north Vietnamese.

Senator AIKEN. Is that because of Russian frustration and futility?

Mr. NOLTING. I would suppose, sir, it is partly because of Russian frustration and partly because the Chinese are offering help because they want to get control. This poses a political problem for Ho Chi Minh because the Vietnamese people, both north and south, had as their traditional enemy the Chinese, and they don't like to be dominated by Chinese. Particularly Chinese. They don't like to be dominated by anybody but particularly by Chinese.

EARLIER COUP ATTEMPT

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned the difficulty in 1960 of which this recently was the story of a man who killed himself. I think this question should be considered very much off the record, but can you tell us any part that we had to play? It has been alleged in the press we had a part of play. Did we?

Mr. NOLTING. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sure about that?

Mr. NOLTING. It is quite true we did not aid and abet the coup plotters or the coup once it got started. There has been great misinterpretation of our actions on the part of the Vietnamese Government. Perhaps we should go off the record here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think maybe we should.

[Discussion off the record.]

AMERICAN ACCESS TO DIEM

Senator MORSE. Would you clear up for us the question of whether you or other American officials have found it difficult to talk to Diem and generals supporting us or do you have easy access to him?

Mr. NOLTING. I have access to him constantly all the time and I have never been refused an appointment or never even had one delayed. I find it easy to talk. I would prefer to say, Senator, with him, rather than to him. He does a great deal of talking, but it is

quite possible to have a two-way conversation and I always do and so does the chargé as he is now doing, and General Harkins [2] and other members of our task force out there.

No, he is an approachable man from my point of view. He is a voluble man. He is an emotional man, but I have found him to be also a man of integrity. When he tells you he will do something he will do it. You can count on it. It doesn't always come out the way you expect it to come out. This, in my mind is not by intention but because of the general inefficiency of the government. They make more booboos than one could imagine. This is improving and they are trying, in my view, very hard to improve the caliber of their government officials from top to bottom. But it is a long, hard process.

MORE ENTHUSIASM FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE

I do know, however, that there is a great deal more enthusiasm for government service than there used to be. For example, they have a national school administration that we helped them build, USOM helped them build. Two years ago they could not fill the classes for this school. As I recall there are about 600 places, and these people are trained to go out and take positions in the provinces and in the districts, they were very dangerous positions and still are to a certain extent.

The last time I was over there for the opening of another wing, they had 2,300 applicants to fill the 600 positions, and this to my mind registers considerable improvement in the morale of the situation when that many young people want to serve their government and want to take the courses necessary. The school itself is good and it does help in the training of them.

Senator MUNDT. Do we help conduct the school or did we just build the buildings?

Mr. NOLTING. We did through the Michigan State University contract but that has expired, and now they run it on their own.

BENEVOLENT PATERNALISM

Senator AIKEN. You speak several times of the government's ability to control the people. Is Diem totalitarian minded?

Mr. NOLTING. I would say more, Senator, that the word is paternalistic.

Senator AIKEN. Is the government a family affair?

Mr. NOLTING. Well, his family certainly comes into it in strong advice to him but he conceives the office of the presidency at this point as being a paternalistic office.

Senator AIKEN. Benevolent paternalism, I suppose.

Mr. NOLTING. This I think would be a description which he would accept. He also would go on to say that what they are trying to do is to build the infrastructure of democracy, education, a sense of civic responsibility, national identity and all those things which will gradually create a truly responsive democracy as the constitution calls for.

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[2] General Paul D. Harkins, Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command—Vietnam.

Senator AIKEN. They really wouldn't agree to outright democracy, would they?

Mr. NOLTING. At this point, I think they would not.

Senator AIKEN. Would it work if they did?

Mr. NOLTING. In my opinion, it would not. I mean the kind of democracy we are used to in our western civilization.

ARE THE VIETNAMESE PREPARED TO EXERCISE DEMOCRACY?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One of the questions I wanted to ask, we talk about democracy all the time and the fact is are those people prepared in the slightest degree for the exercise of democracy and its responsibilities as we know it?

By the slightest degree, I don't mean completely nil but basically, don't they have to have a strong man government over there of the right kind, of a benevolent paternalism let's say, to guide them to the point where they finally can accept some of the widespread responsibilities of democracy?

Mr. NOLTING. I think they certainly have to develop many institutions and a frame of mind among the people as well as those who are governing before they are able to exercise a responsive democracy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't mean to say we should advocate a ruthless dictatorship or repressive dictatorship or something of that kind, but my impression of Diem is that while he is kind of a tough cookie in a lot of things that he really is in the long run—maybe we didn't particularly like the way he does it but he is looking ahead toward the development of systems and capabilities on the part of his people to really govern themselves.

Mr. NOLTING. This is certainly my conviction, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He does it in a kind of a tough way but you almost have to do it, don't you, in those countries to keep them from retrograding back to either tribal forms or capture by the Communist ideology or other kind of totalitarianism?

Mr. NOLTING. I think he is often criticized for the wrong things.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. And I do think that he, that his principles, and his objectives for his people, are things that we can sympathize with and accept. In other words, I think he is sincerely trying to build, again to use his phrase, the infrastructure of a better system of democracy in Vietnam and I think if this came about no one would be more pleased than he. But it is going to take some doing and quite a long while.

OPPOSITION TO DIEM

Senator AIKEN. Does he have outstanding rivalry for the control of government other than the Viet Cong?

Mr. NOLTING. There are constant reported coup plots. There have been two in the last three years. The latest one was in February of 1962. It was not really a well-thought-out plot. It was simply a couple of renegade pilots in the air force who decided they would drop some bombs on the palace but it darned near wiped out the government which would be the——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This fellow who came over to this country, I met him several years ago over there, he was the fellow who put in the IBM——

Mr. NOLTING. Vu Van Thai.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. And certain budgetary accountings and so on, seemed to be a very progressive, far-sighted fellow. Then he came over to this country 3 or 4 years after that, and gave Diem the devil and said it was a closed corporation and it was a corrupt operation and all this sort of stuff. He sort of blew his stack, but at the time I first met him—and I met him then over there once and that was before he defected let's say—he had great ideas about putting in IBM accounting machines for all property all throughout South Vietnam. He was going to have everybody tabulated with a key and a ticker on an electronic device.

Senator AIKEN. Something like Zip?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, like the Zip code for everybody. I don't mean the little fellow. The fellow who had a lot of experience in Europe and was a well-intentioned fellow. I was very much impressed with him and then he ran up against the very practical matter of money, the very practical matter of an utter and complete lack of technicians who could operate such machines and the very practical matter of a complete unwillingness on the part of the populace or the government at that time to accept such a widespread electronic system for a country which was probably far beyond anything any other country had in the world.

He had a dream that was and I just wondered if this fellow who let him get a little excited like this fellow who burned himself in the street the other day simply because he didn't have all the gadgetry and probably had his ears knocked down a few times, if he didn't defect for that reason and probably create a wrong impression in some of these areas.

VIETNAMESE INTELLECTUALS

Mr. NOLTING. I knew Vu Van Thai for a short time, but knew him fairly well before he resigned. I agree with your estimate of it. I believe he is a very intelligent man.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had a very good impression of the fellow.

Mr. NOLTING. But to my mind he typifies a great many Vietnamese intellectuals, they want to get there before the traffic will bear it. They have Rousseauan ideas overlaid with French expertise in many fields. They think everything ought to run better in Vietnam without realizing that it takes a lot of human material, which doesn't yet exist in point of training, to make it run.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He wants to have a jet airplane that will go at twice the speed of sound when they haven't been able to quite master a trainer yet.

Mr. NOLTING. Lest I be misunderstood on this point, Senator, I would like to add that the influence of these people upon the government ought to be greater to make the government move somewhat faster.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree.

Mr. NOLTING. You have two extremes, people who are unrealistic in the sense you are talking about and people who are in my judgment too conservative, adopt too conservative a pace for fear of losing control. And our effort has been to try to push them along.

ESTIMATE OF DAVID HALBERSTAM

Senator MORSE. Mr. Ambassador, I have this article from the Times of July 6, by—written by Halberstam, "U.S. Disaffection with the Government Mounts as Lack of Popular Support Hampers War Effort."

As you probably know, your name appears prominently in a few places. I would like to know first, your estimate of David Halberstam, Special Correspondent from the New York Times. Is he a pretty reliable correspondent; secondly, I would like to get your evaluation of the article, it is a little disturbing.

Mr. NOLTING. It certainly was disturbing to me, Senator. I read it. My estimate of David Halberstam is as follows: I know him well, I see him frequently. He is a young man of great emotional intensity. He is a good writer. He has become, I think, increasingly frustrated in Vietnam. He feels that the government is holding back from giving a true picture to foreign newsmen. He becomes sometimes very emotional indeed, and in my opinion, as a result of that emotion is somtimes not as accurate and objective in his reporting as he ought to be.

There is a lot I could say on that because, for example, if I may add, that statement says as a matter of fact that I and others have often told Diem that he is an indispensable man. When I read that I sat right down and wrote a little handwritten note to the New York Times which I did not send saying that is untrue.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It probably wouldn't have made much difference to the New York Times if you had sent it, would it?

Mr. NOLTING. It wouldn't.

I wouldn't have been foolish enough to say that nor would Diem in my opinion have been naive enough to believe that if I had said it.

INACCURACIES IN THE PRESS

But certainly I didn't say it and I don't know anyone else who said it. And it is that kind of inaccuracy that crops up and in many instances.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We had an example when Elbridge Durbrow was ambassador over there, we had a young reporter who was zealous and did write things that were startling for the Washington News here and other papers and he went over there and wrote about corruption. I happened to be in a group which went over there to look into this and we spent ten days there and we couldn't find a single sustainable, provable fact on the allegations he made.[3]

We found things wrong, yes, certainly, but not along the lines he said, and every investigation which has been made of the allegations that were flatly made here about corruption and stashing

[3] See hearings in volume XI (1959) of the "Historical Series".

away money in French banks and owning property on the Riviera, all that sort of stuff, these young fellows sometimes think they have got to write a lot of startling things in their stories in order to gain attention. Maybe it is good journalism, I don't know, not being a journalist but I always thought that a responsible newspaper had some responsibility to try to screen things for the basic truth of things they publish.

But looking at some of the columnists that write in these papers——

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me tell you how these things happen. A big midwestern newspaper carried in a big bold headline, 300 chickens stolen from Farmer Smith, and on the same page immediately below also in big black type was the headline, "Democrats hold huge chicken dinner." [Laughter.]

Senator MORSE. I have one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

DUNGWAR SINGH

Senator MORSE. I want Senator Mundt's attention.

Senator Mundt has been interviewing a businessman from over there and I am to interview him today unless we work out an arrangement where we all get a chance to interview him as a group. I would like to get your evaluation of him, if Senator Mundt thinks it would be all right to raise a question about this man.

Would you tell the Ambassador, Senator Mundt, his name is Singh. Is that it?

Senator MUNDT. Yes, he is an Indian, of course.

Senator MORSE. He is an Indian but he knows a lot about this situation, so.

His name, I think, is Dungwar Singh. He is from India, New Delhi.

Mr. NOLTING. He is an Indian businessman.

Senator MORSE. From New Delhi, exporter and importer and he has business in New York.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does he do business in Vietnam?

Senator MUNDT. I don't know that. But he might, but he primarily is an Indian. The trouble with Singh, it is a pretty common name over there unless you happen to know him because of his occupation, you might not know him.

Mr. NOLTING. I am sorry, Senator, I do not know him.

Senator MUNDT. I think Senator Lausche is going to see him, too.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I am going to see him tomorrow.

INDIAN INTEREST IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Does India show any interest in Vietnam or Southeastern Asian countries to your knowledge?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, as you know India holds the chairmanship of the International Control Commission for Vietnam and that is a fairly important interest.

Senator AIKEN. Does she show any desire to assume full responsibility which naturally would belong to her for that area.

Mr. NOLTING. The Indian Government through its chairmanship of the International Control Commission has moved right far in

our direction. They have come up with a report which was a divided report about a year ago with the Indian and the Canadian voting against the policy in the Commission and it found the North guilty of aggression against the South, and this is a very important report.

NOT A RUTHLESS GOVERNMENT

Senator MORSE. Have you seen this article in the Washington Post, July 19, "Troops, Secret Police Prop Diem Regime," by Beverley Deepe, Special to the Washington Post, says, "This government is utterly ruthless. If a mob moved toward the palace, the government would line up the troops and mow them down." Have you seen this article?

Mr. NOLTING. I saw it this morning, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Would you give us an evaluation of that?

Mr. NOLTING. I don't think utterly ruthless is a correct characterization of the government.

Senator AIKENS. Moderately ruthless, would that describe the situation better?

Mr. NOLTING. I don't think it is a ruthless government, no.

Senator AIKEN. You wouldn't use the word "ruthless" at all, then?

Mr. NOLTING. No, sir. I would not. I would say it is an authoritarian government. But certainly not ruthless. I think one of the things for which President Diem is often criticized by his own followers not being ruthless enough. He put people in jail but he won't bring them to trial for a long time because he doesn't want to give death sentences.

MILITARY AND POLICE SUPPORT FOR DIEM

Senator MORSE. Is it accurate that the troops and secret police are sort of weaning themselves away from him? It leaves the impression that his troops and secret police are leaving him.

Mr. NOLTING. So far as our information goes the army, the secret police, the regular police, are still carrying out their duties, and the progress on the military front as well as the strategic hamlet front is marching right on irrespective of the Buddhist tensions.

Now, we hope that that is going to continue and that this other thing will die away. Of course, the regular army is composed of the same percentage of Buddhists as the general population, perhaps a little bit higher because most of them are country boys and they are continuing to fight bravely, carry out their duties. This has been emphasized in the most recent reports from the Embassy and from General Harkins command.

AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKENS. Is more or less U.S. military and economic assistance necessary to insure any degree of progress for the future?

Mr. NOLTING. Our hope is to turn over more and more functions in the military and in the economic and other fields, technical fields to the people and Government of Vietnam, and this is their hope, too.

This is what that flap was about about two months ago when there were reports they were asking us to withdraw certain U.S. personnel.

Senator AIKEN. How do we realize that hope?

Mr. NOLTING. By training and when they are ready to take on this, that or the other, let them take it on.

Senator AIKEN. How many men do we have there now?

Mr. NOLTING. We have a total of roughly 15,000.

Senator AIKEN. About the same as the Russians have in Cuba then?

Mr. NOLTING. May we take that off the record, Mr. Chairman, for the reason that the International Control Commission figures 689.

The CHAIRMAN. Take it off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

U.S. EXPENDITURES IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. What did we spend last year? What is roughly the estimate of our expenses in Vietnam?

Mr. NOLTING. Last year?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. I have the total in my pocket for 1963. It was $402 million.

The CHAIRMAN. $402 million for fiscal 1963.

Mr. NOLTING. For fiscal 1963.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this about the level of 1964 anticipated?

Mr. NOLTING. For 1964 we are asking for $335.9 million.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this include nonmilitary aid as well as the expense of our troops and so on?

Mr. NOLTING. It does not include the expenses of our troops. It includes military assistance and economic assistance, Public Law 480.[4]

The CHAIRMAN. Then you have on top of the 402 the expense of maintaining those men?

Mr. NOLTING. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would be very substantial in addition.

WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM?

What do you think is the justification for this kind of expense? What is the importance of Vietnam and its continued independence to us?

Mr. NOLTING. This is a big one. I have my own convictions on that. I think the effort is worth it and I think we have got to win it and I think we can win it.

First because, well, I think it is worth it and important because of the balance of power in the world. I think Vietnam is the principal target of Red China in the Far East. I think if they succeed there there will be no stopping Communist takeovers throughout Southeast Asia up to the Indian border.

I was impressed by the statement that the Tengku of Malaya made to me some months ago. He said if this fight is not won here

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[4] "Food for Peace" program.

this whole thing will break out again in Malaya within 6 months and we won't be able to stop it again.

I think beyond that in this point where the most direct confrontation that Red China has with the United States and both sides indirectly, that if the Chinese win by using their puppets in this kind of aggression, armed aggression, that it will have a most profound effect on the ideological or methodological split between the Russians and the Chinese, because the Chinese can show that by this war of liberation they have gained, and I think that will have a very profound effect.

I also think in terms of U.S. prestige, given where we are now in this effort, that to abandon it or to lose it would be a major setback prestigewise and in the influence of the United States throughout the area and perhaps throughout the world.

WHY SOUTH VIETNAM DOES NOT ATTACK THE NORTH

The CHAIRMAN. Would you comment on the suggestion that I think certain members of this committee and others have made that if we are in this seriously why do not the South Vietnamese with our assistance mount an attack upon Hanoi or in other words some form of counterattack? Why must they sit there and particularly endure the invasions which are coming from the Viet Cong?

Mr. NOLTING. May we go off the record on this one, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

CAVEATS ABOUT VIETNAM PROGRESS

The CHAIRMAN. Are you personally optimistic about this effort of establishing independence of Vietnam?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir, I am optimistic and I think real progress has been made in that direction. I would caveat that with two things: One is the Buddhist situation, which I think can be composed and we can move along.

The second is the, well, three really, the second is the situation in Laos against which we have already erected certain physical barricades in South Vietnam that may hold up if the infiltration is not too heavy and too prolonged. We have made it much more difficult physically for infiltrators to do any good when they get into those high mountains on the Laotian border.

The third caveat, of course, is a major invasion from the north involving not only North Vietnamese regular forces but Chinese and that creates a totally new situation which surely our government and you gentlemen would consider, I think, a new situation involving new decisions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me sum it up now.

A FALSE IMAGE OF DIEM

You believe this government is quite capable of carrying out, with no reservations about backing this government, and as a practical matter no alternative to it as you see it, therefore, we ought to continue our policy as it has been carried on?

Mr. NOLTING. This is my conviction. I also think that at the same time we have got to do everything possible to make this government react better and faster to the political necessities internally, and this has been our constant aim. There has been improvement, but not enough, and it also has to react better to public opinion outside.

Personally, I think a false image has been created and been depicted over the years of Diem and his government, but they don't do very much to help that image themselves, and one of our constant problems is to get them to put their best foot forward and, by golly, they put the wrong one forward nine times out of ten.

The CHAIRMAN. This attack on the press is certainly not very wise. Do you have any explanation of that?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir, just being sore at what they consider the false image that has been given by the press. They are really sore about this. And our position is, at least mine is, that they are both wrong in a sense. The press has not been fair, in my judgment, on the one hand. The government has been most inept in trying to correct that unfairness.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the Senator from Ohio.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR DIEM

Senator LAUSCHE. This piece in the New York Times by David Halberstam carries the headlines "U.S. Disaffection with the Government Mounts as Lack of Popular Support Hampers War Effort."

Did you at any time make any statements that would justify this conclusion that we are disaffected with what Diem is doing?

Mr. NOLTING. No, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And your present judgment is that he is the person, as far as our interests are concerned, who ought to continue leading the government?

Mr. NOLTING. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there disagreement between yourself on what Diem is doing when compared to the judgment of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. NOLTING. On this point?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. No. So far as I am aware and this was certainly the case at the time I left Vietnam the end of May, there is no member of our country team involving [deleted] General Harkins, Jay Brent, the head of USOM, John Mecklin, the head of USIA, who would not agree that the best possibility at success in Vietnam rests with the continuation of the Diem government. Whether that has changed, Senator, as a result of the Buddhist troubles, I cannot say.

Senator LAUSCHE. There is unanimous agreement that Diem is the person who should continue as the head having in mind the available material that is there now. Is there disagreement from any source in our government on that subject?

Mr. NOLTING. Not that I know of, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Not that you know of.

Now, with regard to the coup of 1960, you stated flatly that we did not at all stimulate the revolt.

Mr. NOLTING. That is right.

DECREE ON RELIGIOUS FLAGS

Senator LAUSCHE. Respecting the Buddhist trouble, I have this memorandum that was supplied to me as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. May 7 police in Hue attempted to enforce decree prohibiting the flying of any flag unless accompanied by a larger national flag. This decree was long ignored and not enforced on May 7 anywhere outside Hue.

Do you know why on May 7 the decree was enforced that no religious flag shall be flown while it had in the past been long ignored?

Mr. NOLTING. I do not know.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did you make an inquiry to find out why on May 7 they decided to enforce the decree?

Mr. NOLTING. I did.

Senator LAUSCHE. What did you learn?

Mr. NOLTING. I learned that most of the Vietnamese Government felt that the timing of the enforcement of the decree was very unfortunate.

My own conclusion from that is that somebody passed down the order to enforce this decree, that it happened to come out at the time of the next big Buddhist celebration, and this was the commencement of a series of bonehead plays that the government made on this one.

Senator LAUSCHE. This memorandum shows that Buddha's birthday was on May 8.

Mr. NOLTING. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. The day after May 7 on which the decree was enforced. What is the present purpose or present procedure in trying to eliminate this conflict that resulted from the enforcement of the decree?

I now have in mind the agreement that was made on June 16. Has that decree been revoked?

Mr. NOLTING. The decree has been suspended pending action by the National Assembly.

Senator LAUSCHE. What does the National Assembly intend to do about that decree?

Mr. NOLTING. It would——

Senator LAUSCHE. Or what would it be asked to do?

Mr. NOLTING. It intended in effect to abolish it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Abolish it.

RADIO TIME FOR THE BUDDHISTS

All right. Now, another cause of this riot was the question of radio time. What did you learn about that? Did the Buddhists have radio time and then weren't allowed to use it or had they applied for it and was it denied?

Mr. NOLTING. This question of radio time, Senator, came up after I left Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see.

Mr. NOLTING. I would ask Mr. Wood if he would be good enough to inform you on that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Very well.

Mr. WOOD. We don't know, Senator, whether they had asked for radio time in advance. The evidence is that they had not. They went down to the station and asked if they could go on the air immediately. The time was already scheduled and they were not permitted to go on the air immediately. That is the best of our knowledge.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, the memorandum shows that on May 10 there was a meeting of 5,000 or 6,000 to hear this man Tich Quang Tuc who burned himself to death.

Mr. WOOD. No, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that correct?

Mr. WOOD. No, sir, that is not the same man.

Senator LAUSCHE. It is not the same man?

Mr. WOOD. No, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Anyhow, they made five demands, one, that they be allowed to fly the Buddhist flag. That is contemplated for solution.

Mr. NOLTING. That has been agreed on June 16.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

EQUAL STATUS FOR BUDDHISTS AND CATHOLICS

Number two, that equal status for Buddhists with Catholics under decree ten—what is being done about that now?

Mr. NOLTING. That was also agreed and as you know it is guaranteed in the constitution, and so far as we know it is being carried out.

Senator LAUSCHE. When I had the subcommittee meeting here about 3 or 4 weeks ago I was told that this Decree Ten had its base when the French were there and they have been there a long time and Decree Ten holds gives greater rights in the holding of property by the Catholic Church than that does to the Buddhists.

Mr. NOLTING. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And we are attempting to procure a solution that will give equal rights in the holding of church property.

Mr. NOLTING. This is correct, and the government has guaranteed that it will do so.

ARREST OF BUDDHISTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Number three, that there shall be a cessation of the arrest and terrorism of Buddhists. I think we were told that Diem believes that many Communists are in Buddhist garb and that that has partly precipitated that trouble.

Will you let me hear your explanation on that subject?

Mr. NOLTING. I think he has backed away from that position, Senator. That was his initial position, that this whole thing was stirred up by the Communists. I think he has backed away from that, and wisely so.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have there been frequent arrests of Buddhists so far as you know?

Mr. NOLTING. Not before the May 8 incident.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see.

Mr. NOLTING. In other words, to repeat my observation, there had been no persecution.

FREEDOM FOR THE BONZES

Senator LAUSCHE. Number four, they demanded the freedom for Bonzes. Now the Bonzes, are these Buddhist leaders?

Mr. NOLTING. The press itself.

Senator LAUSCHE. Freedom for Bonzes to practice and propagate faith. What is intended to be done about that?

Mr. NOLTING. That it be implemented and it already existed.

Senator LAUSCHE. And finally——

Mr. NOLTING. It is guaranteed by the constitution and existed and now they promised to do the same thing that has been in effect.

COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF LIFE

Senator LAUSCHE. Number five, the government was to compensate the victims who suffered loss of life and that has been done.

Mr. NOLTING. That has been done, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. It is correct to assume, isn't it, that unless there is equality of treatment given to the Buddhists, with only ten percent of the population Catholics and 90 are Oriental, Far Eastern religious background, that we would be in a precarious position in South Vietnam?

Mr. NOLTING. We certainly would. The government would be in a precarious position and our support of the anti-Communist struggle in South Vietnam would be in a precarious position.

DIEM'S BROTHER AND SISTER-IN-LAW

Senator LAUSCHE. To what extent does the brother of Diem, that is the Bishop, participate in governmental operations?

Mr. NOLTING. It had been my observation that he didn't participate at all, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is your present judgment?

Mr. NOLTING. That is my judgment, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. What about his sister? I think her name, they call her Ngo Dinh Nhu.

Mr. NOLTING. That is his sister-in-law.

Senator LAUSCHE. Sister-in-law?

Mr. NOLTING. The president's sister-in-law.

Senator LAUSCHE. What about her?

Mr. NOLTING. She does participate in government very actively.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has she been in a measure the precipitant of these troubles?

Mr. NOLTING. This is very difficult for me to answer. I don't know whether she has herself precipitated these troubles. I do know she has made some unfortunate statements along the way, as

the government and the Buddhists were trying to negotiate out their differences. She has made it more difficult.

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OUT OF LAOS

Senator LAUSCHE. Then there is the infiltration of the Communists out of Laos; has that been rather pronounced?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes. The Viet Cong have used the Ho Chi Minh trail which comes out of North Vietnam through Laos and into South Vietnam as their favorite means of infiltration of South Vietnam. They have been doing this for several years.

Senator LAUSCHE. What you have told us here this morning, how does that compare with what you told the President, if you had a discussion of these matters? Is your report about Diem to the President similar to that which you made to us?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, indeed, I would not make dissimilar reports. I am speaking out of conviction.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

Has the view at all changed which repeatedly has been submitted to this committee that the Far East must be our first line of defense and if we lost it our first line of defense becomes the shores of the United States? The military men testified to that repeatedly.

Mr. NOLTING. What are my views on that?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. I think it is desperately important to hold the free territory of the Far East, especially South Vietnam which is the key, as I see it, of the Communist attack throughout South Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, you mentioned Malaya, what do you hear out of Thailand? Are they disturbed about what is happening or are they encouraged in the last year?

Mr. NOLTING. In Vietnam?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. Thailand is encouraged about developments in Vietnam over the last several years.

Senator LAUSCHE. How do you get that information?

Mr. NOLTING. Through our Embassy there, through talking to the Thailand Ambassador in Saigon, through various sources.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. That is all that I have.

Mr. NOLTING. I might also add, Senator, that other free countries, not only Asian but Western represented in Saigon, are very much encouraged and very enthusiastic about the U.S. efforts. This goes for Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines as well as the British, the French, and the Germans.

We have a coordinating committee established of aid-giving countries and we have managed through that to stimulate aid from other countries as well as the United States, and to put that aid together in a pattern that prevents overlapping and waste. This committee meets regularly, and has resulted, in my opinion, in more fruitful action than I had supposed.

CHARGES THAT U.S. WANTED DIEM REMOVED

Senator LAUSCHE. One more thought. Has any negation been issued by the State Department to these charges that we are throwing Diem overboard?

Mr. NOLTING. Ben, can you help me on that? Not that I know of. No direct, not directly.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that sound to allow statements of this type to go unchallenged if the statements are false? You don't have to answer that question. I had grave doubts about it.

Mr. NOLTING. If I might just express a view on that without answering your question directly, Senator. These charges are based on newspaper reports which are inaccurate, and I suppose that the view is that we don't go in to knock down every inaccurate newspaper report. I am sure that the reassurance on this point will be given, has been given, and certainly I will give it again when I get back to Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. But you have two groups' minds to satisfy: One is that of our people, and the other is that of the Vietnamese. That is all I have.

Mr. NOLTING. I couldn't agree with you more, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator from Missouri, have you any questions?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PROMOTING DISCONTENT

I was very interested in what you said, Mr. Ambassador, on the effort on North Vietnam.

I was out there when you first started out with General Maxwell Taylor and Mr. Walt Rostow.

Mr. NOLTING. I remember very well.

Senator SYMINGTON. After a week there I became convinced we couldn't handle the situation unless you wanted to put up hundreds of millions of dollars annually or unless you began to move toward Hanoi in North Vietnam. As I remember it Mr. Rostow felt that way about it. I was not sure at all about General Taylor. I was very interested in some of your comments.

It is pretty easy to go out there and criticize, and I remember even newspaper people out there, they could go and see different people, and then bring out different stories and, of course, they are not interested in content in their stories. They are interested primarily in promoting discontent but I must say, I did my best to find out who else we would deal with if we didn't deal with this fellow and I couldn't get any feeling that there was anybody else available.

So much for my own thoughts and my pleasure in seeing you again and the fine job that you have been working on in this very difficult situation.

I would like to ask this question, we can make it off the record, but this is a classified hearing and these minutes are not published.

Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

FISH OR CUT BAIT

Senator SYMINGTON. Based on your answer, if they are still infiltrating from Cambodia from Laos, I think we would both agree—perhaps you discussed in before and if and you did I wouldn't want to get into it, but the Laotian situation looks pretty bad—that if they are still infiltrating, fighting from North Vietnam and if we are spending, you said $402 million last year and certainly 15,000 plus this plus that would be another $200 million so we are spending way over a half billion, perhaps three quarters of a billion, we can't continue that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Spending that where, in the whole?

Senator SYMINGTON. No, just in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole operation.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you have the amount of people we have in South Vietnam and spend $200 million, plus equipment, transportation and gasoline that would be pretty close to a couple of hundred million dollars that would be my guess, and we can't go on that way with the balance of payments running the way it is.

Now, assuming that we had to either fish or cut bait, that is; we had to either move in or get out, which is my feeling in this or other places, what would you think based on your experience, which I value highly, what should we do? If you accept the premise that economically we can't afford to continue this over a definite period of years, what should we do?

Mr. NOLTING. May I insert one thing before I answer your question, Senator?

Senator SYMINGTON. All right, sir.

Mr. NOLTING. On the balance of payments problem, the stationing of forces, that is the 15,000, is a direct drain on dollars, the rest of the aid, however, is not.

Senator SYMINGTON. The figures we get are that 80 percent isn't and 20 percent is and I will accept that if you cut it to 60–40 or 70–30, but in any case it is a heavy drain and involves more drain. Assuming that the drain is an unbearable drain so we could meet on a common ground and obtain an opinion, what do you think we can do instead of getting out in order to save our economy which I am beginning to be very worried about.

Mr. NOLTING. Our hope is, and I believe this is a realizable hope, that we can progressively help the government pacify the country and withdraw. This would be withdrawal of the major portion of American personnel.

At the same time, I would realistically expect a need for, which we probably would bear the brunt of, continued economic support and some technical assistance. The major portion of this as you pointed out, would not be a drain on our dollar reserves. It would however, still continue to be a budget cost.

CHINESE REACTION

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me ask this next question because I just want to be sure I have closed it out.

Assuming that you are not right in your premise, that that is what would happen, and I must say I have my doubts about that despite the fact you know more about it than I do, suppose with

conventional weapons we struck the marshalling yards at Hanoi and destroyed them, would that bring in the Chinese Communists in your opinion?

Mr. NOLTING. I want to express my view on that in all humility since I don't know and can't read the reactions of Red China and I am certainly not an expert on the subject. My guess is that it would not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, that is very interesting to me. Even if it did, and I am getting really toward the end, there is nothing we would have to worry about today with respect to the Red Chinese in the handling of them, especially with the carrier in the naval position of the coastline of South Vietnam which as I remember is 600 miles. But even if we did get into trouble with any of them, based on your knowledge of the ideological problems, politics out there, do you think the Russians under any circumstances would support the Chinese Communists?

Mr. NOLTING. In the event of an attack?

Senator SYMINGTON. By the Chinese Communists on us in the Vietnam and Indochina field.

Mr. NOLTING. Again, I say that I can't read Russian policy and am not, certainly not, an expert on it. The way things look to me though as a personal opinion it is that they would not support the Chinese.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt?

NO CHINESE OR RUSSIAN TROOPS IN VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. Did I understand you correctly to say that there are no Chinese or Russian troops or military advisers helping the North Vietnamese?

Mr. NOLTING. There are military advisers, both Chinese and Russians, but they are few. They are handling mostly the supplies of equipment from those countries that come to the North Vietnamese armed forces.

Senator MUNDT. And no troops?

Mr. NOLTING. No troops.

Senator MUNDT. That leads me to ask this, if we are putting in a half billion dollars a year, the Germans and the French and other few countries are putting in something, you said, through a coordinating committee?

Mr. NOLTING. It has amounted, I think, to $10 million from all other sources.

Senator MUNDT. All right. That makes $600 million. Plus our 15,000 troops, with all that kind of aid, with that many troops and all our advisers, what is holding up the North Vietnamese, if they can keep us tied down that way without any help from anybody except the little military assistance and economic assistance from the Chinese and Russians?

A WAR OF LIBERATION

Mr. NOLTING. It is a war of liberation as they call it, based mainly on the misleading and stirring up of the population of the South directed from Hanoi, supplied from Hanoi and signals called

from Hanoi and realizing in addition to the cadres which they bring in, the South Vietnamese people themselves.

Senator MUNDT. In other words, you're telling us that there is greater support for the North Vietnamese Government by the North Vietnamese than there is for the South Vietnamese by the southern population, is that right?

Mr. NOLTING. No, sir. I think the balance has turned now.

I think the greater support of the South Vietnamese goes now to their own government, to the government of Diem.

Senator MUNDT. No, but I mean there is greater homogeneity of support for the North Vietnamese Government or Hanoi than there is for the South Vietnamese at Saigon.

Mr. NOLTING. Excuse me.

Senator MUNDT. Comparing the two governments.

Mr. NOLTING. I didn't get the question.

Senator MUNDT. I take it from what you have said, there is a greater solidarity of support among the North Vietnamese for their government than there is among the South Vietnamese for its government.

Mr. NOLTING. I am not sure of that, Senator. And there has been evidence and reports of very great discontent by the North Vietnamese against their government. There are, at the same time very rigid controls.

I have been told, for example, that you have to have a pass to go from one side of Hanoi to another, and that you have to say when you are going to be back in your house. These controls are typical, as you know, of the Communist controlled society. And the fact there is not revolution in the north against the government does not indicate there is not discontent, and there have been reports of revolts in certain provinces based mostly on the collection of food from the peasants and they resented it, and got out of hand. But the controls are very effective.

Senator MUNDT. How does the size of the two populations compare?

Mr. NOLTING. One has about 17 million, that is the north, the south has about 15 million.

WHY CAN'T THE SOUTH PUSH BACK THE NORTH?

Senator MUNDT. Given those figures and given this support, and given the fact that you say there is discontent on both sides, I come back to my original question, with all this economic and military aid and 15,000 American troops why can't the South Vietnamese start pushing back the North Vietnamese?

Mr. NOLTING. What they are trying to do is to push the Viet Cong out of South Vietnam and then pursue a live and let live policy.

Senator SYMINGTON. But the question from the Senator, it is a good question and I don't think you quite answered it.

Mr. NOLTING. No, I didn't.

Senator MUNDT. I don't think you did, either.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is the guts of the whole situation.

Mr. NOLTING. You say why don't they?

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. There are some in the Vietnamese government who would like to do just that. Our policy is just based on clearing up, cleaning up the situation in South Vietnam and letting it rest there. Just as it is in Korea.

Senator MUNDT. It seems to me you perpetuate a problem there we are going to have to continue to pour money and troops and aid in ad infinitum.

LIMITED OBJECTIVE

Mr. NOLTING. Well, our hope is—and again, I say I think it is a realistic hope—is that we can help the government of South Vietnam over the next few years reestablish control and leave them in charge to keep control and to keep the country free of Communist subversion, and this is the limited objective.

There will always be pressures on South Vietnam because of its location and for other reasons, but I think the limited objective is an achievable one. I would not like to predict how long it is going to take. I do know that the aid figure asked for in fiscal 1964 is somewhat less than was spent in fiscal 1963 which shows a trend and I hope it is a continuing one.

Senator MUNDT. If in the meantime Laos capitulates to the Communists then isn't the South Vietnam situation hopeless?

Mr. NOLTING. I would not say it is hopeless, Senator, I think it is made much worse.

ATTITUDE OF THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT

Senator MUNDT. What is the attitude of the Cambodian Government, sympathetic to which side?

Mr. NOLTING. The Cambodian Government is certainly not sympathetic to the Diem regime. Sihanouk [5] is constantly making cracks and taking pot shots at Diem personally and at the government but basically our estimate is that the Cambodian Government would prefer to see a victory over the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

Senator MUNDT. Why do they create so many irritations by permitting the Viet Cong to go over the border or come back and have, as you said, sort of an escape hatch, if they get caught in a raid?

Mr. NOLTING. They don't aid and abet this but they have no physical means of preventing it.

Senator MUNDT. Didn't you say they were very irritated whenever the South Vietnamese chased them back over the border?

Mr. NOLTING. They are, yes. We have been working with both governments to try to promote a kind of cooperation on this which would minimize these incidents.

A LITTLE SLIVER OF LAND

Senator MUNDT. What concerns me about your report, as I look at the whole story, Mr. Ambassador, is that you believe that in a few years if we are lucky we will have stabilized the situation in

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[5] Prince Norodom Sihanouk, premier of Cambodia.

Vietnam. But Laos in the meantime could capitulate, Cambodia is not supporting our effort, we are not going to make a thrust into the north to push the Communists back, and that at best, therefore, we just save a little sliver of land down there which would be on our side.

Mr. NOLTING. I would predict if we do that, that the situation in Cambodia will firm up. It is conceivable that the situation in Laos will firm up. Certainly it will be much firmer in Thailand and in Malaya if we succeed in South Vietnam in this limited objective.

Senator MUNDT. Is there sort of an established order between the two parts of Vietnam which is recognized by both sides as a dividing line?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, the 17th parallel, you see it on the map there right north of the caption for Laos. You see that line, the short line that goes across.

Senator MUNDT. And are the North Vietnamese troops any place south of that line?

Mr. NOLTING. North Vietnamese troops as such, no. Viet Cong as we call them, or the guerrillas in South Vietnam and who are supported by the north are in many places south of that line, this is what the fighting is about.

Senator MUNDT. They have to infiltrate from Laos or Cambodia, they cannot cross the line, is that right? The line is protected, fortified?

Mr. NOLTING. The line is more or less protected, yes. It is patrolled in most of the accessible parts by the International Control Commission. I should add, though, all of these people who are fighting in the south are not infiltrators. They are recruited, a large number of them are recruited in the south from malcontent.

PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Senator MUNDT. Which would indicate that the propaganda and the psychological warfare out of Hanoi is much more successful or is more efficient or is adapted to the ideas of the people than is true of the South Vietnamese going north.

Mr. NOLTING. Heretofore it has been effective. It is becoming less so, in my opinion, and recently, Mr. Chairman, the estimate of the group of active supporters of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam has gone down.

This figure is never a very exact one but we used to think in terms of a 100,000. Now, we are thinking in terms of 80,000 as a result of continuing successes on the part of the South Vietnamese in pacifying the country.

Senator MUNDT. One final question. Does the presence of our 15,000 troops in South Vietnam give a psychological propaganda weapon which the North Vietnamese are able to use effectively on the population south of the border or not?

Mr. NOLTING. They use it all the time.

Senator MUNDT. This is effective with the people, that is one reason why they are getting these recruits?

Mr. NOLTING. I think it is not as effective, I don't think it is very effective. The common expression with which radio Hanoi bombards the south is the what they call "Me, Diem regime," "me"

means U.S., so they commonly refer to the government as the U.S. Diem regime, meaning puppet. This is not in my opinion a very effective propaganda weapon. It does influence some people, no doubt. One of the reasons for hoping that we can slim down eventually the American presence there is to make this less effective.

The CHAIRMAN. The Ambassador has an appointment with the Secretary at 12:15 and I am afraid we are going to have to close. Thank you very much.

How long are you going to be there?

Mr. NOLTING. Toward the end of August, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am sorry, we are running a little late. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JULY 10, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met at 3 p.m. in executive session in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

The Chairman announced the committee would consider several bills creating various forms of mechanisms for the improvement of the Foreign Service, and advanced the bills (S. 15), to establish a National Academy of Foreign Affairs; (S. 865), to provide for the establishment of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs; (S. 32), to provide for the establishment of a United States Foreign Service Academy; (S. 99), to create a United States Foreign Service Academy and (S. 414), to create the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy, and for other purposes. He also presented to the committee a draft bill by the staff incorporating some of his own ideas along the lines of the foregoing measures.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[After discussion, the committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JULY 12, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Symington (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Sparkman, Aiken, and Carlson.

The subcommittee was briefed on military assistance to India by William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

MONDAY, JULY 15, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:45 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Long, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

The committee began the markup of bill S. 1276, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

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MINUTES

TUESDAY, JULY 16, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 11:15 a.m. in executive session in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Long, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The committee continued its markup of bill S. 1276, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JULY 18, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:40 a.m. in executive session in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Humphrey, Morse, Long, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

The Chairman read letters from the Departments of State and Justice in reference to the proposed drug investigation in Colombia. Senator Morse moved that the committee draft a letter to the Committee on the Judiciary that any investigation should be pursued by the Justice and State Departments, that the subject matter does involve foreign policy problems, and that the Committee on Foreign Relations has no desire to join with any other committee in the investigation. The Chairman remarked that the Judiciary Committee has to settle its own problems in the matter. The Chairman then announced the motion as carried without objection.

The committee continued its markup of bill S. 1276, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JULY 18, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CANADIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4 p.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Aiken (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Morse, Lausche, and Carlson.

The subcommittee was briefed on Canadian affairs generally by Delmar R. Carlson, desk officer for Canada at the Department of State.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m. in room S116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Humphrey, Morse, Long, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

The committee heard David E. Bell, Administrator, AID, and others on bill S. 1276, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Following, the committee resumed its markup of the bill, and afterward the committee recessed at 12:20 p.m.

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2:30 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol, in executive session.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Morse, Carlson, and Aiken. Senators Hickenlooper, Long, and Mundt later joined.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1276).

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:40 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JULY 22, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Lausche, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

The committee resumed its markup of bill S. 1276, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JULY 23, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

[The committee continued its markup of bill S. 1276, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, recessing at 12:45 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee continued in executive session at 2:45 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Hickenlooper, Carlson, and Williams. Senators Gore, Symington, Aiken, Lausche, Church, Mundt, and Humphrey.

The committee worked on the markup of bill S. 1276, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee recessed at 4:30 to take up other business.]

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Spurred on by their experiences in the Cuban Missile Crisis, both the United States and Soviet Union renewed their efforts in 1963 to halt nuclear tests, stabilize the nuclear balance between East and West, and prevent the proliferation of nuclear power in other nations.

[On July 15, talks began in Moscow, with Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman representing the United States. In surprisingly quick order, agreement was reached, and a treaty was initialed on July 25, and formally signed on August 5.

[President Kennedy submitted the treaty to the Senate on August 8, and the Foreign Relations Committee conducted both public and closed hearings. On September 3, the committee reported the treaty favorably. However, the following week the Preparednesss Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee issued its own report, warning that the treaty posed military and technical disadvantages to the United States. The Senate voted down a series of amendments to the treaty, although it adopted a preamble, offered by Senator Richard Russell, insisting upon the Senate's right to approve all future amendments to the treaty. On September 24, the Senate passed the treaty by a vote of 80–19. The Soviet Union ratified it the following day, and more than a hundred nations quickly followed. France and China noticeably abstained from signing.]

TUESDAY, JULY 23, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 4:30 p.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman), presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Henderson, of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, we are very honored by your and Mr. Foster's coming up to explain matters. We have all been very curious about it. There are all kinds of stories in the press. We are very pleased to have both of you here to enlighten the committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM C. FOSTER, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I know that the committee members have commitments, and so time is limited. But let me say that today we are not undertaking formal and systematic consultation. The President's hope was that when the negotiators would get as far as they can get, that Mr. Harriman would come back, and before we sign any agreement that might appear possible, that we would have full consultation with the Senate in that interim period.

I also would like to say in view of this morning's newspaper speculation that there is no agreement with the Soviets or the British about how and when the signing would take place. Obviously, we have let both the British and Russians know that we want a period

between the negotiation and any signing for consultation and review here in this country. So, that is the parliamentary situation on that particular point.

We would expect Mr. Harriman to come back and we would have several days at least in which we could go into these matters in great detail.

I also would emphasize that this piece of paper which is in front of you, which is marked "Secret-Eyes Only-Ban" is not an agreed test. In other words, this represents the discussion thus far because there are other meetings still to come. I point out one or two points as we go along that will indicate where further discussion seems desirable, but it is very close to an agreed text, and I think it is wise to inform the committee about the way things are going. So, perhaps, I could just run over this very briefly.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be fine if it would be explained.

TITLE AND PREAMBLE

Secretary RUSK. On the title there was considerable argument about the title oddly enough. The Soviets wanted a title which simply stopped at "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests", or language that seemed to indicate that it was a comprehensive test treaty, but they then accepted a more accurate definition here "in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater."

I think on the preamble this is language which has been used in one way or another before. I don't believe that the preamble raises any particular problem, but I will just pause for members of the committee to run over that.

I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, that although I feel that I ought to pick up the individual copies when this discussion is over, that I would like to leave a copy with Mr. Marcy so that members could have a copy where they could refer to it if they wished to, prior to the time that we can get you a text that seems to be fully negotiated.

The preamble indicates that the three of us who constitute the nuclear test ban subcommittee of the Geneva Conference could be the original parties to the treaty. Then we will see later that it is open to adherence by all parties, by all governments. We would hope that everyone else in the world would adhere to it. I will come to that after we run over the text.

But it would be our speculation that most of the governments and authorities of the world would in fact sign this treaty, and we feel that that would give it tremendous backing in terms of its enforceability and its pressures to put an end to atmospheric testing.

PARTICIPATION OF THE FRENCH

Senator MUNDT. Do your hopes include the French, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, still. I would have to say in all candor that we have no indication at this point that the French will sign, but on the other hand they have only conducted 4 atmospheric tests themselves. They, I think, would find it impossible now to conduct another atmospheric test in Algeria. It would probably mean that if they tested they would test in the Pacific, and that is

sometime off, and we would in the meantime be working with them and with our allies to see what arrangements possibly could be made that would make it possible for the French to sign this agreement.

PLUTONIUM TO FRANCE

Senator AIKEN. The Atomic Energy Committee has been asked to authorize the shipment of 40 kilograms of plutonium to France. Would that aid France in nuclear experiments by permitting her to substitute her own limited supply for one purpose while we were furnishing a substantial amount for another purpose?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I am quite frank to say I am not familiar with that particular shipment request.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. 38 pounds.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I am not familiar with that request. It doesn't reflect any change of policy on our part.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know about it.

Senator AIKEN. It is no secret.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. It was divulged in an open hearing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Supposedly for peaceful use.

Secretary RUSK. I would think it would be in that field and not related to weapons problem.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point George is raising is, would it enable them to use this particular plutonium of a certain degree and regimen, use that and then divert their own plutonium in an equal amount at least to weapons purposes. That is the question.

Secretary RUSK. It is conceivable.

Senator AIKEN. The displacements.

Secretary RUSK. I think the problems about testing would be far more severe than the question of supply of material. If a hundred nations, for example, sign this agreement, I think that Peiping and France would have some great problems about further testing, and if I could rely very heavily upon the executive character of this meeting, Mr. Chairman, the Soviets seem to us to be relying very heavily upon the pressures of the rest of the world on Peiping. This is reflected in their attitude toward the wording of the withdrawal clause that we will get to.

But I think that they would like to see as many as possible sign this, preparatory to trying to deal with the Chinese problem.

SEPARATION OF UNDERGROUND TESTS

The gut of the matter is in Article 1 because that is the article which indicates what is to be excluded, and that is that it would undertake to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon tests, exploration or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control, first, "in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or"—and this is the underground section—"in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

In other words, an underground test which may have some venting or some degree of fallout that does not produce fallout outside

of the territory would be permitted under this treaty. In other words, this would leave us free to conduct unlimited numbers of underground tests and would leave them to do the same, but explosions which occur——

The CHAIRMAN. On the surface.

Secretary RUSK. Or in the atmosphere we are quite confident would in fact be detected.

But this is the best definition that we could find as to how you separate an underground from any other kind of test, those that are half and half, at the surface or those that might start underground and become surface in a large way would create some problems of definition, and this is the one that was in our treaty draft of last year that has stood up under negotiation.

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR TESTING

Senator AIKEN. It is almost necessary to conduct underground tests in order to determine the use of nuclear power for constructive purposes, isn't it?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. What did you do about that?

Secretary RUSK. I might mention that point here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Weapons tests.

Secretary RUSK. Or any other explosion.

Now on the peaceful use side, there was in our draft last year a special article on peaceful use, subject to the unanimous consent of the parties, the three of us, or to in effect a disclosure of the device.

Now our own people are very much concerned about the disclosure of a device because it is in the nature of peaceful use that you use your cleanest possible device, and that involves the most advanced technology. So, under this treaty in the first place we would be able in underground testing to continue to test preparatory for peaceful use.

My understanding from Dr. Seaborg [1] is that the testing relevant to that has to do with the means of producing the clean device which will not produce a lot of fallout or contaminated debris, and that is actually susceptible to investigation by underground testing, so that there the Atomic Energy Commission is entirely content with the preparatory experimental work leading to peaceful use under this treaty.

TRANSOCEANIC CANALS

Secondly, since we would not expect to conduct peaceful use, that is digging harbors or things of that sort with contamination but with clean devices, so far as our own territory is concerned and Alaska, Hawaii, and so forth, we would think that this treaty would not get in the way of the kind of peaceful use we may some day want to use in our own country.

There would be potentially a problem in a transoceanic canal because that is not in our own territory. We have talked to Mr. Khrushchev about this question. He has himself indicated a number of projects that they have in mind, and since this is a very long time

[1] Glenn Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

off and very speculative we would be inclined not to make that an issue in this treaty.

Inside of U.S. territory there is no problem as we see it in our talks with the Atomic Energy Commission. I wanted to let the committee know that in terms of a future canal possibility, that we would think we would have to use the amendment process here, and raise that question as a fresh issue some years from now, 5 or 10 years from now if the matter does in fact come up.

Senator SPARKMAN. You mean like the Panama Canal?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Outside of our own country?

Secretary RUSK. Outside of our own territory. We will be looking further into the question as to whether because of the nature of our presence in the Panama Canal that it could be arranged with the consent of Panama that that is sufficient under our control to bring it within this treaty, and that sort of thing. But we will do that before the formal consultation with the committee when Mr. Harriman gets back.

VENTING FROM UNDERGROUND TESTS

Now, the rest of that paragraph 1b simply—the Soviets pressed pretty hard to try to point toward the eventual elimination of all weapons testing, and this is the language that we got which we think is meaningless as far as this particular treaty is concerned, but it just says that this is without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions in all environments in effect.

Then paragraph 2——

Senator SYMINGTON. Before you leave b, Mr. Chairman, if I may ask, "in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State", just what are the implications of that?

Secretary RUSK. If there is some venting from an underground test, for example, which does not create a radioactive problem outside of the State in which it is conducted, then we would think that that would itself not bar the possibility of underground tests. It is an attempt to define what is underground and what is not, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. My next question which I only ask for clarification is how would you tell that there was some venting that was maintained on the soil of the Soviets? These are the questions we will be asked, did that venting come from an underground test and not from an atmospheric test?

Secretary RUSK. I think on the atmospheric tests that we have other means of separating that out. Would you like to coment on that, Bill?

Senator SYMINGTON. If at the same time you ran underground tests which has been the subject of certain discussion here in the committee.

Mr. FOSTER. Answering that first question, Senator, there is a difference between underground debris and atmospheric debris which is distinguishable.

ABILITY TO DETECT NUCLEAR TESTING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Bill, isn't it true that our instrumentation and analytical ability is so refined at the moment that we have very little difficulty in telling whether surface debris is included in the cloud as compared to pure atmospheric testing?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So I don't think there is a great deal of difficulty. They can detect whether underground contamination is in this cloud fairly easily.

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Senator GORE. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

HAZARDOUS RADIOACTIVITY

Senator GORE. What would be the situation, Mr. Secretary, if an underground test were engaged in by the United States which unexpectedly vented with sufficient volume to carry radioactivity to Canada, Mexico, or to some other country?

Secretary RUSK. I think that would be technically a violation of this agreement, but that is a hazard which all signatories who are conducting any underground tests have to encounter, and it may happen the other way around as well.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. But I think it is possible to take large precautions against that. For example, we conduct our underground testing in this country and no one has a greater stake in this not happening than we do ourselves. So that I would think that every possible effort would be made to prevent the contingency which you are talking about.

Do you want to add anything to that, Bill?

Senator GORE. If it occurred as you say, it would be a technical violation and if we were the guilty party, we would frankly say it was unintended, unexpected, and they likely would do the same thing.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. It would be open. If you would look to Article IV, we might just turn to that for a moment because that is relevant here, Article IV is the withdrawal clause.

WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE

We worked on that quite hard because the Soviets did not want any withdrawal clause, and they did not want to use the precise language of violation of the treaty because they seem to feel that this would put them in a very difficult position with the Chinese, that they were relying more heavily upon the total impact of the worldwide support of this treaty, rather than their own bilateral pressure initially on the Chinese.

Now you see under the withdrawal clause that "each party shall have a right to withdraw" if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. That would not necessarily mean that in the event of an accident or a single test by France or a

single test by China that the signatories would automatically at that point withdraw.

They would take a look at it and see what the effect would be. I can imagine that a series of tests by anybody would cause the parties to withdraw. But the isolated event would not necessarily mean that the treaty would collapse, depending upon what else is going on at the time and what the estimates were as to how it affected our national security interests.

The CHAIRMAN. If this happened once and you explained it and it is satisfactory, then that would be acceptable.

Secretary RUSK. I think it is unlikely that the treaty would collapse over an accidental event of the sort that you mentioned, Senator Gore.

AN OPEN-ENDED WITHDRAWAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But this does in fact mean that any of the signatories to the treaty can within their own discretion make a declaration of this kind and withdraw and their excuse doesn't have to be a plausible excuse or anything else. This is an open-ended withdrawal.

Secretary RUSK. It is pretty open-ended, but on the other hand in our discussions with the Soviets we made it very clear that these extraordinary events related to the subject matters of this treaty have to do with the problem of nuclear testing and nuclear explosions, and it would be frivolous and unacceptable if just any reason were given.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't agree with the term "unacceptable," because I don't think any other party has got anything to say about it. I have leaned for several years toward the idea of a more liberal withdrawal provision because the Russians are going to violate it anyway if they want to. They will do as they please, and I don't like to see us tied up in a strait jacket.

So, I tend myself to support a more liberal withdrawal provision, but I am merely calling attention to the fact that this——

Senator CHURCH. It seems to me, Bourke, we would be in a box if we made the withdrawal depend upon the violation of the other party or some other party, because then the question of whether or not the violation had occurred could put us in a very bad light. This would become the subject of interminable debate which couldn't be proved on any side.

Secretary RUSK. And then nonsignatories would not be in violation although the events for which they were responsible might give us the reason for withdrawal.

Senator MORSE. I think that is an excellent clause.

Senator GORE. May I ask another question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary HICKENLOOPER. All I was doing is just trying to point out the fact that this puts the almost complete discretion in the signatory powers to withdraw.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it is the easiest provision I have ever seen in a treaty.

THE 90-DAY NOTICE

Senator GORE. I wondered, Mr. Secretary, about the significance of the 90-day notice. I am inclined to think that it is good. It would at least give us 90 days in which to prepare to resume testing if the Soviets withdrew from the treaty. So, I am not asking the question critically but for information. What is the significance of the 90 days?

Secretary RUSK. We felt that there ought to be 90 days in which there could be a consideration of the whole situation among governments, if a government announced in 90 days it was going to withdraw from the treaty, to see whether this would really collapse over the issues which they seem to have in mind.

We debated, went over in great detail different periods of notice from 60 days on up to a longer period, 6 months. I think that if we got to a comprehensive treaty, that we might want to review this matter on the withdrawal period. Since we will be testing underground, our laboratories will be operational and we will be in a much higher state of preparation than we were during the general moratorium a few years ago.

We felt that this three months is just about right from our point of view, looking at it in both directions, what kind of inhibition do we want on the other fellow and what kind of opportunity do we want to protect our own interests. It is an on balance kind of time. You can make an argument for anything from 30 days on up to 6 months or even a year. We thought that 90 days would well protect us on an atmospheric ban.

LABORATORIES CAN CONTINUE TO WORK

Now, to get the comprehensive, we would have to review that, I think, to see if we would not want a somewhat longer notice period, because our own laboratories might then become disestablished and we may lose a little momentum here, you see. But here under this treaty our laboratories will continue to work, and we will still be in a position of high readiness for the kind of tests that we would conduct in the atmosphere if we withdraw from this treaty.

Senator HUMPHREY. You would be at the stage of what you might call ready alert with your laboratory facilities?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. Also, Mr. Secretary, we don't know what may develop under this treaty. There may be some misunderstandings and frictions develop and it gives us 90 days for diplomatic negotiations to clear up any misunderstandings that might cause a withdrawal of the notice of withdrawal.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

PREPARATIONS FOR A TEST

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, can any part of this treaty be interpreted as prohibiting preparations for a test?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. And it takes 90 days to prepare for a test?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. There are a good many preparations that we could have on a standby alert. For example, we could keep up-to-date the scheduling of the types of tests we would conduct if we were going to test. We could keep that time period caught up short.

Senator AIKEN. Even though you were ready to go you have to give 90 days notice?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. I might just mention, Mr. Chairman, in case any of the Senators would have to leave before we get through here, there is one point on page 3 that could be a little troublesome and we will be discussing it further with the Soviet Union. On the matter——

The CHAIRMAN. Which number?

RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS

Secretary RUSK. It has to do with the paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5, on the matter of signatory states. It is well established already that in multilateral documents the signatory by someone we do not recognize does not imply recognition, so I don't believe that that is an issue we need to worry too much about. We have had the Geneva Accords and other things where that has been promptly dealt with.

But the matter of the depository governments is a little troublesome from a legal point of view, because the way this language now is, it would seem to suggest that anyone who wishes to sign it would notify each one of the depository governments, and the depository governments would inform each of the signatories in certain events, you see. Now this involves a problem of North Korea, North Vietnam, Peiping, and some others in the event that they sign.

Senator MORSE. Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. Cuba. We would like—well, we recognize the state of Cuba.

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. So that could be troublesome but some of these we don't even recognize as states. So we would prefer to make it quite clear in the treaty itself that any depository may receive ratification from any signatory and the depository would notify the other depositories.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Could he finish that?

What was the implication of that? If East Germany ratifies it and deposits it with us it is recognition?

Secretary RUSK. It is that kind of thing, and we might be under this treaty under duty to notify East Germany by a calling of a conference to consider an amendment or something of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. What does this mean, that you don't have to do that?

Secretary RUSK. No, under the present language there is the strong implication that we would have to deal officially with the East Germans.

Senator HUMPHREY. How would you want to modify that?

Secretary RUSK. We would say any one of the depositories so that where there are differences in recognition working both ways.

Senator SPARKMAN. If East Germany offered it to the United States for deposit, would the United States refuse to accept it or simply tell them to go to——

Secretary RUSK. It would be much better for us to be in a position where this was not necessary, to avoid this question if we can.

Senator SPARKMAN. I know, but I am just saying suppose they wanted to be a little pesky and do that approach?

Mr. FOSTER. Refer them to the Soviet Union.

Secretary RUSK. We have not received official communications from the East German Government.

AMENDING THE TREATY

Senator SYMINGTON. Going back to article II. Mr. Secretary, you state, "Any party may propose amendments to the treaty," and you say one-third, which with three would be one, could call a conference right away. Then you say, "Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to this treaty."

If there were say 5 or 6 Soviet countries signed up couldn't they amend it along the lines of underground testing?

Secretary RUSK. Subject to a veto by all the original——

Senator SYMINGTON. That means we would have a veto?

Secretary RUSK. We would have a veto on amendments. On this point the Soviets somewhat to our surprise met our request that we change the two-thirds vote required to amend to a bare majority, and we had in mind we may some day want to raise the peaceful useful purposes as an amendment to this. We wanted to make it somewhat easy to amend as long as we had the veto.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't quite see where you have the veto in there.

Secretary RUSK. "Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to this treaty, including the votes of all of the original parties."

Senator SPARKMAN. That is those three must be included in the veto. But let's say you have got 10 members.

Senator SYMINGTON. Any one of the three okay.

Senator SPARKMAN. It doesn't say that.

The CHAIRMAN. It does. You have to have the agreement of all three of the original parties.

Senator SPARKMAN. It doesn't say that. It says "including the votes." But suppose we vote negatively?

RATIFICATION BY A MAJORITY

Senator GORE. You are saying that the majority must include all of the votes.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what it says.

Senator GORE. If the majority must include all of us, then we have a veto.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, but suppose you have 10 members, we will say, and a majority of six vote for it. Russia would vote with the six. Two of us would vote with the four. We would be included.

Secretary RUSK. We will clarify that.

Senator HUMPHREY. You mean just because it is a vote it may be a negative vote as well as an affirmative?

Senator SPARKMAN. If it relates to majority, if it is tied into majority within your veto that would be right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This language I think is sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly interpreted it that way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It says the amendment shall enter into force for all parties upon the deposit of ratification, deposit of ratification "by a majority." That is ratification by a majority of all the parties, including the instruments of ratification of all the original parties.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So you have to have an instrument of ratification by Britain, Russia and the United States.

Senator MORSE. Sure.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And a majority of——

Senator SPARKMAN. If that is tied in with the majority it does it, but it doesn't seem to me to be absolutely clear.

OTHER SIGNATORY NATIONS

Senator AIKEN. You can repeat the veto power of any one of the original signatories. It would be possible, say, for the African and Asian blocs to take over and amend it.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. To prohibit underground testing or any other use.

Senator HUMPHREY. But that majority under this language must include the three original signatories.

The CHAIRMAN All three of them.

Senator AIKEN. You have a Security Council set-up there.

Secretary RUSK. I am quite sure neither the Soviet Union or ourselves would accept amendments except with our ratification. This means with the advice and consent of the Senate, of course, on these amendments.

Senator AIKEN. But if North Vietnam deposits a certificate with Russia, then she becomes a signatory.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. Just as France, Holland, or any others.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Red China.

Senator AIKEN. That is the remaining obstacle?

Secretary RUSK. No. I think that itself is not an obstacle because we would want North Vietnam, North Korea, Peiping, to sign this.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. That itself under generally established practice does not involve recognition among those signatories who do not recognize each other otherwise. That is quite clear. But this draft here, unless we can get some clarification of it with the Soviet Union seems to say that as a depository we would receive ratifications from North Korea, and that is a depository we would notify North Korea of certain things.

THE RECOGNITION PROBLEM

Senator AIKEN. And then you would be recognizing them.

Secretary RUSK. And this gets closer to the recognition problem than we want to get.

Senator AIKEN. Officially.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. How do you mean talk about three original parties? Aren't there five?

The CHAIRMAN. Three. The three parties——

Senator LAUSCHE. This says here "The governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the quote original parties close quote". That is more than 3.

Secretary RUSK. The title of the United Kingdom is Great Britain and North Ireland.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are raising the independence of Ireland, I see.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Frank, you are from South Ireland.

Secretary RUSK. As a man from Belfast, Senator, I appreciate your sentiments.

NEGOTIATIONS STILL NOT FINAL

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, some of us have to leave in a minute. I would like to respectfully ask what the status is of this situation

Secretary RUSK. There will be further discussion of it tomorrow. Actually, I think what is left for purposes of the negotiators is some tidying up on one or two of these technical matters.

The substance of Article I and the withdrawal clause which, with the two put together, are the gut of the matters I feel is pretty well fixed pending the formal consultation when Mr. Harriman gets back with the committees of the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. Before anybody leaves, some came in late or after the Secretary had made the announcement.

Stuart, I want you to hear this. The Secretary made it very clear that this is not be be given to the press. It still isn't final, and he would not at all like for it be discussed, because it might embarrass the future negotiations. Some of you weren't here, and these copies are to be returned to him except one to be left with the chief of staff.

Senator GORE. I will return mine now.

Senator SYMINGTON. I appreciate your saying that. I would like to make one suggestion if the Chair thought it was in order.

JURISDICTIONS OF COMMITTEES

I certainly would have one of these delivered to Senator Stennis who is chairing the hearing investigating nuclear test ban. The hearing has been running since last September. I think that this might expedite some of the possible problems that the Secretary might have.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think if you are going to do that Senator Russell surely should be advised too as chairman of the full committee.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, if perhaps I could have a word, we don't want anything on our side to complicate the problems of jurisdictions of the committees in anything we do at this stage. We have talked about the substance of this with Senator Stennis and the others.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am bound to say to you, Mr. Secretary that there is a considerable feeling in the Joint Committee [on Atomic Energy] that they have a very vital interest in this atomic energy disposition problem. They are quite concerned about what is going to be done with atomic weapons and atomic energy.

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps we could have some consultation, Mr. Chairman, with the two of you about how we deal with this problem. But we have no objection to showing it to particular chairmen with the full understanding of this committee.

AFFIRMATIVE UNITED COERCIVE ACTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is one question that I would like to suggest here, and I have raised it with you. I know you have considered it. I had hoped that paragraph No. 2 of Article I could go a step further than it has.

Maybe there are practical reasons why. Maybe there is violent objection. It says now: "Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, even encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion," and so on.

I had hoped that we might be able to get some language in a treaty agreeing to affirmative united coercive action of some kind against other nations that proposed to do this. This is sort of a negative thing. I am not critical of it. It goes a little further than I thought the Russians might go.

Do I make myself clear?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Say the signatories to the treaty would act in concert to bring pressures on any other nation that was intending to do this rather than just agree to stand aloof and not do anything.

FRANCE IS THE CENTRAL PROBLEM

Secretary RUSK. Senator, quite frankly to us the central problem on that, and this is as far as I am concerned Top Secret in character, is France.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is what?

Secretary RUSK. Is France. If France had taken its seat in Geneva, sat down with us on this nuclear subcommittee, was an original party here and we were all working together on this, I think we would be in a very strong position to move somewhat more in the direction that you suggest.

But we are not abandoning yet the possibility that France might sign, and we don't want to put a blackjack over France even though we would like to have a blackjack over China. So that these

two things get in each other's way and they have at every turn here, because we don't know yet if we can get France to sign this treaty.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, France is one of the countries I was pointing at. If France is willing to sign this as it is, certainly she would be willing to sign it with that provision in and it could go in. I don't know whether the Russians would accept it or not. That would mean the Russians would agree to bring coercive action against China in concert with other nations.

Secretary RUSK. I think that if we got everybody but China to sign, that we could in fact take some action along this line.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, if France signs this she would agree not to do it.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, but if you were to have a more coercive paragraph in here without France, then I think that we would have great trouble in getting France to look at this in a serious way.

THE ORIGINAL PARTIES

Senator WILLIAMS. Is the suggestion made that France could be one of the original parties?

Secretary RUSK. This is a possibility, that if France were to come in, France could be admitted as an original party. But they have not seen fit to join the negotiations or come to Geneva or take any part.

They have had four atmospheric tests as compared with hundreds that the others of us have conducted. So that we did not think that we should leave this document unfinished by including France in this document as an original party.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about Red China? Is there a possibility they would come in?

Secretary RUSK. As an original party? I would not think so because they have not exploded any explosions, and we don't think you get your admission as an original party and a veto by in effect violating this treaty.

Senator SPARKMAN. What is the position of the United Arab Republic?

Secretary RUSK. It will be very interesting to see whether there are any reluctant signers among all the rest. I mean, the attitude will be very revealing on the part of a number of governments we have our eye on at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

OPINION OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Senator LAUSCHE. What do the members of the Chiefs of Staff have to say about this insofar as it constitutes adequate protection of our national security?

Secretary RUSK. I think there is some difference of view among the Chiefs, but I think perhaps we ought to take that up when we get to the more formal consultation in this period after Mr. Harriman gets back.

Senator LAUSCHE. This is not submitted to us now to procure our tentative approval?

Secretary RUSK. Not at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a briefing.

Secretary RUSK. It is to let you know the present state of the discussion and to say to the committee that it is the President's expectation that Harriman would come back before any formal signing of this treaty for consultation between the executive and the Senate, before we go back for any signature.

Senator HUMPHREY. May I ask, Mr. Secretary, do you intend to have our representatives at the meeting tomorrow attempt to clarify that depository government feature?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, that is the point we are trying to clear up.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is one of the points you would like to clear up. And the other point Senator Hickenlooper raised you feel at this time would be disadvantageous, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I like his point. I want to say I think it is one that has a good deal of merit to it, but the complication with France you think overrides that?

KHRUSHCHEV'S PROBLEM

Secretary RUSK. I think also, sir, that initially we have to think a little bit about Mr. Khrushchev's problem on this. His situation with China is about as bad as it can get. We have had some reason to think that he is hoping that if a hundred nations sign this, that that itself will bring a weight of pressure on China that will make his problem later with China somewhat more simple. I think we have to take this into consideration.

I might also say on the question of France or China, there is some time. That is, France, it is our understanding, does not expect to conduct an atmospheric test in the Sahara. They may, but if Algeria, for example, promptly signs up, I should think under Article II, one of paragraph two, that that would forbid a test in Algeria, you see. That means the Pacific for France. That means sometime off. So, I think we have a little time here as far as France is concerned to work at this and see what we can do.

China, perhaps sometime. We don't know how much.

RECENT SOVIET TESTS

Senator HUMPHREY. Were there recent tests by the Soviet Union, Mr. Secretary, atmospheric tests? I read somewhere in the paper sometime ago that there was a suspicion of such tests. Has that suspicion been clarified one way or another?

Secretary RUSK. It has been, Senator, but I would hope you wouldn't press that point at the moment, because we are not sure that this may not have been an attempt by the Soviet Union to trap us into a demonstration that certain things are possible.

Senator HUMPHREY. Very good, just let it rest.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask about page 2, paragraph 2, line 2, where it says, "Refrain from encouraging." That I take it would preclude us from sending France this plutonium which she desires, because that would tend to be encouraging France.

Secretary RUSK. I would think this would not get in the way of the transfer of fissionable materials for peaceful use.

Senator MUNDT. These materials could be used for peaceful uses and release others for testing. We would be encouraging the French if we gave them under the terms of this treaty 40 kilograms of plutonium.

Secretary RUSK. This is aimed more at giving technical information or sending experts, instruments and things of that sort. I would not think this would bar peaceful use.

Mr. FOSTER. Not at all. This is really directed to not encouraging them to undertake any atmospheric tests or in outer space or underwater. That is the language of the section.

NOT ENCOURAGING THE FRENCH

Senator MUNDT. You don't believe that the transfer of plutonium, regardless of the amount, would be construed by the Russians as encouraging the French?

Mr. FOSTER. It would be done with complete controls.

Senator AIKEN. France also wants a considerable amount of enriched uranium 235.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is also done under the International Atomic Energy Act.

Secretary RUSK. Or bilateral agreements which have their safeguards, the two together. I would think that would not, although in a certain indirect and perhaps hypothetical sense it is a fair question to raise. If the other side doesn't raise it, I would think that we would not look upon this as a violation of the agreement.

Senator HUMPHREY. It would bind us not to do it.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

AIR, OUTER SPACE, AND WATER

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose this probably isn't pertinent, but the environment described above or the environment is of the original parties, not of anybody else's land.

Secretary RUSK. No, these environments would be applicable to all signatories.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Environment is the air, outer space, water.

Senator MUNDT. In the event France should fail to sign, then I am inclined to believe this would be attributory to us.

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't hear you, Karl.

Senator MUNDT. If France should refuse to sign, then I think this should be prohibited as far as we are concerned. If she signs, she would undertake not to use it in these environments which are barred. If she does not sign the presumption might be that part of this would be used I think for an atmospheric test.

Senator MORSE. If she doesn't sign, I would take it for granted we certainly wouldn't make any available to her.

Senator HUMPHREY. It would be a violation of the Atomic Energy Act for us to make available any of this enriched uranium for anything but peaceful use.

Secretary RUSK. Unless there were a finding under the Act under which we made an arrangement with Britain in '58.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have a question whether it is weapons grade material or whether it is enriched material suitable for purposes of that kind. Of course, France can make weapons grade material anyhow.

SENDING SOVIET TECHNICIANS

Secretary RUSK. We were glad to have this encouraging word in here because it certainly, it seems to me, would prohibit the Soviet Union from sending nuclear technology or technicians to Peiping, and I think the Soviets themselves wanted this prohibition.

Senator MUNDT. The whole thrust of your presentation would indicate that the Soviets are not very desirous of having Peiping have this.

Secretary RUSK. I think we can be quite sure that as of today there is nothing that they regret more than the help they have given them in the past, which they quit giving them in late 1959 and 1960, according to our information.

Senator AIKEN. Do you think there is any likelihood of their sending technicians?

Secretary RUSK. I think there is no chance whatever at the present time.

Senator AIKEN. To Egypt or to any other country?

Secretary RUSK. I would not think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How would this affect Israel? She has a reactor that is nearing completion, hasn't she, that would be capable of making weapons grade plutonium?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, and I want to point out that there is an outside possibility, we think it is very unlikely, that someone conceivably might develop a weapon sometime solely through underground explosion, but we think this is highly unlikely in the present state of the art.

But I think we would want to insure ourselves in any event. A prompt signatory by Israel would be of primary importance.

Senator AIKEN. Isn't it likely that other countries could develop improved methods underground?

Secretary RUSK. I think on the underground side my understanding is we are very far ahead on underground techniques and facilities at the present time.

A MAGNIFICENT AND INSPIRING DOCUMENT

Senator MORSE. My reaction, Mr. Chairman, is that if we succeed going as far as this document goes, it is a great day in the history of mankind. I think this is a magnificent and inspiring thing.

Senator HUMPHREY. I should say so.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you give us any idea of your best guess on the timing?

Secretary RUSK. It is possible that Mr. Harriman could initial this from the point of view of the negotiator's initial in the next day or two, then come back for a period of consultation, and then a signing sometime next week.

Senator HUMPHREY. What does the initialing mean?

Secretary RUSK. Initialing simply says that the negotiators agree that this is the document which they have discussed, and have agreed to as negotiators.

Senator HUMPHREY. But not binding upon us.

CONSULTATION WITH THE SENATE

Secretary RUSK. But it is not binding upon the government until the signing, and before we sign we will have a consultation with the Senate.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it is very important to understand, Mr. Secretary, because I am sure that the old axiom laid down by the late Senator Arthur Vandenberg is one that Senators remember, that they like to be present on take-offs as well as crash landings.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. There has been a good deal of talk about the initialing being binding or honor bound, so to speak, by the government, and therefore that any consultations that take place by Mr. Harriman with members of the Senate is after the fact. I merely want the record to be clear so that we have a genuine understanding that Mr. Harriman's visit back to the United States is not just a routine visit.

Secretary RUSK. Pro forma. Let me illustrate it this way, Senator. We have initialed an agreement with the Soviet Union on civil air transport, two flights a week, I think it is, into New York and into Moscow. That was back in 1961. But because of the Berlin pressure and because of the international atmosphere, we simply left it there as an initial negotiated document. It is not signed. It is not active and we have not violated anything by not putting it into effect.

Senator HUMPHREY. I heard a radio broadcast about this, that is why I am asking you, to the effect that yes, Mr. Harriman will be back to visit with the Senators but the work will all be over before he returns and that is merely a nice bow to the Senatorial something or other. I am sure that is not the case. I am being the devil's advocate here.

Secretary RUSK. This is a rather difficult problem to me, because if we are moving toward agreement, then the more we emphasize this point, the more the other side might think that we are being very sour about it and that sort of thing.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. So, I hope somehow or other we could sort of take this in stride.

Senator HUMPHREY. Exactly.

Secretary RUSK. And go through the normal procedure of a document initialed by the negotiator, consultation between the executive and the Senate, signature by the executive, submission to the Senate, and we would hope if we get the kind of treaty we are looking for, prompt ratification.

Senator MORSE. It is wonderful.

Secretary RUSK. This would be very good in terms of setting the framework.

COMMITMENT TO DISARMAMENT

Senator AIKEN. To what extent would the first three lines of the second paragraph commit us to claiming that the principal aim is the expeditious possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control? Is there any commitment implied there? Is that a hope, a wish, or what is it?

Secretary RUSK. This has become a kind of phrase of art in United Nations discussions. It was first used I think in the United Nations in 1959 or 1960, and this has been the phrase used in connection with proposals of the last administration and the present administration on general disarmament. It is within that context.

Senator AIKEN. Would the treaty be signed at the Foreign Minister's level?

Secretary RUSK. There is no agreement yet as to how it should be signed or where and when.

Senator AIKEN. But not at necessarily the same level for all three signatories?

Secretary RUSK. Not necessarily.

Senator AIKEN. Would there be likely to be a summit meeting for the purpose of signing?

Secretary RUSK. There is no present indication of that.

Senator AIKEN. No present indication?

Secretary RUSK. No, but again, we haven't heard from the Soviets as to what their wishes are on it.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Khrushchev wouldn't want to sign it himself?

Secretary RUSK. He might, but they haven't really pressed it in those terms. We probably will hear more about that tomorrow. There are several alternatives.

One would be that Harriman could sign it. Another one would be that we would send a signing delegation. I might go with some members of the Senate. It is theoretically possible that the Soviets might press for a summit signing and we would have to consider that, but we don't know yet. There are several alternatives that are possible.

AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL

Senator AIKEN. Shouldn't it be signed at almost the highest possible level? I would say the Foreign Minister's level would be pretty close to the top.

Secretary RUSK. I think it would be in accord with the potential importance of this agreement if the Foreign Ministers at least were to sign it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think that ought to be the minimum.

Senator HUMPHREY. I hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that ought to be a minimum on a matter of this importance.

Senator AIKEN. I would think so.

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A NONAGGRESSION PACT

Secretary RUSK. I should say one other thing, Mr. Chairman. The Soviets have pushed very hard to have a simultaneous agreed declaration on a nonaggression pact. We have not been able to go down that trail because although the kind of pact they have in mind is simply in language, simply reaffirms things that NATO, for example, has been saying year after year and has said in the text of its own treaty, we think this is something that we and Great Britain should not nominate ourselves as spokesmen for the Alliance about.

We need full consultation with the Alliance on that. It is still possible that the Soviets will insist upon some linkage here, and that is why we have to be a little cautious about supposing that this is in the bag yet. But we are inclined to think today that they are not going to insist upon any formal linkage.

But the nonaggression pact probably is a troublesome one because it isn't easy to sign a nonaggression pact with Laos where it is, South Vietnam where it is, with an overhang of a menacing situation in Berlin, without assurances from the other side. In other words, without some relation to the outstanding problems that are threatening the peace.

And so we would like to take a little more time to talk out this question. We don't want to rebuff the Soviets completely on this point, because we would like to work toward a situation where a nonaggression pact would represent something more than words. But this has been a troublesome question in the discussions in Moscow.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your position that you agree to discuss this with them, but as a separate matter?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Rather than as part of this, is that right?

Secretary RUSK. And in full consultation with our Allies on the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. And you mean particularly the NATO Alliance?

Secretary RUSK. The troublesome point about it is that the atmosphere of the conversations in the past about a nonaggression pact has had to do with the Soviet bloc versus the NATO bloc.

Now there may be injected here a new situation where Khrushchev may feel that he needs something like a nonaggression pact within his own bloc in dealing with problems inside of his own bloc, with China and some of the rebels that he has got to deal with there.

But I think that we can't accommodate him fully on a matter of that sort if it causes problems within our own Alliance. We have to look after our own situation, so it is a troublesome one.

THE GERMAN QUESTION

Senator HUMPHREY. The East German question poses a problem too, doesn't it?

Secretary RUSK. On that, and again, this is very much in executive session, of course, they have said in effect, "We are not concerned too much about the form. We are not trying to get you to recognize East Germany in this matter. We can work out a form

which does not bring up that issue." So that they have taken that problem out of the picture, you see.

Senator AIKEN. Would East Germany become a signatory to this?

Secretary RUSK. We would expect them to, yes.

Senator AIKEN. That would bring about a form of recognition.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. Again, I think it is well established practice now that in a multilateral document, the signatories of a common multilateral document do not imply recognition between two signatories where that recognition does not already exist.

Senator AIKEN. Would East Germany sign it?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, I think so, sir.

Senator AIKEN. They would?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Even if East Germany signs it?

Secretary RUSK. I think so, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You see the difference would come in that East Germany would deposit with the Kremlin. West Germany would undoubtedly deposit it with us or with England.

Senator AIKEN. You have to file it with all three, don't you?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

Secretary RUSK. The West Germans, for example, trade a half billion dollars a year with East Germany. They have a trade mission in Poland despite the fact that Poland recognizes East Germany. In other words, they are finding their way on some of these practically.

Senator HUMPHREY. They don't let these senatorial problems——

The CHAIRMAN. We just had that argument a few minutes ago.

THE COMPOSITE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. When will we have submitted to us the composite views of the interested departments of the government on this treaty? I am now speaking of the Department of Defense, the Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, and the State Department. When will that come?

Secretary RUSK. That will be available during this period of consultation, and it will certainly, of course, be available during the hearings on the treaty during the process of advice and consent.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will it be available to us before the treaty is officially signed?

Secretary RUSK. I will have to check the question on how many of the agencies will be involved in this, but I will try to get you an answer on it.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are primarily interested, Frank, in the Chiefs, aren't you?

Senator LAUSCHE. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. During the period of consultation.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Let me find out what the view on that is.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions? We will close the record.

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to say it is very encouraging, and the withdrawal clause in my mind is most desirable.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

MONDAY, JULY 29, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Long of Louisiana, Lausche, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams of Delaware and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt and Mr. Newhouse of the committee staff.

Members of Senate Committee on Armed Services: Senators Russell, Byrd of Virginia, Stennis, Jackson, Engle, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Young of Ohio, Inouye, Saltonstall, Beall and Case.

Staff members: William H. Darden and Harry L. Wingate.

Members of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Senators Pastore, Russell, Anderson, Jackson, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Bennett and Curtis and Representatives Price, Hosmer, Bates, Westland, Anderson and Holifield.

Staff members: John T. Conway and Edward J. Bauser.

Senators Dirksen, Kuchel, Cooper and Javits.

Department of State: Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, and George Bunn, General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; and Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser.

White House: Charles Johnson, Office of Mr. McGeorge Bundy.

CIA: Dr. Ray S. Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence.

Air Force: Colonel L. R. Garcia, Legislative Liaison Office, Office of Secretary of Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This is a rather unusual meeting for us; three committees, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Atomic Energy.

The Foreign Relations Committee, after consulting with the chairmen of the other committees, extended an invitation for this consultation with Mr. Harriman and Mr. Foster as a preliminary. The actual treaty itself has not been signed and it isn't formally before the Senate, but we thought it would be very useful to everyone concerned if we could discuss it on these rather informal bases.

With the concurrence of our members and visitors, we would like to proceed under the 10-minute rule this morning in order that we get around to as many as we can. Some may not wish to use the full ten minutes but others would. I will lead off with one or two questions.

First, may I say, Mr. Harriman, we are very pleased to have you this morning. We have been following your activities in Moscow with a great deal of interest. I think everyone recognizes this is a significant agreement that is on its way to becoming signed. We are very pleased to have you.

Would you care to open with a brief statement before we proceed to questions?

STATEMENT OF UNDER SECRETARY W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM C. FOSTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

I am grateful for the opportunity of discussing this treaty with you. I feel myself it is a good treaty. It is largely based on the treaty that was tabled in Geneva by our representatives in August last year. It goes back to the conceptions which President Eisenhower and his advisers had several years before that, and I think it carries forward certain principles which are very much to the interest of the United States.

It is the beginning of an agreement with the Soviet Union on checking the tempo of the arms race. There are many things that it does not do, which I think perhaps are clear to you, but it doesn't reduce in any way the number of nuclear mis 'es and nuclear weapons that exist in the world. It doesn't reduce in any way the hazards of war, but it is a first step in the direction of getting nuclear weapons under some sort of control.

Mr. Khrushchev mentioned it in a press conference as to the possibility of a breakthrough to other things. I am quoting what he said in the newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia, in an interview.

By the way, Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak very frankly without any reservation and with the understanding that there are many things in our record which to our national interest would be better not to publish in connection with my discussion with Khrushchev because we have to carry on other negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. This is an executive session. The record will not be published, certainly without the full consent of everyone, which is unlikely. I don't expect it to be published, but even for its executive character we would delete anything that you would feel is sensitive.

Mr. HARRIMAN. As long a my name isn't attached to what I say.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

A TREMENDOUS APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE

Mr. HARRIMAN. Now, the treaty does, of course, have a tremendous appeal to the people of the world in that it will stop nuclear fallout which has become publicized as possibly creating dangers for the health of future generations.

The Soviet Government considers testing as a means by which proliferation or further dissemination of nuclear capability can be achieved by other countries, and they want to have the maximum number of countries adhere to the treaty, if it is ratified. Certainly they are right in that feeling. They didn't get anywhere with the

discussion of a separate agreement on non-dissemination because they feel this is a way to achieve that objective.

Of course, the treaty only covers the three environments, atmosphere, outer space, and under water. It does not in any way affect underground testing unless there is a vent or venting from underground testing which contaminates the atmosphere outside of the territory of the country which has undertaken to test.

The treaty covers testing and in no way the use of nuclear weapons in time of war. Let's hope it doesn't exist, but we are entirely free to use nuclear weapons and unfortunately so are they.

There may be certain risks involved, but it seems to me as an individual that the advantages far outweigh the risks.

INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Now, I have been asked: were the interests of the Soviet Government the same as ours in this case? There is sometimes a feeling if the Soviet Government is for something we should be against it. Well, frankly, all through the years, as most of you know, I have been saying if the Soviet Government wanted something we ought to take a very good look to see what they are after.

Since 1945 it is obvious that our objectives and the Kremlin's objectives are irreconcilable. I have said it at San Francisco to people who thought at that time there was a chance to come to an understanding.

But they want to come now.

Mr. Khrushchev is just as determined as Stalin was to see the world communized and see that it is part of the responsibility of the Kremlin leaders to further that objective. However, he made such an enormous success, in the opinion of Khrushchev, in the Soviet Union, that he believes that through competition that can induce other countries to follow their example.

Even though our fundamental objectives are not completely divergent, we want to leave them free to decide for themselves the kind of life they want to live and not to express the will of certain peoples.

There are certain areas where from time to time our objectives and the Soviet objectives and our interests overlap. One of them, I believe, is clearly that of nuclear war.

Mr. Khrushchev looked at nuclear war in October with the crisis in Cuba and turned away from it. I think it is clear beyond doubt in my mind that the Soviet leaders do not want nuclear war, want to avoid it as far as they can, the risk of nuclear war. They may be willing to apply brinkmanship, but in the last analysis they want to avoid nuclear war.

This is a step in that direction.

CHINESE CHALLENGE TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP

It also seems to me that their greatest preoccupation at the present time is the challenge of Peiping for leadership in the communist movement. That is an unheard-of arrogance, from their standpoint, from Peiping. It was always to be understood by good Communists that the oracle of the communist movement was Moscow and that leadership should be followed.

So that much of what they do is conditioned by this struggle. Some of you may have read the exchange of letters—rather lengthy letters, about 50,000 words each—between the Chinese Reds and the Kremlin. In the answer of the Kremlin one of the principal reasons for condemning the behavior of the Chinese was their willingness to risk nuclear war, their readiness to bring nuclear war onto the people of the world, whereas the Kremlin, the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union were against nuclear war.

It seems to me that it is quite clear from the manner in which they discussed it that they would like to see this treaty ratified, they would like to see as many countries in the world adhere to the treaty, and then if the Chinese Communists go ahead and test nuclear devices, they will be condemned, they hope, by all of the underdeveloped countries.

I have been in Africa, as some of you have, and of course, the emotions of the African people are very strong against continuation of nuclear explosions. It has particularly become impressed upon them, particularly those in West Africa, because they feel further testing by the French in the Sahara will be damaging to the health of their people. So they believe, I think, they would be condemned in that respect.

SENSE OF SECURITY TO SOVIET PEOPLE

Those are not to go against our objectives. Mr. Khrushchev, I think, also wants to give some sense, again to get some sense of security to the Soviet people.

Of all the subjects that they are most concerned with, I would think, in my observations in traveling around the Soviet Union some years ago, this has been one of the peaks. This has been an indication that Mr. Khrushchev's leadership is the one that leads them to that direction.

There may be other reasons for this. There is a possibility that this may save them some money. We generally believe that the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government is having some difficulty in carrying out all of the programs which they wish to carry out. There is a tightness in what they have in investment for future development and they want to reduce their expenditures for investment and develop their agriculture and their consumer goods.

The Soviet Union have had a taste for a little better life and there is an indication they are demanding more. Mr. Khrushchev has not been able to fulfill his promises to the Soviet people.

U.S. BASIC INTEREST

From our standpoint, I think I have mentioned what I think is our basic interest. It is the beginning of a step toward control of nuclear energy away from wartime uses. Whether we can make other steps that are significant, I can't give you any assurance whatsoever.

I think we are on all fours with the Soviet Union in not wanting to see other countries gain independent nuclear capability. The more that achieve that capability, the more dangerous the world will be. I gather that there is a fairly good chance, if there is no

checking, that a number of countries in the next decade will be able to achieve nuclear capability.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you think we might proceed with some questions?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Russell?

NOT OPTIMISTIC BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Harriman, when did you consult with the Soviet representatives in this field?

Mr. HARRIMAN. In this field?

Senator RUSSELL. Nuclear energy.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I talked with Mr. Khrushchev about it when I saw him as a private citizen in 1959. When I saw him on April 19 of this year, we discussed Laos and only touched very generally on this sort of thing.

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Dean and Mr. Foster, on behalf of the Disarmanent Commission, have had a long series of intensive negotiations in this area, and I assume when you were dispatched to Moscow this time that we had some inkling that we would be willing to come to some agreement, would we not?

Mr. HARRIMAN. As I understand the way these negotiations started it was on ther 8th of June, I think, the President and the Prime Minister of England wrote a letter to Mr. Khrushchev suggesting that we discuss the test ban question, which Khrushchev agreed and set July 15. He didn't; when I was asked to go there shortly after this announcement, things didn't look very good.

Mr. Khrushchev had made it very plain that he though it was espionage on the part of inspection. It wasn't until the 2nd of July when he made the statement that we was ready to agree to a test ban treaty in the three environments, leaving underground testing for future consideration.

He, however, at that time tied the agreement on testing in these three environments to a simultaneous signing of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw treaty countries. With that hurdle to overcome with regard to negotiations, we got into it, but I would say when we asked to do this it didn't look too good.

Senator RUSSELL. So you had no reason to believe then there would be any more satisfactory——

Mr. HARRIMAN. I didn't think so. I didn't look forward to these negotiations with any great confidence, and from what I had heard it didn't look as if the Soviet Government would be willing to come to an agreement in this field. But I think the President felt that it was absolutely essential that we show the world that we were ready to negotiate, and that if there was any failure to do so it was failure of the——

Senator RUSSELL. We have been trying to do that ever since the Baruch negotiations. That has been our national policy consistently since 1945 and 1946.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. I couldn't help but conclude when you were selected to go over there we were coming up with some kind of a

treaty, I didn't know what kind it would be. I am glad you set me right there.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator Russell, I was not very optimistic about it when I was asked to do it.

SIMILAR TREATY OFFERED BEFORE

Senator RUSSELL. They did accept practically the same treaty that has been offered heretofore, is that not right? It was substantially what had been offered them with the Eisenhower administration?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We thought, the team that was with me—I had a very able team with me, Fisher is here—we thought we got the main elements of the treaty that was tabled in 1962.

They came forward with a draft which was much similar. They would have liked to leave a lot of things out which we insisted on including but the principal argument was over the simultaneous signing of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw treaty countries and, of course, that we refused to negotiate because we had not consulted our allies.

Senator RUSSELL. Did you have an adviser representing the Atomic Energy Commission or the Department of Defense?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No—yes, Mr. McNamara agreed to send Mr. John Naughton with me. He is general counsel for the Defense Department.

Senator RUSSELL. You had counsel, I mean the military.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator RUSSELL. You had no representatives of the military department?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, we followed entirely the principles which had been agreed to, the draft of the year before, and there were no new aspects to this agreement, except wording. There were certain provisions left out.

Senator LAUSCHE. The draft of what year?

The CHAIRMAN. 1962, last year.

Senator RUSSELL. There is one that was tabled that was initiated earlier than that, wasn't it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, way back in 1959. There was one tabled at that time.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, this was different. This was developed during 1962, this particular draft.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, but there were other drafts that were tabled.

Mr. FOSTER. Eisenhower had suggested one in 1959. In 1961 Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan had offered a restrictive agreement on tests in the atmosphere and outer space and under water just before the Soviet started their massive series of tests in September of 1961.

PERSONAL NEGOTIATIONS

Senator RUSSELL. Did I understand then that the Atomic Energy Commission did not have a representative with you?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator RUSSELL. Were they consulted prior to the time you left the States?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Oh, yes. They were fully consulted for all this for the 1962 treaty which was our starting-off point and fully agreed with us.

Mr. FOSTER. And before you left.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Before you left.

Senator RUSSELL. In your discussions——

Mr. HARRIMAN. This was really personal negotiations between myself and the delegation, with myself and certain advisers. The Prime Minister of England appointed one of his advisers, Lord Hailsham, to represent him.

The negotiations started off with Mr. Khrushchev personally, and then Mr. Gromyko represented him during the negotiations, and then we finally culminated with discussions with Mr. Khrushchev.

Senator RUSSELL. Was most of the negotiation conducted with Gromyko or Mr. Khrushchev?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. The principles of it were discussed with Mr. Khrushchev. He indicated that he was prepared to go forward with a treaty agreement, in the three environments, but emphasized that they expected some understanding, agreement regarding the non-aggression pact.

Then the details were hammered out with Mr. Gromyko daily. We had a drafting committee that helped in developing language where there were certain differences.

ISSUE OF INSPECTIONS

Senator RUSSELL. In your discussions with Mr. Khrushchev, did he give any sign of relenting on his prohibiting any on-site inspection or on-ground inspection?

Mr. HARRIMAN. None whatsoever. He said we ought to have a comprehensive ban, but it was because we insisted on inspections which he claimed were not necessary.

Senator RUSSELL. So those of us who have not wanted to abandon inspection on the ground or underground have no cause for alarm that would be a first step for leading to doing away with inspection for underground tests?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I can't understand it that way. If the administration agreed to it, and the Senate ratified it——

Senator RUSSELL. That is one of the things I fear, if we get the Senate started ratifying in this field we can be towed along rather rapidly. It would be rather hard to break us into harness but when they get us in there we do scare from the harness that an ordinary rule might not.

Mr. HARRIMAN. My instructions were very, very clear. No agreement on comprehensive test ban without adequate on-site inspection.

There was one interesting aspect: Mr. Khrushchev proposed that, if we were able to achieve a nonaggression pact, we ought to go forward with some of the suggestions that were made for protection against attack. He suggested we go forward with what we had suggested several years ago, several times during the years, of the establishment of fixed teams at certain centers, ports, railroad junc-

tions, road intersections and airports on each side of the Iron Curtain.

I asked him why he permitted that type of inspection but refused to agree to the on-site inspection in connection with test ban. He said, "Well, that is different. These are fixed posts. We don't mind them. We will not agree to mobile teams that go move where they wish. That is espionage."

Senator RUSSELL. Any inspection in the age of nuclear weapons carried into space by missiles from a certain set place would not be very effective, would it? It would almost be like inspecting crossbows to see if they had steel heads on their arrows or stone heads.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I said, "If you are going ahead that far, why not put some teams on the missile sites?" He said "no."

Senator RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pastore?

BROADENING BAN TO WATER AND SPACE TESTING

Senator PASTORE. Mr. Harriman, the Eisenhower proposal of April 1959 was confined alone to atmospheric testing. It is my belief that the Kennedy-Macmillan proposal of September 1961 was confined solely to atmospheric testing.

Could you give us a little bit of a background as to how it was broadened out to under water and space?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think I would rather have Mr. Foster answer that question, because he lived through that period. I inherited the work which has been done by him.

Mr. FOSTER. Senator Pastore, at the time of the Eisenhower proposal in 1959, it was felt that over 50 kilometers, which was the height above which testing was still allowed, that we had no facilities for detecting such tests. At that time also you will recall there were included in the proposal fixed control posts on each the sides in order to detect even those up to 50 kilometers.

Then later on in 1961, the proposal that President Kennedy made with Prime Minister Macmillan in 1961, was sent forward in the hope that we would prevent the then expected series of atmospheric tests which Mr. Khrushchev had indicated that they were going to engage in. It was put forward primarily to stop that set of tests which we had expected would have a very major radioactive fallout.

As we started this in greater detail, as we started to study our means of inspection of atmospheric, under water and outer space, we believed that we had the capability of detecting those tests in the atmosphere and under water and we had the capability of detecting those tests in outer space, and if this were to be limited to those three environments we would also have the opportunity to continue testing underground, which we presently are doing. So it was felt that it would be better to contain as many tests as possible, believing as we did, that limitations on testing were in the national interest.

Senator PASTORE. That isn't exactly my question.

We all know that the big enigma is weapons application, that is, the development of an antimissile missile, and the only way that

you could actually do that successfully or do it quicker and better would be in atmospheric testing or space testing.

My question is this, was it part of our proposal or was it their proposal to include these other two environments? Did we go at this proposal; was it our idea or their idea?

Mr. FOSTER. It was our idea, sir, and we put it forward in the suggested draft of the treaty which was tabled on August 27 in 1962.

Senator PASTORE. Thank you. I have one more question.

RISKS INVOLVED IN THE TREATY

You said, Mr. Harriman, that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. Are the advantages predicated upon imponderables or are you basing that on actual military nuclear power?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator, I think I said that there were certain risks in regard to it but from my limited study, I consider the risks of not going forward with this greater than the risks of agreeing to this treaty. But I think that, I don't believe you are very much interested in details in my opinion because they all relate to the problems of what is scientifically involved in continuing the testing in all of the environments and also what risks there are in limiting our testing.

Senator PASTORE. Let me ask a further question then.

Did you negotiate this treaty on the predicate that we were at least on an even basis with the Russians in military nuclear power or that we were ahead or that they might be ahead?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I have been told that it is considered that we are ahead of them on balance in the number of nuclear weapons and in the ability to deliver them. It is true they have grown into certain larger weapons or at least have exploded certain larger nuclear devices than we have but it is the judgment as I understand it, we are better off to have a large number of weapons with nuclear warheads which can be delivered with precision to more areas in the country of the enemy.

Senator PASTORE. Was it taken into account that where we are ahead the treaty does permit testing on their part and where they may be ahead, the treaty prohibits that. I mean, was that taken into account on balance?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, it has been thoroughly taken into account, and in my briefing the reasons were explained to me why we would be no worse off in the future with this treaty than if we permitted testing to go on without any inhibition.

Senator PASTORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?

FIRST REAL PROGRESS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I want to congratulate you on having made the first real progress, as I see it, toward getting something done in this field in which I feel there is a very great meaning.

Of course, I presume that after this treaty is signed and comes before our committee for further study and consideration relating

to ratification we shall have scientists, experts in every field that will testify on the details.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think the Secretary has indicated that. If not, I am certainly authorized to say that everybody in the administration you would wish to call would be available.

Senator SPARKMAN. So this morning's session is more a briefing on the general structure of the treaty and what was intended to be done.

THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WAR

I noticed in yesterday's New York Times an article that some had raised the question about the use of nuclear weapons in the case of war. You answered that in the very beginning of your discussion this morning and it is your contention that there is nothing in this treaty that would prevent the use of nuclear weapons in the case of war.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, sir. I saw the article when I came back on Saturday in the New York Times, which indicated some people had raised the question as to whether the language in Article I would in any way inhibit us from using nuclear weapons in time of war.

There is absolutely in my opinion, no legal basis or implied basis or any conceivable way that this could in any way prevent us from doing it. This matter of this language, in fact, was discussed quite openly with the other negotiators in addition with the Soviet Union, with Mr. Khrushchev himself, and Mr. Gromyko made it perfectly plain that this treaty only dealt with tests and did not deal with any question of the use of nuclear weapons in time of war.

There was no misunderstanding about it among the negotiators, and it is inconceivable to me, myself. It is more of a contention. It is inconceivable to me that anybody could uphold a theory which is headed a test ban treaty and its other provisions could be stretched to indicate there was any inhibition to the use of nuclear weapons is war. In addition any nation has the inherent right to defend itself under article 51 of the United Nations treaty, so this is something which I see absolutely no basis for any concern.

WIDE ACCEPTANCE OF TREATY

Senator SPARKMAN. The press reports indicate a very wide acceptance of the idea of this treaty.

Are those reports correct?

Mr. HARRIMAN. As far as I know, sir. I haven't had a chance to study it, but I have seen some reports and I told some reporters when I came through Europe that the people of the world have hailed this. They have as a general believing around the world that continued tests might well affect the health of future generations, and this has been hailed as a step toward elimination of tests as a first step, which might affect the health of the people. Secondly, it has been hailed as the first important step in an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom and ourselves in doing something in the direction of controlling the development of nuclear power for wartime purposes.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, has there been any word from General de Gaulle's press conference of today?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I haven't heard it yet, but I would assume that he will say that under no circumstances will he agree to this test ban.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is it true that Colonel Nasser has indicated he was ready to sign?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I have heard that said, but I will be glad to confirm it. Have you heard it?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes. It has been indicated he will.

Mr. HARRIMAN. There have been indications from a number of countries, I understand. I have not come here to testify on that, but I will be glad to get the information for you as to the indications which we have had from other countries.

ORIGINAL PARTIES HAVE VETO POWER

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Harriman, in article II, section 2, any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all of the parties to this treaty, including the votes of all the original parties.

Does that mean that each of the original three parties, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each has the veto power?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. Nobody else?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Nobody else, except half the balance.

Senator SPARKMAN. No single nation?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No single nation.

Senator SPARKMAN. But this applies to single nations?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is right.

RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS

Senator SPARKMAN. Is there anything in this treaty which, if put into effect, would constitute recognition of any government that we do not at the present time recognize?

Mr. HARRIMAN. None whatsoever. It is hoped that as many countries, governments that we recognize will adhere and those we don't recognize will adhere. But it is an established legal fact that co-signing of any instruments or adherence of one country with another that is not recognized in no sense changes the question of recognition of that country. You will remember in 1954 there was an agreement in Geneva regarding Indochina, and the Chinese Communists signed that agreement; so did North Vietnam. We didn't recognize them.

In 1962 the signers—over Laos. May I say since you have raised the question of veto, I would not have approved of this treaty personally if we hadn't had a veto on further amendments. We cannot be bound in this very important field to any provisions which we don't agree to.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I have heard some——

Senator SPARKMAN. I recognize the fact that it is extremely difficult to get the veto for ourselves and not let the other principals have it.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Holifield?

Representative HOLIFIELD. I will defer any questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

EXAMPLE OF THE AUSTRIAN TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Harriman, you have had a lot of experience with the Russians over the years.

Do you know of any major agreement affecting international conduct substantially over the years that the Russians have ever signed that is not distinctly to the advantage of the Russians at the time of signing or that has not been broken whenever it is convenient for them to break it at a later date?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator, I have never quite understood why they signed the agreement over Austria. I have heard a number of theories; I actually discussed it again, discussed it with Mr. Khrushchev. I have never thoroughly understood because I thought that was very much to the advantage of the West.

They have not broken that, and it is an agreement that stands. Of course, there are a number of wartime agreements which they kept and——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Those were to their advantage, were they not, distinctly?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, certainly, no government signs an agreement they don't consider to their advantage, but I understood your question to say they haven't signed an agreement in which they didn't have a preponderance of an advantage.

In my judgment, the Austrian Peace Treaty was very definitely on balance to the advantage of the West, and I have never thoroughly understood why they wanted to do it. There must have been some very good reason, a lot of theories, but I am mentioning that as one which in my judgment—in that treaty the preponderance of value was in the West.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't want to take any time arguing the Austrian Peace Treaty except I happened to be in Austria before the treaty was signed and the Russians were having their own troubles and difficulties and those difficulties were increasing. In my view without doubt it was much to the Russian's advantage to get out of there to save face and sign this treaty than it was to stay on and face increasing troubles in Austria because of the particular situation in which they found themselves in with East Germany and Berlin. But that is a matter of opinion.

SOVIETS' BROKEN TREATIES

Basically, as a general practice over the years, ever since we recognized then in 1933, haven't the Russians at their convenience and whenever they felt that it was substantially to their advantage, disregarded, abrogated or simply broken or refused to comply

with agreements in the overwhelming number of cases? The general figure used is some 50 out of 53, out of 54 or 55.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I heard that statement made. I haven't analyzed it. It is my opinion that I would not make an agreement with them in which the carrying out was entirely based on their word. Certainly any agreement we made we should look very carefully at our own interests and what we gained in the meantime, pending a possible breach of the agreement by them.

So that as far as I am concerned, I can't confirm this 50 out of 53, but there are plenty of cases, including all the agreements that were made at Yalta, an agreement which Stalin made with T. V. Soong over the future of China, they were completely broken.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, did expression——

Mr. HARRIMAN. The agreements with us at Yalta were not treaties, but they were very fixed and definite honorable understandings. The Soong-Stalin agreement was a treaty.

TAKING THINGS ON FAITH

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The reason I mention that is that we have heard in the last couple of days the statement so repeatedly made that we must take things on faith to a substantial degree and that nobody could corroborate or guarantee anything. Everyone must take it on faith. I am not quoting you necessarily.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am just quoting the general connotation that goes over the airwaves and that seems to build up in the propaganda by various reports and newspaper people and so on.

If that is the case, it seems to me that our record of success based upon faith with the Russians has been a pretty sorry one.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would never take something on faith. I don't know where this conversation came from, Senator, but I haven't heard of any way, any discussion within the administration of this treaty which included considerations we should take what they say on faith. This treaty, in the opinion of those who were involved in it and in my own judgment, is very much to our interests.

The Russians wouldn't sign it if they didn't think it was in their interests. Both of us can get out of it if circumstances or events are such which we feel it is to our advantage to do so.

In the face of it, it is an attempt to move forward in a field that other steps have to be taken before they are of great value in reducing the risks of nuclear war.

WHY THE CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On the question of advantage—and I shan't try to pursue this particular subject at this time because time won't permit, but I think we will go into it—in 1959 the Russians would not discuss with any seriousness a test ban in the various environments. Certainly, they would not discuss anything that would require on-site inspection.

In 1960 they wouldn't discuss it. In 1961 they wouldn't discuss it. In 1962 they wouldn't discuss it. They brushed it off with a cavalier approach.

Isn't it a fact, Governor, that as late as three months ago certain overtures were made to the Kremlin about discussing the three-environment treaty and they cavalierly turned it down again, just refused to discuss it, and that suddenly, and with a rather unusual and precipitous about-face, they determined that they would sign it and they signed it?

I don't know that all of these postulates are true; I am not so sure, but I think they are.

What we are searching for and are going to search for, I think, or should, is why the sudden change of heart, why the sudden change of attitude on the part of Mr. Khrushchev, who can smile one moment and beat the desk with the heel of his shoe the next. That is going to be a very pertinent thing, I think, that is involved in this matter.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Obviously, Senator—I am not sure of these negotiations, overtures three months ago—I am advised they are correct. In any event he indicated in the past that he would only agree to a three-environment test ban treaty if there was a moratorium on underground testing. In fact, some people thought that might come up when I got there, and it was decided we would again turn that down.

Between June 8, there was a change as far as Mr. Khrushchev is concerned in his attitude toward the three-environment test treaty. It may not have come. So far as we are concerned, we didn't know there had been a change until his speech in East Germany on July 2.

Now, I have given you, because I felt this would be a question, and a question which I asked myself throughout the negotiations what his interests were, I think I have given what I think is the primary reason for this change. There are probably three or four secondary reasons, but the primary reason for his change is the conflict which exists between Moscow and Peiping for leadership in the Communist international movement. He is attempting to pin on the Chinese the war party or war elements of the party and he holds himself up as the peace, for peace. In this field, he evidently thought—and this is purely a guess, I have seen circumstantial evidence in regard to it which I picked up, but I can't guarantee it—that was the development of this competition between Peiping and Moscow which has only become really critical as far as the Soviet Union is concerned since the Cuba incident.

Before that, China's Communists had made very little progress in getting the adherence of other Communist parties throughout the world, but since Cuba they made quite a little progress in the Far East and, I am told, in penetrating the Communist parties in other countries that owe their allegiance to Moscow. Now the minority groups in the parties are beginning to turn to Peiping for inspiration.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is all, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Saltonstall?

CONSULTATION WITH JOINT CHIEFS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Harriman, may I turn to a little different subject or point of view?

I sat on the Military Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee and I listened to a considerable amount of testimony by the Joint Chiefs and the leaders of our military forces, who were very hesitant to believe that we should sign or agree to any cessation of tests at this time. Their testimony was quite convincing.

Were the military leaders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consulted before this agreement was initialed and, if so, in what way?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They were consulted, I understand, before this treaty was tabled last year, and were constantly consulted. What their views are, I wouldn't want to state. I certainly assume that this committee or these various committees will call them before you. But there was no consultation with the Chiefs that I was conscious of in Moscow. I got my instructions from the President and Secretary of State.

I do not know what went on during the course of discussions. There were no very radical changes. The most important one was the elimination of peacetime uses which as in the treaty that was tabled in 1962.

But I don't know what the consultations were with the Joint Chiefs.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then there was no particular consultation with either you directly or indirectly while you were in Moscow this time with the Joint Chiefs.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I didn't have any. Whether there was within the administration, I can't answer.

There isn't any substantial difference, I think Mr. Foster would say, except in the elimination of the peacetime clause between the treaty that was tabled in August 1962 by the United States and the United Kingdom at Geneva and this treaty.

RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask this question: Article III, the first sentence says, "This treaty shall be open to all states for signature."

What would be our position, or perhaps that is an unfair way of putting it to you—was the question of recognition, we will say, of East Germany or of Hungary or any of these Soviet satellites considered when that statement was included?

In other words, supposing East Germany comes up and wants to sign it, are we going to recognize East Germany as a state?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator Saltonstall, it was made absolutely plain in discussions on both sides that if any government or regime that any one of us, the three of us, didn't recognize, the fact that that government or regime adhered to the treaty in no way changed our respective attitudes towards recognition of that regime, in no way did it do so. I think there is plenty of precedent to cover that statement.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So in your opinion this would not change our relations to East Germany if East Germany came up and signed this treaty?

Mr. HARRIMAN. None whatsoever.

NO SECRET OR UNWRITTEN AGREEMENTS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Just one other question. This language is very simple; it is very short. In your opinion, are we committed if we sign this agreement to any moral or unwritten understandings or nonaggression pacts or anything else beyond what the language states?

In other words, there is no secret or unwritten agreement or anything else?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There is absolutely no secret agreement or understanding. This treaty and the communique speak for themselves. I am here to explain the manner in which we interpret them, and I think we did go over them with such care with the Soviets that I believe they interpret them exactly the same which we did. We discussed different clauses, what their interpretation was, and we found they were the same.

We made it very plain that our only obligation in connection with a nonaggression pact was to consult our allies, and we did indicate that if they agreed, we would carry on negotiations for some sort of a nonaggression arrangement. But there is no commitment on our allies, and if the allies don't want to even negotiate or carry on discussions, there is no obligation to do so.

NO IMPEDIMENTS TO SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Senator SALTONSTALL. Just one more question: In your opinion, this does not prevent us from making whatever preparations we can make without actually testing nuclear weapons?

In other words, we can go forward with our scientific improvements, we can go forward with all of our research undertakings without any risk of breaking this treaty?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There is nothing in the treaty to prevent that, and I certainly hope that would be the policy of our government.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the majority leader would like to ask some questions?

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to come in at this time because I do have to go shortly. I only have two questions, Mr. Secretary.

NO GIMMICKS OR SIDE ISSUES

One, are there any gimmicks in this agreement?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't know of any gimmicks. We tried to get them all out on the table. I don't know of any sentence in this which wasn't thoroughly analyzed and discussed, and there is no hidden meaning in any words.

Senator MANSFIELD. The second question is, are there any side issues attached to this treaty outside of those that you have mentioned that you have agreed with the Soviet Union to continue negotiations on, other matters which you probably would anyway; there are no commitments made we would agree to a nonaggres-

sion pact between the NATO and Warsaw countries or anything of that nature?

Mr. HARRIMAN. None whatsoever.

We did agree, as the communique says, to consult our allies with a view to working out something in that area, but I did not discuss with them the details of what kind of arrangements could be made; in fact, I avoided discussing them.

So I do not know what the Soviet Union has in mind in connection with nonaggression. Khrushchev did suggest that we might explore some of the proposals which we made in the past regarding elimination of the dangers of surprise attack. One of them that he mentioned was the one I spoke of, the establishment of control posts at the different important centers on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

CONFERENCE ON SURPRISE ATTACKS

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Harriman isn't there at the present time, at least in the state of suspension, a conference going on on the matter of surprise attack and hasn't that conference been, in effect, in operation for the past four years?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The conference has been going on.

So far as I know there has been very little, except the very important hot line agreement, which was reached. I took over with me the hot line equipment which was installed in the Soviet end of the line.

Mr. FOSTER. There is a slight difference, Senator Mansfield.

In 1958 they started two conferences, one on the test ban which has continued off and on for the last 5 years, and in 1958 also there was a conference on surprise attack to which this control post suggestion was first made in November of 1958.

Then in 1961 there was a conference continuing on the test ban but in 1962 was formed, following an arrangement, a conference to devote itself to disarmament on a broader scale, on arms control and disarmament, and there was a new conference consisting of 18 nations—unfortunately from which France withdrew, leaving 17 nations—and that conference has continued and there has been a recess during Mr. Harriman's discussions in Moscow but it reconvenes tomorrow in Geneva.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Does Minority Leader Dirksen have a question?

SOVIET CHANGE OF HEART

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Harriman, pursuing for a moment the question raised by Senator Hickenlooper, the Baruch plan of 16 years ago—the disarmament plan was submitted 15 years ago; there has been no agreement. We have been hassling over Berlin for 14 years and there has been no agreement. We have been hassling over Korea for 10 years and there is no agreement. It took eight years to get the Austrian Treaty and I think the only reason we got it was that the two parties including the Socialist Party, were so closely in balance that they had to take the deputy chancellor from the Socialist Party.

But there is a natural curiosity as to the sudden change of heart on the part of the Soviet Union with respect to this treaty. You have mentioned the possible fear of China. Are there any other reasons?

Mr. HARRIMAN. It isn't a possible fear of China. It is this competition that is going on.

There have been indications that the Soviet Union wants to reduce its military expenditures as a result of the increased expenditures in the military field which have been authorized by President Kennedy which have led to the abandonment of certain curtailment of expenditure by the Soviet Union and some indication of stepped up investment in the military field. It is generally considered to be true that this has upset some of their civilian development, particularly in the agricultural field.

They are going to go ahead, they want to go ahead, with the tremendous increase in chemical fertilizer production and other ways to improve the food and also to improve the consumer goods available. Mr. Khrushchev promised this to his people and he hasn't lived up to it. So this may have some bearing on that desire.

KHRUSHCHEV WANTS THE APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE

Mr. Khrushchev attempts to get support of the Soviet people, and also he wants to keep control of the Communist Party in a situation which is quite different from what was with Stalin.

I was with him twice, once when we left the stadium at the time of the Soviet-American track meet, and also we walked from his office to one of the buildings where we were going to have the dinner. He circulated around the crowd as if he was a politician. He stops and pats children on the head and shakes hands with them; he is applauded by them. He tries to get the popularity of the people.

Since the debasing of the responsibilities of the secret police which were so tight under Stalin, he evidently seems to want to have the approval of the Soviet people. Now, this test ban treaty is tremendously popular with the Russian people, I gather from what I saw and from what I heard, and maybe that—he may have had something in mind on that score.

Let me quickly say that although there is less police control, there is the most strict discipline in the Soviet Union both on the workman in the plants and on what you can write, even paint, you know. I don't want to indicate that it has become an open society; it hasn't.

Mr. Khrushchev moves among the people more like a politician. Stalin used to get in his car and drive 60 miles an hour with a guard in front of him and a guard behind, with the curtains drawn. The Kremlin was closed.

I can't tell you, I am not privy to all of the motivations. But there may be a series of reasons why he suddenly has come to a decision to—I say suddenly, it may have taken him six months to make up his mind on this.

Our decisions are made out in the open. Theirs are made with the Central Committee of the Communist Party under closed doors.

They may have had this in mind for some period and it may not have been as sudden as we thought.

But I do think there has been quite a change, I don't only think, but there has been quite a change in the position between Peiping and Moscow and leadership in the international Communist leadership. In my humble judgment that is the great preoccupation in the Kremlin today, and everything they do is, I think, to some extent conditioned by that.

I don't say they make all their decisions based on that.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV

Senator DIRKSEN. As far as you know, has it been one of personal correspondence between the President and Khrushchev?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would prefer you to ask the Secretary of State about that. I am not familiar with what has become public knowledge and what hasn't.

I can assure you there is nothing in the correspondence which in any way covers a secret agreement which is outside of this. Whatever there has been, has been a straightforward exchange.

May I go back to indicate why it is they conside. this, in my opinion, to be their value? They want to isolate China. They want to go round the world and say, "Look here, we are against destroying the atmosphere, contaminating the atmosphere; we are for peace."

If you read that 50,000-word letter, the principal point they make in it was pointing the finger at Peiping as being the country that wants nuclear war and wants to bring disaster on the world, and, therefore, there is some reason why there are some pressures and also some more detailed indications from comments one man or another has let slip.

A DEFINITION OF STATE

Senator DIRKSEN. I notice the treaty does not contain a definition of a state.

Mr. HARRIMAN. A definition?

Senator DIRKSEN. Of a state, a signatory. It uses the word "state," meaning country. There is no definition of it.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, there isn't intended to be. You mean in this, "to adhere." No, we did discuss it, and governments or regimes. "State" is a rather general word, and we didn't think it was well to try to define a state because, for instance, we hoped some day—which I think is very much to your interest—to get the adherence of Red China to it.

I don't think there is much chance at the present time, and we certainly don't need to change our policy toward Red China. This makes it possible for a state in any way you wish——

THREE DEPOSITORY GOVERNMENTS

Senator DIRKSEN. Going back to Senator Saltonstall's question, any state may deposit its ratification with any of the three depository governments, is that correct?

Mr. HARRIMAN. All three are depositories. We discussed procedure and we all interpreted the procedure in the same way. If a country was recognized by all three of the depositories, the country would have to deposit with all three, the ratification.

If it was one or more did not recognize the regime or government, it would be deposited by that government with the depository government which they recognized, and then that government would give certified copies of the deposit to the other two.

Senator DIRKSEN. Suppose East Germany deposits with the Soviet Union, what happens?

Mr. HARRIMAN. If they deposit with it presumably, not presumably, but our understanding would be, that they would send the deposit—they would give a copy of the ratification, a certified copy, to the British and ourselves.

Senator DIRKSEN. After that——

Mr. HARRIMAN. There is no obligation on us to recognize them. There is even no obligation on us to receive the document if we don't want to.

Senator DIRKSEN. Having deposited under the treaty with the Soviet Union, does that make East Germany a state?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We don't believe so. We don't believe it changes in any way the situation that exists in connection with our interpretation of our recognition of the government or regime, and, or course, in East Germany we look upon it as a regime, not as a government.

There are plenty of cases—I mentioned one or two but I will be glad to submit to you, sir, a list of the countries which have signed or adhered to treaties either we or the other governments did not recognize the government or regime, and in no way changed the relationship between the respective governments or the regimes.

Senator DIRKSEN. I notice that withdrawal is conditioned somewhat on "extraordinary events" related to nuclear weapons.

Who determines when an event is extraordinary as a justification for withdrawing from the treaty?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would think this withdrawal clause depends upon the government involved as to how they interpret that language, and each government has a sovereign right and must be free to interpret that language at it sees fit in the national interests.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator DIRKSEN. One more.

UNDERSTANDING ABOUT TRADE

I see the New York Post this morning carries an article to the effect that one of the reasons for Khrushchev entering into this treaty was an understanding with respect to trade with Communist countries.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Trade?

Senator DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is about as false a statement as I have heard of recently.

Senator DIRKSEN. It says, "Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman refused to comment on the starting point yesterday after his meeting here with President Kennedy."

It is pretty well built up and I just show it because, after all, it is in the public domain.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The New York Post is not one of the papers that——

Senator DIRKSEN. The New York Daily News.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The Daily News?

Senator DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. There was no basis for that whatsoever. If the word "trade" has come up in any talks with any member of the press, I have simply said the matter was not discussed. There were no negotiations about trade whatsoever. Khrushchev mentioned trade; he doesn't like our embargo. There was no discussion of it of any kind, shape or description; there was no negotiation of it of any kind, shape or description.

If I can find any more definite words I would be glad to give them to you. This is a subject which is very irritating to the Soviet Union both as to trade and it hits them quite hard.

The comments of many visitors recently have pointed to the fact that he is quite annoyed because we wouldn't sell him big inch pipe, not we, but the allied countries wouldn't sell him big inch pipe and he blames us for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Anderson?

ATOMS FOR PEACE

Senator ANDERSON. Mr. Secretary, President Eisenhower made a great speech about atoms for peace about 1953 or somewhat in there. I watched it on television; it was very moving. We had a conference later at Geneva, atoms for peace. We have seen spending a lot of times, hundreds of millions of dollars for peaceful uses of atomic energy, and this treaty bars us from that field.

Why?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We had a provision in the treaty that was tabled——

Senator ANDERSON. In 1962 there was specific permission for this sort of thing. It was taken out.

Mr. HARRIMAN. They objected to that because it was very hard to define explosions for peaceful use. It could be gotten around without too much difficulty. They thought it would raise doubts in people's minds. They were unwilling to agree to the second part of that article.

The first part said, "if unanimously agreed to by the original parties," and the second part was, "if carried out in accordance with an annex hereto, which annex shall constitute an integral part of the treaty." There never was an agreement as to just what that annex should be. They threw that out and then it came down to an agreement to authorize explosions by unanimous agreement, and they preferred to handle that through amendment to the treaty.

AMENDING THE TREATY

Senator ANDERSON. An amendment to the treaty has to be made with all of the original parties agreeing, and suppose the Russians oppose it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The three original parties have to agree.

Senator ANDERSON. So you couldn't do it.

Mr. HARRIMAN. It is the same as the first point in the rrticle II which we had tabled a year ago.

Now, the addition of that reason why we changed the normal ratification of two-thirds of the signatories to a treaty to a half was to make it easier to get other countries to agree if there was some reason to permit peaceful uses.

We can, of course, explode atomic devices underground for peaceful uses or underground but with only——

Senator ANDERSON. I am not too sure.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Without venting which would have a fallout not go beyond the territorial limits of the country.

But any change, if there is something that is desired to be done—we have had some ideas of the use of atomic energy for that purpose—the matter will be discussed. We spent quite a little time in thrashing this out. They were the ones who did want to include it and we agreed for the reasons that I have given.

Senator ANDERSON. I know this.

Mr. HARRIMAN. We don't think it will reduce the work that may be done in increasing the value of peaceful use of atomic explosions, but if we do want to use it in a substantial way that will contaminate the atmosphere, we do have to get the approval of the two other signatories to this agreement.

RUSSIANS SUSPECTED A LOOPHOLE

Senator ANDERSON. In 1961 I was over with Ambassador Arthur Dean while he was negotiating with Tsarapkin. Every time he proposed peaceful uses Tsarapkin would object. We offered them the black box. We offered them everything we could think of to make it perfect for inspection, and every time they refused.

It is quite obvious they are the ones who took this out. I don't see why. We took a lot of money, for example.

Mr. HARRIMAN. They are suspicious of us, as we are of them.

Senator ANDERSON. But it is out of proportion.

Mr. HARRIMAN. They considered that an explosion; this would be a loophole. They evidently have no immediate plans for the use for peaceful purposes, so they told me, and they thought we might have it and this would be a way we could get around testing with a value to us which they would not enjoy.

Senator ANDERSON. I point out to you when we tried our first peaceful use in Project Plowshare we thought that was going to be completely contained underground, but there was some leakage from it and under this language it would be barred from testing.

Well, you shake your head over there. I think you will agree—Senator Pastore, I think, agrees with me. The Soviets have been in this for quite a while.

Mr. HARRIMAN. If there was not any leaking and there was not any venting, if it was contained in the atmosphere——

POSSIBLE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Senator ANDERSON. I am just coming to that, we are talking about doing a harbor in Alaska. It has been abandoned, but if we did it and there was a leak of some kind as with Plowshare, there would be a leak over into Canada and we are barred from it.

We are talking about building a canal in the Canal Zone. If there was any leaking, it would be barred. I fail to see what is wrong with the peaceful use of atomic energy. That is the only hope the world can have.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I can only tell you, you know, their objection.

They have no present plans to use it. They were suspicious that we would use what appeared to be a peaceful use as a means of carrying on testing to our advantage against theirs, and they would not agree to it.

Senator ANDERSON. But in 1962 we offered them the right to inspect the device before it was exploded. We offered them the right to watch it, invite all the newspaper people of all of the countries of the earth. We gave them every chance in the world to find out. I just can't imagine something which has been a national goal that both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy have turned their attention to time after time and on which great sums of money are now being spent——

Mr. HARRIMAN. I discussed this with Khrushchev himself, and Gromyko, with both of them. He said if there was a peaceful use, conditions would be improved. As feeling between us improved, if there was a useful purpose that would be of value of all of mankind including the Soviet Union—you know they have some very big plans to turn some of the rivers that flow north, south, Khrushchev told me about that. But he said, "If it would come to a point where we have greater confidence in each other, why, then we can consider it."

We believe that the point one of article II of the treaty we tabled is covered in the amendment clause, the only difference being that if there is an amendment to the treaty we have to come to the Senate of the United States, whereas under article II if the Soviet Union agreed we could do it without consulting the Senate.

SOVIETS HAVE VETO POWER

Senator ANDERSON. But as Senator Sparkman pointed out, if there was an amendment the Russians could veto it, and they have always taken the position there should be no peaceful uses. I don't understand why.

Mr. HARRIMAN. They didn't want to have an agreement to provide for it. They feel they are not far enough along to see a way in which they can use it today for peaceful uses. I am not familiar with any project which we are about to engage in, or if we are there is no inhibition to take the matter up with the British or the Soviet Union and get an amendment to the treaty if we wished to do so and if they would agree to do it.

Senator ANDERSON. But, Mr. Secretary, it is just like inspection. They are happy to talk about the numbers of inspection, but they never give in. We came down from 35 to 20, to 10, to 8, I under-

stand to 7, maybe to 5, but the Russians have never moved off their peg at all at any time.

Senator Pastore asked a question that I thought was similar.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I understand, Senator, there is no inhibition for carrying on the peaceful uses which would in itself require, which would be, if the explosion was underground——

Senator ANDERSON. Yes, there is; we just got through saying it.

Mr. HARRIMAN. There would be many, many years before we would agree to an explosion which jeopardized this treaty.

PROJECT PLOWSHARE EXPLOSION

Senator ANDERSON. I only say to you if you examine what happened in the shot, if you examined Project Plowshare, it was 2,000 feet underground and there was seepage from it which completely violated this treaty.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Can I ask Mr. Foster to comment on it?

Senator ANDERSON. Yes, if you can contradict Plowshare, go ahead.

Mr. FOSTER. Plowshare did vent but AEC has made a substantial number of improvements both in cleaner devices and also in entrapment procedures. The technical people with AEC, with whom we have been in constant communication, believe that this treaty will not seriously inhibit their plans for many years. In fact, they believe that with the increasing improvements which they have made in the last several years, they can carry out practically all of their plans presently set forth for the next many years.

This is not my opinion, this is that of the AEC.

Senator ANDERSON. I believe most of the peaceful uses on Plowshare were in charge of Dr. Edward Teller. I am sure he would be happy to give that, but I don't believe that.

Senator Pastore made a very good suggestion when he said they want to bar the shots in the area where we have leadership in, small tactical weapons. They are going to permit the use of tactical weapons in underground tests. They are going to bar the shots out in the atmosphere where they have been testing 30 and 60 and perhaps 100-megaton bombs and we haven't.

I do think there is some range but I am far more disturbed over the peaceful uses. We have talked about it a great deal and we have language in here that the Russians would agree to, but they have never agreed to a real peaceful uses.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Of course, we are available and we would be very glad to discuss this with you in detail, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD of Virginia. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey.

LANGUAGE OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROCEDURE

Senator HUMPHREY. I would just like to ask whose language was the withdrawal procedure. Was this presented by the United States delegation or was it by the Soviets?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We had a withdrawal procedure which we presented. They had a counter proposal and we thrashed it out and

came to an understanding. If you will look at the withdrawal procedure that was contained in a 1962 draft that was tabled at Geneva, you will see the difference. You will see the withdrawal procedure now covers us completely, leaves within the discretion of the President of the United States the interpretation of this language.

Senator HUMPHREY. Each nation to exercise its own judgment?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, that is what I would consider it. That is the sovereign right of every country to do so. The events that happened and if it affects our vital interests the President of the United States can withdraw, and so can the Soviet Union, of course.

Senator HUMPHREY. After a 90-day notice?

Mr. HARRIMAN. After a 90-day notice.

RESEARCH AND TESTING IN READY ALERT

Senator HUMPHREY. Are we to understand that during all the time this treaty is in effect, our laboratories, research facilities, and testing facilities will be kept in a state of ready alert?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would hope so, sir. I would hope so, and I would hope the Congress would provide the money necessary to carry that on.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are we to understand that research will continue with means of detection and inspection?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would hope so.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that covered in any way by this treaty?

Mr. HARRIMAN. None whatsoever; there is no inhibition in this treaty against our carrying on research in any field.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The only thing which is dealt with are explosions.

TESTING DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Senator HUMPHREY. Does this treaty in any way adversely affect our right to test advanced delivery systems?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, not at all. Advanced delivery systems?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, no inhibition at all.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, the propulsion, delivery systems, guidance systems that would be required for nuclear warheads are not in any way affected by the provisions of this treaty?

Mr. HARRIMAN. None whatsoever.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is merely the explosion?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The explosion.

Senator HUMPHREY. And the nuclear energy itself?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The explosion of a nuclear device.

CONTINUED TESTS BY FRANCE OR CHINA

Senator HUMPHREY. In your discussion, Mr. Secretary, did you discuss in any detail with the Soviet delegates what action would be taken, if any, if the French continued to test or stepped up their tests, and if the Chinese Communists should succeed in exploding a nuclear device?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We both made it very plain, talking about it, that continued tests by anybody, France or Communist China, would be one of the types of events which might be considered as affecting the vital interests of our mutual countries.

They made it quite plain if France didn't go along, but it was rather interesting, they accept France as a nuclear power, and that is in the record of our negotiations. I don't think they were very much concerned with France. I think they are concerned with West Germany getting independent nuclear capability. I don't think they are overly concerned about France.

I think they are very anxious to stop the French from testing so as to point the finger of scorn on Red China if and when she tests. I got the impression they were very keen to see France stop testing for that reason.

Senator HUMPHREY. There are many others who would ask questions.

Mr. HARRIMAN. But I didn't get the impression they were afraid of France. They voluntarily said France was a nuclear power and they accept that fact.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Price.

Representative PRICE. I will defer.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Beall.

Senator BEALL. I don't have any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Aiken.

RISKS IN THE TREATY

Senator AIKEN. Governor Harriman, you have referred twice to certain risks involved in our approval of this treaty, but I don't think those risks have been spelled out very clearly.

What, in your opinion, are the very greatest risks we would run by agreeing to this treaty? Is it military, economic, or political, or what would it be?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would have thought—I would rather have you question the scientists on this score, or Mr. Foster, who has been studying it in detail.

I get it from being briefed, but in any treaty of this kind, there is a possibility of evasion, and there is a possibility that there may be more knowledge gained by the Soviets than by us by the elimination of atmospheric tests. It is conceivable that we might let down our bars and not do what Senator Humphrey implied, and keep our research going, and the Soviets would then give us three month's notice, and we might be caught flatfooted.

There are points of that kind.

I have listened very carefully and as a businessman viewing the risks both ways, I think the risks are greater in continuing testing in these three environments than they are to adhere to the test ban.

Senator AIKEN. Offhand, is there anything Russia could do under this treaty that could put us to a disadvantage that we couldn't do if we were so minded?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, there is nothing we couldn't do then, except there is, I gather there is a threshold, very small explosions in the atmosphere.

Foster, you might like to explain that.

LARGE YIELD WEAPONS

Mr. FOSTER. I think, Senator, the things that are brought out, I would agree with the Secretary's conclusion as to the balance of risks. I think the things that are mentioned are the fact that the Soviet Union is ahead of us in large yield weapons at this point in time, and this treaty does put limits on further large yield developments on both sides.

Senator AIKEN. Do you mean production of large yield weapons or ability to deliver large yield weapons.

Mr. FOSTER. I think it probably has both advantages at this moment in time.

Senator AIKEN. There is nothing in this treaty to preclude our continuing testing the delivery of——

Mr. FOSTER. Not a thing.

Senator AIKEN [continuing]. Of 50, 100-megaton weapons?

Mr. FOSTER. Not a thing. The only advantage that they have is in the large yield weapons. They have a greater yield-to-weight capacity than we do at this moment in time.

They also have developed, because they choose this way, larger missile propulsion capabilities. We, on the other hand, have never felt that was in the U.S. interests and have directed our devices to smaller, more accurate, and more efficient devices.

Senator AIKEN. Because we can't deliver the large ones, that is why we haven't built them?

Mr. FOSTER. That is right. That is why we chose the other method.

They do not have at this moment in time, so far as we know, the capacity to deliver that device by any missile.

Senator AIKEN. You mean the 50-megaton bomb. They do not have the capacity to deliver?

Mr. FOSTER. By missiles. They might have the capacity by aircraft.

The other field in which it is sometimes stated we would be limited is that of weapons effects where they have tested perhaps to a greater extent than we.

I believe our people, and you should hear from the technical people on this, consider that this is a minor risk. We could do much of this underground under the provisions of this treaty.

There is also one area between perhaps ten kilometers and 40 kilometers where if they were to attempt to cheat to get certain advantages, they might be able to get away with it. This again is a minimum risk and much of what could be accomplished there we could accomplish better and cheaper underground and legally.

USE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN CANAL BUILDING

Senator AIKEN. Senator Anderson raised a very important point relating to this treaty, one which perhaps is most adverse from our viewpont and that is, it would seem to preclude any plans to con-

struct another canal from the Atlantic to the Pacific through the use of nuclear power, although I think it is already agreed that such a canal could be constructed for about 30 percent of the costs by nuclear power than it would cost by conventional means.

What would be the attitude of other signatories to this treaty if the United States approved the treaty with a reservation maintaining our right to construct, improve harbors or canals by nuclear power? What would they say, it is important——

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think we would run the risk of having them repudiate the agreement or fail to go forward with the agreement. They are not willing to have us undertake peacetime uses. They are just as suspicious of us as we are of them, or perhaps not just as suspicious but they are suspicious and they would consider that we would reserve a right then to test. I think it would be a very unfortunate thing to do so. I think it might well jeopardize the whole treaty.

Senator AIKEN. It might well jeopardize the treaty if you don't.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think we would live with an extra cost of a Panama Canal, but I think this treaty is worth more than a couple of million dollars more than we would spend.

There is nothing in this treaty which prevents an agreement to permit that use. I presume we are going to have a lot of trouble getting the Central American countries to agree to permit explosions that are going to emit dangerous fallout in the atmosphere.

AN UNFORTUNATE HYPOTHETICAL CASE

I have been told that, so I would think it would be a most unfortunate hypothetical case to raise. I would earnestly urge, sir, that the Senate not put in either this reservation or any other reservation.

Senator AIKEN. Was this matter brought up at the Moscow meeting?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, indeed. I told them so.

Senator AIKEN. It was and they refused to agree?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They said," We can't agree."

I talked to Khrushchev about it and I said there are no reasons if our relations improve by that time we can have some peaceful uses and this matter can be discussed. Of course, I was told if there is going to be any substantial fallout, there is going to be a great deal of difficulty in getting the Latin or Central American countries to permit explosions that do emit a substantial debris.

Mr. Foster, do you want to continue on that?

Mr. FOSTER. It would be some years before we would have completed experiments that would permit us to undertake that if it were allowed. There is also some question which you, sir, have a better judgment on than I as to whether Panama Canal territory is under the U.S. jurisdiction and control or could be so indicated. If it were to be, then it would be possible with clean bombs to dig a canal there, but this in any case is some years off.

Senator AIKEN. That is all. I have used my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Governor Harriman, I just have three principal questions here.

CONTINUED UNDERGROUND TESTING

In the first place, we will continue this underground testing, is that a fact?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I understand we are, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Did you tell the Russians that was our intention?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Oh, yes. It is perfectly clear that all of us are going to continue underground testing; there is no remission, no moratorium, no agreement. We can have as many underground tests as we want with the one qualification that any venting of fallout should be retained within our respective countries.

Senator STENNIS. But not only——

Mr. HARRIMAN. I assume that continuation of testing over the years depends on the administration and Congress giving them funds for that purpose, and I certainly hope they do.

Senator STENNIS. I just want to make that clear. There is not only no inhibition, but the understanding during the negotiations is that we would continue.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't know any particular aspects of this treaty that I did not discuss with Khrushchev and point out what our interpretation is. There is no understanding, sir, at all.

Senator STENNIS. I understand.

Mr. HARRIMAN. But I just wanted to make it absolutely certain that there was nothing in this treaty that would come in the future as a misunderstanding of our interpretation, so I explained in detail our understanding, what we intended to do and what he intended to do.

Senator STENNIS. I think it would be reassuring to the American people to say openly that you did base this upon the assumption we would continue testing and the Russians so understood it.

SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THE ATMOSPHERE

You said in answer to some questions this superiority of theirs in the atmosphere was taken into account by you or by the United States. That superiority that I referred to is what Senator Pastore referred to about the big bombs that you have already mentioned and the superiority, perhaps, in the anti-missile missile field. I say perhaps, I don't think it is too clear.

When you say it was taken into account, I want to know by whom? By whom was that weighed? You relied on someone else, I imagine, on a point like that?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I relied on my instructions which basically come from the President of the United States who has available to him all the facts. Mr. Foster could go into detail perhaps better than I can, but as I understand it they have exploded larger nuclear devices with larger capacity than we have.

On the other hand, I do understand we have exploded large enough bombs so that we could increase the size with real assurance that they would be effective. So I do not believe that we are very seriously affected by this particular aspect of their having gone further in testing the larger bombs. We have, as a matter of choice, decided that it was a more effective weapon to have relatively smaller devices, weapons and more of them, and that the

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added value of a larger bomb wasn't worth the expenditures and we would get more for our money, more for our efforts by more of the smaller.

PRESIDENT'S DECISION

Senator STENNIS. I know the Joint Chiefs of Staff are very much concerned about that point and also on this question of the anti-missile missile developments, and our prospects in that field which would be precluded and the Russians' prospect of what they have already done, which is not fully known. What I was getting at there was the prominence or lack of prominence that this point was given in the decision to sign. You didn't pass on that yourself; you accepted someone else's views.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I didn't pass on that myself. Obviously I am not competent to pass on it, but I can assure you it was given consideration by the administration. Consideration of further anti-ICBMs also was given consideration on the ground it was—would you want to comment on that, Mr. Foster?

Mr. FOSTER. Basically the——

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Foster, pardon me, there are others to question and I know we will go into that later.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do know it was given consideration, and the judgment was that our interests were not seriously adversely affected.

Senator STENNIS. My question was just by whom, what decision was it based on, and you really don't——

Mr. HARRIMAN. There was only one person in the administration, that was the President of the United States. He has available the recommendations of all concerned and I was satisfied that he had given it adequate consideration as a personal matter.

WHAT ADVANTAGE IS THERE IN THIS TREATY?

Senator STENNIS. For brevity's sake, let me put this question: Except for the psychological advantage to the world and to us and as a step in the right direction, so to speak, what advantage is there in this treaty to us?

Mr. HARRIMAN. You have mentioned what most of the people of the world are interested in, which is to end testing in the atmosphere because of the fear of contamination, fear that contamination might affect future generations.

From the standpoint of the first step, Mr. Khrushchev in his public interview may not have paid much attention to it, but he did say publicly what he said privately—that he hoped this would be a breakthrough and it would lead to other understandings that would reduce the risk of war.

This in itself, he was very blunt about it, is not a step of reducing the number of weapons, reducing possibly the risks of war, but was a step in coming to an understanding and might lead to others.

Senator STENNIS. So the main point is that this is a step in the right direction. It might prove to be the basis for further steps?

Mr. HARRIMAN. It might prove, to use his words, a breakthrough.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I didn't use that word; I haven't been as optimistic to use that word, but those were his words.

AREAS EXCLUDED BY THE TREATY

Senator STENNIS. And in the scientific field of related matters you do not feel that the agreement goes very far, if at all?

Mr. HARRIMAN. It doesn't go anywhere beyond the question of testing.

Senator STENNIS. I say it doesn't have any great meaning in your view, after all, than just an agreement to stop atmospheric testing?

Mr. HARRIMAN. It doesn't go anywhere in the more important field of the number of weapons there are, the freedom of both the Soviet Union and the United States to use those weapons, in no sense reduces the risk of war.

But I do think it confirms the impression which we have created that Khrushchev—they have such a large investment of effort in the Soviet Union that they have become what they consider a prosperous nation. I believe, I am certain it is true, that the Russian people are just as concerned as our people are of nuclear war, and it does look as if the Kremlin leaders are as concerned as we are to avoid nuclear war. I think Mr. Khrushchev was very much affected by what happened in October over Cuba when he looked down the nuclear gun barrel and he pulled out.

I don't think he wants to get into another situation of that kind. That is just an opinion.

MOSCOW SEEN AS FAT AND SOFT

Senator STENNIS. Did he refer to that, if I may ask, by name?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, he wouldn't have referred to it in that way. If he would have referred to it, he would have said he was a man of peace who was ready to avoid the risks that were involved. He has done this publicly. Of course—and this is something I wouldn't want to have printed—what burns him up is when he said, "I am the man of peace, I am out to save the world from nuclear disaster," they said, "Not at all, you are just a coward." He didn't like that.

And I think this was the beginning—and actually Peiping is posing as the great radical leader and Moscow has become fat and——

Senator STENNIS. Softy?

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. And soft. That is the issue, sir, to put it in colorful language. He wants to make peace a great issue.

Now, he hasn't changed one iota that I can see, from his conviction that communism is going to sweep the world, but he does look as if he is committed more now to this vigorous, what he calls peaceful, coexistence. I would call it vigorous competitive existence, of trying to force communism on other nations but gradually, they have become more conservative with greater prosperity.

KHRUSHCHEV AS A LEADER

Senator STENNIS. One brief question, Mr. Chairman, I know your services there have been over a long period and outstanding. You

had had previous contacts with Khrushchev after he came to power.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, The first time I saw him——

Senator STENNIS. By comparison, you have found him somewhat a different leader?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, completely.

In two sentences, I can say, sir, the difference. Stalin said to me, "Communism is going to sweep the world because of the failure of capitalism."

Once he used the colloquial phrase that communism breeds in the cesspools of capitalism. Fifteen years later, sitting in the same office, same table, with the same pictures on the wall, he says, "We are making such an enormous success of communism in the Soviet Union, other countries are going to have to follow our example."

That is as brief a comparison of our differences. It behooves us to get at it and take it seriously.

I don't want to in any way indict—I am all for the maximum deterrent, military deterrent. We won't be living safely unless we have it. But it does underline for me the need to get on with this competitive enterprise in which he is engaged of trying to communize the world by example.

He will do everything; he admits small wars, wars of liberation, are desirable and essential. But I think the character of the contest has changed.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Jackson?

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I quickly say it hasn't changed in terms of the necessity of maintaining the strongest military posture.

SOVIET TEST IN JUNE

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion of the Soviet test of June 12?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator JACKSON. We know there was a test, as you know, on June 12.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator JACKSON. I think this has been quite definitely confirmed.

There was no discussion or any mention of that?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. So far, from—if I am correctly informed and unless this knowledge comes since I have been away, there was no atmospheric, there was no debris and therefore the tests would have been permitted under this treaty. I don't raise it, because we have had a number of underground tests and their tests, curiously enough, have been conducted in such a way that they would have been allowed under this treaty.

Senator JACKSON. Yes. I think it may well be—we don't have all the information, of course—an indication that they had developed a sufficiently clean weapon that they could detonate at the surface. We don't know. This is speculation, but at least there is that possible indication.

SOVIET CUTS IN PRODUCTION

Did Mr. Khrushchev or any of their officials give any indication that they might be cutting back in their production?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes. This I would like to have very definitely off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator JACKSON. As you know, we have information that they are expanding their facilities.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, I was familiar with that.

Senator JACKSON. And that these new facilities have not yet come into production. I just wondered how that squared with the fact.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I didn't want to cross-examine him because I was not prepared to give any information to him. I am only quoting him.

Senator JACKSON. I understand. I merely wanted to make that point.

Mr. HARRIMAN. He may have had in mind they were not going to expand it beyond their present expansion. They may have had plans for further expansion. The actual expansion which I understand is not a very great expansion compared to our production.

IF THE CHINESE EXPLODE A NUCLEAR DEVICE

Senator JACKSON. Was there any indication that they would resume testing if and when the Chinese exploded a device?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. He reserved his position in regard to France, but he never mentioned, he didn't volunteer—whatever he talked to us about China came from my side. He was not anxious to talk about Red China, but I did raise it on a number of different occasions.

WHO PROPOSES AMENDMENTS?

Senator JACKSON. I have a question that Congressman Westland called to my attention.

Referring to article II, it states in the first paragraph that, "If requested to do so by one-third or more of the parties, the depository governments shall convene a conference to which they shall invite all the parties to consider such an amendment." Then it goes on in paragraph 2 of article II to state that, "Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to this treaty, including the votes of all of the original parties."

The question is, are the new countries that will be brought in as so-called signatory nations, parties?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, the original parties are the three, the three governments, and they name them here. The others are just parties and they will have to be—to change, amend the treaty, you would have to get a majority of the balance minus three.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, are you saying that the amendments that are to be proposed would have to initiated by the original three?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, the amendment, I think, can be initiated by a third.

Senator JACKSON. One-third of all of those who become signatory nations?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They could call it, but there wouldn't be very much use in calling it unless the three original parties agreed to it, because nothing could be done at the meeting if the three didn't attend, and the three have a veto.

Representative WESTLAND. May I interrupt?

Senator JACKSON. I will yield to him.

Representative WESTLAND. It says any party may propose amendments. I assume, then, anyone who subsequently signs this treaty if it's ratified by the three signatory nations would become a party?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is right, sir.

Representative WESTLAND. So any party, this could be Mali or Upper Volta or anybody who might sign this and call for amendments, and one-third could call a convention?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is right.

Representative WESTLAND. You would expect if this becomes a treaty, I would imagine you would get all of the nations in Africa, for example, to sign this treaty. I don't know how many of them there are: there are 40 or 50 of them.

Mr. HARRIMAN. There are about 30.

Representative WESTLAND. There are a whole bunch of them.

Senator JACKSON. They are over a third of the United Nations.

Representative WESTLAND. There are over a third of the United Nations.

It would seem to me you are going to be in convention for the existence of this treaty. They could propose any kind of an amendment they want; they could call a convention, and you must call it or not?

Mr. HARRIMAN. You don't have to attend a meeting.

Representative WESTLAND. You don't have to attend a meeting, but you have a convention of the signatories of this treaty.

A HYPOTHETICAL CASE

Mr. HARRIMAN. We don't have to attend unless we choose to, and it would be a rather futile act unless the three original parties attended, because no amendment is valid without the agreement of each one of the three.

The CHAIRMAN. All three of them?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think this is rather a hypothetical case. I don't think it could be involved.

Senator JACKSON. I think they could stir up an awful lot of trouble.

Representative WESTLAND. I do, too.

Senator JACKSON. Psychologically, they are going to propose a whole lot of amendments.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I wouldn't think so. They are very active in their self-interest, but it costs them money to travel as well as it does us.

Representative WESTLAND. Suppose they propose an amendment to abolish underground tests. We would be for that; so would they.

Mr. HARRIMAN. We don't have to approve.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, there might be. Any question on this treaty, of course, would have to be submitted to the Senate for ratification.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Any amendment would have to be submitted.

Senator JACKSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Aspinall? Is he here? He is not here.

How about Mr. Thomas or Hosmer?

EFFECTIVE INSPECTION

Representative HOSMER. Mr. Secretary, in February of last year, President Kennedy, speaking of an atmospheric treaty, said that it would be very vulnerable unless it contained provisions for effective inspection to avoid secret preparation and sudden tests. Earlier this year, Mr. Foster put it another way, saying that one of the most serious dangers or hazards from a treaty is surprise abrogation.

Were these matters discussed or not? Why have we no provision for that kind of inspection in this treaty?

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I say, sir, as far as the President's statement, I thought it referred to a moratorium, did it not? Mr. Foster, so far as your own statement, perhaps you had better speak.

Representative HOSMER. The statement, Mr. Secretary, was made February 7 in a press conference and it had reference to an atmospheric treaty.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Do you know, Mr. Foster? I thought it related to moratoriums.

Mr. FOSTER. We were concerned about an atmospheric treaty with a moratorium. We were not concerned if we were able to continue underground testing and if the Congress accepts the necessity of maintaining the state of preparations under which we could go into atmospheric tests promptly.

Representative HOSMER. Then I understand, Mr. Foster, that the President's attitude has changed?

Mr. FOSTER. I think this treaty provides methods by which he has been able to change what was stated at that time concerning that particular proposal.

SECRET PREPARATIONS FOR ATMOSPHERIC TESTING

Representative HOSMER. Is there anything in this treaty which enables the United States to ascertain whether or not secret preparations for atmospheric testing are made by the Soviet Union?

Mr. FOSTER. Not in this treaty.

Representative HOSMER. Then that hasn't changed, has it?

Mr. FOSTER. No, not that particluar thing. The thing that has changed is that we would expect to test and continue testing underground. The laboratories would remain alert, active, and making progress, and we would build the necessary installations from which atmospheric tests could take place promptly if that were to be required.

Representative HOSMER. I call your attention to the fact that the President's statement was made with specific reference to a ques-

tion regarding an atmospheric treaty and not a comprehensive treaty.

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Representative HOSMER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

PRESIDENT HAS NOT CHANGED HIS OPINION

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, the President approved the treaty that was tabled in August 1962, and he hasn't changed his opinion from that time to the present time in regard to a treaty with the provisions substantially the provisions that this one has. Am I right in that, Mr. Foster?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. HARRIMAN. So the President has not changed back and forth; there are different conditions involved.

Representative HOSMER. I can't understand you, sir.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I say the President approved the treaty that was tabled in August 1962, and he has not changed his opinion from that day to the present day. This treaty is substantially in accordance with the treaty that was tabled at that time.

These other suggestions were of a different character under different circumstances. I only wanted to get in the record the fact that the President hasn't been changing his mind back and forth on the basic principles of this treaty.

Am I stating it correctly?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Representative HOSMER. The change was between February 7 of 1962 and August of 1962.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, sir. I haven't got the question——

Mr. FOSTER. That could be read into it. We thought it would be possible to check on preparations at that time. We decided it would not be and we would take other steps that we would keep our own preparations alive and green. There are some other things which we, of course, do have——

Representative HOSMER. Of course, we understand the difficulties that the President pointed out on March 2, 1962 of maintaining preparations looking forward to somebody else to break the treaty.

Are those difficulties going to be overcome in the testimony that you people will bring forth?

Mr. FOSTER. I don't understand your question.

KEEPING LABORATORIES ACTIVE

Representative HOSMER. The President said it was impossible to keep topnotch scientists on the job and to maintain laboratories in reasonably efficient operating circumstances, under circumstances where carrying through the experiment involves waiting for somebody else to break a treaty. He also made reference to the impossibility of carrying forward the program to maintain an adequate deterrent while testing was limited to caves.

These statements of March 2, 1962, are much in conflict with the implications of the treaty that has been initialed. I asked if these conflicts will be resolved at some point along the line.

Mr. FOSTER. The difference is the laboratories will be kept in action. There will be testing; there will also be a maintenance of

the abilities to test again. We have since that time a good deal of experience in each of those activities.

There is no fear in anybody's mind that, the underground testing continuing, there is any advantage that the Soviets can get in their laboratories or otherwise.

Representative HOSMER. That doesn't exactly respond. The capacity for atmospheric testing depends on techniques and skills that are different from those of underground testing. I wonder if that will be brought forward—that atmospheric testing techniques, skills, and equipment can be placed on a standby basis ready for immediate resumption in case there is a breach of the treaty.

Mr. FOSTER. That is the plan as set forth by the people who are charged with that responsibility.

Representative HOSMER. And the situation, then, is different now than it was in March of last year?

Mr. FOSTER. In some respects.

Representative HOSMER. With respect to the estimated capability to do this?

Mr. FOSTER. In some respects we have all learned a good deal more about this business.

Representative HOSMER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

JURISDICTION AND CONTROL

Senator LAUSCHE. Article I of the proposed treaty says, "And not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosions, or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control."

My quandary arises from what the situation will be if a test is made in Red China, the Arab Republic, or by France—I will confine it to the first two—through a concurrence of action between Red China or the Arab Republic.

Will these words "jurisdiction or control" make it a violation of the treaty if Red Russia collaborates with Red China or the Arab Republic? What is the meaning of "jurisdiction and control" discussed by you?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, by no stretch of the imagination——

Senator LAUSCHE. Where is it discussed?

Mr. HARRIMAN. What?

Senator LAUSCHE. The meaning of the words "jurisdiction or control."

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't recall any detailed discussion. Perhaps the drafting committee may have discussed it. But I want to say by no stretch of the imagination would the Soviet Government maintain that it had jurisdiction or control over Red China.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Any more than it could be maintained that we had jurisdiction or control over France.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is the exact point I had in mind. It does not have jurisdiction or control over Red China.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. But let's assume there was an understanding that they collaborate in making the test in Red China.

Mr. HARRIMAN. If they do have tests in Red China there may be circumstances or events which will make it clear that the President—our interests are involved in abrogating the treaty.

Senator LAUSCHE. We will withdraw?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, they can. If you will read the second item that each party undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapons tests. The second part relates to carrying out. We could not——

Senator LAUSCHE. That answers the question.

Mr. HARRIMAN. We could not, sir, participate with France or help France in carrying out her nuclear tests if she intends to do so, nor could the Soviet Union.

KHRUSHCHEV'S MOTIVES

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, question number two: In your opinion was Khrushchev under the language contained in subparagraph B of article I, influenced by his desire to keep the air uncontaminated or to stop us from making tests comparable in size to the tests made by Red Russia in September 1961.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I can't tell you what his motivations are. I don't know, Senator, that you were here when I gave you my guess as to what I thought his principal motivation was, but——

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, that answers the question.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The question of fact is we have sufficient information in order to go to a very much higher nuclear warhead than the ones we have now used.

Foster, you might want to expound on that.

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. HARRIMAN. But I do not believe—my guess is, this was his motivation. His motivations were of a different character, more of a political character.

EFFECT OF 100-MEGATION TESTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Under the huge tests that were made, I think it was 100 megatons, in September 1961, did the Soviet Red Russians gain knowledge of the ability of a huge explosion destroying the efficiency of radar communication and electronic devices that guides missiles?

Mr. HARRIMAN. In the first place, I think the explosion that took place at that time, if I remember correctly, was of 60 megatons, not 100. There was some rumor that it would be a hundred, but I think, if I am right in saying, that it was 60 megatons.

Now, so far as the other question is concerned, the question which you ask has been given consideration, and it is the belief of the President's advisers that our interests can be protected in other ways.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was that subject discussed by you with any of our military experts and military scientists?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I was briefed on this subject as the conclusion of the advisers involved in briefing me.

Mr. Foster, perhaps, can give you more details if you wish to ask him, sir.

Mr. FOSTER. This has been discussed at great length in the Committee of Principals and among the interested staffings of the interested agencies and it was felt, Senator, this does not hold a threat to the United States security.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were there different views expressed by the military chiefs and the military scientists than the conclusion which you just expressed?

Mr. FOSTER. There are many differing views in this, and I think——

MILITARY TOOK EXCEPTION

Senator LAUSCHE. Who are the men in the military who took exception to the conclusion which you expressed?

Mr. FOSTER. In the Committee of Principals, the man who speaks for the military in that regard is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I think you should refer this question to him, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can't you tell who the men in the Joint Chiefs of Staff are who took exception to the conclusion which has been presented?

Mr. FOSTER. No, I do not have that information because I don't meet with all those chiefs.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator yield?

What is the conclusion? You used that expression several times.

Senator LAUSCHE. He said we have other ways and means of learning of impact of huge explosions on the technique of communication, on the efficiency of radar, and on the impact that it might have against our anti-missile missile program.

It is my understanding that the fear is that out of this huge 60-megaton test, they acquired knowledge of the disturbing and distorting impact that a huge explosion has on communication and radar systems.

TESTIMONY FROM MILITARY CHIEFS

I assume, Mr. Chairman, we are going to hear from the chiefs of the military.

The CHAIRMAN. After the treaty comes up, of course, the committee will hear anybody the committee wishes. I have made no plans. We don't have a treaty yet.

Senator LAUSCHE. There was discussed, Mr. Harriman, the subject of whether signing the treaty would constitute a recognition of a signatory as the valid government of a particular people.

Did you propose that there be written into the treaty that the signing of it would not constitute a recognition of the validity of the signatory government?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We didn't think it was necessary, sir. It was perfectly clear.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was it discussed at all?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We discussed the situation, but no one thought it was necessary. It is an established principle of international practice, and there was no need to put it in. It was not discussed because neither side thought it necessary. It was perfectly clear that the signing of an instrument with another regime in no way recog-

nizes that regime. We have done it before, with China and with other countries.

U.S. POLICY AND SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

Senator LAUSCHE. In the face of this supposed separation that has occurred between Peiping and Moscow, is there now a change in the international policy of our government?

Mr. HARRIMAN. In regard to Red China?

Senator LAUSCHE. With regard to Red Russia.

Mr. HARRIMAN. There is a proposed signing of the treaty but no change in policy that I know of, other than the standard policies that we have been pursuing since President Kennedy took over his responsibility as President. I don't know of any change in policy.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have any idea of what the thinking is of the people in the satellite countries concerning a lessening of our intent to liberate them?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I didn't know we had an intent to liberate them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, the hope is they would be liberated.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I know I debated that question in 1952 with Mr. Dulles. I had four debates with him. I pointed out that his policy of liberation might create a terrible disaster to the peoples, would encourage them to rise up, and he would have the death of many people on his conscience, this was 1952, if he proposed a policy of liberation, because we have no way, no method of liberating them. We would always hope and I, for one, am one who would always keep the hope alive and will do everything I can personally, and I would hope our government will, to see that these countries are liberated from the iron yoke of communism.

There has been a considerable advance in the loosening of the bonds of Moscow over these countries, rather faster than I thought would come, but the tragic events in Hungary in 1956, I think it was, showed that we are powerless in terms of liberating them.

We have never, so far as I know, as a government taken a commitment to liberate these people. We do hope and constantly express the hope, and I have done so as an individual, that we will always do so.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I just finish one sentence, that we will always keep before the people our hope that they will someday be freed from the yoke of communism.

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one further question, if I may.

EFFECT OF TREATY ON "CAPTURED NATIONS"

In your opinion, what impact will the signing of this treaty, if it is finally approved, have upon the hopes of the people and the spirit of the people of the captured nations?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't know. I don't know any people in the world, nor have I heard of them, that are not concerned over the effect of testing and the fallout on the future health of the people. So, I don't know of any country which won't welcome this treaty.

Now, the Chinese Government has come out violently opposed to this. They are attacking the Soviet Government for initialing this treaty. We don't know what the opinion of the Chinese people are,

because they are not allowed to express their opinions, and we have no way of finding out what they feel. We probably don't know anything about this.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cannon.

Senator CANNON. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bennett.

Senator BENNETT. I have just one question.

RESEARCH CAN CONTINUE

Mr. Secretary, you have indicated your belief, the belief of the administration, that research can go right on in the face of this test ban. Is that the belief of the Atomic Energy Commission? Have you had that confirmed by the people who have that responsibility?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I understand that is the policy of this administration, and if they have the appropriations from Congress they will continue to do so.

Senator BENNETT. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. Just one question on something I want to get clear in my mind.

CLEAN NUCLEAR DEVICES

If the Soviet Union should develop a clean nuclear device, would this treaty prohibit the Soviet Union from experimenting with it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They are prohibited by this treaty from exploding a device in the atmosphere.

Senator DODD. Clean or dirty?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I imagine if they had a clean device they could—they are not prohibited from exploding underground. If they had a clean device they could, of course, test underground at rather shallow depth. The treaty provides that there shall be no venting which would cause fallout to go beyond the territorial limits of that country. If they had a device which was clean they could test underground rather shallowly.

Senator DODD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

VIOLATIONS OF THE TREATY

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary, just one question, the fact we have a 3-month period before renouncing the treaty—is it required we wait 3 months in the event of an obvious violation or breach by one of the two other major participants?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't understand it so. If a treaty is violated by someone, the treaty is abrogated at once. You had better get an international lawyer. That is my understanding. That was my understanding and that was clearly understood by me when I initialed the agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may clarify that, you mean where the violation is by one of the parties, where the extraordinary circumstances arise from a third party, the 3 months, is that correct?

Senator CASE. Yes, I am talking about one of the 3 nuclear powers.

Mr. HARRIMAN. If we had evidence someone exploded in the atmosphere, that would be a complete tearing up of the agreement. Whether Red China would test or some other country would test, then the President would decide whether our vital interests were affected, that is in our thinking an extraordinary event, and he would make up his mind whether it was affecting the vital interests of our country, in which case he would give notice.

Senator PASTORE. Wouldn't this atomic event relate to atomic energy—it would not be any extraordinary event.

Mr. FOSTER. Relating to the subject matter of the treaty.

Senator CASE. That is all, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.

SENATE RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS

Senator WILLIAMS. Governor, I just want to be sure I understood your answer to Senator Jackson's earlier question. Assuming this treaty has been ratified and an amendment is submitted thereto, that would require the consent of the United States.

Does that mean ratification by the Senate of each amendment which may subsequently be put up?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, sir; they might put up several amendments at one time, but any amendment or series of amendments that were adopted by the conference at one time would have to come to the Senate for ratification.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is the point I wanted to clear. It was not just approval by our delegate to this convention.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator WILLIAMS. But ratification by the Senate.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Curtis?

Senator CURTIS. Mr. Secretary, what is the time schedule on this? When is the signing expected to take place?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I understand the Secretary of State is going shortly to Moscow and possibly it will take place next week. The exact time has not been set, but if you wanted me to make a guess I would say it would be signed early next week.

Senator CURTIS. Then any reaction here will have no effect on the signing? By here, I mean in the Senate.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't know of any reaction that has come out so far that would change the President's decision to authorize the Secretary of State to sign it. I have understood there was some discussion of some of the distinguished members of the Senate going to Moscow and participating in the ceremony perhaps signing the treaty, too.

Senator CURTIS. Does this treaty in any way relate to underground testing?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. Underground testing is permitted except——

Senator CURTIS. It is permitted——

Mr. HARRIMAN. I mean it is not prohibited; underground testing is clearly permitted. The only type of underground testing which

would not be permitted would be where the venting of fallout went beyond the confines of the country.

RUSSIA AND CUBA

Senator CURTIS. Referring to the 90-day withdrawal, suppose the Russians encouraged an aggression from Cuba throughout all the rest of the hemisphere, and the use was conventional weapons, that would not be an extraordinary event that would permit us to withdraw from this treaty, because the extraordinary event has to be related to the subject matter of the treaty, is that correct?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, sir, but we could use nuclear weapons in that context, if we wished to do so. There is no inhibition to the use of nuclear weapons.

Senator CURTIS. As a matter of fact, they could not only use conventional weapons throughout the Western Hemisphere, but they could test underground, improve their tactical weapons and use them throughout the Western Hemisphere, and we would still be bound by this treaty so far as the escape from extraordinary event is concerned, is that not true?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am not completely clear. We could be completely free to use nuclear weapons in any hostility.

Senator CURTIS. That is not my question.

Mr. HARRIMAN. So far as testing is concerned, our right to get out of this is the interpretation that the President places on extraordinary events.

Senator CURTIS. Which are related to the subject matter of the treaty.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Related to the treaty. It depends on how he would interpret the events that you speak of. I would think when you think of the fantastic capacity we have as compared to anything Cuba might have, I don't quite see the bearing of your question on the ratification of this treaty.

Senator CURTIS. Russia might go in and use Cuba as a base, and are we still bound by a treaty banning tests?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Am I to understand you to say use Cuba as a base for conventional attack on the United States?

Senator CURTIS. No, no, throughout all of the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Assuming they got control of all of South America.

Senator CURTIS. I don't know how successful they would be; I hope they wouldn't be successful. But my point is that this 90-day escape is neither an escape regardless of what Russia can do—they could make war on us, they could conduct all sorts of aggression in the Western Hemisphere, definitely as long as they used conventional weapons, and they could probably use atomic weapons.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator, if we get into a nuclear war the world will not be in condition where anybody will care much whether this treaty—this treaty will probably burn up in the disaster that occurs. I don't see the relevance of your question, sir, to this treaty. If we have atomic war, the disaster will be such that people won't be worrying about this treaty or many of the other things which are now a part of our life.

Senator CURTIS. I won't take very much time, so this can be submitted for the record.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TREATY

You referred a time or two to the advantages or disadvantages of this treaty.

Would you list both?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think the advantages of this treaty are, number one, that it is a step in the direction of control of nuclear weapons, it, in itself, doesn't control them. It simply to some extent limits further development of them possibly; but it doesn't, in itself, limit weapons. It is a step in the direction which we have been trying to work for for many years.

Secondly, it prevents the atmosphere being contaminated by fallout from explosions in the atmosphere by the Soviet Union and the United States and the United Kingdom. It is welcomed for that reason pretty generally throughout the world.

Those are the two principal reasons for them.

Senator CURTIS. What are the disadvantages?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The disadvantages may be that the Soviets could gain somewhat in their position as compared to us in the effectiveness of their weapons as compared to the improvements of effectiveness of our weapons by limiting our future testing to underground. But on balance—the evidence I have received makes me believe this—even that part of the problem is not serious. In fact, I don't think we need to be unduly concerned that there would be, that the Soviets would adhere to this treaty and conform to it—I don't believe we need to be unduly concerned that there will be a change in the knowledge that each of us have to such an extent as to affect our relative capability as against a condition which would exist if we all continued to test in the atmosphere.

Senator CURTIS. Are there any other disadvantages?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There are those who have said that we are ahead in the type of weapon that can be developed and approved by underground testing and therefore the Soviets might catch up with us in that event.

They may well catch up with us in the smaller size weapons, but they could do that anyway, even if the treaty didn't exist. They could continue to test underground and in the atmosphere as well, so if they do catch up to us they would catch up anyway.

CATCHING UP WITH THE SOVIETS

Senator CURTIS. Will we be able to catch up with them in matters where they are ahead if we cannot test in the atmosphere?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am told we can, with the present knowledge, go ahead with weapons very much larger than those that we now have.

Mr. Foster, would you confirm that?

Mr. FOSTER. That is right. They have certain advantages in the high yield, but again it has been our strategy and policy that we preferred smaller, more effecient, more accurate, more mobile, harder weapons.

Senator CURTIS. My question was, could we catch up in those weapons where they are ahead of us if we stop our atmospheric testing?

Mr. FOSTER. We think they are ahead of us in the large yield somewhat, but they have only really exploded two of these, and therefore they have a lot to learn as well. They, too, are limited now, so whatever lead exists perhaps would be maintained. The conclusion is, it is not of great significance.

Senator CURTIS. And we cannot catch up with that.

Mr. FOSTER. We could not in that field.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Mundt?

"BEYOND ITS LIMITS"

Senator MUNDT. Governor, in article I, subsection A, precisely what is the meaning of the three little words "beyond its limits?"

Mr. FOSTER. May I speak to that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER. There is a mistake in punctuation which in your copies does not conform to the actual draft treaty. There should be a semicolon after "in the atmosphere," and another semicolon after the word "space" in that section A. So, "in the atmosphere" is one environment, and "beyond its limits, including outer space" is a second environment, or "underwater, including territorial waters or high seas" is a third environment.

Senator MUNDT. It seemed quite clear from the copy which I have before me that this would not stop the Soviets from conducting atmospheric tests above its own territory.

Are you quite sure that you have this thing punctuated—that this thing is correct?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, sir, I think we have. I didn't realize you had a different draft. But the draft we signed is punctuated as Mr. Foster indicates.

The CHAIRMAN. I have that. I may explain, the copy we had was prepared by the State Department and did not have this correction on it in punctuation.

Senator MUNDT. Your interpretation and their interpretation——

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I say this was an earlier draft where the punctuation was not there, so when we cabled it on—this is not anybody's fault but just——

Senator MUNDT. All I could do is work from the draft I had before me, obviously. I don't know what draft you have but I am interested, more than in punctuation, in whether there is a mutuality of understanding.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Complete mutuality in understanding.

Senator MUNDT. They cannot test above their own territory.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. And they cannot contaminate.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, sir, clearly correct.

Senator MUNDT. And you would leave it the way the punctuation was stated.

Mr. HARRIMAN. We thought it did.

Senator MUNDT. It did not accord with these comments you have here.

Mr. FOSTER. That is right. We didn't have the original draft until Mr. Harriman got back Saturday night.

DEMONSTRABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE TREATY

Senator MUNDT. On the matter of withdrawal, I am a little bit concerned that unless a reservation is written into this treaty we can get ourselves in a pretty bad box, because it looks to me as though even though the Soviet deliberately violated the treaty by exploding a bomb in direct violation, that we still have to grant the 90 days grace period.

I would like to see something in this treaty which would read, "it shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty 3 months in advance, except where there is a demonstrable violation."

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would hope you don't do that. That is a clear understanding of international law and it would indicate a spirit that we had in this which would not do the United States Government any good.

I hope you won't. It is perfectly clear if a treaty is violated by one side, none of the other signatories are bound.

Senator MUNDT. We are still bound by this 90 days, are we not?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We are not bound by 90 days. If the other side should violate the treaty, there is the right of anyone of the signatories to act on its own if one of the parties violates the terms of the agreement. You don't need any notice.

Senator MUNDT. Would you be able to supply for the record a unanimity of opinion from the international lawyers that this point is covered, because to me it is a little bit dubious. There must be precedents involved and there must be international opinions involved.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would be very glad to do so.

Senator MUNDT. But to me also, unless there is something here to protect that as a demonstrable violation we don't want to wait 90 days.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chayes, our counsel, is here. We would be glad to submit that to you. I think beyond question my statement is correct, is it not?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir, I fully subscribe to that.

Senator MUNDT. Will you give us something in a little more detailed form for the printed record rather than an insertion?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir, we will have a memorandum which will fully cover that.

Senator MUNDT. One other question, Governor.

CHINA'S RELATION TO THE TREATY

You have stressed several times that you think the reason the Soviets have taken a definite attitude on this is because of the situation with Red China, which to me also on the surface makes a lot of sense.

Do we have to presuppose, therefore, that there is this definite difference between Red China and Red Russia in order to give this

treaty an opportunity to be serviceable to us as well as to them, because if, in fact, in depth there does not appear this difference which appears on the surface, are we not thereby in signing this treaty simply providing an automatic catch-up period for Red China to go along?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't believe we would be greatly concerned about our position against Red China in terms of its capacity to do us any vital damage. I personally feel that the world will be far less secure when and if Red China gets independent nuclear capability, even to a moderate extent. But I don't believe, having more knowledge or more information against nuclear weapons will protect us against that. It will be a blackmail value against other countries.

Senator MUNDT. That is the very point that concerns me. I share with you completely the fact that the world would be less secure——

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think so.

Senator MUNDT [continuing]. If an irresponsible government like Red China would get a nuclear capability.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. But I would hate for us all to stand by and tread the mill while the Chinese Government is able to catch up with us as they presumably could to a great degree before they had violated the terms of the treaty.

Mr. HARRIMAN. It is perfectly clear that the President of the United States would have complete right to abrogate the treaty if extraordinary events that you described transpired. If there was one explosion, I don't know whether the President would want to abrogate the treaty, but if it caught up—you know there is quite a difference between being able to explode a nuclear device and having the industrial capacity to develop a large arsenal of weapons. You are more familiar with it than I am.

I fully agree, sir, it would be a more dangerous world, when and if the Chinese get a nuclear capability, but I don't think many more nuclear weapons than we now have will make the world any less dangerous. It is a blackmailing capacity, the ability of one country, even with a few small nuclear weapons, to start a nuclear war off, that would be the danger in the early stages anyway.

But it would be some years before nuclear capacity—even the most optimistic estimates—before Red China could have any substantial arsenal or nuclear weapons.

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA

Senator MUNDT. Do you accept or reject as a hypothesis of possible validity that all that appears on the surface in this controversy between Red China and Red Russia may not exist in depth?

Mr. HARRIMAN. In depth? Well, what is going on is going on. This idea of this being a big hoax is really beyond the realm of reason, but no one knows where this rift is going to lead to.

You have to recognize they are both Communist countries. Both of them, as Communist countries, have a great deal to gain by maintaining relations with each other and not splitting the Communist movement. The concept of communism is that when it suc-

ceeds in dominating the world, as they hope to, that the Communist countries will find ways to live together in peace.

So there are many reasons for the Communists to attempt to patch up the differences that exist. Whether they will be able to do so or not I wouldn't want to hazard a guess. There is a very deep conflict going on between Moscow and Peiping, and it has been going on for some time. It is out on the surface now.

Senator MUNDT. If I interpret what you have said, you share with me the feeling that there are more basic factors tending to pull Red China and Red Russia together than there are basic factors tending to push them irrevocably apart.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't know that I would put in the word "more". There are basic factors.

Now, this, we could spend 2 or 3 hours debating, or discussing, rather, but there are some inherent factors in the relationship between Red China and the Soviet Union that cannot be changed, historic differences between the two countries: the fact that Russia is a have country and China is a have-not country; the fact that the population of China is beyond what they can feed; the fact there is a lot of open space in the Soviet Union which China might look at with envy. These are all factors which are very important factors.

Whether they outweigh these other factors which I have mentioned that would tend to tie them together, I wouldn't want to say. I wouldn't want to predict what the relationship between the two countries were a decade from now and certainly not two decades from now. There may well be a change in the attitude of the Soviet Union as well as a change in the attitude of communist China.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long.

INCREASED ATMOSPHERIC RADIATION

Senator LONG. Do you have some information as to how much the atmospheric radiation has increased as the result of the various atomic tests which have been held by all nations?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would rather have you get that from another source. Do you want to answer that?

Senator LONG. Do you have it? I would like to get it. Do you have any idea?

Mr. FOSTER. It has been increased somewhat, Senator Long, but I think we had better get the actual figure rather than guess at it.

Senator LONG. Get it and supply it to me.

EXPLOSIONS IN OUTER SPACE

Mr. Foster probably could answer this better than you could, but I would like for you to spell out for me what you believe to be the kind of explosion in outer space that would be most difficult to detect in the event the Soviets engaged in it, and what would be your problem and the possibilities of trying to detect it.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Certain distances, perhaps solar distances, a hundred million miles which, if they were successful in getting a satel-

lite out there, would be difficult for us to detect unless we had a satellite also mounted above our atmosphere.

Senator LONG. That is a tremendous distance you are talking about.

Mr. HARRIMAN. This is tremendous distance and this is what we are talking about, and almost everything that can be done in that way, Senator, can be done legally underground. Therefore they would be very foolish to attempt to avoid detection by engaging in this kind of a test.

Senator LONG. Suppose you tried to explode it at 50,000 miles away from you, would that be detectable?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Readily detectable from the earth—excuse me, I want to qualify that. It depends, of course, on the size of the yield.

Senator LONG. If you exploded a big bomb that far out at a distance where you couldn't detect it, I would ask you if you could tell much more about what you achieved than just the fact that it did go off.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, this is the other side of this equation. As you get way out, of course, the time to get it out is long, and the time to get the data back is long, and the validity of the data is certainly in question, and the thing may not go off. This is a very expensive way to do it, and except if you had perhaps a lead balloon which is sometimes used as an example, you might hide behind a lead balloon certain of the effects, but you still face the problem of how do you get the effects without revealing it to the detector.

So we do not think that this is a matter of great concern.

DETECTION OF EXPLOSIONS IN SPACE

Senator LONG. So that testing at extreme distances, while you might send 100-megaton bomb out there and explode it, as to whether you got 100-megaton yield or just 20-megaton yield out of it might be very difficult to tell if you did it at such a distance it would be almost impossible to detect by your adversary from Earth, I take it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, a 100-megaton bomb would be fairly easy to detect even at greater distances if we had satellites to check it and, of course, there is a problem of getting a 100-megaton device out that far. As yet nobody has the propulsion capacity so to do.

Senator LONG. Yes.

What is the possibility?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We can also detect the takeoff of the satellite that was mounted.

Senator LONG. This question might have been asked already, but you can just dispose of it briefly if it has been.

CASE OF AN EXPLOSION ON RUSSIAN-CHINESE BOUNDARY

How do you propose to handle the problem of an explosion that might occur near the Russian-Chinese boundary. Suppose we find there has been an explosion near the Chinese boundary and the Russians disclaimed responsibility for it. Is that a possible source of evasion on their part?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The withdrawal clause would protect in either event.

Senator LONG. In other words, it would be up to you to make a value judgment as to whether in your judgment that was the Chinese exploding or the Russians?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct, sir. The President would decide.

Senator LONG. That is a problem to meet when you get to it, I take it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes.

Senator LONG. Thank you.

EFFECT OF A NONAGGRESSION PACT

One more question, if I might, Mr. Harriman. Just what does a nonaggression pact mean insofar as war between two foreign countries are concerned?

Suppose we had a nonaggression pact with the Russians and they became involved in a war with the Chinese, would we be obligated to go to war in that event or would it be vague?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We have never discussed, or at least we didn't discuss at all, what the terms of this nonaggression pact would be between the NATO and Warsaw treaty countries. The general conception, I believe, has been the relations between the two might start in Europe as a result of a breach in the integrity of the lines of demarcation or boundaries between the states. It would be nonaggression within the area of Europe, although I can't tell you what the provisions of the treaty may be.

Now, actually there is nothing that has been talked about so far that is not contained in the obligations we all have as members of the United Nations, so that the purpose of the Soviet Union in this is not entirely clear in their proposal. This has been up for discussion for how many years, Mr. Foster, this question of nonaggression?

Mr. FOSTER. The first formal pact was tabled this spring, but they have talked about this for 4 or 6 years.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Five or six years ago, when I was in Russia, Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov asked whether we wanted to have a nonaggression pact between our two countries. I told him then I thought there wasn't any need for it because we intended to join the United Nations.

Senator LONG. That is the point I was saying to you. Don't we, to a considerable extent, have a nonaggression pact with the Russians, although we might call it by a different name, in that we are both committed not to wage war on one another?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct, sir.

OBLIGATION TO WAGE WAR

Senator LONG. If we signed a nonaggression pact with them, would that raise a question of whether either country would be obliged to go to war in the event the other became involved with the Chinese Communists?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, it wouldn't be involved at all. At least I don't see that it could be. I don't know what the terms would be, but we are committed under our North Atlantic Treaty to take certain steps, and I can't conceive that nonaggression would involve us

beyond what our present commitments are in the United Nations or NATO.

But this is all hypothetical, because we don't know; we didn't negotiate a treaty, we didn't have a draft of a treaty, we didn't discuss any provisions of it. All we did was to agree to consult our NATO allies and see whether they were ready to embark on negotiations. If they were, why, then we would have some talks about it.

The Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, places enormous importance on this. Why he does that, I can't tell you, because I didn't explore it with him. But he undoubtedly has some reason for it. So far we haven't seen any valid reason on our side to pursue it.

Senator LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Young.

Senator YOUNG. Nothing, Mr. Chairman; no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else?

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I say, until we consult with our allies.

Senator LONG. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I believe you have been most helpful. You have been very enlightening, and I was delighted we could get so many members here to listen to your explanation.

Do you have anything else you want to add?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I just want to express my gratitude to you and other members for coming and to be as patient with me and in the rather involved answers, but I have tried to give you all the facts as I know them and understand them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has been a very good meeting and I congratulate you.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee adjourned subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JULY 30, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee convened in executive session at 12:15 a.m. in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Carlson, the committee, by voice vote, approved for report the nominations of Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., to be Ambassador to Portugal; Henry Cabot Lodge, to be Ambassador to Vietnam; James R. Loeb, to be Ambassador to Guinea; W. Michael Blumenthal, to be Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations with rank of Ambassador; Howard Rex Cottam, to be Ambassador to Kuwait; and Claude G. Ross, to be Ambassador to the Central African Republic.

On motion by Senator Carlson, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee, by voice vote, approved for report the nominations of Dr. Walter Adams and Dr. Mabel M. Smythe to be Members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.N.

The committee approved for report without objection the nomination of Donald A. Dumont to be Ambassador to Burundi, on motion by Senator Sparkman.

The committee voted to report a list of nominations and appointments in the diplomatic service dated June 21, 1963, without objection.

Without objection, the committee voted the favorable report of the resolutions (S.J. Res. 67), extending an invitation to the International Olympic Committee to hold the 1968 winter Olympic games in the United States, and (S.J. Res. 72), favoring the holding of the Olympic games in America in 1968. A like resolution (H.J. Res. 324), extending an invitation to the International Olympic Committee to hold the 1968 winter Olympic games in the United States, previously referred to the committee, was held over for other action.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Long, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

The committee resumed its markup of the bill (S. 1276), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:25 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, AUGUST 2, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Humphrey, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1276), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, AUGUST 15, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2:13 p.m. in the Joint Atomic Energy Committee hearing room, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

Also present: Senators Byrd of West Virginia and Young of Ohio of the Committee on Armed Services. Senator Case later joined.

Also present: Senator Pastore (Chairman), and Senators Anderson and Curtis of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified on the proposed nuclear test ban treaty.

For a record of the proceedings, see the printed hearing and official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:10 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, AUGUST 16, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room AE-1, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Senator Russell (chairman) and Senator Jackson of the Armed Services Committee.

Also present: Senator Pastore (chairman), and Senator Anderson of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

John A. McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and others of the CIA, briefed the committee on aspects of the proposed nuclear test ban treaty.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 1:30 p.m.]

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MINUTES

MONDAY, AUGUST 19, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in public session at 10 a.m. in room 318, SOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson and Williams of Delaware.

Also present: Senator Russell (chairman), and Senators Jackson, Thurmond, Goldwater, Case, and Young of Ohio, of the Committee on Armed Services.

Also present: Senator Pastore (chairman), and Senator Anderson of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Also present: Senators Dirksen, Kuchel, and Simpson.

Testimony on the proposed nuclear test ban treaty was presented by General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, United States Army; Admiral David L. McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; General Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and General David M. Shoup, Commandant, United States Marine Corps.

For a record of the proceedings, see printed hearing and official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, AUGUST 23, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m. in room AE–1, Capitol, in executive session.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Senator Curtis of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Also present: Senator Kuchel.

Doyle L. Northrup, Technical Director of the Air Force Technical Applications Center, appeared and testified in relation to the proposed nuclear test ban treaty.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:00 p.m.]

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Mansfield, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director; Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser, State Department; Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs; Mr. Marcy, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased to have the Secretary of State this morning. We had certain things during the open hearings that arose that would be discussed in executive session. I might just suggest some of the items that came up to refresh your memory.

One, I believe from the Senator from Oregon, was the attitude on the transfer of nuclear materials to non-signatory countries, particularly France. Others were the right to use nuclear weapons to repel aggression in the case of actual hostilities, the status of additional proposals for arms control and non-aggression, the significance of a reservation, and the interpretation of the word "debris".

These were some of the subjects that were raised during the course of the hearings. I don't limit it to that, but merely to refresh your memory on some of the items; these were pretty long hearings. We had 44 witnesses, Mr. Secretary, in public session and we completed them yesterday afternoon.

Do you wish to make an initial statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM C. FOSTER, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take the committee's time from questions that the committee might wish to ask, but I might make some comments quite informally on some of the points that have come up.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Secretary RUSK. I must say I greatly respect the thoroughness with which the committee has gone into this question and the searching examination of witnesses that has occurred.

I can report to the committee that at the close of business yesterday 81 countries had signed. These included three of the four nuclear powers. France has not signed and shows no indication of doing so.

But with the exception of Communist China, the signatories now include the countries that we thought have a capability of developing nuclear weapons in, say, the next ten years or so.

So this, at least will have, I think, some impact on the proliferation problem.

COUNTRIES THAT HAVE SIGNED THE TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Could you tell us the European countries and countries of size—I am not talking about these completely ineffective countries that have no forces whatsoever, but I am talking about countries that have reasonable potential—that have signed?

Secretary RUSK. I think they include these, Sweden, West Germany, Israel, UAR, Japan, India——

Senator LAUSCHE. Arab Republic?

Secretary RUSK. The UAR has signed. Our information is they are not involved in working on this business at the present time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who has signed?

Secretary RUSK. UAR. We have been watching that very carefully and they don't seem to be working in a nuclear field outside of peaceful uses.

India has signed, and we think they——

Senator AIKEN. They have a potential?

Secretary RUSK. They would have a potential.

It is our present estimate that at least 107 signatories will evolve and there may be some additional ones.

COUNTRIES THAT HAVE NOT SIGNED

North Vietnam, North Korea have indicated that they will not sign. There is some real doubt about the Malagasy Republic for some reason. They have indicated they are not interested in signing.

Cuba for some strange reason has not signed, and this may be because they are still playing the Moscow-Peiping problem a bit. They have been one of the more interesting slow ones to come in.

The French-speaking African countries have been a little slow. Paris tells us with complete insistence they have not been trying to influence those French-speaking African countries, but it is possible that these countries themselves are trying to read the French mind and some of them are a little reluctant to come forward fast.

Senator AIKEN. Some have signed, some of the French colonies?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I hope we get them in pretty soon because their scientific capabilities threaten us so that—[Laughter]

The CHAIRMAN. I hope Chad comes in.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Has San Marino come in yet?

NOT A BAN-THE-BOMB TREATY

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I might then turn to the question of whether the treaty is in any sense a ban-the-bomb treaty and the clarification of the meaning of the treaty. I think it is a little unfortunate that this has been caught up in the difference between clarifying and interpretation, and the use of the word "reservation," because basically—I am not speaking now legally, but speaking in the broadest sense—basically a reservation is used to change the meaning of the treaty.

Senator MORSE. Sure.

Secretary RUSK. In this context, it would seem to us that where it is wholly agreed that the treaty is not a ban-the-bomb treaty, where there is no international doubt on that subject, and where there is no doubt in the United States itself, that it would be appropriate simply to pin down that point of interpretation utterly and completely in the formal legislative record of the Senate itself. That is, if that record shows the statement of the President of the United States, the statement of the Secretary of State on this matter, and the attitude of the Senate on this point, then for all purposes whatever that is what this treaty means to the United States, and that would not even be challenged internationally.

As late as August 21, for example, in a statement which the U.S.S.R. addressed to China, they said, "Second: The treaty also does not prohibit the Soviet Union if need be from holding underground tests, from increasing the stockpile of its nuclear arms, and even from using these weapons against imperialist aggressors if they unleash a war in a fit of insanity." The Roumanian, when he signed the treaty, for example, in talking about the unfinished business in the disarmament field, referred to the banning of the manufacture and the use of nuclear weapons. So did the Bulgarian, In other words, I think that this is not an issue which is international in character.

Quite frankly, in taking the advice that we had from down here, before the treaty was finally initialled, to look at it under a miscroscope, we ourselves wanted to be sure there was no possibility of doubt on this. We mentioned this to Mr. Gromyko and he seemed puzzled. He said, "Well, of course the test ban—this is a treaty to ban tests. The treaty speaks for itself, and this is not in question. This is not the problem."

So, I would hope that the committee and the Senate would feel if this is——

BANS TESTS IN THREE ENVIRONMENTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As a matter of fact, it is not a treaty to ban tests?

Secretary RUSK. Beg pardon?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is not a treaty to ban tests and nuclear explosions under any circumstances?

If it were strictly a treaty limited to tests, the issue would not be valid as to whether or not it could be used someplace else. But the thing that raises the question on the necessity for clarification is that it is all-encompassing, it is all-inclusive. It bans other explorations.

Secretary RUSK. But the substance of the treaty, the title of the treaty, the preamble of the treaty, the purpose of the treaty is to ban tests in the three environments.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And other explosions?

Secretary RUSK. Ban tests in the three environments without permitting under some guise, some sheep's clothing, explosions to be called something else than a weapons test and yet be used for weapons testing.

ONLY IN TIME OF PEACE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I raise the question through a comment, because if I am wrong on this I don't know how to interpret the English language at all.

It is my understanding—and I would like to have the Secretary tell me whether I am right or wrong—that this treaty devotes itself exclusively to the banning of atmospheric tests in time of peace. It has nothing to do with the sovereign rights of any nation in time of war. If you come to war, everything is off the boards. All the President of the United States in my judgment needs to say—and there is no doubt about his saying it, he has already indicated it very clearly and I just take it for granted that there will be a presidential pronouncement on this matter—is that this treaty in no way restricts whatsoever the sovereign right of the United States to use whatever weapons at its command it has, including nuclear weapons, to defend the security of this country. Am I right or wrong?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir, and that has been said by the Secretary of State. It was said by me at the time of the signing, for example, in Moscow.

The record on what this treaty means——

NO DANGLING DOUBT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then why shouldn't we say it?

Secretary RUSK. I think we should, but I think the place and way to say it is in the committee's report.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the point, in the report and on the floor.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not quarrelling about the particular means.

Secreatary RUSK. I think we would be well-advised to leave no dangling doubt on this point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't think the President of the United States has anything more to say than the Senate has. I think it is absolutely co-equal.

Secretary RUSK. But if the two make it clear——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the two make it clear, that ought to button it up.

Secretary RUSK. In my statements, the President's statements, in the committee's report, the Senate's views thereby recorded would leave no doubt whatever on this point and it would not be challenged internationally. This is not a matter of international dispute or controversy.

Senator AIKEN. Why should we admit that the treaty does not cover that situation? If we adopt a reservation, we are saying in

effect the treaty does prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war.

Secretary RUSK. I would hope the Senate would not throw any doubt upon the meaning of the treaty through a reservation, but I do think it would be normal practice when the committee puts in its report to the Senate on a treaty for it to explain what that treaty means. This is the way in which this is normally done, you see, and this is done often on a paragraph by paragraph basis.

I have had occasion to go back to the Senate reports on treaties to see what the legislative record was on the meaning of particular sections of other treaties and this is the way you determine what a treaty meant at the time that it was adopted. I have done that in SEATO and a number of other treaties.

Senator AIKEN. A reservation would weaken our interpretation.

Secretary RUSK. I would think it would, sir. And it would create, I think, an unfortunate impression internationally. I do hope, Mr. Chairman, that if we ratify the treaty we ratify it without appearing to do so kicking and screaming, without the kind of reluctance that would tip over to Moscow and to London sort of a monopoly on an attempt to move in on this terrible dangerous nuclear field and try to do something about it, even though this is a small step in itself.

SITUATION WITH FRANCE

Another point on which I might comment, Mr. Chairman, has to do with aid to other countries and particularly France, and I am especially anxious that I have a chance to take full advantage of the executive character of this session and that nothing of what I am about to say could be made public without further consultation.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this something with regard to de Gaulle you would not like on the record at all?

Secretary RUSK. I would prefer it.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is of a personal nature and the committee doesn't object, I think it is kind of dangerous.

Let's take this reference to de Gaulle particularly off the record. Do you object?

[Discussion off the record.]

GIVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER NATIONS

Senator AIKEN. Admiral Strauss raised the point that in the event of war between two countries—and India and China were referred to—that the treaty would prevent our giving nuclear weapons to India.

What do we say about that?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe that we would give nuclear weapons to somebody else for them to use. I think that contingency is rather remote.

Now, in the case of our own use of nuclear weapons it is covered by what we already have said this morning.

Senator AIKEN. It would be controlled by our own law rather than the treaty, wouldn't it?

Secretary RUSK. Beg pardon, sir?

Senator AIKEN. Wouldn't we be controlled by our own law as far as giving nuclear weapons to another country with which we did not have a compact?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe that we could give nuclear weapons. We could station nuclear weapons in another country under ourselves.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Under our law we simply cannot give.

Senator AIKEN. The treaty won't have anything to do with it.

THE RIGHTS OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That was not the question he was raising. If we consider it in our national vital interest that somebody be stopped someplace in the world, let's say, in Latin America, in the Himalaya Mountains, let's say, North Vietnam, and we consider it in our vital interest to use nuclear weapons which we could use otherwise in the absence of this treaty, which we could use without any inhibitions, does this treaty prohibit us from using those weapons in that remote place? Or are we limited under this self-defense policy only to using atomic weapons if the continental landmass of the U.S., the homeland, is threatened?

Secretary RUSK. The way you put that, this treaty in no way inhibits the use of any of our weapons for individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the charter, for example. In other words, this just does not inhibit the use of nuclear weapons in anger.

Senator WILLIAMS. In other words, we could use them in a situation in India?

Secretary RUSK. India or China.

The CHAIRMAN. We would use them, but we wouldn't turn them over to India.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We cannot turn them over to India; we are absolutely prohibited by law.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is clear.

DE GAULLE'S DEMANDS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact I asked the Secretary to be recalled for the discussion of this subject matter, I have a few questions I would like to ask him now if it meets with your approval.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Senator MORSE. They will be on two general subject matters, but I shall commingle necessarily the questions by moving from one subject matter to the other. Most of them will be related to France.

I want to say, Mr. Secretary, that I just think it is not in the national interests of this country for us to be yielding to various demands that de Gaulle is making upon our country, not only in the nuclear field, but in the economic field and other fields. I think we have got to make clear to de Gaulle that he is either going to join as an ally or be treated as what he is at the present time, head of a government which through his offices is obviously not friendly to the United States. I just don't see how you can possibly analyze the French policy for some time in the past and reach any other conclusion than that it is anti-American in its general objective.

I have your letter which you sent to the chairman. It is very helpful to me. Your discussion this morning is very helpful, but in order to pin it down I want to ask these questions.

It is my understanding—and I ask you if I am right about it—that certainly under this treaty, the language of the treaty, there is no question about the fact that we would be in violation of the treaty if we assisted France in any way in nuclear fields where it could be said that the assistance would be of help to them in atmospheric testing.

Secretary RUSK. In testing in the three environments, that is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. So that wipes out any question as to the United States giving de Gaulle any assistance if he remains a nonsigner of the treaty with respect to atmospheric testing.

GIVING ASSISTANCE TO FRANCE

Does the treaty restrict us in any way in giving de Gaulle assistance in underground testing if he refused to sign the treaty?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that the best way to clarify the point would be for him to sign the treaty. If he does not sign the treaty, speaking purely now legally and theoretically for the moment, sir, if he would commit himself completely and absolutely to test only in the environment permitted by the treaty and in the way permitted by the treaty, then the treaty itself would not prevent us from giving assistance to President de Gaulle for that kind of testing. But there would have to be a bar at least as valid as the treaty against the prohibited testing before we could, I think, give assistance.

Senator LAUSCHE. Look at paragraph 2, I think it bars giving knowledge or help in an explosion in the first three but it doesn't bar giving aid—the paragraph, maybe you have looked at it.

Secretary RUSK. But I was speaking in the more technical sense. In the political sense assistance for underground testing is not in the cards at the present and again that is a hypothetical problem.

Senator MORSE. You see, Mr. Secretary, when you move from the premise as I do with no trust of de Gaulle, this answer disturbs me.

REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION

Take my hypothetical now. He doesn't sign the treaty, he doesn't ask for any help for atmospheric testing, he hasn't conducted any atmospheric testing yet in my hypothetical, but he says, "I want some help in underground testing that is not barred by the treaty."

We have had testimony from one expert and another that you can accomplish many things underground that you can accomplish in atmospheric testing, so de Gaulle decides, "I will get all those accomplishments first. "I will get the help from the United States for underground testing, go as far as I can. After I have gained all the advantage that I can from underground testing, then I will move into the atmosphere." The testimony also shows that there are certain things we don't think too important, but some scientists disagree, there are certain things you can learn only through atmospheric testing.

Now, we start out, Mr. Secretary, as a matter of policy, with an attitude that because legally we may not be restricted from assisting de Gaulle underground, and go ahead and help him. I think you run right into a de Gaulle trap of subterfuge where he will take all the advantage of us he can—he has been doing it in every field—and after he has used us to the maximum extent, he will then move into the atmosphere.

So, what disburbs the senior Senator from Oregon is the policy of this administration vis-a-vis the United States and de Gaulle in the nuclear field. I am not asking that it be written into the treaty, but I am asking for some clarification of Administration intent as to what you propose to do with this fellow by giving him nuclear assistance. I understand as you brought up here this morning, Bourke and George brought out, you would have to come to the Congress under the McMahon Act to get approval to give any assistance to any country, I understand that. But I want to say most respectfully that might not be very difficult to get under some situation that may exist at the time, and I would like to have some assurance, as long as de Gaulle remains a non-signer he is going to be told, "We are not going to give you any assistance from the standpoint of French interests."

I would be the first to say if he got into a changed world situation in which it would be in the interests of the United States to give the devil assistance, and I put him above de Gaulle—I would give the devil assistance. But I want some assurance that this trickster, in my judgment, as a matter of governmental policy isn't going to be encouraged into thinking that we are going to move around the spirit and intent of this treaty in some way, somehow slip some assistance to him in the nuclear field.

FRANCE HAS NOT REQUESTED ASSISTANCE

Secretary RUSK. Senator, may I comment that my earlier remark was addressed to what I thought was your initial question, that is, what would be the effect of the treaty. I was pointing out that, as far as the treaty is concerned, it would not affect assistance that did not lead to or take part in or assist violations of the treaty.

Senator MORSE. We are in agreement on that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. We are in agreement on that.

Senator MORSE. I asked this question in the hearing. I knew this was the only answer you could give on the treaty.

Secretary RUSK. On the background, on policy, I have already commented on that. It is also fair to point out that President de Gaulle both publicly and privately has made a point and continues to make the point that he has never asked the United States for nuclear assistance. He has never taken it up with the President of the United States. The Foreign Minister has never taken it up with me. There has been no governmental, high-level governmental, approach on the subject, and I will have to admit that his silence is very eloquent on this matter.

[Discussion off the record.]

GIVING NOTICE TO CONGRESS

Senator MORSE. I am going to be satisfied with this discussion. We had to haveBoundary County it in connection with that. If you have any caveat or reservation, state it. Let the record show that the State Department completely agrees that under the McMahon Act as presently written you wouldn't have the authority to give the assistance to France or any other country without coming to the Congress for approval.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just technically correct that?

Senator MORSE. That is what I wanted to get.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Under the law as it now stands a country that has a nuclear capability may be cooperated with by our country, providing the terms of cooperating are submitted to the joint committee or to the Congress and referred to the joint committee for—I think it is what, 60 days?

Secretary RUSK. 60 days.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It stays out there 60 days without action, so it does not require, as I understand it, affirmative action. I was merely making a technical point. It does not require the affirmative approval.

Senator MORSE. What I was referring to was that they have to come to the Congress and give notice to the Congress what they do.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator MORSE. If the people want to stand on their rights, they can do so.

Secretary RUSK. The policy issues are so grave, Senator, that you can be completely assured that no such steps would be taken without the fullest consultation with this committee, the Joint Atomic Committee, no question.

Senator MORSE. That is satisfactory.

INTERVENING WITH THE FRENCH

Another point and I am almost through. I am sure you would be perfectly willing to discuss with the committee what you and I discussed in a conversation a few days ago about the intervention we did make in connection with French nuclear policy when it was discovered by some of our scientists in this field that France was about to—[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MORSE. I think the appropriate committees of the Congress ought to be informed. I wouldn't want any administration to be in position where they can use this escape hatch for giving assistance to France or any other country and subsequently say, "Oh, but we did it because it was a safety matter and it was in our national self-interest to do it." I think even in those circumstances, and it can be done in a top executive session, the Congress should be informed so at least they would have knowledge of what is going on.

Secretary RUSK. I think the committee could be assured we would not use peaceful uses or any other cooperation in the nuclear field as a device for evading the treaty.

WEST GERMANY AS A NUCLEAR POWER

Senator MORSE. I want to say to the Secretary, as I expected to be, that I am perfectly satisfied with your statements in regard to what the policy will be on France. I have another question that involves West Germany.

Secretary RUSK. I see.

Senator MORSE. I am likewise concerned about building up West Germany as a nuclear power. At the present time West Germany does not meet the tests of the McMahon Act as a nuclear power.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir, and they have formally, by international agreement, foresworn the development of nuclear weapons.

Senator MORSE. I am of the opinion that there is a strong movement within Germany on the part of some of her military leaders and others to seek to get that restriction upon Germany changed so that West Germany can become a nuclear power.

Do you think I am wrong in that appraisal?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, looking ahead 5, 10, 15 years, that there could be a growth of that kind of sentiment. You see signs of it at the present time. This is one of the reasons why we are interested in a multilateral force, to give Germany some participation in the general nuclear problem without getting a national nuclear force of its own or nuclear weapons of its own.

But it seems to me that the development of nuclear weapons by Germany, at least for the foreseeable future, would be so utterly divisive within the alliance itself and would create such a high state of crisis and tension between the East and West that it would be most disadvantageous from the American interest point of view for Germany to go down that trail. So——

Senator MORSE. That is perfectly satisfactory. I just wondered what the policy of the Administration was in regard to giving any encouragement to West Germany for the development of its nuclear power.

AGREEMENT WITH WEST GERMANY

Senator LAUSCHE. Wayne, would you yield for a question?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. With whom has the agreement been made by West Germany not to develop?

Secretary RUSK. That was the WEU [1] agreement of 1954, wasn't it? I will be glad to have——

Senator LAUSCHE. What nations are the signatories?

Secretary RUSK. The seven members are the present six members of the Common Market plus the United Kingdom.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Wayne, would you yield for just a moment?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

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[1] Western European Union.

SAFEGUARDS ON GERMAN EXPANSION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is a factor that I think is a presently built-in safeguard in connection with Germany's expansion. While Germany, without doubt, has the potential scientific capability for developing these things, the complex necessary to put themselves in a position to reach a state of so-called nuclear capability would be a rather lengthy process that is the building of plutonium plants and uranium separation plants, and the complex necessary to put themselves into that physical capacity would take a substantial period of time. It couldn't be done without even the basic preliminary steps being practically available to the world.

I mean that the steps are known to the world. So over a period of time if they did begin to put themselves in a position where eventually they could claim to have a nuclear capability as contemplated by the Act, it would be immediately known. I don't believe they have gone to that point yet.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was one area in which the Germans developed basically the theory, which has had some potentials which don't seem to have materialized fully, and that is the centrifuge process of separation which, if perfected, would be a cheap and probably rather rapid method of separating these materials without the necessity for extravagant expenditures. There have been some bugs in it and I don't believe it has been perfected. I certainly hope they are not able to perfect it. That would make a lot of nations put it within their financial ability to do separation.

REACTION IN COMMUNIST BLOC

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, there is another check, I think, besides de Gaulle, and this wouldn't be very persuasive with a lot of people, but it is to me because I recognize the existence of the Communist bloc as an ugly reality, and it is my fear that any assistance to West Germany in building up the nuclear power would result in such a changing course of action in Russia and Poland and Czechoslovakia that our hands would be called in Germany, as we called Russia's hand in Cuba. If I were a Russian and a Czech and a Pole, to say nothing about the government, that would be exactly my position, because I just have to face the fact that the populations of those countries live in terror as far as fear of West Germany is concerned.

Secretary RUSK. This was what I had in mind, sir, when I referred to such a development leading to a very great crisis between the East and West. There is no question this would be a major problem.

Senator MORSE. I have finished these two subjects, Mr. Chairman, and I am willing to desist for a time so others have other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

Senator MORSE. I have one question to ask the Secretary, but I have another subject matter that I asked information about from

the CIA and I have the secret answer and I will raise that later but I certainly think it ought to be raised while the Secretary is here. The question I want to ask now for your guidance is, I will walk out of this room and there is no question about what the press is there for, and I wonder if I make a statement to this effect--they will say, "Did you discuss with the Secretary of State the questions that you raised in regard to France?" Would I in any way embarrass the State Department—I have to say something—if I say the questions were raised and I am completely satisfied with the position of the Administration? Or give me your suggestions as to what I should say. I will take your suggestions. I have to make a statement.

Secretary RUSK. Satisfied with the position of the Administration with relation to that question and this treaty, or would that be too much of a qualification?

Senator MORSE. We know that is now the only point I have been raising. I can simply say I am going to vote for the treaty. I am satisfied.

Secretary RUSK. That is fine. I was just——

Senator MORSE. That is what I will say.

Secretary RUSK. I just didn't want to endorse by blanketing in a good many things I have not studied.

Senator MORSE. I think this statement is fair. All I will say is, "Gentlemen, I am going to vote for the treaty. I am satisfied."

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Can we move on? Does anyone else wish to discuss this problem? We have several things on the agenda.

The Secretary has a longstanding luncheon engagement and he is very anxious to make it. I would like to give everybody a chance to raise other questions, too.

Can we move on on this? Anything further on this?

Senator LAUSCHE. Not on this.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the French question and Germany.

Has that been exhausted? There are several other points we have.

EXPLOSIONS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask a question on a subject that was raised previously? If we exploded a bomb in the Himalaya Pass to block out an active invasion by China on India, and that explosion diffused radioactive debris into Pakistan or Burma or any other nation, would we be violating the treaty?

Secretary RUSK. An explosion for a military and hostile purpose would not have anything to do with this treaty, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the predicate for that conclusion? What language in the treaty justifies that judgment?

Secretary RUSK. This is something which goes back to the point that this treaty is a treaty to ban tests in three environments, tests and explosions in three environments, but does not have anything to do with the use of nuclear weapons in war.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Secretary RUSK. And I might say, Senator, and I don't want to appear cynical about treaties in this regard, but on the day that we explode nuclear weapons in anger, all of our treaties are going to be the least of our worries.

Senator SMATHERS. I am sorry, would you repeat in answer to Senator Lausche's question about where in the treaty does it say there is no proscription against the explosion of a military weapon.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the point is there is no proscription there.

Senator SMATHERS. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. In other words, the treaty doesn't get into this point, therefore you don't look for the permissive language. You look to see whether there is any prohibitive language. There is no prohibitive language.

Senator SMATHERS. There is no prohibitive language and the generally broad language about no explosion does not, as far as you interpret it, proscribe military.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if I could suggest to the Senator that before he came in this was the first subject; he went into it at great length just before the Senator came in and it is in the record.

Senator SMATHERS. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. He explodes it from our point of view, and if we go back over everyone of them——

SOVIET STATEMENT TO CHINA

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, it might be worth 15 seconds for the Senators who did come in later to read a statement made on August 21 by the U.S.S.R. in a statement to China in which the Soviet Union said:

> The treaty also does not prohibit the Soviet Union if need be from holding underground tests, from increasing the stockpile of its nuclear arms, and even from using these weapons against imperialist aggressors if they unleash a war in fit of insanity.

Senator SMATHERS. Who said that?

Secretary RUSK. The Soviet Union to China.

So, there is no doubt that no one looks upon this as a ban-the-bomb treaty.

Senator MUNDT. Is this a public message?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, it is a public message. Published in Tass.

Senator LAUSCHE. We could in our report or whatever we submit indicate this understanding?

The CHAIRMAN. I may say to the Senator we have already written up a tentative report including this language which is similar to what the Secretary has testified to, and it is here available if anyone wishes to read it. I thought we would come to it a little later, but the staff has already tried to cover this just in the fashion he has stated.

CONTROL OVER THE NUCLEAR TRIGGER IN EUROPE

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a question that does relate to the French matter, indirectly at least.

Mr. Secretary, I have been very much concerned at the development of a national nuclear capacity by France and the divisive effect this is having on the treaty and the possibility in the future that other countries might choose to follow the French example. If

this should occur and our own position should become exposed to increasing risks, as our own control over the nuclear trigger diminishes in Europe, and we were to attempt to solve this dilemma by urging the creation of an integrated nuclear command that is European and not national in the sense of the French nuclear capacity, but genuinely integrated and generally European, with the power to invoke the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe, then though there may be—and I think there is—a prohibition in our present law for transferring nuclear weapons to such a command, there would be nothing in this treaty that would prevent us from taking that course of action should we decide that it was in our national interest to do so.

Secretary RUSK. Again, referring back to my discussion with Senator Morse, I want to be very clear we separate the policy and the legal aspects of this.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, I am talking about——

Secretary RUSK. Insofar as this treaty is concerned, this treaty does not bar us from transferring nuclear weapons to anyone. The McMahon Act would and might under the circumstances you are talking about.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. But there is nothing in this treaty that would bar us from transferring weapons to anyone, providing it did not involve explosions in the three prohibited environments.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But on the other hand, if you will yield, it is my belief under the law, treaty or no treaty, our officials without violating the law simply cannot transfer atomic weapons to anybody else.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, I understand McMahon.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We can cooperate with certain other powers under certain circumstances by submitting a proposal for 60 days and so on. We might just as well be realistic. What we have done and what we are doing is in effect transferring atomic weapons to people now, because if they want to basically club us over the head and take charge they could.

Secretary RUSK. That would be an act of war.

The CHAIRMAN. This would be an act of war and precipitate a war.

THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR DEBRIS

I wonder if we could move on to some of these others. The question of debris has been raised. I don't know whether it is a serious one or not, but it was raised.

Do you wish to comment on that? The distinction in the Russian language and ours.

Secretary RUSK. May I ask Mr. Fisher to comment on that because I have asked him to check this for me and Mr. Fisher——

The CHAIRMAN. I thought something ought to be on the record. I was not aware of this until just a day or two ago.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, first, the Russian text was gone over very carefully by Mr. [Alexander] Akalovsky, with whom I think you are familiar. He is an interpreter and a disarmament official.

The CHAIRMAN. He is the best one——

Mr. FISHER. He is the best one we have.

The English text which was originally the proposal made on August 27——

The CHAIRMAN. May I say for the members this word occurs in 1 b, Article I, 1, subsection b, where it uses the word "debris" in the English text.

Mr. FISHER. The English text uses the words "in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside of the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

As this committee is aware from the testimony of Chairman Seaborg of the AEC, this doesn't mean a theoretical calculation that one atom in the event of venting might in a thousand years find its way out. It means the commonsense interpretation that the impact of this test resulted in detectable amounts of radioactive debris which could be attributed to this test.

We all are aware, and particularly those members who are members of the joint committee, that there have been vents, but the vents, the effect of them has been local.

COMMONSENSE INTERPRETATION

The literal translation of the Russian uses the words "causes the falling out of radioactive debris outside of the territorial limits of the state."

Mr. Akalovsky and I went over that in Moscow and we came to the conclusion that this, far from being contrary to the U.S. interpretation, reasonable amount of debris, detectable amounts, attributed——

Secretary RUSK. Commonsense interpretation.

Mr. FISHER. Commonsense interpretation of the English language was quite consistent with it, and therefore we felt no reason to insist on an interpretation which might be inconsistent in its total impact with our interpretation of the English language merely in the sense of word-for-word translation.

We always have this problem in a bilingual treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. In terms of where you have languages that have different sentence structures—one has no definite articles—of whether you want a literal or consensual translation. It was my opinion, after examining Mr. Akalovsky on this in great detail, that far from an inconsistency on this, it is quite consistent with the interpretation which has been presented before this committee, which is a commonsense interpretation of causing, in the words "if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside of the territorial limits of the State."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Fisher, I think probably that is what we meant but I am just looking at the English language here. It says, "If such explosion causes radioactive debris," not to descend on or anything else, but "to be present"—where—not on the territory of another.

Mr. FISHER. Outside.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But outside the territorial limits of the United States. It is just plain English.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If it is outside the territorial limits of the United States, up in the air or anyplace else. I don't necessarily object to it one way or the other, but I don't know that your commonsense rule necessarily applies to that, because it looks to me like you are trying to say something that it doesn't say in plain English.

Mr. FISHER. Well, the English was the text that was discussed at great length the summer of a year ago when this language was the result.

When the Russians—when I examined the Russian translation and found that it used the term "falling out" far from saying, "Don't do that, we want to have something that has a more theoretical interpretation," I saw no reason to object to a Russian text that was quite consistent with the interpretation we put on it, and had justified before this committee as what we consider to be the commonsense interpretation—not one atom a thousand years later, for in a sense, I guess even the atoms in this room may someday find their way to Russia, but a commonsense interpretation of causing, meaning in discernible amounts attributable to this test—causing; that seems to be the natural interpretation of that word.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand it, the Russian language, if there is any difference at all, is less restrictive than ours.

Mr. FISHER. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know how we would object to that.

Mr. FISHER. I saw no reason to object to it, sir, particularly——

ACCIDENTAL VENTING OF UNDERGROUND TESTS

The CHAIRMAN. How did this question arise? I never heard of it until yesterday. Who brought this question up?

Mr. FISHER. I was aware of the question, but I didn't consider it serious enough to bring it up for the reasons I have indicated.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It came up in the hearings on the question of some accidental venting of an underground test releasing a miniscule amount of this stuff that can be up in the air and drift.

The CHAIRMAN. That came up about the difference between the texts; I know that question did. But I mean whether there was any significant difference between the Russian language and ours.

Mr. FISHER. Well, I did not think so, sir, at the time.

Senator LAUSCHE. I had heard of it this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I only heard it yesterday.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where?

The CHAIRMAN. The staff said there is this question and we wanted to resolve it, that is all. That is just one of the questions I thought might come up later and I wanted something on the record to explain it, and as far as I am concerned it is explained.

Is anybody disturbed about this? If not, that is sufficient.

The next one we have on the significance——

A VERY RESTRICTIVE PROVISION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not disturbed about it particularly. I just don't agree with it. I think, I mean the plain English is we are prohibited from releasing anything that will have radioactive debris present; that is what it says.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be our interpretation——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Outside the territorial limits of the United States. It is a very restrictive provision.

Senator MUNDT. How do you feel that it would limit it——

The CHAIRMAN. If it is restrictive.

Secretary RUSK. The English and Russian texts apply to both parties.

The CHAIRMAN. The word in the Russian interpretation, if I understand him, there must be a falling out of it. They wouldn't just be wandering around in the stratosphere indefinitely, but there would be some appreciable recognizable falling out on some other jurisdiction; that is the only thing that I can see.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is what it ought to be.

The CHAIRMAN. If that is their interpretation to me a commonsense interpretation of the word "debris"—I thought it meant appreciable, recognizable amount, not a single atom.

Secretary RUSK. The key word might well be the word "debris," because debris means something more than a single atom.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me it would. I don't know how you define these words.

THE LEGISLATIVE REPORT ON THE TREATY

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a parliamentary question as a new member of the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. When you ratify a treaty, I suppose the treaty would be reported by the Chairman of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. Does the legislative report have any bearing on a treaty as a legislative history does on a bill?

Secretary RUSK. There is no question about it. It certainly is a principal aid in the interpretation of a treaty, particularly where that report includes the views on this matter of whether this is a ban-the-bomb treaty—I use that as an example. Where the Committee report includes both the views of the executive and the Senate, then that is a conclusive interpretation so far as the United States is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. I will say to the Senator, before you came in the first item we discussed was the interpretation of that language "any other explosion" and so on.

Senator MUNDT. I suppose if we said in this instant case that our committee interprets the language used by the Russians and the language used by us to have identical meaning, this would have a significance, is that right?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, oh, yes, it would. I mean whatever the Senate says—

Senator MUNDT. I haven't had much luck with committee reports.

Secretary RUSK. In case of treaties, I made the point earlier. I myself have had occasion several times to go back and look at a Senate committee report, because there you usually get the legislative record of what the language means. I frequently—I say frequently—I have done it a half dozen times myself.

ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS FOR ARMS CONTROL

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we could take up the status of additional proposals for arms control and nonaggresssion. Someone has raised that. Would you wish to comment on that?

Does anyone wish to have him comment on it? It is a question that came up.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. There has been some question, raised by witnesses more than, I think, any member of the committee, on the status of additional proposals for arms control and nonaggression. One of the witnesses, not a very prominent one, yesterday said this was only a step toward total disarmament and the turning over of everything to the United Nations and so on.

I don't know that this is——

Senator SYMINGTON. Who said that?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You are now getting into the question which has been at least privately raised as to what the connotation of the correspondence and the papers and the discussion back and forth leading up to the preparation of this proposed treaty may be. In other words, are there understandings that we go forward on certain other things after this treaty is signed? That is the question that has been raised.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been raised.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is part of the reason why I raised the question the first day the Secretary testified. I expected to ask for the papers and documents of negotiation or discussion that went back and forth.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the proper place to discuss it, I guess.

JUST A FIRST STEP

Senator HICKENLOOPER. To see whether or not the adoption of this treaty is in fact the contemplation of just a first step toward certain other things to which we may be bound or may be morally committed.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Do you wish to comment on that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, first on the question of the status of other disarmament proposals, the status of those proposals is about where they were before this question of a limited test ban treaty came up.

In other words, there have been many discussions with the committee, more than one of the committees, of the Congress on various disarmament proposals that have been considered and those that have been put forward in Geneva. We do not at the present time see any rapid movement toward particular steps here. In the case, for example, of the static control posts, it appears still, unless we have had any information from Geneva in the last few days, that the Soviet Union want to tie those into other subjects, other disarmament measures such as the limitation of troops or some sort of withdrawal and that kind of thing, which we would find quite unacceptable under present circumstances, so that there is no—there is nothing special to report. The public information on this subject is the same as the private information.

QUESTION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE

Now, on the question of the correspondence, Mr. Chairman, I have testified under oath that there were no side deals.

I would hope very much that the committee or the Senate would not formally request this correspondence. I do so not only because of the constitutional point which has been with us since the time of George Washington on the transmission of correspondence between the chiefs of government or diplomatic correspondence, but also because I think the channel between heads of government, in this instance President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, and before that other Presidents, is an important channel to keep open and usable. We have had some complaints from the Soviet Union from time to time that the content of such exchanges are leaked and create difficulties and tend to close up this channel. I would hope that we could handle this in such a way that it would not raise issues of that sort, either constitutional or international.

Now, there is nothing secret from this committee, as far as I am concerned, in this correspondence. I think I would be glad informally—and I have done this before where I couldn't make a formal transmission of a document, I have gone over it with the committee—I will be glad if the committee would ask the Chairman to designate certain members or find some other way to sit down informally and just run over this correspondence to assure yourselves that this correspondence has been about this nuclear test ban treaty.

There are no hidden pitfalls there in any way, but I would hope the committee would not find it necessary to make public the fact that this has been in any way transmitted to the committee, because this again complicates our problem of how to communicate with a man with whom we need to communicate simply because the situation is tense and dangerous and potentially critical.

ONLY A PROPOSED TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I wrote the committee members and, roughly, I suggested one of the bases for my suggestions.

I have some considerable respect and there are persuasive arguments, probably many of them sound in many cases, for executive privilege on communications. I think the executive has to have a certain amount of leeway, just as I believe Senators and Members of Congress have to have a certain amount of leeway in their discussions and examination of problems.

I set out in my letter and I want to set out again what I believe to be a differentiation in this particular case, that is the case of a treaty of this kind, and the normal exercise of the principle of executive privilege. It is just—it is comparatively simple.

In the making of a treaty, the treaty is not made, the President cannot make the treaty until the point where he does receive the advice and consent of the Senate. He acts utterly without authority in any finalizing of any treaty; he can't do it. The authority is equally divided, therefore, between the Senate which advises and consents, and has to before the President can make a treaty.

This is not a treaty. This is only a proposed treaty so far as we are concerned. It will not become a treaty until the Senate advises and consents to it.

Therefore, the equal responsibility on the part of the executive and the Senate, in my judgment, warrants the Senate in saying that with that equal responsibility we are just as entitled to the details of what went into the formulation of this proposal as the executive is entitled to it if we are to exercise that co-equal power and authority. And therefore, I think there is a distinction between this situation—that is, involving the accomplishing of a treaty—and other areas in which the executive privilege can be very persuasively argued to apply to the President in his coming to conclusion on matters that are within his province to resolve.

This is not within his province to resolve. This is a matter that is within the province of the Senate and the executive to resolve with co-equal responsibility, and I think there is a distinction.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Let him respond.

NOT WITHOUT PRECEDENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to say only one other thing.

As I pointed out in my letter, it is not without precedent. At the time we recognized Russia in 1933 and then in 1934 in January, at the request of this committee, President Roosevelt turned over the correspondence between himself and others in the Administration, and Molotov and others in the Soviet regime, turned it over. It was turned over to this committee, and that correspondence and those discussions leading up to that Act were incorporated in the Congressional Record in January of 1934.

So it is not without precedent, and that was not necessarily involving a treaty. That was involving an ambassador and recognition.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, as this committee knows, I have the greatest respect for the views of the distinguished Senator. I think that on the precedent of the recognition of the Soviet Union, there is a substantial difference, and that is that those letters that were made available, I understand, were made public at the time that the letters themselves were written or shortly thereafter, and that the transmittal was in effect transmittal of letters that had been made public. Further, those letters were the operating instruments of recognition; they were written to be made public as the operating documents involved.

On the broader issue, I don't know that we can—well, we will ever have a completely agreed interpretation of the constitutional position. There is a certain tension in this matter and there has been from the beginning, but it is true that the President and the Senate are under the Constitution partners in the treaty process. That doesn't mean that their functions with respect to the treaty process are identical.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRESIDENT

The President, it is my understanding, has the responsibility for a negotiation of a treaty and the conduct of negotiations with for-

eign governments. That treaty then is proposed to the Senate for its advice and consent——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask where you get that treaty except by custom, precedent, and consent?

Secretary RUSK. Well——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It isn't contained in the Constitution.

Secretary RUSK. Those three are good enough for me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It isn't contained in the Constitution.

Secretary RUSK. The President sends and receives ambassadors. He is our spokesman for the U.S. with the other governments. He is the spokesman of the U.S. in dealing with other governments, and I would think that is a fairly well-established matter, but the normal expectation is that the President would negotiate a treaty, that the proposed treaty would come to the Senate for its advice and consent, and if the Senate gives its advice and consent, then the President proceeds to ratify.

Now, there have been occasions where, after having obtained the Senate's advice and consent, a President has not moved to the act of ratification. I don't have the precedent at the tip of my tongue, but I understand there have been occasions where the reservations or attitudes expressed in the Senate made it clear it was unwise to go forward and the President withheld ratification.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It works both ways.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. It works both ways.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Senate has refused advice and consent.

Secretary RUSK. I think both are necessary to the treaty function. That does not mean that the role of each is identical.

KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER

However, I hope that we could find a way to deal with this without raising it in these constitutional forms. The key, I can assure the committee that the key documents in this situation actually are the public documents.

There was first Khrushchev's letter last December in which he said, "Well, we will have three inspections." The President replied to that and said, "that is not good enough." Khrushchev came back rather pained and said—these three exchanges were public.

The CHAIRMAN. These were letters which you published?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Khrushchev published his first, and we published the other.

[Discussion off the record.]

NO SIDE AGREEMENTS

Secretary RUSK. I recall, Mr. Chairman, in public session under oath I testified there were no other agreements. I think in answer to a question by the distinguished Senator from Delaware, I said there were no agreements on trade. I had some specific questions on particular points there, so that it is not a problem of being reluctant to get into merits of this exchange.

The exchange only went up to the beginning of the negotiations, and the draft treaty itself speaks for the result of the negotiations. There were no side arrangements there.

Mr. Harriman had no instructions to enter into other subjects, make other agreements, or tie this treaty into anything else. The public communique issued at the time, I think, made this quite clear even in connection with the so-called nonaggression idea, that this is something we were not able to agree to. And so I would hope that we could satisfy the committee in a way that would not raise any problems for us.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take any time at all except to make my point quickly.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

I don't know in all my years in the Senate that there has ever been a case involving the separation of powers doctrine that I haven't been involved in. I recall to some of you I was deeply involved in the constitutional question at the time of the MacArthur hearings when an attempt was made to get General Bradley to disclose executive information and the Administration stood on its rights of the doctrine of privilege.

Bourke knows my high respect for his views. I am in complete disagreement with him on this matter.

I do not think that we should press the Administration to give us information which under constitutional right, which has been clearly sustained in our history, that he doesn't have to give us. It is a voluntary matter.

There have been presidents in some instances who have given certain information and presidents who have said there is certain information they don't propose to give. The Secretary of State has set forth here the reason as to why this Administration in connection with this treaty doesn't propose to disclose its files, which is its constitutional right.

I think the essence of the issue here is whether or not we as members of this committee can honestly and sincerely say we believe the Secretary of State. He has sworn that there are no side agreements. That satisfies me, because, let me say, Mr. Chairman, that the treaty can't possibly be anything but the treaty that we ratify on the basis of the record that has been made in respect to the hearings that were conducted and are carrying out our advice and consent function.

If there were side agreements, in the future those side agreements could not affect that treaty as far as United States obligations under it are concerned, because the hearings, the commitments, the representations made in the Congress, the Senate exercising its advice and consent limits the treaty. It can't be any more than that. Therefore, you don't need the information in order to determine what the future effect of the treaty is.

Now, I certainly would not be in favor of our raising a big issue over a request for these papers when the President of the United States to the Secretary of State says, in effect, "We think under these circumstances we should exercise the executive privilege right."

But what more do we have here?

We have the statement of the Secretary of State. He is going to sit down with us informally without producing the documents and tell us the meaning of any communications or conversation that transpired between this government and Russia.

What more do we need?

After all, we are the ones who are going to say to the public that in the exercise of our advice and consent we are satisfied that this is the treaty. I think, as far as I am concerned, that ends the matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, let me clear this up. I haven't the slightest question on the Secretary's word. I have taken his word for anything and I will take it for anything, but I don't say that the Secretary can always interpret things the way I interpret them. We may have different interpretative views on these things, and to be perfectly honest that is what made lawsuits.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt?

DISCUSSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, on a related subject, or perhaps an unrelated subject, but in the public hearing I raised the question of whether we could have access to what I hoped would be a transcript of the discussions during the process of negotiations. You variously described this report as something less than a transcript, a summary or a kibitzer's notes, but you did imply that some kind of interpretation, submission, or written report occurred.

I respectfully submit that there is a vast difference between the notes which occur during the negotiations of a treaty and what you have described as a confidential line of communication between heads of state. I don't think the same arguments apply to both.

Personally, I am more interested in finding out what was said by the Russians and what was said by us at the negotiating table in terms of their expectations and their concessions and our expectations and our concessions, and whether we started out to get this kind of treaty or some other kind of treaty or whether they started out, and the process by which we brought about a meeting of the minds.

I wonder whether you would agree with me that this comes in a different category from confidential communications which have been a source of constitutional controversy since George Washington's time.

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that although there are some differences, the basic element is the same. They were certainly considered the same by President Washington, who was asked for the correspondence and documents relating to a particular treaty.

He said that the nature of foreign negotiations requires caution and their success must often depend on secrecy. Even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all measures, demands, or eventually concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate inconvenience—perhaps danger and mischief—in relation to other powers.

Now, it would be, I must confess, extremely difficult for our negotiators, in dealing with foreign governments every day and every week, to consider that their conversation with foreign governments on instructions of the President and the Secretary of State are, in effect, being conducted in a goldfish bowl. It is potentially subject to full notes being made public in the Senate or in any other way.

Again, I can run over the course of the discussion in terms of time. Most of the time was taken up by the Soviet Union pressing to try to link this treaty with a nonaggression pact, and we wouldn't have it. That is what the bulk of the time was taken up with.

I will be glad to go over with the committee, when the committee has time to do it, if they will take some time to go over those discussions so the committee will know what went on. But I would hope very much—I think the same constitutional problem arises, Senator Mundt.

MAINTAINING A LINE OF COMMUNICATION

Senator MUNDT. I think the whole argument about maintaining a line of communication between heads of state would have some persuasive appeal to me, but it is entirely irrelevant to the request that I now make. This has nothing to do with letters from Khrushchev to Kennedy and back and forth. I think there is some merit in keeping those lines of communication open. I see some danger to it, but I see more merit. It is comparable with the hot wire.

Obviously, if we were to publish without consent of the Russians the entire correspondence it would probably close that line of communication. I don't think that is on four squares at all with the committee's, what I consider, legitimate right to know what the negotiating positions were of the two governments when they went to the negotiating table, and the process of give and take which evolved as we got a meeting of minds.

The CHAIRMAN. If I could interject there, you remind me of the process that we have in the conference here.

In enacting a law, we don't even keep a transcript. There is no transcript ever taken of a conference between the two Houses, and yet we are doing public business. We do for a very good reason, that people want to be very free to say whatever they like in that conference, and there is no transcript kept at all, as the Senator well knows. I think this is somewhat similar.

Senator MUNDT. I will take that analysis. Let's take this analogy, if I may. When we go into a conference between the House and the Senate, the established position of the House and the established position of the Senate are matters of public record, and then we move towards a meeting of minds. It is this particular aspect that I would like to know more about.

We certainly know where we were when we started, and they know when they started, and the process of negotiation which involved concessions on both sides and you arrive at a commonality of viewpoint. I want to find out exactly what it is.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator from South Dakota yield to me? I have got to leave to go to a meeting.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, just a second.

I have got to find out exactly before we go to the conference between the American and the Russian position.

I yield.

Senator SYMINGTON. I thank you very much.

AN OPEN SOCIETY AND A CLOSED SOCIETY

Mr. Chairman, we are having a joint meeting of our delegation on the bicentennial at Clarence Cannon's office.

Senator MORSE. How much money do you want?

Senator SYMINGTON. I will let you know.

First, I am not a constitutional lawyer, but I say with great respect to my senior colleagues on the other side of the aisle on this matter, as a negotiator I don't see how you could negotiate in an open society with a closed society and then have all these matters put on the record, you might say, even on a classified basis. As somebody who has made a good many trades in my time, I just don't see how that can be done, but I will read the record and very possibly I will have another opinion after doing so.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask the Senator before he leaves, because we had 12 members here this morning, which is most unusual and a good attendance, we are not going to be through, apparently.

Can we meet again at 2 o'clock and try to discuss some things?

Senator MORSE. I have got to go to the march.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's move along then. There are some procedural matters I want to discuss.

Senator SYMINGTON. I just want to give my position on that matter, and I want to ask one question.

THE POSITION OF CHINA

Have you read a book called Tata Tantan?

Secretary RUSK. Not yet, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have. Why?

Senator SYMINGTON. I wanted to ask the Secretary if in his opinion it properly reflected the position in China today, especially with iron and steel, because if it did it certainly nails down the logic of a speech made on the floor by the Senator from Ohio with respect to the Caro Steel Mill. You asked me why. I felt I should answer.

Mr. Secretary, would you let me know whether you think that is a reasonably accurate summation of our effort in this field?

Secretary RUSK. I will, indeed.

Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's move along now. The Senator from Ohio is seeking recognition.

Are you through?

NEGOTIATING NOTES

Senator MUNDT. I didn't get any answer from the Secretary. I got an answer from the Senator of Missouri, but I asked the Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. The difference between the negotiating notes and the exchanges between the two chiefs of government are not all that pronounced, because Mr. Harriman saw Mr. Khrushchev

and there were exchanges with him, and the negotiations were with the foreign ministers. So I don't believe that the difference of level is decisive on this particular point.

But, again, it is not the form, it is the procedure. I can sit with the committee for an afternoon and go over with them these various documents and the various discussions. As a matter of fact, we have in the course of our hearings brought out quite a number of points, I think perhaps most of them, where there was a difference, a beginning difference of view between ourselves and the Soviet Union, and how the final result developed. We did that with the withdrawal clause, with the peaceful use point, with this business about not using peaceful use as a pretext for conducting tests, and these things have been fully discussed here before you, and many of them in public session.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I just say with regard to what Senator Mundt says, I don't think that the situation is comparable. I do not believe that the give-and-take in a preliminary discussion leading up to the arrival of the final conclusion is necessarily too important, but what I am talking about is the documents which may contain certain things which later can be considered to be binding between the two countries.

Now, there is a difference. We have give-and-take in these executive meetings in which I may take a position and the Chairman may take another one and he may argue me out of it.

I may change my mind before that is through. That change of opinion is a part of the friction of discussion, which inheres in a final conclusion. My attitude toward these communications is whether or not anything will give rise to a claim that there was an agreement or something that would sustain agreement contained in this exchange which affects this treaty or which affected the final conclusion of this treaty.

APPOINTMENT OF A SUBCOMMITTEE

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say we had a procedure once, I remember Senator Taft was then concerned and others, and we appointed a subcommittee to go look at confidential documents that could not be made available to the committee, as our representative.[1] Now, the Secretary has offered to follow somewhat similar procedures.

If the Senator from Iowa would like, I would certainly be glad to appoint a small subcommittee to go informally, so that it wouldn't be publicized, and read the documents. I understand that is agreeable to the Secretary.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator MORSE. I recall that very well. That was only on the basis of the offer of that Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

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[1] In 1953, when President Eisenhower nominated Charles E. Bohlen as ambassador to the Soviet Union, allegations were made that the FBI files contained information which, if known, would disqualify him from service. An informal subcommittee, consisting of Senator Robert Taft, Sr. and Senator John Sparkman, was appointed to examine the evidence. They reported that nothing in the files should stand in the way of Bohlen's confirmation. See vol. V in the "Historical Series."

Senator MORSE. That is quite a different thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he is offering here.

Senator MORSE. I don't know about that. I just wanted to get this point in the record.

That depends, however, upon the offer of a given Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator MORSE. Unless that offer comes from a given Administration I would object to any committee of Congress seeking to force the Administration to comply with that request.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. He has offered this and if the Senator from Iowa wishes to accept the offer, I think it might be a way out of this, if it is agreeable.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, it is not up to me to accept an offer. I don't speak for this committee. This committee operates on its own. It is whatever the committee wants to do.

The CHAIRMAN. If that is the question, as far as speaking for myself, I would oppose the committee moving to do it.

Senator MORSE. I am going to oppose it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would, too, but if the Senator wishes, if he has a real question in his mind about what is in the documents, then this is the procedure that is simply suggested.

Senator MORSE. I will tell you why I am going to oppose it, Mr. Chairman.

I think it should be an unsolicited offer of the Administration. I want to say let's assume the worst ugly hypothetical you can. Let's assume now that, contrary to what the Secretary of State has said under oath, there was a side agreement.

We are ratifying this treaty, and every party to the treaty knows we are ratifying it under the constitutional process of this Government. That is said. The parties know that. They have had that notice.

The only constitutional process that creates this treaty is the record of the treaty at the time of the ratification, and unless these so-called side agreements are made a part of that ratification process, they are not binding upon this country in the future.

NOT WITHHOLDING INFORMATION

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I must confess that when I leave office I don't want to leave through the process of impeachment, and when I testified under oath that there weren't side agreements—and I appreciate the Senator from Iowa's remark on that subject—I was fully aware also of the President's first point that he made in his letter of transmittal to the Congress that, "This treaty is the whole agreement. U.S. negotiators in Moscow were instructed not to make this agreement conditioned upon any other understanding and they made none. The treaty speaks for itself."

Now, I don't ask any Senator to comment on my next remark, but I have tried in dealing with this committee never to leave this committee room having concealed a relevant piece of information. I have gone to the limit of discretion in trying to follow that personal policy.

The committee will recall that I read to the committee a letter that I couldn't transmit to the committee, that was Khrushchev's

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letter of October 26th, for example, a letter which Khrushchev himself very anxiously wanted to keep confidential, and when you read the letter you could see why he would, you see. It is not a question of withholding information from this committee, but how we do it in an informal way, and I am perfectly happy to offer to sit down with a subcommittee of the committee to go over this material.

The CHAIRMAN. He voluntarily said that. It wasn't the result of a demand.

Senator Williams wishes to comment.

THE DANGER OF DISCLOSURE

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I asked the Secretary a question as to whether there had been any side agreements, either written or gentlemen's agreements or understandings. I want to say that I was perfectly satisfied with your answer and I accept it in good faith.

I can see the danger of disclosure. Now, in reference to what the Senator from South Dakota spoke of, memos at meetings afterwards, if there is a meeting which I have which I think is important and I want to keep a memo on it, I dictate one memo as to what actually happened and then I issued a little memo of my own that I was impressed with his sincerity or thought he was a liar. I just do that for a matter of record.

It would be highly embarrassing to me if somebody else had that published. That is an important part of the document as to my impression at the time. But I think it would be equally important when we go before the Senate for ratification, and I say that as one who certainly accepted in complete faith this statement of the Secretary, that the Chairman of the committee or the Senator from Iowa would be able to say that we have read these documents and we were satisfied.

I am not asking as a member of the committee that I see them, and I would be perfectly satisfied, and this would not be in any way suggesting to check on the accuracy of the statement of the Secretary, because when you answered it, as far as I was concerned, that question was answered. But the Senate does have a responsibility when they report to the Senate on the treaty, the Chairman and the Senator from Iowa as the ranking member, to see that, "We personally have examined it and we are satisfied."

While I would not oppose the committee examining these documents if it was agreeable, I would be perfectly satisfied, I think it would be well in order, and I think that the suggestion was very timely. The Secretary is willing to meet with a subcommittee, and let that subcommittee report.

The Senator from Iowa, the Chairman of the committee, and the Secretary of State have said there were no agreements. As far as I am concerned, I could vote on that treaty and if it developed a year later that there had been a signed contract I would pay not attention to the contract at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say, again, that there isn't the slightest question raised by me about the integrity of the Secretary of State.

Senator WILLIAMS. I appreciate that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Or anybody else who has testified here.

But I will call your attention to one hassle we had this morning here. I don't agree with the State Department's interpretation of what this treaty says on debris, or how much debris is going to fall out. I disagree with that interpretation. It is just a question of disagreeing with an interpretation as to what has been said, and people can honestly disagree.

A SENSIBLE SOLUTION

Senator SMATHERS. I have a good solution, going along with what John Williams said.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is not a question of integrity at all.

Senator SMATHERS. The Chairman is totally satisfied.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator SMATHERS. I was just saying in response to the Senator from Iowa's statement, the Senator from Delaware has come up with what looks to me like a very sensible solution. It satisfies the Senator from Iowa, because then he gets to see the past record and the Secretary of State has offered to let you, him and somebody else you designate.

I am like John Williams. I accept completely the word of the Secretary of State. I agree with the Senator from Oregon, and I don't really think we have got a right to do it, but if somebody has any doubts and the Secretary of State says let them see it, that would eliminate the doubt and the matter is settled.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio has been seeking recognition.

Senator LAUSCHE. I wanted to give you my understanding of the apprehension of the people of Ohio and myself.

SUPERSEDED DOCUMENTS

I am constantly getting letters asking me for a copy of a certain document that was issued by the Disarmament Agency, and I think that document is the one that proposed a three-stage transition from protecting ourselves and assigning to the United Nations. The particular document of which I am speaking is not supposed to be out of supply.

Am I correct that that document is out of supply?

Mr. FOSTER. Two documents, Senator.

One was a document put before the United Nations on September 25, 1961, which was superseded by an outline of a draft treaty which was based on three stages. The superseding document is in ready supply. The one on which it was based before this agency came into being is out of print.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is odd, because I have asked for the original, but I wasn't told that the superseded document is available. So in answering letters I have got to say that document 1197 is no longer available, and the suspicion is that it isn't available because it had proposals in it that were bad.

Secretary RUSK. I think we can correct that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Anyhow, the people of Ohio are not willing to put the security of our Nation into the hands of the 110 countries that now from the United Nations.

DISCUSSIONS ON THE NEXT STEP

From my standpoint, I must scatter or dissipate in their minds any belief that the approval of this treaty is just the preliminary of abandoning our own defense and depending upon Mali and Dahomey and the other countries to defend us. And so I would like to ask, have there been any discussions on the next step, apart from the high echelon officials? Has the Disarmament Agency been discussing a next step?

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, we have been discussing, under the instructions of the Congress of the United States and the laws of the land, many procedures which are designed to reduce the threat of war and destruction.

We have discussed separable measures. We have tabled at Geneva on April 18, 1962 a complete outline——

Secretary RUSK. An example would be that hot line, or conceivably it might be static control.

Mr. FOSTER. All of these have been discussed with this committee in one way or another. All of them are public documents, including this document to which I referred as having superseded the September 25th document. These are not designed to turn over the national security of the United States to the United Nations' 110 nations, but to try in a balanced, safeguarded, progressive way to move toward a world in which there is some more dependence on international law to settle disputes.

This can only go in a balanced, safeguarded, phased manner. One step must be completed with the appropriate changes in the political relationships and all the other things that must accompany that sort of movement by moving on to the next one.

Each step would be under the control of the United States of America, and the national security of the United States is paramount at all times in whatever proposals are on the table.

Secretary RUSK. And these steps would be taken by treaty, so that they would be here before this body.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Foster, what was the difference between what you call the superseding document and the document that is out of print, just briefly?

Mr. FOSTER. Very much more general, without the kind of necessary safeguarding procedures which were introduced as we knew more about it.

Now, it is called to my attention that the document is available.

Senator LAUSCHE. Which one?

Mr. FOSTER. The superseded one. It is available in the history of documents on disarmament in the booklet, "Documents on Disarmament 1961," and is shown on page 475 of that document.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am glad to hear that.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we will help you deal with your mail problem.

Mr. FOSTER. We have a lot of information that will help you answer that mail, and we will be in touch with you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION

Senator LAUSCHE. I would suggest that as far as I am concerned with this offer, these documents are available for inspection and discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Which documents are you talking about now?

Senator LAUSCHE. The exchange between Khrushchev and——

The CHAIRMAN. The letters?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. I think that answers my question.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say about Senator Williams' suggestion, I agree with all of it except one point. I don't think we ought to publicly state, even though we look at them, that they have seen them.

Senator WILLIAMS. Oh, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly without authorization. I don't wish to suddenly confront Khrushchev with the idea that these have been made public.

Senator WILLIAMS. I didn't mean it that way.

I just meant that if I as a member of the Senate was concerned, and I could talk to either of you and you tell me you had done it, as far as I am concerned—I think we do have to respect the delicacy of how you are going to handle this, but at the same time it would make a lot of difference to a man who was disturbed about it if he could talk to some member in whom he had confidence and he would be told, "I have seen these documents."

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to be heard on this very briefly.

A SUBTERFUGE

I opposed the Taft proposal when it was made.

I strongly oppose this proposal. I think this is a subterfuge. I think this is going around the end. The Chairman of the committee, the Senator from Iowa, or Senator X, Y, Z can't represent me in my capacity as a representative of a sovereign State.

This isn't a very large committee. I think this committee has to make up its mind whether or not it wants to voluntarily offer these documents for the inspection of the Foreign Relations Committee or not.

I think we would make a mistake if it did, but that is an executive decision for it to make. But if it is going to make the documents available to anyone on the committee, it has a clear obligation to make the documents available to everyone on the committee.

That was the basis for my objections to the Taft proposal when it was made before, because you have got a very simple issue here: Whether or not a President of the United States wants to waive his executive privilege in connection with any material. If he is going to waive it, he ought to waive it to all the members of the committee that has jurisdiction over the subject matter or not waive it at all.

I think the Secretary has set forth an unanswerable argument as to why it shouldn't be waived, and if we aren't satisfied with the assurance that the Secretary of State has given us without taking a

look at these documents so that we can say we took a look at the documents so we could be sure that we would have assurance in what the Secretary of State said, we ought to get rid of him. He should not holding his office.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not for that at this point.

Senator MORSE. I am not, either. I am not for any modification of this doctrine of executive privilege. I am not for any informal understanding. We either do it formally as a whole committee, or I want the record to show that I am opposed.

You may outvote me. I want the record to show before, as I opposed the Taft proposal, I will be no party to an end run-around of——

The CHAIRMAN. I admire the Senator's principles. I sure would like to get rid of this treaty—I have been struggling along with it long enough. I am not that much of a man of principle.

Is there anything else?

NO FORMAL ACTION

Senator MORSE. We haven't taken formal action on the suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. No, we have not. It is altogether an informal operation, if it takes place.

Senator MORSE. You can't leave it that way, Mr. Chairman, because if you are going to do it that way, you are going to make it public. I can assure you of that, because I will make it public.

I am going to find out whether or not this Administration is going to exercise executive privilege.

The CHAIRMAN. I personally don't want to see the documents, if you are interested in that.

Senator MORSE. I don't think they should be offered to anyone but the full committee, then.

Senator SMATHERS. Can I ask a question while you are all deciding?

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary has got to leave in a minute. I want to put some procedural questions to the committee.

Can anyone raise a question with the Secretary? We can discuss any internal problems of our own. Are there any other questions of the Secretary?

Senator MORSE. I am ready to excuse him, as far as I am concerned, because the document I wanted to take up with him, Mr. Chairman, I will take up with him on a conference basis because it goes to this McCone report, and I think we ought to know where the Secretary of State stands on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you do that some other time?

Senator MORSE. Then he can file with us—I think there ought to be something in the record. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I think the Secretary of State should speak on foreign policy matters as the final authority. I am glad to have Mr. McCone's memorandum, but I want to know whether or not the Secretary of State agrees with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we do that some other time?

Senator MORSE. We can do it by memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. Has anyone else a question to the Secretary now pertaining to the treaty?

Senator Smathers?

CUBA AND THE TREATY

Senator SMATHERS. I would like to ask this question because of a lot of mail which I am getting from my State.

What is the reason Cuba has not yet signed the treaty?

Secretary RUSK. We don't know, quite frankly, Senator. It appears that they may be still playing a waiting game as between Moscow and Peiping. It is very interesting that they have been so long delayed in coming to any conclusion on this matter.

Senator SMATHERS. I can answer that it appears that they are bargaining for the best position as between Red China and the Soviet Union, and would probably be as right as anybody?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it is possible, but I would appreciate it if this was not attributed to me. It is possible that they are holding off, pending, say, some economic negotiations with Moscow or something of that sort. Quite frankly, we just don't know.

Senator SMATHERS. All right, the second question—go ahead.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is the inference at all warranted that they are just psychologically trying to make our people believe that they have got something that they don't want to give up?

Secretary RUSK. I don't think so, sir.

CHINESE TESTING

Senator SMATHERS. The second question, in response, again, to a lot of mail which has suddenly begun to inundate my office to the effect that this is actually a grandstand play, that the Soviet Union is going to let Red China do testing in the atmosphere and that, thereby, they will make an end run around us.

I don't believe it, of course, but that is the best answer, that Red China is not involved in this, they will be exploding in the atmosphere?

Secretary RUSK. Actually, if the Red Chinese test we will know about it, and we will take steps that we would need to take under the treaty. Our interests there are fully protected from that point of view.

Now, I wouldn't say this if I were you, Senator, but I personally believe—that is, I wouldn't say it in a letter to your constituents—I personally believe that the Soviet Union at the present time is concerned about a nuclear China, and that they would hope that 110 signatures on this treaty would put pressures on China and begin to build up resistance against China going down the nuclear trail. I can't certify that, and I would be wrong tomorrow morning, and, therefore I wouldn't suggest you use that.

BREACH BETWEEN SOVIETS AND CHINESE

Senator SMATHERS. But you are satisfied that the breach between the Soviet Union and Red China is genuine, is deep, and will probably be permanent?

Secretary RUSK. I think that it is very serious and deep today, but we have to have in the back of our minds the reservation, if I can use that word today, that these two totalitarian systems can reverse directions suddenly and without notice and that tomorrow could be different. After all, Communist Russia made a nonaggression pact with Hitler in 1939. You see, I mean this kind of thing.

But the evidence is that the split is still there, and deep, and is getting wider and deeper.

Senator SMATHERS. If Red China starts exploding in the atmosphere then we are free at that time to make a decision, and we can start tesing in the atmosphere?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. One further question.

DETECTING SOVIET TESTS

Senator Anderson, when Mr. McCone was before us, raised the point that test stations in Red Russia are in the southwestern part with the prevailing wind easterly across a broad expanse of Red Russia, and thus debris, if it is to fall out, would fall out on Red Russia and not on the adjacent nations. Are you familiar with that?

Secretary RUSK. I am familiar with it.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I have your views on what dangers are there of Russia being able to test, distribute debris upon its own land while we have no place to test in a similar way?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I really think that you are entitled to a more technical answer to that question than I am capable of giving, but it is my impression from listening to our technical people that atmospheric testing would involve debris that is of the sort prohibited by this treaty, would involve debris into the higher altitudes and the higher velocity winds, so that it would not easily be sort of snuffed down into the Soviet Union itself.

After all, we do have also with prevailing winds from Nevada, we have a considerable extent of United States territory over which some venting might be dissipated.

But I think you are entitled to a technical answer to that, and I am not qualified to give it.

Senator LAUSCHE. These are the underground tests?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know whether the Senator heard Northrop or not.

Senator LAUSCHE. I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. You ought to read that. That fellow went into great detail, and it amazed me, as to the extensive operations we presently have underway and planned for detection. It was far beyond anything I knew anything about. He is the technical man in charge of this program.

I think you would be satisfied by reading that record. It was an executive record and it was very full, much more than the Secretary is capable, I think of giving—or anybody else, I expect.

Any other questions of the Secretary?

OPPOSED TO RESERVATIONS

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your coming. I hope we don't have to bring you back, as much as we like you.

May I ask you one more thing? You are not in favor of any reservations on this treaty?

Secretary RUSK. I am very strongly opposed to reservations.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are perfectly agreeable to interpretations or statements in this report along the lines we have discussed?

Secretary RUSK. I think any problems of interpretation should be fully clarified in the report, and it would be wise to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[At this point, Secretary Rusk leaves the hearing room.]

PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman, I wish we could now discuss procedure.

We have had a very good attendance this morning. I have already stated we have had 44 witnesses. We have had, I think, a fair representation of both sides.

In addition to our own hearings that have run over 800 pages, we have available to the committee a very extensive executive hearing that will be available to any member who wishes to see it of the Preparedness Subcommittee, many witnesses of whom are the same as we have had and some of whom were different witnesses.

I personally think we have had enough testimony to make up our minds on this treaty. As you know, we are running very late in this session. I would like to propose that we vote on this treaty tomorrow, and then get it out and vote on it on the floor, if agreeable to the committee.

There are certain members who have commitments next week, and I would certainly not suggest that we try to rush it through the floor, but I think it is important to have it reported out by this committee, and then the public would have an opportunity to consider it, and so on. I am not proposing we try to vote on it on Tuesday or Wednesday. That is another matter.

But as far as the action of the committee, are you agreeable to vote on it tomorrow? Should we give notice we will vote on it tomorrow?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.

CONCERN FOR PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that we would be subjecting ourselves to some reasonable criticism from the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee if we acted formally. Now, we have the power and authority to vote this treaty out; that is within the province of the Foreign Relations Committee. But I saw Senator Russell at breakfast this morning, and he said they were in the process of completing right now all their investigation. It would take them a few more days.

While I have no authority to speak one way or the other for this committee, of course, I am merely saying to the committee that be-

cause they are so deeply involved in the question of national defense and security, if they come to the conclusion that they are not as a committee in any way going to raise an objection to this treaty, it would be much better to have them come to that conclusion prior to our final action. If we vote this thing out tomorrow, it is a complete disregard of their efforts, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. I must say, I haven't said anything publicly, but I have not appreciated what that subcommittee has done. In fact, I don't like it in their presuming to interfere, particularly in the question of calling witnesses.

AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE COMMITTEE

We intended to bring those witnesses before this committee, and I think their action is without precedent. I never heard of another committee taking a treaty up, and they took it up as a treaty, holding hearings on it as a treaty. I think it is a direct violation of the Reorganization Act, and they have, in my view, embarrassed the committee and embarrassed me on the committee in the way they have proceeded.

I don't personally at all want to defer for that reason. If there are other good reasons, I am perfectly willing to hear them. But I don't like what that subcommittee has done and the way that it approached it. They are presuming to take over the holding of hearings on a treaty, and the law is very explicit about the treaties.

If we had referred the treaty to them for their advice as has been done in the past, it is one thing, but we didn't refer it. They not only undertook it on their own initiative, but when the staff and I were negotiating with the Defense Department about the Joint Chiefs and others, we were met with the objection, "No, the subcommittee insists upon its priority in holding those hearings." I didn't like it a bit.

But I didn't want to precipitate a quarrel prior to voting on this treaty in public with this committee. It is a very powerful committee with Senator Russell as its head, and so on.

We had invited them to participate in our hearing, invited them to give questions to any extent they wanted, and they were given every opportunity to come to our hearings and ask any questions they wanted. They didn't invite us to their hearings.

ASSERTING EQUAL JURISDICTION

But here it looks like to me an effort to try to oust this committee or to certainly assert coequal jurisdiction over a treaty.

I, first, think it is a violation of the clear provisions of the Reorganization Act, and, furthermore, I think it was very discourteous to the committee, the way the Armed Services' subcommittee insisted upon its right to preempt the witnesses who were clearly to be brought before this committee. I don't like it and I don't want it deferred for that reason.

Senator LAUSCHE. What witnesses were they?

The CHAIRMAN. The Joint Chiefs, in particular. The Administration wanted them to come to this committee, and I wanted them to come, but that subcommittee was so adamant in its attitude. They

conferred with us, in order to avoid, I thought, an unseemly and discreditable row in public between two committees, which happens too often, I said all right, I won't make an issue of it, and I didn't because I didn't want to get into a quarrel in public with that committee.

It is a very powerful committee. I thought it might even prejudice it, on the treaty, and I didn't want to do anything publicly that would do this. I haven't said anything in public, and won't, certainly not prior to voting on the treaty, for fear it might prejudice some votes on the treaty.

IF THE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE DISAPPROVES

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, if we defer to that committee and wait until they make their findings and report, and they disapprove of this treaty, doesn't that leave us in an extremely difficult situation?

Senator SMATHERS. Exactly.

Senator AIKEN. After we have advocated?

The CHAIRMAN. It does. There is too much already. There has been a lot in the press, and I have attempted to say something, but I have restrained myself because I was afraid it might involve us in a quarrel that might affect votes. That is why, as a practical matter, I didn't want to get any row going with some of the most powerful members of this body over this question of jurisdiction. But I certainly think it is involved.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I don't think it is a question of jurisdiction.

The CHAIRMAN. I do .

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This committee has the entire and sole jurisdiction.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I thought it did, too, but they presumed to oust us as far as the hearing go.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't think that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. They did, too.

COMPLAINT AGAINST DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator SYMINGTON. I beg your pardon. In defense of the Military Preparedness Subcommittee, of which I happened to be a member, I was dissatisifed with the way that the Disarmament Subcommittee of this committee was operating, and I so told the Chair. At one time I remember the Senator from Iowa and the Senator from Vermont, we agreed that certain things should not be done. The reason I was dissatisfied, we weren't having any hearings and we were having a lot of committee staff reports which were drawn up, I understand, in the main by somebody who was relieved of duty on this committee.

Now, last September—I take full responsibility—I went to the Chairman of the full committee and the Chairman of the subcommittee, and said that I thought this was a technical matter that could not be decided by romance and it could not be decided by people who didn't know at least something about the question of nuclear problems incident to the test ban, and there was nobody on the subcommittee who had any knowledge in this field.

As a result of that, and in his typically thorough manner, the Senator from Mississippi got hold of an expert whom, I believe, he borrowed from the Central Intelligence Agency. All the witnesses were put under oath, and I think that a magnificent record with respect to what are and what are not the problems incident to a test ban treaty have been developed in that committee.

I may say to the chairman of this committee that never once have I felt that anything was said or implied by either the Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the full committee, or the Senator from Mississippi, the Chairman of the subcommittee, that there was any effort to encroach in any way on the logical and obvious rights of the Foreign Relations Committee, of this committee.

A SPLENDID RECORD

On the other hand, I believe that the record, especially from the standpoint of the future, will be a splendid record for all Senators to read with respect to the technological aspects of any test ban treaty.

I have recommended—just so that the Chair can see my objective position in the matter—I have recommended to the Chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee that rather than accept some of the deletions that have been made by the Pentagon or somebody in the Government with respect to scientific and military testimony, that the report not be issued at this time, or in any detail anyway, maybe an interim report, I wouldn't know, but that we withhold the testimony until we get reasons why justifications for some of the deletions that have been made on the grounds of security.

So I honestly don't feel, Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as these hearings were started last September—I might say I was glad that they were started. They have been running intermittently because we had to stop for Cuba and then we had to stop for the VTOL plane situation and so forth. I think a good job has been done.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about those hearings that started last September. I am talking about the hearings that started since this treaty was an issue. It became a treaty then.

Senator SYMINGTON. They were already running. It was already planned.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about those other hearings at all. They weren't after the treaty. Senator Jackson made it very clear in several of his statements that he was examining this treaty, and so did Senator Stennis.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I say, because I mentioned Senator Russell, I just happened to run across him at breakfast here this morning; there was not meeting with Senator Russell at all. I just walked into the dining room, and he had breakfast and I did, too. Now, quite the contrary, he made it quite clear in the connotation of what he said to me this morning that we had the authority. He is not claiming any authority over this treaty.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was my understanding.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We discussed the closing up of that situation.

INTEREST OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Now, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has a collateral interest in this. We have an interest over atomic energy, its production and the authorizations to meet the needs of the country.

We don't attempt——

The CHAIRMAN. I have no criticism of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I want to say is this: The joint committee, I am quite sure, had they been completely ignored on this, if they had not been given the courtesy—and it was a courtesy to ask the Senate members of the joint committee to participate in these hearings—had they not, they would have felt somewhat left out. As a result there is not the slightest objection on the part of the Senate members on the joint committee that I know of.

Is there, George?

Senator AIKEN. Not that I know of.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have had our little hearings over there. We said at the outset that we must confine our inquiry there to the things within our bailiwick and not get into foreign relations, not get into military requirements, but to get into procurement and into the authorization field that we are authorized to get into, and not step on the military affairs committee or the Foreign Relations Committee's specific problems.

They are perfectly satisfied. They have completed their job over there. They sat in on the hearings, they had their own hearings over there. It was wound up. There is no criticism of this committee.

JOINT COMMITTEE TOOK NO POSITION

Senator LAUSCHE. What has it done by way of conclusion? Has it taken any position?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We took no position on——

Senator LAUSCHE. Has your committee——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Frank, we took no position on the treaty. We said it is not in our province as a joint committee to take a position on this treaty. It is the province of the Foreign Relations Committee, and we tried to keep that completely clear and the lines distinct.

Now, the only thing that I suggested was that the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee has done a great deal of work on what? On the security of the United States, and the question of the abandonment of the right to test in the atmosphere or to do other explosions of atomic energy is a pretty important thing in the defense of this country. They have, I believe, a natural interest.

I have seen no evidence—I have talked to Senator Jackson several times. He is also on the joint committee. I have never had Senator Jackson indicate that that committee wanted to take a position pro or con on this treaty. The only thing he has ever said was that they would like to round out complete, which they would be able to do, he thought, shortly, their investigation.

Senator SMATHERS. May I ask a question right there?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

NOT PROPOSING TO WAIT

Senator SMATHERS. Are you proposing that we wait?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

Senator SMATHERS. That this committee wait until the action by this subcommittee which Senator Jackson heads?

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Stennis is the head of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am proposing this, George. I said to Dick Russell this morning at a purely accidental meeting—it wasn't anything planned or formal at all, we just happened to meet at breakfast—I said, "Dick, how long are you fellows going to hassle around with this thing?"

He said, "I think it will only be a day or two more. I think we can get our end wound up. I am giving serious consideration to my vote on this treaty, which way it will go when it comes up on the floor."

Senator SMATHERS. Do you have any doubt that it is really the responsibility of the Foreign Relations Committee to report this out?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. None whatever.

I have said that three or four times, and it is the sole province of this committee.

Senator SMATHERS. Then the other question I would like to ask, should we wait until they take action and, if so, why, if it is our responsibility?

That is the only thing I don't understand.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just answer this one question? Then I will shut up.

A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE TREATY

Now, believe it or not, I have been doing a lot of talking about this treaty one way or the other, and I haven't said how I am going to vote, but I do think it is to the interests of this country that we have as clear and acceptable an understanding of this treaty all the way through the Senate as possible.

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to associate myself with that remark.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And that is what I think we ought to have.

If by a delay of 2, 3, or 4 days, let's say, to the first part or to the middle of the week, before we take a precipitous action or an action which they might say was a little precipitious, "You didn't wait to talk to any of us before our final conclusions," 2 or 3 days, if we can get as reasonably a harmonious attitude out of their committee as we have out of the Senate members of the joint committee, I think it would be beneficial in the consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken would like to say something.

Senator AIKEN. I talked with Senator Jackson a few minutes last night. I didn't get the idea that they were trying to hold up this committee from functioning, but they were interested in not having a bill come up for action on the floor until they had made their final decision.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't propose action on the floor. I think that could well go over.

Senator AIKEN. He indicated it would not be much longer, if I understand it rightly, while the bill might be laid down by the end of next week, that really action wouldn't be taken on it until the week of the ninth.

The CHAIRMAN. That suits me fine.

Senator LAUSCHE. What position are we in——

WAIT FOR THE PRINTED HEARINGS

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I would simply like to say as one member of the committee that I would hope we could have our printed hearings available for a little study before we vote in this committee. I say that as one who has not made up his mind. There were some meetings which I wasn't able to attend because we have 2 Senators from Arkansas and the other fellow kept us busy with the TFX and I wasn't able to be here.

I would like to get a chance to study the hearings after they have been printed. I would like to have those available before there is action by the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. This came to us on August 6th. It is one of the important pieces of business that we have, and today is the 28th. So 21 days after we receive it, we contemplate sending it out.

Moreover, I will be tremendously influenced by what Russell will say to me either privately or what he will say to me through any official document issued by that committee. To me the most important aspect of this treaty is the danger of yielding a part of our national security by weakening the military.

Now then, if they issue a report one week from today, and that committee says that this treaty is not in the interests of our national security, I will have some explaining to do. They are in a better position to know whether it is in the interests of our security than I am. They have been with this all the time. I have not. Therefore, I would like to find out from Russell, are you going to issue a report or not?

IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would attempt to answer the Senator from Ohio this way.

I recommend to the Chairman of the subcommittee this morning that rather than have vital facts cut out that we felt should be in, and, therefore, would follow the procedure of the MacArthur hearings which Senator Russell ran in 1951, and also the hearings that I ran on air power in 1956 where we had a referee—the same man, incidentally, in both cases, Admiral Arthur Davis—that I would rather see the record from the standpoint of the future on other treaties that may come up not be rushed out at this time.

I would not want to give the opinion of the Chairman of the subcommittee, because I think he would probably want to discuss it with the Chairman of the full committee. But I do feel that this record which has been built in that committee is most constructive. I might add I can say for myself that I do not intend to sign anything in that committee which states that this treaty is against the best interests of the United States, and I say that after listening to

all the testimony that has been given in that committee, and I have to the best of my ability tried to understand it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any contemplation on the part of that committee to issue a finding?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would rather not speak for the subcommittee, but my impression is that the Chairman feels that each member of the subcommittee should have his own opinion about this matter. I have certainly got mine, and I will not sign a negative report on this treaty.

I want to tell my colleagues that, based on those hearings—I do feel those hearings have been tremendously constructive and I would hope that after we get it in proper form and printed, that it be read by everybody and that the classified hearings be read by every member of this committee, because there will be other treaties of this character, in my opinion, that will come before this committee.

SUBCOMMITTEE'S POSITION ON THE TREATY

Senator AIKEN. If that committee issues the report, what is it to be directed to? Is it to be directed to the members of that committee, to the members of this committee, to the Senate, or to the world at large?

Senator SYMINGTON. I think if they issued a report at this time it would be a report that would be issued to the full committee, the Armed Services Committee.

Senator AIKEN. The full Armed Services Committee?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. The public has the idea that that subcommittee is opposed to the treaty.

Senator SYMINGTON. There is no justification for that.

The CHAIRMAN. There is plenty justification.

Senator LAUSCHE. No, there isn't, because Senator Russell told me that he felt that the treaty ought to be signed, after he spoke to McCone.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't think there is any justification for that at all.

Senator AIKEN. There is quite a general impression.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator Morse. I would like to be heard.

ANTAGONISTIC MILITARY WITNESSES

First, I want to say I want this record to show my high commendation of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee for the masterful way in which he has handled the hearings on this treaty.

I have been around here a long time and I know of no job, or few, if any, that have been equalled. I think one of the fairest and most statesmanslike things this Chairman did was to invite the members of the Senate Armed Services and the Atomic Energy Committee to sit with us. We made the record and they had all the opportunity to ask all the questions they wanted to ask. They had the military leaders and they had the civil leaders and they had the scientists. The record on this treaty has been made.

I am as disturbed as is the Chairman in regard to some of the announcements that have been coming out of the subcommittee. They have been calling in not balanced panels of witnesses; they have been calling in military witnesses, many of whose antagonistic attitudes toward this treaty are well known.

I am glad to have their testimony, but we had the testimony of the people that speak for them from the military. We had the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the committee. I am perfectly willing to admit, I say it on the floor of the Senate, that in my judgment you have got honeycombed in that Pentagon building too many people that do not have the civilian approach to the problems of foreign relations, but a military approach to it. They don't want anything that in any way circumscribes or restricts their desire to build up a military might in this country far beyond the need of this country. Let them go ahead and have their hearings, but I do think, Mr. Chairman, that the majority leader, the Chairman of this committee, and the Chairman of the other committee ought to have an off-the-record conference so there will be no doubt at all about where the jurisdiction on this treaty lies.

I want to say to the Chairman I do not think that we should spoil the great record that this Chairman has made by any precipitous course of action, by way of a hasty timetable in the language of this treaty. I want to say that I think some of these people are going to hang themselves in the course of action that they are following in regard to this treaty, but that is their privilege.

I won't be attending their political funerals, I can assure you of that. But I would say, Mr. Chairman, that I think it would be a great mistake for us to vote on this treaty tomorrow. I think the point that was made by, who was it, Karl Mundt, that we might be subjected to some criticism is right and sound.

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, you have done such a magnificent job on this, that you shouldn't spoil it in any way, I think you ought to postpone action on this for several days and say politely and as tactfully as you can so much better than I, because I am not given to that great attribute, that you as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee are waiting for whatever information the committee wants to submit to this committee.

SENSATIONAL OPPOSITION

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if they come out with a report next Tuesday disapproving the treaty or raising grave doubts about it, I think this puts us in a most peculiar light.

They have gone through all these hearings. Just one example—you talk about their attitude—take Mr. Power. There are nine of those Chiefs of the Unified Command underneath the Joint Chiefs. They pick one out of the nine. It was the only one of the nine who disapproved the treaty. That is Power. All seven of them approved it; one said he didn't know enough. The only one they announced was Power. If this is an objective approach——

Senator SYMINGTON. May I be heard, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me be heard a moment and then I will yield.

They come out with it in the beginning, and here we come along. We would look really silly in my opinion if they come out with a

report disapproving this treaty or if they raise a question about it, because they brought out this sensational opposition which always catches the headlines. Day after day, although we were holding hearings, the news was dominated by Power disapproves or somebody else disapproves, Mr. Teller disapproves and raises grave doubts.

I just think that we will look silly if our report comes out after theirs.

Senator MORSE. I don't think so. I think the other ones are going to look silly.

THE BENEFIT OF THEIR REACTION

Senator LAUSCHE. The others are going to look indefensible. My suggestion would be that since you had them present at the hearings, we have them present here at one meeting so that they can give to us their reactions at a closed meeting.

If you justified having them there at the hearings, why shouldn't you have the benefit of their reaction at a closed meeting?

The CHAIRMAN. They give their reaction when the treaty comes up for vote in the Senate. Every one of them is going to vote like everybody else, and that was one reason we had them there, not only for their information, but to give them a chance to develop the record as they wanted it, so that no question which they thought significant to this treaty would be overlooked because of simply the limitation of numbers and so on. This was the reason Mr. Thurmond, who is a very positive man, had an opportunity—and I will have to say this for thim, he came more than most of those members and he asked questions, and he asked very searching questions and so did Henry Jackson, and they had the opportunity to make the record.

They came particularly, just incidentally, to those witnesses who opposed the treaty and asked very searching questions, and that is perfectly all right. Everything was out in the open. It was all in open session.

In their hearings you will notice that most of the hearings they made public were those in opposition to the treaty. What testimony they had for the treaty, if they had any, was not released to the same extent. It is quite clear that was the orientation of their hearings.

Now, I think the committee is going to look pretty silly to sit around waiting to get the advice of that subcommittee to tell us what to do.

Senator MORSE. Oh, no.

The CHAIRMAN. If they come out for it——

Senator MORSE. That is not my proposal.

The CHAIRMAN. Say they come out and say very reluctantly—they give all the reasons why it is dangerous—"but we will go along;" then the Foreign Relations Committee says, "Well, we are very glad, we will follow their advice," and we come out in favor of it. Either way you go, I think we are going to look silly.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I say something?

DOMINATING THE NEWS

The CHAIRMAN. They have dominated the news and they will, too, because the military opposition is always more newsworthy in the eyes of the television and the press than those who are for it.

I was talking about that Scherer program I saw Sunday night. Much more notice was given—and this is nationwide and one of the principal means of communication to the people of this country—to Edward Teller's testimony. They gave him practically all of the significant statements, and they gave Mr. Brown—I will admit Brown is not as colorful a witness and he is not newsworthy, but they gave him just one little snatch and passed on to some of those public witnesses, a little boy, "Freedom of America," who wants to go to war next week and so on; they gave him equal notice with reputable witnesses.

I think it would be a very great mistake if the committee just sits here and twiddles its thumbs until we hear from that subcommittee.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I be heard?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the Senator from Missouri.

DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE WAS NOT FUNCTIONING

Senator SYMINGTON. First, I want to be absolutely candid with the Chairman. In my opinion the Disarmament Arms Control Subcommittee of this committee was not functioning. They weren't holding any hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know why that is relevant to this treaty.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will tell you why. That was one of the reasons I was glad to see the other hearings start in the other committee.

Secondly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and every member of the Joint Chiefs has testified under oath before the committee that they would support this treaty, and the reservations that they have made were already covered by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.

Third, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has said that he would support this treaty. There was a previous treaty which was offered by the Administration which Senator Russell, Senator Jackson, and I wrote to the President that we could not support. That was leaked to the New York Times, not by me, and I am certain not by any of my colleagues, and the President answered that letter which has not been made public.

So, I think that unfortunately what happened, Mr. Chairman, was that while these hearings were proceeding intermittently because of Cuba and so forth, there came a treaty which was a totally different treaty than the one that had previously been offered.

The CHAIRMAN. Not totally different. There was a very minor one.

Senator SYMINGTON. Underground testing is minor? I think underground testing is significant. It couldn't be minor in my opinion, because I would not have voted for the underground testing treaty at that time, and therefore it couldn't be minor in my thought.

NO DESIRE TO HOLD UP THE COMMITTEE

Now finally, I will vote with the Chair. As a member of the other committee I am certain there is no desire to hold up this committee. If the Chairman wants to vote on this I am prepared to vote this afternoon, tomorrow morning, or any other time as a member of this committee, which is the best practical presentation that I can make that there is no effort on the part of that subcommittee to hold up this committee. It would be entirely up to the Chairman.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think we ought to find out what those people intend to do, as Senator Morse has suggested.

If the Armed Services Committee says that this proposed agreement is not in the interests of the security of our country, I just don't see how you can possibly adopt it.

Senator MORSE. I can, because the record in this case shows that it is not——

The CHAIRMAN. I think what you say would certainly be persuasive as to votes on the Senate floor. They all can vote against it if they are so disposed. I wouldn't deny that, but I don't think that is pertinent to what this committee's function is.

If they come out with a report on Tuesday proposing reservations to this treaty, it will be very difficult for us then, I think, to take it or not. If we go against it, then it looks as though we don't pay any attention to——

Senator SYMINGTON. I think there is great merit in the Chairman's position.

COMMITTEE IS IN A PECULIAR POSITION

The CHAIRMAN. We will look as if we are ignoring them. Now, they have a perfect right on the floor to offer any reservations they want to. Everyone of them can, and they will be there for the consideration of the Senate.

But I think it puts this committee in a most peculiar position if we don't agree with them. I don't know what they will do, but you are taking a chance. There is no way to ascertain just what they are going to do until we wait to see their action.

Supposing they put in a modification in the form of a reservation, which the Secretary of State and everybody else says will muddy the waters, will make it unacceptable to other people. We will be in a heck of a position to turn it down after they have taken action.

After we take action and it is our responsibility, then if they wish to make recommendations they can make them for action on the floor, and the whole Senate will decide on it. I have no objection to that. But this is a full standing committee, and here you have a subcommittee of that committee which has been doing all of this.

Senator Russell attended the early hearings on this and asked questions. He had opportunity to ask them. But you have got the Foreign Relations Committee and a subcommittee of another committee coming in, and they make recommendations, and I think we would be very embarrassed. We would look either as if we are accepting them and they are the determining factor in this picture,

or if we go against them, why, we are challenging the best authority in the whole military field.

Now, this is quite all right on the floor. I have no objection to them doing anything they want on the floor. But I just think this committee will look silly. I think we have already looked pretty silly.

A BAD PRECEDENT

I felt very embarrassed nearly every day. The press would come around, "What about the subcommittee over there? Are they holding hearings on the treaty?"

I asked the staff to look up is there any precedent for any other committee holding hearings on a treaty, and they were unable to find one. We asked the Legislative Reference Service, the Library of Congress—because I was disturbed about it—would they make a research and see if there was any precedent for another committee, especially a subcommittee. They couldn't even find an example of a full committee holding hearings on a treaty after the fashion of this. I think it is a hell of a precedent for us to have at this time.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I don't think it is as nearly important to find out what some other committee wants to do as it is to find out what this committee wants to do.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. I would suggest that you call the committee together and find out whether the majority wish to report the treaty out or whether they wish to delay a while.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I was——

Senator MORSE. I move we meet tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to meet tomorrow morning. Of course, if the full committee doesn't wish to report it or they want reservations, that is all right.

Senator AIKEN. Then the committee itself can decide whether they want to report that or delay.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. That is the privilege of the committee.

OTHERS WHO WANT TO TESTIFY

Senator LAUSCHE. What about these people that want to testify, like Arleigh Burke and Radford?

The CHAIRMAN. All I can say about that is that we have had a very full hearing. Those men have both testified, I assume under oath, certainly in executive session, at length before the other committee.

Anyone who is interested in their views, that testimony is available to them. I told you the other day if they wanted to make a public statement I was perfectly willing to accept their written statement and make it a part of the record and give it to the press, if they want publicity.

Senator MORSE. Shall we meet tomorrow morning at 10?

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you men agree with that? You have announced that the meetings are closed? That is, if they want to file a written statement and have it made public——

The CHAIRMAN. We can make it a part of the public record. I have no objection to that. I told you that, Frank. Shall we meet tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock?

Without objection we will meet tomorrow at 10 o'clock.

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to say one thing.

IN DEFENSE OF THE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Wayne Morse told of what a great job you have done. You are complaining of the task. You have been benefitted by it. Your normal attitude is belligerent and hostile, and now you have become like a lamb.

Senator SYMINGTON. One other thing I would like to place on the record in defense of the Preparedness Subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. That puzzles me.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the reason that General Power was called—I didn't know he was going to be called, I wasn't in town when he was called—was that a member of the subcommittee asked that he be called.

The policies of the Chairman of the subcommittee is that he call all witnesses requested by members of the subcommittee, at least up to this time. So I wouldn't want you to think that because one of the Senators—I don't know which one and I wasn't here when Power testified, I didn't know he was going to testify until the day before or two days before at the most—but I wouldn't want you to think that there was any effort on the part of the Chairman to establish it, you might say, from the standpoint of the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. It certainly looks that way from the public record.

Senator SYMINGTON. He is just as fair as you are, and I join with Senator Morse in the magnificent way you have handled these hearings. The reason that I didn't attend a lot of the hearings that you were holding was that I had heard a good many of the witnesses, and had made up my mind already.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

SELECTION OF WITNESSES

Senator SYMINGTON. But I wouldn't want you to think for a minute that Senator Stennis was in any way encroaching on this. I am sure that he called these witnesses at the request of members of the committee. I know that I requested that he call John Foster, and I know that I requested that he call Norris Bradbury, and both of those people supported the treaty, and I understand when they were called that they would not support the treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Foster didn't support it but Bradbury did.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, he did. I asked him a direct question under oath before the subcommittee, if he as a scientist would or would not support this treaty, and it is in the record. He said that if we kept the laboratories in good shape and continued with underground testing he would support the treaty. That is in the record.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is not the burden of the testimony before our committee.

WON VOTES FOR THE TREATY

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, my final point is that I think that the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings have won votes for the Administration and for this treaty as a result of having these hearings. I know something about it now that I did not know before.

Senator SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, just for the record I want to agree with the Chairman in the decision which you have made. I also think the Senator from Missouri's attitude is right. The hearings thus far of the Preparedness Subcommittee have probably in the final analysis made votes, although around the country it created some doubt. But I could not see how this committee could call itself the Foreign Relations Committee where it is assigned this function of passing on treaty, it would put itself in an indefensible position if we didn't go forward and meet the responsibilities of this committee.

Senator MORSE. I agree.

Senator SMATHERS. If we waited for them to advise us as to what to do you would just recapitulate, and the committee wouldn't be worth a nickel after that.

Senator AIKEN. The committee is adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, August 29, 1963.]

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

THURSDAY, AUGUST 29, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:30 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and, Senators Humphrey, Mansfield, Long, Lausche, Church, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we will come to order. We are told by the staff that there are two more on their way. Let us start the discussion.

IMPORTANCE OF ACTING ON THE TREATY

I just wanted to know what you think about this. The situation as I see it is if we do not act on it, and at least approve it, it will delay the report, and we will not get it out probably until a week from Monday. I do think it is serious if we wait and have the subcommittee of the [Armed Services Committee] issue a report. We will be in a position of either directly going against their views or just seeming to follow their views. I think it has created an embarrassing situation for the committee.

Next week I am almost certain we will not have a quorum around, and this thing is relatively simple. It is not a new treaty in the sense that it was just sprung on us here. We have been discussing this generally, both in the previous Administration and this Administration, for 4 years.

ALLOWANCE FOR UNDERGROUND TESTING

The one big change is the allowance for the underground testing, and everybody is now of the opinion that if that had not been done you would have no treaty at all. We ourselves would not have it. Our own people would have opposed it without the inspection, which was clearly impossible to obtain.

There is nothing new or unusual about this as far as for what it provides, and I think it is much more seemly and proper for this committee to act first and to report the treaty, and then they, subcommittee [of armed services] can report, and whatever they say, we

will have ample time to consider it in our vote on the floor. If they wish to offer reservations, the proper place to do it is on the floor.

You have heard what the Secretary said and what many witnesses said. I do not wish to emphasize it, but I think it is a very bipartisan recommendation. You had three of the leading members in an advisory capacity to President Eisenhower come here; that is, you had Dean in the nontechnical field, and you had York and Kistiakowsky in the technical field. All of them agree they supported it wholeheartedly and without reservations.

We have agreed that whatever statement we wish to interpret it, have an understanding, we can put in the report. Everybody, I think, so far has said this is quite all right.

I think it would be much better if we voted it out, and then the committee staff can prepare the report. It will be ready by the middle of next week. and with the approval of the leadership, you probably would want to take it up about a week from Monday, I would guess.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is what Mike had in mind, depending on what the committee did.

The CHAIRMAN. That is my idea. Then the Preparedness Subcommittee will issue their report probably in the middle of next week, and it will come along and everybody will have it before making up their minds on the treaty itself.

The committee, I think, is in a peculiar position. We never before have had anything like this happen, according to our best research, that another committee has undertaken to hold hearings on a treaty and to pass judgment on it at the same time. I think it would be very bad for them to come out first, and supposing they do strongly recommend reservations in the treaty, we then would be in a position of just ignoring and going against their views. It puts us I think, in an embarrassing position.

VERY FULL HEARINGS

You know very well that I have not tried to push this committee. Time and again if any one member had asked to go over, why, we have always gone over. I am not trying to ram it down anybody's throat. We have had very full hearings, and I think everybody is thoroughly familiar with what has been said. If you were not at the meeting, it certainly had been widely publicized in the newspapers. I cannot think of any aspect of it that is not well known.

We, of course, know this conflict of view between Teller and York and Kistiakowsky and a number of others. Teller and Foster were the two principal people on one side, and you had about, well, several times that many, 3 or 4 times as many on the other side. That is a conflict that we have to resolve. There is nothing secret about it or mysterious about it.

The evaluation of these views is, of course, what we have to do. I do not know why we cannot do it now and get out from under, I think, a rather difficult situation regarding the subcommittee. That is the way I feel about it. It is open to anybody who wishes to discuss it.

Senator MUNDT. The leader is now here. Why don't you get from him what——

NO QUESTION ABOUT COMMITTEE'S AUTHORITY

The CHAIRMAN. I said just before you came in, Mike, that my idea was that we ought to vote it out today so that it will be out and in the press and for everybody to consider, and our report will be ready by, say, Tuesday or Wednesday, but that you have no intention of trying to take it up then. If we take it up, say, a week from Monday, you would have all that week to both consider our hearings—our hearings will be printed by Tuesday, and then whatever the subcommittee reports will come in. The people can consider that in relation to their final vote on the floor which is, after all, the final decision.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I say the whole question about the authority and the responsibility of this committee on this treaty is ours and it is ours exclusively. There is no question about that under the rules of the Senate.

It was my hope that if this treaty would be reported out today, and I hope it is, to maybe bring it up a week from today, Thursday next; to have debate the end of next week, but to have no votes until the following week, because I think it is going to take a week or 10 days, at least, of discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. At least, the vote.

ANYTHING MISSED BY THE COMMITTEE

Senator MANSFIELD. And we have other things to consider, and I think we ought to do this, get it out. Certainly if there is anything we missed in the committee we ought to bring it out for the whole world to see.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we missed anything. I do not think any treaty has had a more thorough going-over.

Senator MANSFIELD. I have talked to Senator Jackson on this. He asked that it not be brought up next week.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean brought up for a vote.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes, because he has commitments in the State of Washington. Others have stated they would like to have it brought up earlier. You cannot please them all.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to bring it up earlier. I do not want to give the impression that we are rushing it through.

Senator MANSFIELD. We are not.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the committee ought to report it for the various reasons I mentioned, but then the vote could come, as you say, a week from next Monday or Thursday.

Senator MANSFIELD. There will be at least a week of debate. There would be no voting next week. The voting would be the week after.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Senator MANSFIELD. The week after Labor Day.

The CHAIRMAN. There would just be some speeches.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is right.

TIME TO CONSIDER THE TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I personally do not hope the thing comes up even for discussion until the week after next, because there is a

certain time to consider this thing. I have for years seen treaties going through here, go through, go through, and go through. We always have the same argument that this treaty is a terribly important thing, and it is important that the United States okay it first.

So far as I know, there is not a single nation in the world that has gone through the constitutional processes in the adoption of this treaty that we have. It has been initialled; we have initialled it.

The CHAIRMAN. Bourke, no other country has this procedure that we have.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why, in practically every other country the treaties have to be approved by the their parlimentary body of one kind or another.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a formality. Take in Britain, it is a complete formality because they never have the division we have. They do not have to go through what we do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have to submit it for approval. In most of these other countries it has to be approved by their legislative bodies, some by both bodies if they have a bicameral legislative body. With us, it has to go through the advice and consent of the Senate. That is our process. We do not require that it go to both legislative bodies, but it does go to the Senate.

WHY SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ACT FIRST?

Why does the United States in every case have to do this thing right off the bat first or the heavens will fall?

The CHAIRMAN. It does not do it in every case. We have treaties, genocide and others, that have been laying around here for 6, 8, or 10 years, and they are still there. We do not do it in every case. But we took the lead in this particular case. We and the Russians have been talking about this for years, you know, certainly since 1959, and it is here.

It is the simplest treaty I ever saw in its terms and in its size and context and lack of complexity. I think psychologically it would be very bad if we wait and have the subcommittee come out and make recommendations and we are in a position of either following their lead, if we agree with it—well, we took their views, the military views—or if we disagree, I think that is embarrassing. I do not want to be in a position of contesting over a treaty with the subcommittee. This is the element to me—you know it has arisen, it has been in the press all along; it makes the difference between having it out today and having it our next Thursday, when it will be probably after the subcommittee reports.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think we should be governed or controlled necessarily in finality by that subcommittee. But I do say we, as a committee, I am not talking now about certain individual members of this committee who happen to have prominence in other fields as well—but as a committee we are not competent, comparably competent, to pass on the military implications of this treaty and our defense, and the Armed Services Committee is.

We do not have a backlog of technical staff that has gone into these things over the years. We do not have an historic compilation of our military needs in this country. National defense has not been a primary subject of our study.

Now, I agree thoroughly that this committee has complete exclusive jurisdiction over the recommendation on this treaty to the Senate, but we are dealing with a pretty serious thing here.

I am going to say this, and I probably am going to have to end up grudgingly and vote for this thing, but I am voting in the dark. I do not know for sure what I am voting for. I have some definite figures. I wonder why the Russians suddenly just overnight said that they were ready to sign this kind of a treaty when they have not done that for years.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think the military are going to reveal that, do you? They do not know. Nobody knows.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. We had the Joint Chiefs of Staff; we had the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We have had everybody except Power, Burke, and Twining, and their testimony is going to be available. It is now.

I do not want to be in the position of admitting that this is essentially a military treaty. I think its significance is primarily nonmilitary. It is primarily political in its implications. The military is incidental to it in the sense that if it is not seriously prejudicial to our defense, then that is as far as you can go. You cannot expect military people ever to be for something or anything that will restrict their course of action.

POSITION OF GENERAL LEMAY

You say LeMay is grudgingly for it. That is a lot. I was surprised he was not against it, but he did come out and say that he was for it. I do not think the idea exists that a man like LeMay can be pushed around by any President. He is nearing the end of his career. He is 63 or 64 years old, in my impression, and he is the last of the great World War II heroes.

Take General Taylor. When he disagreed the last time, he resigned. He felt strongly enough about it. And if LeMay felt strongly about this, if he really were opposed, I have no doubt he would resign, too. I think to insinuate that he is being twisted around by the Administration is a disservice to LeMay.

Senator MANSFIELD. He has denied that.

The CHAIRMAN. I know he denied it, and I do not think he was. I believe he is much too tough and too self-assured and sure of his own place to be pushed around by any administration. I think this is so, just as General Taylor was. Taylor resigned, and you know what he did. Several have done that, and I think LeMay would. I do not think you could say he feels strongly about it. He does not like it. I would not expect him to like it.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, in order that we might have something before the committee, I move the committee report the treaty favorably without reservation.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the motion.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OUTWEIGH THE MILITARY

Senator SYMINGTON. Before we consider the motion I wanted to make this statement. I am sorry to hear the chairman say that it is not important with respect to the military aspects of this treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not say it was not important. It is incidental to the political; the political outweighs it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not agree with that at all. I want to make the record clear, first of all.

Second, I do not think that in any way the Preparedness Subcommittee has any idea about encroaching on this committee.

Senator MANSFIELD. Senator Stennis made that very clear to me yesterday.

Senator SYMINGTON. After taking this position yesterday before this committee, I had a lengthy talk with Senator Stennis, went over, to the best of my recollection, what we said, and he gave me permission to say that I expressed his position properly in the meeting yesterday.

JOINT DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE

Now, the facts are that there was once a committee which was a joint committee of the Atomic Energy Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Russell made me a member of that. It was a Joint Disarmament Committee.

For reasons that I have never understood, and protested bitterly to the chairman of this committee, and emphatically, and to the chairman of the subcommittee, and also to the then Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson, that committee was abolished. The matter was put back under this committee, and there was no military coordination of any kind with the Armed Services Committee. I protested this at the time, and I protested it later, the fact that we did not have hearings to clarify the military aspects of this problem, which are very deep and real.

But if you say there is no military problem involved, in my opinion, in effect, you are saying that you are willing to trust the honor and justice of the Kremlin.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not say there was no military to it. In the first place, we have had the Secretary of Defense, we have had the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we had the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. All of them have recommended this treaty. We have not ignored the military.

RECORD OF THE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator SYMINGTON. I think it started last September. The job that has been done by the Military Preparedness Subcommittee is a magnificent job. It has given a record that every Senator should read, in my opinion. It has gone into great detail on this subject, and it was done at a time—in fact, up until very recently high authority in this Administration said, "You don't have to worry about it because the Russians aren't going to sign anything anyway." That was the State Department's position to me. Suddenly we get a

treaty that eliminates 90 percent of what I was worried about when they eliminated the underground testing aspect of it.

So I am ready to vote on the treaty. I agree with the Chairman's position, I think we should, if there is any doubt in his mind or in the minds of the people. You cannot control the press, or if he believes that the press have given more emphasis to the Preparedness Subcommittee and the splendid job John Stennis has done, I am ready to vote this morning on the treaty.

On the other hand, another reason for that is I would hope that the Preparedness Subcommittee report is not released until this clarification of why and arguments about why many matters that have come up in the Military Preparedness Subcommittee hearings have been deleted by the Pentagon building on the grounds of classification, because we will have other treaties of this character.

I have just seen this, I think wrong and misleading, statement that Salazar has just sent to the Foreign Relations Committee. It just makes no sense to me that he thinks he is in a better position—what he says in his last paragraph—to judge this treaty because he is not in possession of the facts. And, therefore, I think——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Salazar.

Senator SYMINGTON. He says, "I am not speaking here as a scientist who can claim to have special knowledge of the atomic bomb, but rather as a citizen whose political judgment is not obscured by being in possession of inside information."

READY TO VOTE

In other words, the less you know about this the better position you are in to make a decision on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think his letter means anything.

Senator SYMINGTON. It was sent around to members of the committee and their staffs.

I am ready to vote on this treaty. I think it is unfortunate if there is criticism of the Preparedness Subcommittee because they did a job I hoped would be done by others, and they have done it. I agree with the chairman that the sooner we vote on it the better.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, there was a determination that there would be no further hearings on this treaty.

Senator LAUSCHE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We did not have a vote on it.

Senator CHURCH. My only point was that was the decision, and we are now prepared to vote on the treaty.

Senator SMATHERS. You say you thought that was the case?

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Senator SMATHERS. I thought that was the case.

REVIEW THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator CHURCH. We are going to have the benefit of the subcommittee's hearings, and we can review whatever the subcommittee reports out. But just for the protection and integrity of this com-

mittee and its jurisdiction, it made sense, no matter how you would stand on the treaty, for this committee to take action first. There will be plenty of time to review the subcommittee's recommendations and the testimony before the subcommittee before the matter comes to a vote on the floor.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, could I say something?

Senator CHURCH. I think we ought to act.

Senator MANSFIELD. Are you through?

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

SCHEDULE OF LEGISLATION

Senator MANSFIELD. I want to say that, first, I cannot reiterate too strongly that the authority of this committee must be protected regardless of what other committees we are on.

Secondly, I want to say, as the Majority Leader, we have to get as much legislation through as possible before we get to the civil rights bill, and even when we get to this bill, I think it is going to stymie a lot of committee hearings.

At the present time, as I see it, it is going to be impossible to get the tax bill up—and you can check me on this, George—until after the civil rights bill is out of the way one way or the other.

We have eight appropriation bills still to bring up, and if we delay these things too much, we are going to be in trouble.

I would go this far, although I do it reluctantly, Bill, but, gentlemen, if it will help the situation, and I think this would meet with Stennis' approval, I would be willing not to call up the treaty until a week from Monday.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that would be better.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be better.

Senator MANSFIELD. That will give us 2 or 3 days of debate.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not think Stennis is particularly interested in this.

Senator MANSFIELD. No. Stennis told me absolutely what you said. He recognized this committee has primacy on it. He wants to get his report out, and I think that will give him plenty of time to do it.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it is merely a matter of being reasonable on this.

Senator MANSFIELD. He has done a good job.

Senator SYMINGTON. He has done a marvelous job. He may not be able to put it out for weeks. My own staff man, who is an expert engineer in this field, told me that there are at least 35 places, that was his figure, where the Pentagon has cut out testimony which he feels there is no justification to cut out at all from the standpoint of classification. Therefore, I have told Senator Stennis that it would be up to the committee, that I would much rather see the report not out than to see it come out not right, because it does not read against this treaty, in my opinion, but it reads against future things proposed. I would rather see it postponed than to come out now at the time of this treaty. But, above all, I would like to see it come out right.

Senator MANSFIELD. I may say it is my opinion, and just an assumption, that Stennis is not unfriendly toward this treaty.

Senator SYMINGTON. Not in the slightest.

Senator SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, may we hear from the Senator from South Dakota; he has been wanting to talk.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

NEED FOR PRINTED RECORD

Senator MUNDT. I would simply like to renew what I said yesterday. I am new on this committee, but to me it is not just an unimportant scrap of paper. I think it has real significance, and I just cannot quite see why we should vote on it before we have the printed record before us to study a little bit.

I recall, for example, some specific cases in the printed record where questions were asked, one of them by me of the Chairman, as to whether we could call an executive session with respect to certain witnesses to be heard, and the Chairman said, yes. I am not sure how many of those there were. I am not sure from memory that just all those things had occurred, and I would like a little time to examine the printed record. I would like to read the testimony pretty carefully. I am inclined to vote for the treaty, let me say.

There is some pride in this committee in all of us, I know, but it is a little frivolous to me to rush through this in a horse race with another committee action on a treaty before we get a printed record because we are afraid the other committee is going to comment on it. I just cannot see myself defending that kind of procedure in public, and I can envision myself criticizing it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would say that 90 percent of the time we vote on bills before the printed record is available. It is the usual practice rather than the unusual practice.

Senator MUNDT. That is correct.

Senator MANSFIELD. But the record is available.

Senator MUNDT. We do not even get it here. On the TFX transcript——

Senator HUMPHREY. We have it. I have been down here reading the record when I have missed the hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. It is here every day.

Senator MUNDT. We do not get it distributed to our offices.

Senator SMATHERS. One of the fellows in my office got it yesterday so that he can start working on a speech.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all here and available to all the members every day.

Senator CHURCH. It has been on my desk every morning.

Senator MUNDT. Certain members get it and certain members do not.

Senator SMATHERS. It has not been on my desk unless I send down for it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is available.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

UNCERTAINTY CONCERNING THE MILITARY POSITION

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to vote for this treaty, and the only hesitation that I have about it now is my uncertainty concerning what

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it will do to the military position that we occupy relative to that of Red Russia.

My reading the documents and listening to the testimony have left me with the impression now that there are military disadvantages to our nation, but that those military disadvantages are more than neutralized by the advantages that will come in stopping the proliferation of the bombs and the relieving of tensions and the driving of a wedge between Red Russia and China.

There is a dispute as to whether the treaty will place us in a disadvantageous position in the development of the antiballistic missile. Highly competent experts differ on what the impact will be. There is an issue as to what the position of Red Russia is on the anti-ballistic missile, and the testimony, so far as I have been able to learn behind closed doors, is that we do not know. McCone does not know. A system has been installed which could be a bluff. What if it is not a bluff?

Another view given by one of the witnesses was that somebody sold Khrushchev a bill of goods, that Khrushchev has been led to install an anti-ballistic missile system believing that it will operate, when, in truth, it will not.

Senator SYMINGTON. It has all been installed around one city.

Senator LAUSCHE. It has all been installed around Leningrad, yes.

When Kistiakowsky testified, he said Teller does not have information from the Central Intelligence Agency. The Central Intelligence Agency says they do not believe that an effective system has been installed, and when asked if they have knowledge, the answer was, "No, we don't have knowledge."

Now, with this situation, and I agree with Senator Symington, that the gravamen or the core of this whole thing has revolved about the military posture. Why did they write into it four provisions demanded by the Chiefs of Staff if it is not vitally related to the military position of our country? We have had listening to the testimony the members of two other committees.

I want to exercise my own judgment. I will not be dictated to by either of the other committees. But, as Senator Hickenlooper has said today, and I said yesterday, the Armed Services Committee is in a far better position to determine the meaning of this treaty with respect to our military position than we are or than I am individually compared with Jackson and Stennis and Russell.

Russell told me this morning that he is for the treaty right now, but still I would like to learn what those men have to say. If we had them as participants in the hearings, why can't we have them in, not to tell us what to do—we have got to do that finally ourselves—but to give their analysis of the military issue.

CALL FOR A JOINT MEETING

I move a substitute, that we have a joint meeting of the other committees that were participating in the hearings to allow them to express their views but not in any way to vote or to determine what we will do.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a highly unusual procedure. I think that each Senator in this body, each of the

100 has to make up his own mind himself, and I will not take a back seat to anybody on the military or the atomic energy committees, and dilute my responsibility as a member of this committee.

I think that if you start setting precedents of that kind, you might just as well abolish this committee and start a series of combined committee meetings by which others will tell us what to do. I am willing to face up to my responsibility now and tomorrow, and I want to, and I hope this committee will.

Senator SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smathers.

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

Senator SMATHERS. I would only say one thing. I think everybody agrees we have exclusive jurisdiction. This committee, it is its primary responsibility. We have called in the other committees to sit with us and hear testimony. They have had the opportunity to examine the witnesses. We have heard the military, we have heard the Defense Department, we have heard the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we have heard Dr. Teller, we have heard the scientists, and somewhere there comes a point where you have got to believe somebody and make up your own minds.

It seems to me any further evidence we have is merely cumulative. There will be some against it, some for it, but we certainly have the picture insofar as we will ever get it, and we have got to act.

It seems to me the time has come for us to act. As somebody has said, if we are ever going to start any kind of a treaty of this nature for the control of arms, when is a better time than now?

Of course, there are calculated risks, but this is what we are having to take. So, from the best evidence we have, everybody—and we have got all the evidence on both sides thoroughly and, I think, fully—I do not want some other Senator to tell me what he is going to do. I have got to do it myself.

I have listened to some of it, and I am ready to vote. I think we ought to vote in the discharge of our responsibilities here as members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator MANSFIELD. Will the Senator yield right there?

Senator SMATHERS. I would be happy to yield.

Senator MANSFIELD. I would like to say for the record that every witness who appeared before us, so far as I am concerned, was qualified and made a contribution whether you agreed with him or not, every single one that I know of.

Senator SMATHERS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further discussion?

A SYNTHESIS OF JUDGMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. May I just, since it revolves about my position, say that we sit in this meeting, exchange views, hoping that out of it will come a synthesis of judgment. I am not asking anybody else to tell me what to do. Nobody has ever told me what to do, and I need not speak about that at all here.

But I do think that we will not be amiss if we hear the opinions of Stennis and Russell and Jackson and others. Nothing is wrong

with that. It is mere consultation and trying to determine what to do.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I just say this? Before I came here, one reason I was so late coming to this meeting, I tried to contact a Congressman from Louisiana, one of the ranking members of the House side of the Armed Services Committee, my friend F. Edward Hebert. Not that he knows more about it than I do, but I just wanted to get his thinking to see if he might have something to contribute.

I put in a call to Dick Russell to ask him, "What do you think about it"? I do not know whether he might contribute something to influence my vote or not, but I was frankly interested in the ideas of the other fellow. I will assume by the time we vote on this we would be in a position to where we could advise the Senate. We are trying to advise the Senate as to what it looks like to us after having thought about the thing with people who have had a chance to look into it more than the other fellow.

I am frank to tell you that I am troubled by it. I have not decided how to vote. I will go along with the committee in whatever you want to do with it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.

FORMAL REQUEST TO SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have another thing to propose, not by way of delay or anything, but I see nothing wrong whatsoever with a formal request to the Preparedness Subcommittee along this line:

> Do you have any findings or opinions which you declare, which you believe, to indicate an adverse result of this treaty to our national defense?

I am not speaking of affirmative approval. It is our business to pass on that. But I also think it is our business sometimes to inquire whether there is a monkey wrench in the machinery from the standpoint of national defense that they see. If they do not see it, if they can say, "Well, we don't know; it has its facets, but we can't say that there is a definite adverse, or we will not advance a definite adverse report on this thing," then it is up to us.

I would not ask them to approve it or disapprove it as a treaty, but from the technical standpoint. I am not proposing that as a motion or anything, but I am merely saying that as a suggestion.

INTRICACIES OF THE PROPOSALS

We have expert sources of information. I do not think we have used them. We have had practically nobody in executive session. There was a little executive session yesterday afternoon late that developed quite a number of intricate things about this that have never been developed in open session, and that gives some orientation to thinking. Don't you think that was a helpful thing yesterday, Karl?

Senator MUNDT. Yes, I do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was an extremely helpful thing yesterday. It was an executive session, and it was at a pretty high level as to the amount of information. But we have not gone with these

fellows into real executive sessions on the intricacies of the proposals for the future or the lack of proposals. All we have had is public testimony, and they run up against the veil of secrecy and so on.

Now, I will say this to you——

The CHAIRMAN. I do not understand that, if the Senator will yield. We had McCone in executive session and we had Northrop in executive session.

Senator CHURCH. The Joint Chiefs.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Joint Chiefs in executive session. Where does he get the idea that we did not have any executive session? We had the top intelligence and military people in executive session.

TELLER'S TESTIMONY

Senator LONG. Teller said before our committee on other occasions, he talked with other people present, there were some other things wrong with this treaty that were secret, and he could not tell except in executive session. I am inclined to think in fairness we ought to hear that. He is really the only witness against this treaty. We should say to him, "If you know why it is, then you tell us."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will say this about Teller. Maybe I am prejudiced. I am a great admirer of Teller's foresight and courage over the past years. He has been one of the few fellows who has been consistently right, more so than a lot of other fellows have been. He is an emotional fellow. When he gets started he sees just one side of the question, I will admit that, but he is a dedicated man.

He is a part of that little coterie that was born, four of them, the greatest scientists ever produced in the field of physics, who were born within the confines of 1 block in Budapest. He comes out of that school. Von Neumann was one of them.

But I do want to say this: I believe that Teller has been away from classified, highly classified information for a substantial period of time, and so far as Teller is concerned, I could not see a great deal of advantage in having Teller in executive session.

Now, I happen to know that within the last 2 days Teller has been taken in and told some things that his normal operation and work or his normal conduct would not ordinarily entitle him to. He has been told certain things and certain plans that may have not altered his basic belief, but have modified his attitude because he did not know really what was going on.

So far as I am concerned, I merely want to say this: I have made up my mind on how I am going to vote on this thing. I have because I have no choice. I just do not have any choice, and my own view is that I am going to have to vote for the confirmation of this treaty because, from a political standpoint, we have been put in such a boxed position nationally and internationally that I feel that I have no choice. I cannot produce in my own mind, I cannot produce a specific sustainable adverse result from this treaty that would justify me in voting against it.

I am going to scream to high heavens about certain things, and I hate to have anybody think that I am being bamboozled by the Russians in this, because I think we are being bamboozled to a considerable extent in many ways by the Russians, but I do not think we have any choice. That is my feeling about it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So I am going to vote as a result of compulsion.

A STRONG COMMITTEE REPORT

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, so far as I am concerned, I am ready to vote on this treaty at any time. When it was first proposed, there was serious doubt in my mind as to the advisability of ratifying it.

Having followed these hearings, I am going to vote for this treaty. I was one of those who was convinced it was not to the best interests of our country, from the beginning, but I am nevertheless going to vote for ratification of this treaty, and I am not going to support reservations on it.

I do want a strong committee report. I just want to make it clear. But I do wonder if, instead of having a vote here on the procedure of whether or not we are going to give members of this committee a couple or 3 more days to study certain information which they want to actually examine, if they could not work out an arrangement if we vote, say, next Tuesday or Wednesday, to have this treaty before the Senate, if it will not meet with the objections of the Majority Leader. I can recognize this problem, and we agree we will all be ready to take it up Monday a week and proceed to vote on the treaty then. But if the Senator from South Dakota and the Senator from Ohio wish to get further information, I think we should cooperate and let them have it because there are many men who are really disturbed about this, and I know that there are back in my State now.

Fortunately, I have reached a decision. I am willing to make this statement that I am definitely going to vote on it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am ready to vote on it Tuesday.

TROUBLE BACK HOME

Senator MANSFIELD. To put a personal matter before you, I happen to be—this is beside the point, but I think we had better bring it up—I happen to be in trouble back home. The only chance I can get to be off for 4 or 5 days is beginning tomorrow. I would hope, John, that you would not push that and that we delay bringing it to the floor until Monday to pass it out. I would have a hell of a time getting home.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to make one comment. I doubt if it is humanly possible to get a quorum here Monday or Tuesday.

Senator MANSFIELD. I will give up my trip to Montana.

The CHAIRMAN. There are several people who have told me they have commitments.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can't we agree today that we can vote by polling Tuesday?

The CHAIRMAN. No. Under the rules—we had this raised by our colleague William Proxmire on a bill out of Agriculture, and they sent it back to the committee because there was not a quorum physically present. That is why we have got 12 members here this morning, or 11, and we either do it today, I think, or it will be into the following week before we can get a quorum.

ACCESS TO EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, before you decide that, I have a matter that I feel I must pursue to its conclusion. I am not going to argue this thing or take up any time of the committee. We argued it yesterday.

I stated at the outset of these hearings that I thought we were entitled to correspondence that had gone on leading up to the preparation of this proposed treaty. I think we are. I think it is different from the ordinary executive privilege situation, because we have co-equal authority with the President. He cannot make a treaty without us, and we cannot make a treaty without him, and therefore, what led up to the proposal of this treaty by way of his acting as the agent for us and the country in this negotiation, I believe we ought to have as a committee, we ought to have access to it. I will make the motion now and then I am going to keep still. You can do whatever you want to with it. I make the motion that the committee——

Senator LAUSCHE. There is a motion pending, isn't there?

The CHAIRMAN. By unanimous consent we will have the pending business aside and have a vote on this. It is an incidental issue, if you have no objection.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. I do not want to withdraw my motion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Will you agree that we suspend it until we vote on this motion?

Senator AIKEN. What is your motion?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am under no illusions about it, but I am going to ask for the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. He wants a vote on it, and then by unanimous consent we can lay aside the pending business and take his motion and then revert right back to yours.

Senator AIKEN. You mean back today. I do not want to postpone it.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not asking to postpone it.

Senator AIKEN. I will be glad to do that. I did not want for us to say today that we would put it over until Tuesday.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not what he is doing.

REGRETS THE MISUNDERSTANDING

Senator AIKEN. The Armed Services subcommittee, if they report Monday and we vote on Tuesday, that is where the trouble will be. And it is not beyond the realm of imagination to think that they will report that the treaty would be good, with reservations.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not proposing that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have been attempting to be recognized, and I would like to be recognized now, based on what

the Senator from Vermont said. I continue to regret what I consider to be a misunderstanding with respect to the position of the Military Preparedness Subcommittee under Senator Stennis, and this committee, therefore—Mr. Chairman, I was going to say although I cannot speak for him, I am confident because of his respect for the Chairman of this committee and this committee, that he would be willing to withhold any report from the Military Preparedness Subcommittee if it was necessary to do so. I shall vote the way that the Majority Leader wants, on a personal basis. If it is a personal problem with him, that ends it for me. I will vote for the treaty and I hope we can do it today.

I do not think we ought to continue to express this apprehension about the Military Preparedness Subcommittee. I am convinced that the Chairman of that subcommittee—and I have a little to say on this because I have to sign that report—that he will adjust himself within reason, of course, to whatever the Chairman of this committee wants.

There is one other point I want to make. I was mistaken yesterday when I said that only Dr. Teller opposed this treaty. I checked the record. Dr. Foster did say that he thought we ought to continue to test in the atmosphere, but he said there were other reasons why he recognized that that should be taken into consideration. I said, "You mean the political situation with the Russians?" And he said, "That is correct." So I was in error when I said that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper's motion had nothing to do with that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand. Senator Aiken mentioned a report of the subcommittee.

Senator AIKEN. I do not want to have it set aside.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection then, the pending business is temporarily laid aside and Senator Hickenlooper wants to make a motion. Go ahead.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER'S MOTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My motion is now eligible to be made; it was not eligible when I mentioned it before. In accordance with my announcement at the first day of the hearings, and because I believe that there is a distinction in the question of executive privilege here, which I do not care to raise other than to call attention to the distinction, I believe that we are entitled in giving advice and consent to the memoranda and the discussions which went into the formulation of this proposed treaty. Therefore, I move that the committee request from the Administration—through whatever proper sources, through the Secretary of State, to the President—that the correspondence and communications between our executive department and the executive departments of the Kremlin and of Great Britain in connection with the development and formulation of this particular treaty be submitted to us for our examination.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the motion.

SENATOR MANSFIELD'S SUBSTITUTE

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard on that motion and perhaps to offer a substitute motion if it will not preclude the consideration of the motion of the Senator from Vermont this morning. On that basis, I would make the following substitute motion: That based on the precedent at the time of the Charles Bohlen hearings, at which time this question was raised—I want to thank you, Bourke, for letting us know of your intentions prior to the motion—at which time the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader, Senator Taft, and Senator Sparkman of this committee were delegated by this committee to examine certain papers, that the same procedure be followed to the extent that the Chairman and the Ranking Republican Member be instructed to do the same.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope the Senator won't make that substitute motion.

Senator MANSFIELD. I will withdraw it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator wishes a vote on his motion and we can vote on that.

Senator MANSFIELD. I will withdraw it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I recognize the separation of powers and that we have no right to look into the files of the Administration on matters that deal with administrative work. However, this is a task on which there is a joint responsibility. We are asked to advise and consent to a judgment that has tentatively been reached by the Administration. The judgment reached by the Administration is rooted in exchanges had with Khrushchev. We are an alter ego in this activity, and I think that constitutionally we have a right to see those papers and those exchanges.

When I make this statement, I am casting no reflection upon Secretary Rusk. I have implicit confidence in him. In these hearings he did not dodge at all. Those things which were helpful to his cause he told with no less vigor than the things which were harmful to his cause.

But on the matter of the right to see those papers, I am of the belief that we have a right. I support the motion.

Senator SMATHERS. Why don't we vote?

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if instead of having these papers submitted to this committee if we should not have made available to this committee—I do not think we should take them physically out of the possession——

Senator SMATHERS. We all heard what Rusk——

Senator AIKEN. If somebody would bring them up here and read them.

Senator SMATHERS. You heard what the Secretary said yesterday, that he would be glad to show it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's have a vote on the Senator's motion.

Senator SMATHERS. I move we vote, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we vote on the Senator's motion?

Do you want a roll call?

DEFEAT OF THE MOTION

Senator MUNDT. I would like a roll call.

May I inquire whether Senator Hickenlooper has agreed to what I think is a very constructive modification of the amendment, that it be made available?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We talked about that yesterday. All I want to say here is that there is no question about the integrity of Mr. Rusk. There is no question about the integrity of anybody that testified here, nor the Administration.

It is a question of individual interpretation of verbiage, and in which all honest men can agree. I don't question the integrity of any of these people.

The CHAIRMAN. Call the roll.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Sparkman?
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Humphrey?
Senator HUMPHREY. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Mansfield?
Senator MANSFIELD. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Morse?
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Long?
Senator LONG. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Gore?
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Lausche?
Senator LAUSCHE. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Church?
Senator CHURCH. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Symington?
Senator SYMINGTON. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Dodd?
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Smathers?
Senator SMATHERS. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Hickenlooper?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Aiken?
Senator AIKEN. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Carlson?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye. I have his proxy.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Williams?
Senator WILLIAMS. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Mundt?
Senator MUNDT. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. No.

Ten to seven—the motion is lost.

Now, we revert to the substitute motion of the Senator from Ohio.

ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS

Senator WILLIAMS. I wonder if the Senator from Montana wanted to renew his motion. That was my suggestion yesterday, that the Chairman of the committee and the minority——

Senator SMATHERS. As I understood it, the Secretary said he would do it, but he didn't want it out that they were doing it.

The CHAIRMAN. He stated here yesterday on a voluntary basis but he would not respond to a demand by the committee.

Senator WILLIAMS. The only thing, it would be officially done.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I say this in response to the suggestion of the Senator from Delaware, the purpose of which I understand—I meant it is perfectly sound in many ways, a sound and understandable purpose. I have been on two or three occasions designated along with somebody on the other side of the aisle, basically on atomic energy matters, to go down and examine documents which the executive did not want to submit to the committee, although we thought we had a right under the law to have them submitted. But we have agreed on those compromises.

I personally would prefer not to be charged with the responsibility as an individual to go down and then impress my judgment upon the judgment of others, or attempt to, on the other members of the committee. I believe everybody else's judgment is as good as mine, and I personally would hate to be charged with that responsibility.

MEMBERS SELECTED BY THE CHAIRMAN

Senator LONG. Did I understand you to say, Mr. Chairman, that the Secretary said that on a voluntary basis or a voluntary off-the-record basis he is willing for any member of this committee to see the correspondence?

The CHAIRMAN. He is not willing to respond to a demand by the committee.

Senator SMATHERS. But he didn't say any member. He said members selected by the Chairman.

Senator LONG. Members selected by the Chairman?

Senator SMATHERS. He didn't say any member. He didn't make it quite that broad.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. In other words, he is not giving up what he considers constitutional.

Senator LONG. I understand all that, and, frankly, I voted for the motion under this impression. My feeling is that I see nothing wrong with us requesting certain information from the executive. Now, if he wants to say, "I am standing on my executive privilege, I am not going to make it available to you," I respect that, too.

But, on the other hand, there is a lot of information that they do from time to time make available. When Senator Kefauver wanted to investigate the gamblers, he made available the income tax returns.

Senator SMATHERS. I think you heard what he said. He said the problem on this was that if Khrushchev ever got the idea that they were showing this around and it would be getting out, then it destroys the line of communication between the President and Mr. Khrushchev in the future. He said, "If this gets out, it hurts him back home. And so we are trying to keep this, and we would like to show it to you, except that if it gets out, Mr. Khrushchev says, 'The hell with you, Mr. Kennedy, I am never going to write a letter to you,' and the communication line is closed."

That is the real danger. That is the only danger.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I call for a vote on the motion.

SENATOR LAUSCHE'S SUBSTITUTE

The CHAIRMAN. Can we refer back to the Senator from Ohio's substitute motion?

Senator LAUSCHE. My motion was that inasmuch as we had at the hearings representatives of two committees to listen to what was testified and to ask questions of the witnesses, we called them here not to participate in the judgment but to give their views of the military aspects.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want a roll call?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Call the roll.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Sparkman?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Humphrey?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Mansfield?

Senator MANSFIELD. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Morse?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Long?

Senator LONG. Aye.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Gore?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. Aye.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Church?

Senator CHURCH. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Dodd?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Smathers?

Senator SMATHERS. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Carlson?

[No response.]

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Williams?

Senator WILLIAMS. Aye.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Mundt?

Senator MUNDT. Aye.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to make a statement qualifying my vote.

The CHAIRMAN. The vote is 5 to 11, 5 ayes, 11 noes, the motion is lost.

Now, it reverts to the Senator from Vermont's motion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely want to make a qualification on my vote.

I believe that the Senator from Ohio's motion goes further than I would like. I would prefer to go only to the point of requesting the opinion of the Preparedness Subcommittee if they have an adverse report based upon information, I would like to see that. I voted for it in principle, but I feel that his motion went a little further.

MOTION TO REPORT THE TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. The motion is on Senator Aiken's motion to report it.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say if we vote on Senator Aiken's motion ratifying the treaty, am I correct in understanding that the report itself would carry the written-in safeguards that have been recommended by the various groups?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. We discussed that at length yesterday.

Senator WILLIAMS. I thought you had.

Senator LONG. Might I just raise one point that the committee ought to do one way or the other. The point has been made that this treaty by its language would deny this nation the right to use atomic weapons for purposes of warfare. Now, the testimony of Mr. Harriman and the legal opinion handed down by the State Department was just the contrary. I can only say this, that as a lawyer, or if I were a judge having to read that contract, I would have to say to you that that treaty clearly prohibits you from using atomic weapons in any respect without 90 days notice.

Now, we are told that the Russians understand that they can be used for war purposes, and we are told that that is our understanding. They see this nation some day hauled before the United Nations for doing something we think we have a right to do, or before the World Court on that basis. It seems to me that at a minimum we ought to have something in there, just some sort of interpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say to the Senator, we discussed it at length, and I have now already on that point, if the Senator wishes to look at it, and everybody agreed that a strong statement to this effect is in the report. Here it is, if you would like to see it. We discussed it yesterday at great length.

Senator LONG. So you feel that a strong statement in the report will cover that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. May I see it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you may see it. We discussed this at length yesterday.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

SENATOR MUNDT'S SUBSTITUTE

Senator MUNDT. I would like to offer my substitute motion now, and that is that the committee defer its vote on the treaty until 48 hours after the printed hearings are available to the members, so we have an opportunity to examine the record.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the motion. Are you ready to vote?
Do you want a roll call?
Call the roll.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Sparkman?
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Humphrey?
Senator HUMPHREY. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Mansfield?
Senator MANSFIELD. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Morse?
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Long?
Senator LONG. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Gore?
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Lausche?
Senator LAUSCHE. Aye.
The MARCY. Mr. Church?
Senator CHURCH. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Symington?
Senator SYMINGTON. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Dodd?
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Smathers?
Senator SMATHERS. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Hickenlooper?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Aiken?
Senator AIKEN. No.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Carlson?
[No response]
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Williams?
Senator WILLIAMS. Aye
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Mundt?
Senator MUNDT. Aye
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. MARCY. Eleven to five.
The CHAIRMAN. The motion is lost by 11 to 5.
Now, are you ready for Senator Aiken's motion?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just ask this question——
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

WALKING INTO A DARK ROOM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I expect, or hope to be able, to call to the attention of the Senate certain deficiencies in this treaty and certain implications and complications which I believe possibly may exist in connection with the adoption of this treaty. I don't want my vote, because I am going to vote to report this treaty out, I don't want my vote to be understood to preclude me in any way from taking a position that we are walking into a dark room rather dangerously, and that we must not be deluded that this is a great

leap toward peace or that it is a great leap toward anything, that it may be at the most a hopeful situation, and that we must not be fooled and that we mustn't let our guard down.

I don't want to be accused of going back on the motion of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

RESERVING THE RIGHT TO CHANGE ONE'S MIND

Senator AIKEN. I want to say, although I move to report it out favorably without reservations, that I, too, reserve the right if anything develops between now and the time comes when we vote on it on the floor which indicates that it is not wise to approve it, I reserve the right to change my mind, too. I think that should apply to all members.

Senator HUMPHREY. That surely is the standard.

Senator AIKEN. We all do it anyway, so we might as well apply it to ourselves.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One other thing. Do I understand that it is now contemplated that the matter will not be brought up for for discussion before a week from Monday?

Senator MANSFIELD. That is the understanding, and the Chairman, I think, in reporting this ought to make that announcement.

The CHAIRMAN. The report will be filed before that, of course.

Senator MANSFIELD. Oh, yes.

Senator MUNDT. Did I understand the Chairman to say that if we vote now that it will not in any way preclude any member from voting against this on the floor in the event that evidence comes up that gives an indication that—

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely, there is no doubt about that; that is correct. That is absolutely correct.

Are you ready to vote?

The Senator from Ohio.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will vote for reporting this treaty out, reserving to myself the right to vote against it on the floor, especially if after hearing what the Armed Services Committee has to say on it reveals factors which I believe of such consequence dealing with our national security that the treaty should not be adopted.

The CHAIRMAN. I made the same reservation. I think everybody does.

ADOPTION OF MOTION TO REPORT TREATY

Are you ready to vote?

Call the roll.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Sparkman?

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Aye.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Mansfield?

Senator MANSFIELD. Aye.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Morse?

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Long?

Senator LONG. No.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Gore?
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Lausche?
Senator LAUSCHE. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Church?
Senator CHURCH. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Symington?
Senator SYMINGTON. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Dodd?
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Smathers?
Senator SMATHERS. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Hickenlooper?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Aiken?
Senator AIKEN. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Carlson?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have Mr. Carlson's proxy and am voting to vote this out with the same general reservations which I made in regard to him.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Carlson?
The CHAIRMAN. He votes aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Williams?
Senator WILLIAMS. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Mundt?
Senator MUNDT. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.
Mr. MARCY. Sixteen to one.
The CHAIRMAN. The vote is 16 to 1.
Any further business before the committee?

GENTLE BROWBEATING

Well, gentlemen, we did a very good job. We have completed it. Is there anything else?
The understanding is, of course, the staff will prepare the report. It will be subject to everybody looking at it.
Senator MUNDT. Is that report passed around?
The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to have it?
Senator MUNDT. I would like to take a look at it.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clerk, see that Senator Mundt has a copy of it.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just say in the course of these hearings while the Chairman has browbeaten me considerably, he has browbeaten me gently and courteously, and I appreciate the gentle persuasion which he has used. I want to thank him for his very considered attention to the views of most all of us.
The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the kind words.
Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, in the press conference, I wish you would point out as a foundation for me, my motion, and whether you state my reservation or not I don't care.
The CHAIRMAN. Which motion?

Senator LAUSCHE. The motion that we haul in the members of the Armed Services Committee for the expression of opinion, but not the rendition of judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. It shall be done.

Senator MUNDT. Will you do the same for me for my vote?

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk has those motions, and they will ask us which motion. We will do our best.

Senator SMATHERS. Aren't there 3 or 4 other things we can dispose of now that we are in a voting mood?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to vote out the foreign aid bill at this moment, without amendment?

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Lausche (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Morse, Church, Symington, and Carlson.

Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, briefed the committee members on the situation in Vietnam, Laos, and Korea.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 11:20 a.m. in executive session in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Church (presiding), and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Carlson, the committee, by voice vote and without objection, voted to report favorably the nominations of Henry A. Byroade to be Ambassador to Burma; Graham A. Martin, to be Ambassador to Thailand; Herbert B. Powell, to be Ambassador to New Zealand; William Matson Roth, to be Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; and William O. Hall, to be Assistant Administrator for Administration, AID.

The committee also approved a list of nominations and promotions in the Foreign Service.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:26 a.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 12 noon in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nomination of Dwight J. Porter, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Administration.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the committee approved for report the consular conventions with Korea (Ex. B, 88-1) and Japan (Ex. I, 88-1); the Rome protocol to amend the convention on International Civil Aviation (Ex. D, 88-1), and three extradition treaties with Sweden (Ex. E, 87-2); Israel (Ex. E, 88-1) and Brazil (Ex. F, 87-1).

The committee discussed further action and the taking of testimony on the bill (S. 1276), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in an informal, executive session with members of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry at 2:30 p.m., in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Church, Aiken, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Chairman Ellender and Senators Cooper, Walters, Edmondson, Boggs, Mechem, McGovern, Talmadge, Jordan, and Young of North Dakota of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

Also present: Senator Smathers and Senator Proxmire.

The joint meeting was called to discuss proposals and problems connected with wheat sales to Russia.

The officials meeting with the 2 committees from the executive branch were G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Ronald Renne, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and Member of the Board of the Commodity Credit Corp.; and Dr. Jack Behrman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business.

No transcript was kept at the meeting.

SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

[Editor's note.—In December, 1962, more than a year after the assassination of longtime dictator Rafael Trujillo, the Dominician Republic held free elections. Juan Bosch, head of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, won the presidency, and was inaugurated in February, 1963. The Kennedy administration hoped to make Bosch's government a showcase for the ideals of the Alliance for Progress.

[Despite increased aid from Washington, Bosch was unable to reduce the serious unemployment in the Dominican Republic, and he steadily lost support among the island's merchants and military forces. On September 25, a military coup overthrew Bosch and sent him into exile. The military dissolved the legislature and voided the constitution which Bosch had promoted.

[The U.S. Government suspended diplomatic relations, recalled Ambassador John Bartlow Martin, and halted all economic aid to the Dominican Republic. "We are opposed to coups, because we think they are defeating, self-defeating and defeating for the hemisphere," said President Kennedy, ". . . not only because we are all committed under the Alliance for Progress to democratic government and progress but also because of course dictatorships are the seedbeds from which communism literally springs up."]

SEPTEMBER 26, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:40 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Morse, Gore, Lausche, Smathers, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Holt of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

After an interval of almost 2 months during which the nuclear test ban treaty was the first order of business, the committee this morning returns to consideration of the proposed foreign assistance program.

The committee felt it desirable to explore recent developments, and we have, therefore, asked Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs and Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress to be with us this morning. We are particularly interested in hearing Mr. Martin's assessment of the situation in the Dominican Republic, and of the United States policy there.

Mr. Moscoso, we are particularly interested in hearing a report of your recent trip to certain Latin American countries. Of course, either witness should feel free to bring to the attention of the committee any other matter of interest. Members of the committee are not limited in the scope of their questions. I suggest we first hear introductory statements from Mr. Martin and Mr. Moscoso, after which questions may be directed to either witness. This is an executive session, and the transcript will not be published.

Mr. Martin, will you come around, please sir. We are very glad to have you with us, and you proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT HON. EDWIN M. MARTIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. TEODORO MOSCOSO, U.S. COORDINATOR FOR THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AND ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA, A.I.D.

Mr. MARTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think with respect to the rather tragic events of the past 48 hours in the Dominican Republic, I would like to say something about just what has happened and then something about the background for it.

Sometime on Tuesday the President, President Bosch, who has been concerned and particularly concerned since his return from a trip to Mexico for the independence celebrations there, about a threat of a military takeover.

I think to some extent this was accentuated by rather considerable disorder that developed over the weekend in the business community which called a strike, in effect an employers' strike, closing down all stores in the Dominican Republic.

This strike was started on Friday, and in Santo Domingo most of the stores were closed down, although those in Santiago were not, as much to bad organization as not.

Saturday most of them opened up and Monday all of them opened up. But this has been a culmination of a campaign which has been going on for several weeks in public rallies of a pro-Christian movement so-called, although the church as such did not participate, protesting Bosch's failure to take action against the Communists in the Dominican Republic.

CIVILIAN-MILITARY PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT

I think there were some people who felt, and certainly those active in this movement, that this civilian strike would create such chaos and pressure that Bosch would give up and leave the country, and there were others who felt that it would be, if successful, accompanied by a military action and there would be a joint civilian-military pressure on him, and we had clear indications from senior military people, although not at the top, that they had seriously in mind taking action over the weekend. We took a very strong position in opposition to this, and they did not move.

Sometime Monday or Tuesday, the civilian action not having forced Bosch out, some of the military who have been most extreme in their antipathy to Bosch and most publicly outspoken in their anti-Communist sentiments, including particularly a Colonel Wessin y Wessin who is head of the training command and has a large part of the training equipment——

Senator SMATHERS. What is his name?

Mr. MARTIN. Wessin y Wessin, "y" meaning "and" is Spanish, Wessin and Wessin, apparently decided to try to go on on their own, and Bosch became aware something was brewing, and on Tuesday afternoon, and for a day or two had been trying to get Colonel Wessin to see him but he had not obeyed this request.

TAKING THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE MILITARY

Tuesday afternoon he asked Vinas Roman, the Minister of Defense, who up to now has been loyal to Bosch but had been losing prestige in the military for a variety of reasons, to try to find Wessin and bring him in, and he went off ostensibly to do this but didn't come back, and apparently he went into session with the leaders of the 3 military forces and the Chief of Police, and sometime later in the evening Bosch was called to the palace for a meeting with them to discuss the Wessin problem.

Bosch apparently decided to take the offensive against the military, and he went into the meeting saying that unless they insisted on the resignation of Wessin from the armed forces, immediate dismissal, in effect, he, Bosch, would resign.

The military considered this, and according to some information we have, and I may say the events of this night are not entirely clear yet, the military took the position that he would have to be tried by a court martial according to military law, but could not be summarily dismissed at the request even of the president.

Bosch said in that case "I resign" and the military obviously took no efforts to persuade him not to.

He wanted to resign in accordance with the constitutional method which would have been to, he and his cabinet and he was speaking for the cabinet, I think, as well, the vice president, to submit their resignation in a speech to the Congress. Congress is the body to which he must resign, and he wanted to call a joint session of the Congress for yesterday morning.

Now, we don't know quite what happened from here on for the next few hours but apparently the military decided it was not wise to permit Bosch to have a meeting of the Congress, and make a public speech of resignation, the reasons therefor and so forth.

ACCEPTING BOSCH'S RESIGNATION

So, between their last session with Bosch which was around midnight or shortly thereafter and 4 o'clock in the morning they decided they would abolish the constitution and take over the government, in effect accepting Bosch's resignation themselves rather than waiting for him to resign to the Congress; and they have done so.

Our Ambassador went to the palace at 6:15 yesterday morning when he heard that something was going on there, and met first with Bosch, in his own office. In the anteroom were most of the members of the cabinet; the vice president also was there with him. The Ambassador discussed the situation briefly with Bosch, and told him he thought he (the Ambassador) ought to talk to Vinas Roman, the Minister of Defense. Bosch agreed, and he went to speak to him making clear that he was speaking to him as Minister of Defense since he is Ambassador accredited only to the government of the President Bosch. He found the Minister of Justice in another room in the palace, and with him were all the senior officers of the military services, and of the police, also 2 or 3 civilians whose identity seems a little unclear, they were doctors appar-

ently, and also Imbert. It was Imbert and Amiama [1] who were two of the killers of Trujillo. [Deleted.]

Imbert was there; Amiama was reported to be around but was not in the room. He spoke to Vinas Roman about the gravity of what had been done, urged very strongly that, if they insisted that the resignation of Bosch and the vice president had to be accepted, they follow the line of constitutional succession and permit the president of the Senate or president of the Chamber to become president, who would then call for the election of a new president in 30 days, in accordance with the constitution.

But Vinas Roman [2] said, "We have taken over. The constitution is not in existence and, therefore, we cannot follow a constitutional succession."

And at that time the radios were broadcasting that. So it was too late.

A NONPOLITICAL JUNTA

He made a very important point of the personal safety of Bosch and the importance of avoiding loss of life of any kind in any kind of brutality and Vinas Roman assured him that Bosch and his associates would be deported with all the courtesy that his high position called for.

He emphasized the serious and grave nature of the step he had taken and the impact on the hemisphere as a whole, and the degree to which it was deplored.

Vinas Roman assured him very strongly that the military had no desire to be in power, and that they would be calling in the political parties to choose a nonpolitical Junta to rule the country, and that it would not include any military man.

The military did not want to have a position in the new government.

They have proceeded to call in the political parties except for the Communist Party which has been outlawed, the 14th of July Party which has been heavily infiltrated by Castoite elements and Communists, and the 2 parties which were supporting Bosch, the PRD and the PRSC, which is the Christian Socialist Party.

All the others who had been called in came to the palace early yesterday morning, and issued a statement saying they had agreed to the request of the military commander to propose or select a government, a provisional civilian government, to rule the Dominican Republic.

Senator LAUSCHE. To whom were all these statements being made, to our——

Mr. MARTIN. The statements for the most part were being made to our Ambassador, Ambassador Martin.

Senator SMATHERS. Isn't the PRD party the big party?

Mr. MARTIN. In the election it was the party which won about 60 percent of the votes for Bosch. I think, I would like to get a little more into the status of the party a little later.

Senator SMATHERS. Yes.

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[1] Gen. Antonio Imbert-Barreras and Gen. Luis Amiama-Tio.
[2] Maj. Gen. Victor Eby Vinas Roman.

BOSCH'S SAFETY

Mr. MARTIN. Now, Bosch and his immediate associates are apparently still quite unharmed though there were a good many rumors yesterday afternoon they were going to leave for Puerto Rico immediately. These were rumors stemming from Puerto Rico and not from the Dominican Republic and apparently had no foundation, as far as we can tell, and not having diplomatic relations we cannot contact the new group officially and have to use informal channels. There is a certain amount of confusion with everybody holed up in the palace, but so far as we can tell they are completely safe, but the Junta, the military, do not intend to let them leave the Dominican Republic for several days.

I think they probably, and this is surmise, would anticipate that when he leaves he will immediately go on the air to denounce them and attack them and try to mobilize opposition, and they would like to have the civilian government in office before they permit him to go out and start attacking them.

CONSTITUTION OF 1962

They have said that the government is being returned to the constitution of September, 1962.

Now, this was the constitution really of 1955, as it was revised in December, 1961, to set up the Council of State, which ruled the country from January 1962 on until the election, for a year, and as revised to a small extent in September, 1962 to provide for the election which took place in December or 1962, in which Bosch was elected.

Now, I don't think any of us feel we know what it means to say the government is operating under the September 1962 constitution. Particularly we don't know whether that means that the civilian Junta, which the political parties have been called in to select will be like the Council of State and have the same powers as the Council of State.

I think it is a reasonable assumption but one can't be sure. Also they apparently are making some provisions for an election.

We certainly hope that they are, and will want to use what influence we have to push things in this direction.

U.S. POSITION

Now, I should say with respect to our own position in the matter, that we have known that there were elements in the military, in the business community and the opposition political parties, particularly the UCN [3] who have been talking about and doing some casual plotting about overthrowing this regime for almost since it came into office. This has been building up in intensity and outspokenness. We have done, we think, everything we could to make clear that as far as the United States is concerned this was a constitutionally elected government of the Dominican Republic, and we thought its replacement by the military or anybody else, by illegal means, would not contribute to a solution of the problems in

[3] Union Civica Nacional.

the Dominican Republic and was something that should not take place.

In July, for example, Ambassador Martin was here, and we arranged specifically to have him meet with the President and have his picture taken with the President and then when he went off he made a public statement which was carried in the press under the picture with the President, making clear the support of everybody he had talked to in Washington for the continuation of the constitutional regime in the Dominican Republic.

More specifically, as the focus of activity has seemed to center more on the military in recent weeks, we have been holding frequent conversations with them. Our military personnel there are in very close touch with the Dominican military and have good relations with them, emphasizing this point.

INDICATIONS OF A COUP

About 10 days ago, it seemed or 2 weeks, we were queried about whether we really would now think that it was a bad idea for the military to take over, and while the military, our military, gave the same pitch about our opposition to it, that they had in the past, we thought it wise to send down a rather sharp telegram from here that would be conveyed as current Washington thinking on this subject, and we did so.

We had again on Friday night and Saturday morning indications that further thought was being given to this and people came to our military and again they repeated very strongly their opposition and nothing happened over the weekend.

During Tuesday night—well, I should say perhaps further that we got enough concerned in the middle of last week about the military attitudes that we called up the senior attache. I asked that he be brought up over the weekend and we met with him Monday afternoon to try to consider what the attitudes were and what further we might do. But by then it was clearly too late and he went back yesterday morning quickly so he could continue to be in contact and try to help influence developments.

On Tuesday night when the events were taking place, our army attache did get in touch before the final decision with the military to again urge on them not to take unconstitutional action, and consider it very carefully.

CRITICISM OF U.S. EMBASSY

Ambassador Martin talked to Bosch about his ultimatum approach to the military as being not really the tactful way in his position to deal with this problem and said he shouldn't be demanding the resignation of Wessin y Wessin, should agree to his being sent overseas or something a little softer and not promise to resign if action were not taken, because this had crystalized this situation.

Bosch rejected this advice and it proved to be too late in any case. Bosch said, "Maybe it is a matter of temperament but I can't do any other way. I am through."

I think our people have done a rather vigorous job of trying to forestall what has happened. I may say that as a result of our posi-

tion being widely known in the Dominican Republic, the Ambassador and embassy have come in for rather widespread criticism from those elements in the population who dislike and distrust Bosch, which are considerable in influence if not in numbers, and have suffered a considerable amount of vituperation. I can use no other word. But the opposition is rather strong.

MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

On the general background of the situation, I think it is right to say there have been major problems in the Domincan Republic. It seems to me this is the kind of the situation which resembles that of a child learning to walk. The people hadn't had a government for which they had any responsibility or under which discipline represented anything during the 31 years of the Trujillo dictatorship.

They had to learn to walk all over again. They took a couple of very good steps in holding an election as successful as they did, but one seldom learns to walk without a few falls and, in terms of operating a government, they had up to now been quite unsuccessful in accomplishing anything like effective government.

There is not an informed and responsible public opinion. The press and radio is by all odds the most irresponsible in Latin America, which has irresponsible presses. There hasn't been a free press for 30 years, and they don't know what a position of responsibility means, and the bureaucracy which is largely a carryover from the days of the Council of State is still inexperienced and on the whole fairly incompetent with no standard of responsibility.

Other parties on the whole refused to participate in the Bosch government, although he did invite them, and Bosch's party was not able to produce effective cabinet ministers and his first cabinet included mostly non-entities with no experience or background for their jobs; at least one crook, who is not out of the government, and one who is a definite pro-Communist, although I think perhaps not a Communist. There had been some three changes made in recent weeks, to some extent under our pressure, which were all improvements, but this came rather late.

BOSCH'S POLITICS

Bosch himself has worked 16 to 18 hours a day trying to make his government run. I think there are few examples of as much devotion to the job as he has put into it.

I think personally there is no evidence that we can discover, and in view of various charges we have made an effort at this, that he is a Communist in any sense of the term. He is a left of center liberal, a man of very high ideals, and a very devoted desire to help his people, and very fixed ideas about how this should be done.

He himself has had no experience in government, His great talent is as a storywriter and a poet and he has considerable talent as an orater. But he has worked 16 to 18 hours a day, seeing hundreds and hundreds, if not thousands, of job seekers.

We understand that every expenditure of over $300 had to have his personal approval, and he has tended to be very thin-skinned, which is not unusual in an inexperienced political person, to

attack, and has spent time and energy and prestige and bitter investice on the radio for hours on end, attacking pipsqueak politicians or journalists he should have disregarded or paid no attention to.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, he did so, Bosch?

Mr. MARTIN. He did so personally. We can argue about the wisdom of this—but he has not, on the whole, found it possible to trust the members of his cabinet or government and delegate to them the carrying out of the development of the program.

As a result of trying to do everything himself, he has found it very difficult to find the time to develop a policy and a program and to see that it was executed and, in the absence of delegation to people of mediocre ability even, just lots of things don't get done that he would like to do.

ENLISTING HELP OR PRIVATE AGENCIES

We have done a great deal enlisting the help of private agencies, enlisting the help of other Latin American countries, the international institutions, AID, to provide technical assistance and industries and to help build a program and get it executed, but in the last analysis the Dominicans have to do it. We can't do if for them. And while some good things were done, basically the progress in helping his people was moving slowly.

At the same time, I would have to say that the impatience of the Dominican people to be helped was very great, and for the past couple of months the attacks on him have been so heavy for not doing more sooner that he has felt forced to spend most of his time defending himself than taking constructive measures.

FAILURE TO DELIVER TO THE MASSES

With respect to his party situation he did get elected, as has been said, with a large majority by a party built up for the election with considerable help from his friends in Latin America and Puerto Rico. Some people feared when he came in that this was a strong enough vote that, with skillful manipulation, he could establish a dominant party like the PRI in Mexico and dominate Dominican politics for a long time in the future.

Instead he decided he was going to represent all the Dominican people and no party and that he didn't need the party. He discarded it in effect and broke off from it and made no effort really to build it up.

And as a result it has gone downhill, and the combination of lack of attention and of support from the president, and failure to deliver to the masses who voted for him in terms of employment and a higher standard of living as a result of his programs, has meant that most observers, both our own and outside people who have been there recently, feel the PRD is pretty much a hollow shell as a party at the present time, in terms of popular support.

He recently went into a slum area in which he got all the votes in the election and was roundly booed. His popular support has been to a very considerable extent lost.

THE COMMUNIST QUESTION

On the Communist question, which was the central issue of the attacks on him, although there were these other matters, his difficulty lay in not being able to point positively to what he had done. There wasn't enough there.

On the Communist point, the first charge made against him very strongly was that he was permitting Dominican Communists that were expelled earlier to come back into the country.

This is on the whole an unfair charge, in our view, in that the return was first permitted in January 1963 by the Council of State. It started then and a pledge to permit return was in the platform of every party in the election. This wasn't his own idea. If a party was in exile under Trujillo, they wanted everybody to come home and this included the Communists. So they have been coming back.

In terms of his general attitude toward communism in the Dominican Republic, he had a defensible theory which was that if I take vigorous steps against them I will merely drive them underground, and be faced with the kind of sabotage and terrorism that Betancourt has experienced in Caracas and I don't want to make his mistake. What I want to do is to let them come in, operate openly, where they can be watched and if they take any subversive action why then, of course, we can move in but we will watch them and let them operate openly and not drive them into terror which I could not cope with as Betancourt can't.

WEAKNESSES OF BOSCH'S POSITION

This is a position, which is a defensible position, although its efficacy is open to doubt.

Its weaknesses were of 2 kinds, the most important of which was he had no apparatus to watch them.

He expressed the intent of wanting to set up one, he made some efforts in this direction, and people were hired but they never did anything, never acquired any competence. It is not easy to undertake an intelligence job of this kind and he never got off the ground.

The first head that he selected for this intelligence operation was fired for taking bribes, and the second one has, on the whole, done nothing.

Senator GORE. Has done what?

Mr. MARTIN. Had done nothing.

His second difficulty was that by one means or another these people were not only allowed to move around but somehow managed to wangle some government facilities to conduct their activity. They got use of—some very suspicious characters got use of—some government radio time and one of the groups got hold of a government school building that was not being used, and used it to run a Communist school. This happened before Bosch took over and we received repeated promises from Bosch that this school would be taken back but he had to wait a few weeks because of certain things, so it didn't get too much attention.

We had 4 promises, I think, and still it is in the hands of the Communists. There was no follow through as was the case in many other things.

TRAVEL TO CUBA

A recent problem has been the travel of Communists to Cuba and back and there has been great pressure to stop this. We have consulted with him about this problem very closely. A few weeks ago he saw to it that passports be stamped not good for travel to Cuba. But there is no penalty for disregarding this regulation, and under the constitution travel is one of the rights of man as it is in a number of Latin American countries. He felt it would require a constitutional amendment to permit a penalty for travel to Cuba and thereby bring it under effective control.

We have been discussing this with him and working on the problem of legislation, but nothing has happened, and in a conversation with our Ambassador Monday afternoon—sorry, Tuesday afternoon—he indicated that, while he would not do it under military duress, if this turned out to be a plot which could be defeated and they did not move by the next day, he had a speech drafted which he would present to the Congress asking for this constitutional amendment.

It is just too late. He didn't get to it the next day.

WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO?

Senator SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt? I apologize to my colleagues, Hubert Humphrey has asked me to do him a favor at 11:15 and I have to go, and again I ask the indulgence, I wonder if I can ask a question which will be asked sooner or later: What now does the United States do? Where do we go from this point right here, real quickly.

Mr. MARTIN. What we have done, of course, is to——

Senator GORE. Before he gets into that, I would just like to say a word to compliment the Secretary. I think this is as clear and fine, as frank a briefing as we have had.

Mr. MORSE. It is the best briefing we have ever had.

Senator SMATHERS. I would agree with that.

Mr. MARTIN. Thank you. I will answer your question.

We have, of course, suspended diplomatic relations because the government with whom we have been dealing has been overthrown by constitutional means and with that goes the suspension of aid activity.

I think we are not disposed to take any other decisions until we see what comes out in terms of a civilian government and what its plans are with respect to resuming the democratic process, what its attitude is toward civil liberties, and so forth.

I think we do intend for at least the moment to leave Ambassador Martin in the Dominican Republic. We could pull him out as further evidence of our dislike of what has taken place, but we feel that he and his staff have influence with the people who are operating there, and informally may be in a position to both protect Bosch's personal safety, and to influence the course of events in a desirable way.

But I would assume sometime in the relatively near future we will call Ambassador Martin back for consultation and leave the place open until we decide to resume relations.

COMPARISON TO SITUATION IN PERU

Senator SMATHERS. Then generally, and this is just very generally and not to commit you people to a thing, but our position would be somewhat like it was, we will say, recently in Peru, I guess it was Peru, I am thinking of.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, no two situations are the same.

Senator SMATHERS. If the military show a disposition to move back to a civilian government recognizing civilian rights and constitutional rights, then the inclination would be on the part of this government, if they move in that direction, to possibly cooperate with them depending upon the extent to which they move in that direction.

Mr. MARTIN. I would say this would be the inclination. This is a decision the President will have to make and I don't want to commit him but I would say this would be the inclination probably.

Senator SMATHERS. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. Just one other word on this.

HEMISPHERIC POSITION ON MILITARY COUPS

Betancourt has issued a public statement in Caracas that he would like to have a meeting of foreign ministers not to consider necessarily the Dominican situation but the general posture of the hemisphere toward military takeovers. He obviously has a long concern in principle with this.

This is a proposal he has been pushing for some time and he also has a problem in Venezuela. Our own thinking at the present time and also that of some of the Venezuelans we have been talking to up here is that there could be no unanimity on positive action on a hemisphere basis military takeovers. Every case has its own military variety and it would be worse to have a meeting in which there was no agreement than to have no meeting at all.

So, I doubt that there will be a meeting.

LITTLE EVIDENCE OF COMMUNIST STRENGTH

If I may finish up on the Communist question, one more thing is to be said. Despite all the concerns various people have had and ours have not gone nearly as far as many of the Dominicans, because we think many of their charges were based on really a slogan approach to the Communist question rather than a careful and discriminating one, there is no significant evidence of increase of Communist strength thus far in the Dominican Republic.

In other words, their influence in the trade union movement and in the government, and in the student movement has not terribly improved despite the relaxed official posture, although we feel, we have felt, that the combination of their ability to operate, plus the difficulties the government must have in carrying out an effective program, provided very fertile ground for them, and we were, therefore, continually working with Bosch to try to improve his ability to deal with this problem.

GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION

I should say on the general economic situation that it has not been bad but it hasn't been improving much, and we are increasingly concerned that the major asset the Dominicans had, the Haina sugar complex, which was not well run under the Council of State, is being still less well run currently.

There are far too many people on the payroll. The planning programs for next year are not being carried out as they should be.

There are a great many charges of graft. I couldn't prove anything, but I would be surprised if over the last 2 years people had not been making money out of sugarcane.

Senator LAUSCHE. Who operates that?

Mr. MARTIN. It is operated under the government now.

Senator LAUSCHE. And it is the sugar industry?

Mr. MARTIN. It is the sugar industry. It was the big Trujillo sugar complex and the government has taken over from Trujillo and has not yet moved it back into——

Senator MORSE. We missed one phrase.

Mr. MARTIN. Out of the Haina operation.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is this an individual?

Mr. MARTIN. This was the Trujillo sugar mill at Haina and the fields are all around. But it was a big operation and one of the major earners of foreign exchange. And if it is unable to deliver the amount of sugar it should and do it profitably this will hurt the economy very seriously and this has been one of the things we have been trying to get at but so far without any success in terms of improving that operation.

CARRYOVER FROM THE TRUJILLO REGIME

I should say one other thing that I think has to be kept in mind. I referred to it briefly but I want to emphasize it further; that the carryover from the Trujillo regime has made extraordinarily complex the setting up of any kind of a normal society in the Dominican Republic.

It reminds me, coming to Latin America particularly from a fresh experience in Europe, of the situation of the collaborators in France, for example.

Nearly everybody who stayed in the Dominican Republic, during the Trujillo regime had to cooperate in one sense or another and is open to charges, and there still is a great deal of distrust and of worry about people being fearful of being charged with this, if they take any strong stand on any question, of being a collaborator. So the mutual distrust in this society is great.

Among the common people there have been very great difficulties in restoring order or getting respect for the police or the forces or order, because they were the representatives of Trujillo and discipline was a Trujillo idea, "Now, we have thrown him out, we don't have to obey orders, we are free."

And I think it is going to take a while to re-establish a normal working society in the light of this.

DISPOSAL OF TRUJILLO PROPERTIES

Lastly there are the accumulated problems of all the Trujillo properties to be dealth with, operated or disposed of, and the claims against Trujillo for the things he took from people.

It is a technical job of major consequences to operate them and gradually dispose of them, but it is also a political problem for the Dominicans and an enormous opportunity to make a little something.

So, getting an efficient and honest administration of as big a problem as the disposal of the Trujillo properties has been a very difficult issue.

About the only way in which this has been an asset has been the fact that the agricultural lands that belonged to the Trujillo family have come into the hands of the state and have been a great opportunity for an agrarian distribution program. I think it is probably fair to say, although Ted Moscoso might like to add more to this, that certainly the most successful thing that had been done started under the Council, but continued rather vigorously by Bosch, has been this program of agrarian reform but they are beginning to run out of land.

Senator AIKEN. What happened to Trujillo's cows?

Mr. MARTIN. That peasants killed them and ate them. "They are ours now."

Senator AIKEN. They don't give milk now.

Mr. MARTIN. They are having to rebuild the herd. Am I not right they are having to rebuild the herd?

Mr. Moscoso. Most of the herds were killed by the peasants.

Mr. MARTIN. This happened in Cuba, all of the cattle were killed by the peasants.

THE SUGAR SITUATION

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me suggest as I did in the opening statement, I thought what we ought to do is to let Secretary Martin and Mr. Moscoso make their statements, and then question them together. We digressed from it because George had to leave to go to the Senate floor.

Just keep your seat there, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Moscoso, will you come around and just make your statement? Go right ahead.

Mr. Moscoso. I would like to add just a minor footnote to what Secretary Martin was saying about the suger situation in the Dominican Republic. Perhaps the major cause of the unprofitable operation of the Haina Complex is the labor costs. The decrease that increased wages, which were approved before the Council of State took office but which it had to adhere to almost doubled the cost, the labor cost in the Haina Complex.

And the elimination of some of the services which were being provided by the military to this complex and substituting regular civilian commercial services also increased the costs substantially.

That plus the fact that there was a general relaxation of Dominican discipline, and that was a forced sale of sugar, and the complex was not able to take advantage of the substantial increase in world prices of sugar, is one of the reasons for this very substantial reduction in profits and ultimately a loss to the complex.

AN ADMINISTRATIVE VACUUM

I think in the case of the Dominican Republic we can say that we did a fairly good job of trying to develop a program with substantial financial support, but with a very thin structure of government to help us along.

I believe we should have perhaps foreseen that after 31 years of dictatorship the total elimination of the people who know how to govern, was going to create a power vacuum and an administrative vacuum.

The fact is that practically everyone who had had anything to do with the Trujillo regime was not allowed to participate actively in government. I think that some kind of a procedure will have to be worked out in those cases where there has been a long entrenched dictatorship to see how the next or the duly elected democratic government is going to be able to function.

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The planning function has been almost in the hands of a group of people that we ourselves brought in. Very few Dominicans were able to handle the job. They had no control agencies, no budget people, no one who knew anything about personnel.

Trujillo had seen to it that human resources were not adequately developed, education was never given the importance it should have been given. For example, the Dominican Republic is preponderantly an agricultural economy and there was practically no schooling in agriculture so you can see the vacuum we had to work in.

One of the problems in building institutions is we want to leave an imprint and we want to train the people who will do the development job but there is usually someone who has had some degree of training that you can quickly bring up to our standards by putting him through a short term course here in the states or by bringing him to some agency of Government where he can get this on-the-job training.

Well, in the Dominican Republic it was extremely difficult to indentify those people.

BOSCH WAS UNABLE TO BEND

I think Secretary Martin has done a splendid job outlining or mentioning to you some of the difficulties developing in a functional democracy when there has been such a long-standing dictatorship.

I fully agree that Mr. Bosch did not have the flexibility to compromise. He was an idealist. I think he was very honest, he knew nothing about the running of a government, and perhaps he should have thought of the harm that was being done to democracy by not bending a little, and allowing himself to develop over time the kind of a power structure that would have permitted him to face up to the military.

I think that he thought that because he had won this election with such overwhelming vote, that he had the people fully behind him.

Well, he didn't have what we would consider a well-structured, well-organized, well-disciplined party, and I think that the loyalties

of some of the voters could have been switched from one group to another rather quickly depending upon how they felt on what the people were getting from the government.

We tried to convince him of a need for a rapid creation of jobs, even if it was was just a question of perhaps cleaning up ditches, anything like that in order to give the people some work and give an impression of a great concern for the welfare of the people.

PUBLIC WORKS

I must say that with the Council of State, we had more success in convincing them that this should be done. You may recall when we first gave some assistance to the Dominican Republic—the $25 million loan of February 1962—we managed to get the Council of State to devote a very substantial part of that money in municipal or public works, but works which did occupy people, and at one time about 30,000 people were employed. Now, we tried to see to it that those public works at least made some contribution to economic development—fixing roads, building irrigation ditches and repairing those that had been overgrown by weeds, and so forth.

In the case of Mr. Bosch, he had other ideas. I don't think he was able to capture enough of the feeling of the populace and their desires to see some forward movement. Besides, I think that during the political campaign he did hold out rather strong promises of great economic betterment that would take place quickly, and I think he underestimated the time that it was going to take to do these things.

Mr. MARTIN. May I interrupt just a second there, Ted?

Perhaps our difficulty on this particular point was that we really haven't had much experience trying to persuade left wing liberals to spend money.

Mr. MOSCOSO. I must say that he ran probably about the most conservative government, financially, "fiscally responsible" government, that I have seen—fiscally responsible in quotes because I wonder how responsible a government is which when faced with this kind of a situation doesn't indulge even in a deficit, if necessary.

I think, if I can use that word right here in order to avoid——

A NEW DEAL PHILOSOPHY

Senator GORE. You are speaking on very dangerous grounds. You are indicting the policy of your own administration in this country.

Mr. MOSCOSO. I said in quotes.

Senator GORE. I think it is a foolish policy but nevertheless you are indicting them and you said you have been trying to do in the Dominican Republic that which has been just denounced and thoroughly repudiated by the highest officials in our own country, that is just an interruption.

The last time I talked to you, incidentally, you were very enthusiastic about building a TVA in the Dominican Republic with an initial cost of $150 million, and I told you I could not suport it. I thought it was too great a gamble.

I don't say this in criticizing you but just let this serve as a warning that it is an enormous gamble, particularly in Latin American

countries and emerging countries to make an investment of many hundreds of millions of dollars in big projects when it may be subject to government takeover, coup d'etat, and so forth. I am glad we didn't get this one started in view of what has happened.

Mr. Moscoso. Well, Senator, I am sorry, but in the first place this was not going to be a privately owned project. This was going to be a government operation. This was going to be a good project, and would eventually be built in the Dominican Republic by someone, some government because the area that was being considered has the best agricultural land in the whole of the Dominican Republic, and has little water available now, but a very substantial amount of water could be made available.

I must say, Senator, that the idea was to make a study, a feasibility study, to see if it was a good idea to do this.

All we were trying to do when we——

Senator GORE. I really didn't mean to hurt you.

Mr. Moscoso [continuing]. But we gave it a little bit more publicity perhaps than would have been warranted particularly since we ought to announce things that are being done or finished.

Senator GORE. I hope you will be able to pardon me and indulge me my enjoyment in this good New Deal philosophy you were advocating for the Dominican Republic but which has been denounced and repudiated by our own administration.

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

Senator SPARKMAN. I wonder if I may suggest to Mr. Moscoso this: We understood you were just back from a tour of several of the Latin American countries with particular reference to the progress that the Alliance for Progress was making, is that correct?

Mr. Moscoso. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I wonder if you would run over that. That is what we were wanting to hear from you, one thing we would hear from you.

Senator MORSE. Do you think we should do that before we finish our discussion of the Dominican Republic?

Senator LAUSCHE. I think we ought to take up the Dominican Republic and get it out of the way.

Senator SPARKMAN. It may mean another session.

Senator MORSE. I think so. But he raised some questions that are fundamental.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right, Senator Hickenlooper. We are talking about the Dominican Republic.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, that I had——

Senator SPARKMAN. Would you prefer that someone else ask the questions?

Senator Hickenlooper I had some questions I wanted to ask about the Dominican Republic.

Senator SPARKMAN. We understand you had constituents and constituents come first.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had a successive flock of constituents.

CANNOT OPERATE ON A BASIS OF DEMOCRACY

Mr. Moscoso, the thing that bothers me, the impression that is constantly created in my mind, is that we haven't learned any lessons apparently from the time of the fiasco in China at the close of the war, and our starry-eyed acceptance of the agrarian reform philosophy developed by the Communist movement over there.

We seem to at least acquiesce in the throwing out of strong man governments in these places, and in practically every instance it results in chaos or a complete swing to the left.

Just to use some illustrations, a lot of the basic troubles in Venezuela today, I think, are that we become so intrigued with Betancourt during the days of his Communist association and his semi-Communist association and then apparently his swing away from them when he went in.

However, I would like to say, I think he has tried to do a good job down there in Venezuela. What did he do? The first thing he did was to admit all of the Commies back into Venezuela and we apparently approved of it or we didn't do anything to stop it.

Bosch in the Dominican Republic, the first thing he does is let all the Commies come back into the Dominican Republic. That begins to raise the question whether we perceive that this struggle is a Communist struggle and when we have a government that keeps them out—even though we thoroughly disapprove of Trujillo and I think everybody does and he should have been out of there and applauded his getting out of there, I don't applaud murder, but I applaud the change in government there—we have a responsibility to, it seems to me, to not get so deluded by this intriguing term "democracy" that we lose perspective in many of these countries; that you cannot operate these countries on a basis of democracy as we understand it and interpret it, that you still hve got to have a strong central government but it is our job to see, if possible that that strong central government, while strong, nevertheless is definitely oriented toward private enterprise, toward the philosophies of self-determination and responsibility. I think we have failed in those things just repeatedly.

We have said when we throw somebody out, the next fellow who comes in and veers way over to the left and says, "I am going to be a great democratic hero and I am going to let the Commies back in here and show that I believe in equality and so on," every time we have done that we have utter failure and chaos and we go to the other extreme and un-do all of the good works we would like to do and have done in the past.

That is probably an extravagant statement I have made here, and in some ways it perhaps is unfair, but the net result is not so good.

We suddenly got emotional, withdrew recognition of Peru, when what they were trying to do was to save that country from going clear over to the left.

NEED FOR A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

I don't like military juntas; the only thing that saved our bacon in a lot of these countries has been because they have had military forces in there who have said, "This far and no farther will we go."

They have had to do that to keep the country from going Communist and I don't like that any more than anybody else does.

But we don't seem to have the formula for a vigorous support or a recognition in the first place that most of those countries still must operate on a strong central government philosophy because the masses of the people have not yet come to the point where you can say individual responsibility can truly reflect itself in responsible government in the masses, and it is an educational process.

So they go to the other extreme. The pendulum swings clear over to the other side.

I don't know what this junta business in the Dominican Republic is, but I will say one thing for it; that it has laid down some rules that the Communists are not going to have anything to do with the Dominican Republic and that is something that Bosch wasn't doing and we apparently were standing by and sort of acquiescing in his great humanitarian attitude of letting the Commies back in and we will all be humanitarians down there and so on.

I can't follow the pattern of our operations. That has been going on for quite a number of years. We have got some other countries in Latin America if we follow this pattern will go the same way.

THE BETANCOURT EXPERIENCE

Mr. Moscoso. I am sure Mr. Martin can say this better than I, but prior to Bosch's inauguration, knowing that he had some notions of allowing the free movement of people in and out of the country and so forth, strenuous efforts were made to convince him that this would be undesirable because he didn't have the police capabilites to handle the situation.

Mr. MARTIN. As a matter of fact we took advantage of the Betancourt experience to which you refer to suggest to Betancourt he was in particularly good position to speak to Bosch about this matter since he had made the mistake that Bosch was about to make. Betancourt did speak to him during the inauguration and Bosch told him that he was the most recently elected president and he had gotten the greatest majority, and he would give them advice rather than take it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is very true.

But in some ways that is like a 10-year-old child telling adults that he knows more about what he is going to do and he is going to do as he damn pleases.

We have got the greatest weapon in the world, leaving out military strength or gunboat diplomacy, we have the greatest weapon in the world, we have the purse strings. We have the checks and we have got the stuff they have got to have to survive, and some of these times I hope we settle down and say, "We cut off your water unless you do certain things along the lines that we think are sound."

All we do is let them go ahead and do as they please and keep writing the checks to them and keep supporting these things and they keep on bringing in these left wingers on the idea they are being fair to all people, and that they are establishing the basic tenets of democracy. I think democracy has got to be founded upon responsibility, and if you have a country where regardless of what

we think of self-government, where responsibility is not the order of the day because of lack of education, because they have been ground down, because they have been held down, then we have got to have some kind of a means of holding them in the right path meanwhile using or help to bring up education, to bring up appreciation of their responsibilities in a really democratic society.

U.S. AID AS A WEAPON

It is not easy to do. I know we can't run everybody's business. But we do have a weapon and that is the weapon of the money that makes the mare go.

MR. MOSCOSO. We tried to do the next best thing in this situation, Senator.

We developed a pretty good internal security program. I think it is one of the strongest we have been able to develop. We tried to see if we could have those capabilities developed for him, that would enable him to control the situation. I am sorry to say that is didn't last long enough to do any good.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, did we say to Mr. Bosch at the outset, when we knew he was thinking of being such a great democrat, that he was going to let the Commies all back into the Dominican Republic, "All right, Bud, we are not going to send gunboats down here to invade you but just no do, that is all. No money. We cut off your water. We just cut off your water and you can sink, swim, survive or whatever you want."

You know, sometimes I think if we just told these countries, some of them, that, "All right, if you want the Commies to take you over here, see how you like a dose of it for a while."

To keep furnishing them money to operate on and yet have them do the political things that are inimical to the whole purposes we are trying to promote just doesn't quite square with me. It is nothing new; recently, I am not jumping on you particularly at this particular moment. I am just talking about things we have done quite repeatedly over the years.

I don't like to see the Congress have to write definite and detailed restrictions in the law as to how some of these things ought to be done. I believe in the most reasonable area of administrative discretion in many of these things.

I realize that these things are not all hard, cut and dried. But I think we are getting to the point where we are going to have to write some restrictions into some of these bills that really may handicap discretion which I would like not to do.

There are some proposals right now that I am not so sure are necessarily good in the long run, but the proposals are being generated because in the administration of these programs, things are not being done which have been written into legislative reports on these bills from time to time, and they are utterly disregarded and the philosophy is not put into effect. A lot of us kind of want to support some of these things, and have supported it and we haven't any particular desire to cut loose from them and stop supporting them. But we do feel that many of these things are just not realistic. I am sorry.

Thank you for your indulgence.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I have a few questions.

U.S. MILITARY TRAINING OF DOMINICAN OFFICERS

What training, if any, did Wessin y Wessin have in the United States?

Mr. MARTIN. I can't answer that question offhand. What training did Colonel Wessin have in the United States? I can't answer that question.

Mr. MOSCOSO. I don't know.

Mr. MARTIN. I will have to look it up for you.

Senator MORSE. What training, if any, did any of the officers in this military takeover have in the United States?

[Material supplied for the record follows:]

A list of the military signatories to the proclamation and their record of United States Service School attended follows:

MILITARY SIGNATORIES TO THE PROCLAMATION SIGNED IN SANTO DOMINGO, D.R.

	Rank	Position held	U.S. service school attended	Year of training
Victor Elby VINAS Roman	Maj. Gen., Army.	Secretary of Defense	Armor Officers Adv. Course, Ft. Knox, Ky.	1957/58
Renato HUNGRIA Morel	Brig. Gen, Army.	Chief of Staff, Army	Basic Infantry Officers Course, U.S. Army, Puerto Rico.	1944
Atila LUNA Perez	Brig. Gen. Air Force.	Chief of Staff, Air Force.	Jet Qualification Course, Craig AFB., English Language Tng., Lockee and AFB.	1955
Julio Alberto RIB Santamaria	Admiral (?) Navy.	Chief of Staff, Navy	Basic Course, U.S. Marine Corps Sch., Quantico, Va.	1953
Belisario PEGUERO Guerrero	Col. (?)	Chief of Nat/l. Police	No record of U.S. training	
Felix HERMIDA Hijo	Brig. Gen., Army.	Pres., Superior War Council of Army & Nat'l. Police.	do	
Manuel GARCIA, Urbaez	do	Inspector Gen., Armed Forces.	do	
Antonio IMBERT, Barreres	do	None stated (Police)	do	
Luis AMIAMA, Tio	do	do	do	
Salvador A. MONTAS, Guerrero.	do	Inspector of Northern Zone, (Army).	do	
Marcos A. RIVERA, Cuesta	Col., Army	Under Secretary of Army.	Short period of training with U.S. unit in Puerto Rico while a D.R. Cadet.	1943
Ramon Eduardo CRUZADO Pina.	Col., Air Force	Under Secretary of Air Force.	English Language Course, Lackland AFB. Jet qualification course, Craig AFB.	1956/57
Elisa Wessin Y WESSIN	Col., (now Brig. Gen.), Air Force.	Director of Army Training Center.	No record of U.S. training	
Manuel Ramos PAGAN, Nontas.	Col., Army	Quartermaster General	Counter Insurgency Orientation, Course, Ft. Culick, C.Z.	1962
			Trained with U.S. Unit in Puerto Rico as a D.R. Cadet.	1943
Branlio ALVAREZ, Sanchez	do	Comdr., Transportation Bm.	Sr. Frn. Off., Preventative Maint. Course, Ft. Gulick, C.Z.	1963
Neit Rafael BAVIR, Seijas	do	Director of Military Training (Army).	No record of U.S. training	
Juan W. FOLCH, Perez	Col., Air Force	None stated	do	
Andres Geronimo SANZ Torres.	Capt., Navy	Minister of War & Inspector of Ministry of War.	do	

MILITARY SIGNATORIES TO THE PROCLAMATION SIGNED IN SANTO DOMINGO, D.R.—Continued

	Rank	Position held	U.S. service school attended	Year of training
Jose Maria SANCHEZ, Perez	Col., Air Force	None stated	English Language Course, Lackland, AFB. Pilot Instrument Course, Valdesta, Ga.	1957/58
Carlos Maria PAULINO, Asiatico.	Lt. Col., Army	Asst. to, Secretary of Army.	Counterinsurgency Orientation Course, Ft. Gulick, C.Z.	1962
Rafael E. SALDAMA J.	Lt. Col., Air Force.	Legal Advisor, (JAG) to Secy. of Air Force.	No record of U.S. training	
Ruben Aut. TAPIA Cesse	Col., Army	Deputy Chief of Staff, Army.	Sr. For Off. Preventative Maint. Course, Ft. Gulick, C.Z.	1963
Sergio de Jesus DIAZ, Toribio	Comdr., Navy	Deputy Chief of Staff, Navy.	No record of U.S. training	
Ismael Emilio ROMAN, Carbuccia.	Col., Air Force	Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force.	do	
Librado ANDJWAR, Maton	Capt., Navy	None stated	do	

MILITARY SUPPORT

Senator MORSE. How much military support have we been giving this military group in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. MARTIN. I can't answer the specifics.

Essentially civic action internal security.

Senator MORSE. I think you will find when you get the figures that per capita the Dominican Republic has been the recipient of the largest amount of military aid in all of Latin America.

I think you will find that for fiscal 1963 the Dominican Republic received $1.26 per person measured by that standard in comparison with Bolivia's of $1.17.

Senator LAUSCHE. Repeat that figure, please?

Senator MORSE. $1.26 per person, $1.17 for Bolivia, and $1.03 down in Mexico.

I want to say that there are many implications in the Dominican Republic that I think are going to blow themselves up into a considerable discussion in this country as to the effectiveness of military aid group and what our military attaches and military group abroad are doing in connection with the military groups in other countries that are leading the military junta.

I am very concerned about it and I am very concerned about what our military is doing abroad.

Senator SPARKMAN. We have the figures here showing what 1963 was.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, let's have the figures.

Senator MORSE. I can give you 1963 Dominican Republic, $3,981,000, the largest Latin American per capita.

The point I want to raise here, I want to seek some information, but I have got some advice from the Dominican Republic, too, and we had better take a look at what our military group has been doing down there allegedly in cooperation with the Dominican military, and to what extent they are involved with the Dominican military against the civilian government, because I am having growing concern about the activity of the military in Latin America. The surprising thing is when these juntas take place they are

too frequently led by military people who have been trained in the United States, military people who have maintained very close associations with American military in our country, and I think this matter is going to have to be thoroughly aired.

ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

What evidence is there that the Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic has not cooperated with Bosch since he has been in office? They opposed him before he went into office.

Mr. MARTIN. I think their relations have fluctuated somewhat from time to time, depending on particular policies, but in general it is my impression from the reports from our embassy that that they have tried to stay out of politics from the Dominican Republic as an institution. As for example, they made it quite clear they were not participating in these anti-Bosch rallies, the so-called pro-Christian rallies in the last two weeks.

Senator MORSE. Some of the news releases of yesterday and this morning, how reliable they are I don't know, indicate that the military junta has the support of the church and that Bosch had its opposition.

Mr. MARTIN. I think in terms of general political attitude this would be a reasonable surmise. But in terms of active organizational position, my impression is they have not taken a stand. This doesn't mean that individual clergy in the countryside have not taken positions but the official hierarchy has not. I would like to say one thing about the military if I may, Senator, this is a matter of both information and judgment.

On the basis of what I now know, I would feel that the close association between our military and the Dominican military which has to some extent, but not entirely, been facilitated by our military assistance program, has put off by about 3 months a military coup in the Dominican Republic and might have escaped it but we didn't. But it certainly put it off and it gave Bosch that greater time to try to deal with the problem.

I also feel that the association, the contacts which have been made, cannot be disregarded in terms of the military position with respect to physical safety of Bosch and his cabinet members.

This respect for life has not been characteristic of the Dominican Republic not only under Trujillo but for a good many generations and their desire not to be in power but to bring a civilian junta and operate under a constitution is not characteristic, and I think is of benefit.

Although we didn't get the total prize of not having a takeover, I think, our relationships have softened the picture materially. This is a matter of judgment on the basis of what facts you have. This would be mine.

INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. RACKETEERS

Senator MORSE. What evidence is there that there is any involvement in recent months of U.S. gamblers and racketeers in the Dominican Republic seeking an overthrow of Bosch?

Mr. MARTIN. I have not as far as I can recall seen any evidence in the the Dominican Republic. There are one or two other countries that are not quite the same but the Dominican Republic, no.

Senator MORSE. Some of the information I have is that a syndicate of American gamblers and racketeers down there that have been lined up against him, and have been financially assisting and assisting in other ways that this kind of element always does in stirring up troubles against the Bosch government.

Mr. MARTIN. I have not seen it. I couldn't say that isn't true because they have operated other places so I wouldn't be in position to deny.

PARTICIPATION OF UCN PARTY

Senator MORSE. What effort was made on our part to get the UCN party to join in the Bosch government?

My understanding is they haven't joined from the beginning which was a disappointment to me because you remember at Punta del Este that the top man for the Dominican Republic made a terrific impression on us.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

Senator MORSE. And my understanding is that he hasn't been really free to help because his party has been so adamant in opposition to the Bosch government. If it weren't for his party we might have had the benefit of this man's great mind.

Mr. MARTIN. Both before and after the election with our full approval Ambassador Martin tried to get a full understanding that whoever won would try to work together for the benefit of the Dominican Government and after the election we spoke specifically to the UCN party leadership to participate in the cabinet and urging Bosch to invite them.

He did invite them, they did not participate. They were very bitter and thought they should have won but they didn't win and thought they were the responsible elements in the community and refused to have anything to do with Bosch. We made an effort.

Senator MORSE. What was this man's name?

Mr. MARTIN. Rene Fiallo was the candidate.

Senator MORSE. [Jose Antonio] Bonilla, the Foreign Minister.

Mr. MARTIN. Bonilla, the Foreign Minister, left the country at the time of the inauguration extremely bitter and unwilling even to stay in the country, let alone help in the government.

DOMINICAN POLICE OFFICERS TRAINED BY FBI

Senator MORSE. What happened to this Dominican police officer that I understand was trained by the FBI as a likely person to take over their security policing?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't know, the police organization has stayed the same under Bosch. He has not changed it and our public safety people are working with him but I don't know the name.

[Material supplied for the record follows:]

The name of Dominican police officer trained by the FBI is Rafael Tineo Morel. After his training he became head of the Secret Police Section of the National Police.

Senator MORSE. You said the security police chief they had first was eliminated for taking a bribe and then they had another man in and he hadn't done anything. Was he this FBI trained man?

Mr. MARTIN. No, he was not. This was a special security setup reporting directly to Bosch to work on the Communist problem for Bosch that I was referring to.

CIVILIAN STOOGES FOR MILITARY JUNTAS

Senator MORSE. Now, Mr. Secretary, we have this military coup and we have this military group and apparently from the press releases, and that is all I know about it so far, they are going to follow the usual pattern of allegedly setting up a civilian government which in the opinion of many will be nothing but a group of civilian stooges to carry out policies behind the scenes that are dictated by the military junta.

What can we do about that, if that turns out to be the pattern?

Mr. MARTIN. I would say a couple of things.

One, I think in the Dominican Republic case this is less apt to be the situation than it was, for example, in Argentina, because the military in the Dominican Republic are far less experienced [deleted] and capable of calling the tune than they are in Argentina where they [deleted] have a long tradition of participation. So that I think we are less apt to have dictation except on the question of the Communist issue in the Dominican Republic.

I don't think there is a great deal that we can do but, as we did in the case of Argentina, try to find as many opportunities as we can, first, to push for early elections so the government will be reporting to the people and not to the military, and secondly, to work with the civilian government on things it wants to do to show its independence of the military and establish its hold with the people and not depend on the military and, therefore, to move toward civilian government of their choice and not under military dictation.

DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONS

Senator MORSE. What are the major differences between the constitution of 1962, and the so-called Bosch constitution from the standpoint of governmental organization? Why does this military junta find it so desirable to reestablish the constitution of 1962.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I haven't yet had a full examination of this but I would assume the essential point is that the constitution of 1962 was the one under which the Council of State, a group of 7 people, as I recall it, ran the country, there was no Congress, and they were not chosen by election.

The executive power was in this group. It was a junta in the Latin American sense and they had the executive authority.

Senator MORSE. What public acceptance has there been of the so-called Bosch constitution?

Mr. MARTIN. It has had a very mixed reception. There was some strong opposition to it on the part of most elements of the center and right, and by the Catholic church because of some provisions with respect to church-state relations.

Senator MORSE. The church has fought it from the beginning.

Mr. MARTIN. Bosch is anti-clerical and the constitution reflected that.

Senator MORSE. The church has fought it from the very beginning because it laid down a very good American principle of separation of church and state.

Mr. MARTIN. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. Was it imposed on the Dominican people?

Mr. MARTIN. It was, I believe, drafted and approved by the Congress which was elected by the Dominican people in which the great majority of the members were members of the PRD party.

Senator MORSE. Was it made clear during the campaign that was what they planned to do?

Mr. MARTIN. I think it was well understood, yes.

Senator MORSE. It was a great campaign issue.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes, I don't think there was any question about it, [deleted].

A NEUTRAL POSITION REGARDING THE CHURCH

Senator MORSE. Which leads me to say, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to get into this, you will not find the Catholic church following a hands-off policy.

Mr. MARTIN. Not in all respects by no means.

Senator MORSE. In regard to this turnover and we had better be very careful or we are going to get ourselves in a position where we are supporting the Catholic church in Latin America, and I don't want to oppose the Catholic church.

I want an American neutral position with regard to the Catholic Church as I want a neutral position in all churches in this country but under our separation of church and state do you think the pattern of the U.S. is going to be the usual pattern we are going to condemn military takeovers and say we want civilian patterns to be set up and then after a few days or weeks proceed to recognize a government which has come into power by force, by an overthrow of the constitutional system, saying after all we have to deal with somebody down there so we recognize it.

Mr. MARTIN. I would think in a few weeks we will be considering how we can best get back to a normally elected civilian system and we may decide that recognition will be the best way to promote that objective.

Senator MORSE. I think so and I will judge it as of that time but as of now, unless we break away from the old pattern of recognizing governments that act only as stooges and fronts of Fascist military groups in another country here is one person who will not vote for that recognition.

We will have to raise this issue in this country in relation with the whole foreign aid bill that is coming up and I think we are going to have to decide now whether our foreign aid bill is going to be heavily colored by military domination or whether we ourselves are going to apply our own civilian principles.

That is all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Lausche?

RE-ENTRY OF COMMUNISTS INTO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator LAUSCHE. Do I understand that the State Department, when Bosch decided to admit the re-entry of the Communists, protested that practice?

Mr. MARTIN. No, that is not quite the sequence of events, Senator.

The Council of State in January before Bosch was inaugurated at the end of February began to permit them to reenter and they started coming back and quite a few of them were back before Bosch took office.

What Bosch did not do was establish legislation which would have permitted them to enter, and we did two things: One, we urged him to reconsider this point, and we urged others whom we thought had perhaps more influence on this question than we might have, to press him on it, and we also urged him and got him to agree to set up machinery for watching the situation.

We did cooperate with him in establishing such machinery but the cooperation from the Dominican side broke down administratively.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is you sort of foresaw that the re-entry of the Communist might create trouble and therefore you asked him to establish the law?

Mr. MARTIN. We urged that he consider the dangers involved in this type of situation with the Communists entering at will.

Senator LAUSCHE. And he took the position that it was the general policy and representation that all exiles would be invited back home?

Mr. MARTIN. I should say he and the Dominican people generally took this position. In addition he took the position that he was not competent to deal with undergound violence and if he didn't permit them to come back and be in the open where he could watch them they would come back clandestinely, they would undertake a campaign of violence against his government such as is going on in Caracas at the present time and he was not able to deal with it as Betancourt who was secure in office.

This was his political judgment.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you feel this is one of the factors that caused the difficulty that occurred in the overthrow?

Mr. MARTIN. I think the general attitude on Communists of which this is a factor was an important point in the military decision to take action, yes.

THE TEACHING OF COMMUNISM

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, you stated that the government allowed the Communists to use an unused school building for the indoctrination of Dominicans in communism.

How long was that school building used? Do you know?

Mr. MARTIN. I can't answer accurately. I suspect it has been 5 or 6 months that it has been used for this purpose.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you know how large the operation was?

Mr. MARTIN. It is relatively small one, but I can get you the figures, I think, on that, yes. It is not a major operation but it is an operation of this kind.

[Material supplied for the record follows:]

The enrollment in Dato Pagan's School is 200 (June estimated).

Senator LAUSCHE. Did our State Department know that the government facilities were used for teaching communism?

Mr. MARTIN. We found out about it subsequently, and we immediately took it up with President Bosch.

Senator LAUSCHE. What happened when you took it up?

Mr. MARTIN. He promised to take care of it shortly and to take it away from them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was it taken away?

Mr. MARTIN. Up to now it has not been. We have taken it up with him 4 times, I believe.

Senator LAUSCHE. When was the first time that you took it up with him?

Mr. MARTIN. I think it was in May or June, I would have to check that to be accurate.

Senator LAUSCHE. So it is now 4 months later and the school was still operating at the time of the overthrow?

Mr. MARTIN. From my latest information it still was.

BROADCASTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, you also stated that Communist propagandists had the availability of the broadcasting facilities.

How long were they broadcasting?

Mr. MARTIN. I think I indicated pro-Communist broadcasts were made on government radio stations. I don't know how long that has been going on. I would have to check into that and let you know.

Senator LAUSCHE. When did the State Department find out that the facilities were so being used?

Mr. MARTIN. I can't speak for the Department as a whole. It came to my attention only within the last couple of weeks.

Senator LAUSCHE. How long had the facilities been used for that purpose?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't know at the present time.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

BUSINESS COMMUNITY STRIKE

Now, then this business community strike, was that genuinely rooted in the protest against what the Communists were doing?

Mr. MARTIN. I think it was publicly addressed primarily to the Communist question, but I think it also reflected a wide variety of political and economic opposition to the Bosch regime in general, and it would not have had the support it did get in Santo Domingo without this wider feeling about the Bosch regime and fear of measures it might take which would affect their business future.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you describe what this strike of the businessmen was, how it went on?

Mr. MARTIN. They just close their shops. Didn't open on Friday morning.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where did this happen, all over?

Mr. MARTIN. It was supposed to be all over the Dominican Republic but it was effective primarily in Santo Domingo itself, in the capital, for Friday. On Saturday most of the smaller shops were open again, and on Monday all but a few of the big department stores were open.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was there any particular spearhead by way of an individual who announced the closing?

Mr. MARTIN. There were, there was an individual who claims credit for having organized it. There were a number of individuals who apparently attended meetings talking about setting it up and it was announced by several radio announcers or TV announcers over their networks, people who have consistently for the last 4 or 5 months been bitterly attacking Bosch at every turn but I have the impression that one of the reasons it wasn't more successful was that the organization was fairly loose and nobody was quite clear who was in charge.

MOTIVATING FACTORS BEHIND COUP

Senator LAUSCHE. According to your appraisal, which of the motivating factors in overthowing the regime of Bosch was the most significant. Was it the failure to improve the economy, was it the spreading of Communists or was it some other cause?

Mr. MARTIN. I think, insofar as the direct overthrow turned out to be by the military, and not by civilian elements who have also been plotting, that in the military mind the impact on them has been primarily the Communist question, although the unanimous support for it which had not existed until right up to the time of the plot, was based also, I am sure, on their fear of their own future vis-a-vis Bosch.

This treat to discharge Colonel Wessin was a threat to them, too, to be discharged.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, I failed to mention a fourth element that had aspects of communism, and that is the movement back and forch out of Cuba. Will you describe that in greater detail, just what happened, if you have the information?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, there has been some travel of Dominicans back and forth to Cuba for various purposes, and some of this had been clearly people who were Communists who were looking for training and assistance from Cuba. This was discussed with Bosch, and he had a constitutional problem but he did agree to make passports invalid for travel to Cuba and the foreign office undertook to carry out this instruction. To the best of our knowledge there was never any publicity about this change in policy or the fact that they were doing it but they did do it.

However, the foreign office pointed out to us they were helpness to penalize anybody because there was no law providing a penalty for disregrading this action so we were pressing to get a penal law enacted, and working with Bosch's knowledge and approval in drafting such a legislation, hoping he would introduce either legislation or a constitutional amendment.

There was some argument as to which was required and he felt he needed a constitutional amendment.

INDOCTRINATING THE YOUNG

Senator LAUSCHE. Do we have any proof of any kind that the technique that was followed in inducing American youth to go to Cuba was also practiced down there in sending Dominicans into Cuba to be indoctrinated and taught the technique of Communism.

Mr. MARTIN. I personally don't know enough about the exact techniques they used on the youth there.

My understanding is that in most of the Latin American countries it is the Communists or pro-Castro parties who recruit people to send to Cuba, and they get financial help from Cuba to do this, where they need it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have been told that definitely the American 59 paid their way to New York but from New York on in the entire journey and back it was paid by someone.

Mr. MARTIN. I am sure they did not finance it themselves for that much of the journey. How they got to New York I am not clear.

CUBAN INFILTRATION OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator LAUSCHE. What I am trying to learn is, does our intelligence indicate to what extent Cuba was being used by the Dominican Communists and by the Cuban Communists to infiltrate into the Dominican Republic.

Mr. MARTIN. It certainly was. There were Dominicans going back and forth to Cuba who were Communists, and who undoubtedly derived some benefit from their sojourn in Cuba. I don't think we are able to identify exactly what happened in Cuba.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Now then, Communist motivation is, one, the reentry of the Communist exiles into the Dominican Republic; two, the using of a governmental school in the teaching of communism; three, the use of government-operated radio in disseminating Communist propaganda; and four, the use of Cuba through the travel back and forth as a point of indoctrination. Is there any fifth aspect of Communist participation?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I think that as in most countries there was disturbance over the opportunities that the free activity of the Communist Party gave them both to acquire new members and to spread their doctrines in the uneducated rural and urban population and to try to increase their strength in the trade unions and in the student movement. And it was felt there ought to be firmer measures taken to prevent their ability to do this.

DWINDLING STRENGTH OF BOSCH'S PARTY

Senator LAUSCHE. Did the party or whatever it was that supported Bosch dwindle in strength as his incumbency grew longer?

Mr. MARTIN. There is no precise measures, of course, of party strength in between elections. But all observers that I have talked to felt its strength was diminishing very substantially.

The effect was a very small cadre who by skillful campaign led by Bosch, acquired a great many votes, but it didn't have in our sense a wide party membership or loyalty. This was a brand new

thing in the Dominican Republic. They had an educational program to explain to them what political parties were.

Senator LAUSCHE. The cause of the change of attitude from what I gathered thus far, is that he failed to get the economy moving, that is one; and two, this issue of communism. Is there a third factor?

Mr. MARTIN. I think there is a third factor, namely, he did not, as leader of the party, spend any time or effort trying to build up the party as a person who was in office can do, but decided to operate independently of the party.

IMPACT ON HAITI

Senator LAUSCHE. What happened in the Dominican Republic, will that have any type of an impact in Haiti?

Mr. MARTIN. I think it is a little early to tell. We have had an initial reaction of the foreign minister talking to our change who felt that while the Dominican-Haitian relationship has fundamental difficulties in it—they have hated each other for a good many generations—they felt they might be able to work out a more satisfactory arrangement with somebody other than Bosch who was, they felt, very determined and their utterly irresponsible enemy.

But I think this is somewhat optimistic in that I think the Dominican military, as Senator Morse said, called the tune, and they might still to a considerable extent on this issue with the Haitians.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all, Mr. Chairman, I am thankful for your recitation.

Senator MORSE. Get into a summary of the Bosch-Haitian relations.

Mr. MARTIN. In fact, there is one point I thought to mention but I forgot to mention.

One of the things I think brought this to a head when it did was military impatience with the feeling that Bosch was using them for his internal political purposes in respect to Haiti.

The Bosch government put out this story about Haitians firing in Dominican territory, and building up rather a bit of enthusiasm for perhaps Dominican military retaliation against Haitian invasion without waiting for the Dominican military observers who were on the border to report what in fact was going on and having before the end of the day to retract everything that was said. The military felt he had blown up a false balloon somewhat to their discredit and they were about to be used politically for this purpose.

I think it is also true that at the time of the crisis last April and May Bosch made statements about the Dominican military attacking Haiti without consulting the Dominican military and without knowing that they didn't have the facility including gasoline to get to the border, let alone to attack.

NO COMMUNIST DEMONSTRATIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Were there any demonstrations or disturbances by the Communists prior to the beginning of this overthrow?

Mr. MARTIN. No special demonstrations or disturbances of any kind, no. And thus far since the overthrow we have had no reports. There have been some leaflets passed around, but they are appar-

ently Communist inspired, and there have been threats that things would happen last night including to our embassy, but as of this morning we were on the phone and everything is still quiet.

Senator LAUSCHE. Threats by whom?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, there were anonymous telephone calls but we assume they were Commie.

Senator LAUSCHE. Commie. Why would they be wanting to act against us?

Mr. MARTIN. The Commie line, which has already come out of Moscow, is that the U.S. military staged the coup because the first act of the new regime was to condemn the Communists. And they have alrady had this outside of Moscow and Cuba and elsewhere.

Senator LAUSCHE. What appraisal do you make of that charge?

Mr. MARTIN. It is wholly incorrect.

Senator MORSE. It has been the line in Latin America so long as you build up the military.

LIKELY EFFECT ON VENEZUELA

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question. What is the likely effect of this on Venezuela?

Mr. MARTIN. Betancourt is worried about both what happened to his good friend and about the possible repercussions in Venezuela, encouraging the military there, and I may say, in Venezuela he has 2 military problems.

There is the military higher up impatient with his inability to deal with the violence problem in Caracas, and this is intolerable, and there are also some evidence of communistic penetration at lower levels in the Venezuela military in an attempt to pull off a coup and forestall a real election.

I may say——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Betancourt wouldn't be in there for 24 hours if it wasn't for the military, would he?

Mr. MARTIN. I think he has to have military support to stay in office.

In other words, the military can throw him out but this is true of any country. I think he has general popular support and the military have been able to be effective with the guerrillas because the campesinos support Betancourt and give him intelligence.

A PROBLEM IN HONDURAS

I might say we have a problem in Honduras also, and we are watching very closely because of this.

As you know, in Honduras the present party in power, the liberal party, has set up a civilian guard of which the regular military establishment is very jealous, [deleted].

Our Ambassador has already reported his fear that what has happened in the Dominican Republic may have repercussions and may complicate his problem there [deleted].

COMMUNIST PRESSURES ON SOUTH AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Which of the South American countries are having troubles with the Communists? Can you identify them?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, the most overt difficulties are the violence in Caracas in Venezuela. There is some violence and there was another outbreak last night which was certainly Communist-inspired in Colombia. This is relatively new, urban violence in Colombia.

But in the last two or three weeks they have moved to that, Commie and pro-Communist elements. They are not all Commies but of different parties. I think these are the two places that would concern me most from this standpoint.

There are some minor guerrilla elements in Guatemala but they are not a threat to the government there at the present time in our judgment.

There is some infiltration in power centers in Brazil, which we are watching very carefully, and where they have nationalist elements with whom they associate, ultra-nationalists who add to their strength. We are, of course, watching very carefully the open political strength of the popular front in Chile in which the Communists are a part.

Senator MORSE. Is Bolivia settling down?

Mr. MARTIN. I think in Bolivia the Communists are pretty well disorganized and in disarray at the present time and the leader of the left sector of the party, Lechin, throughout the battle of the last 3 months has seen fit to stay very quietly at home and not expose himself.

All the evidence is that the miners are back at work, the new mine programs and in effect, of the Communist Union leaders one has been fired and one is being sued in court.

I say in Chile the evidence now is that if the democratic front which supports the present government can stay together and if the Christian Democrats maintain their present position, both of them are apt to get more votes than the front in the election next year. But this is still iffy.

THE SITUATION IN MEXICO

Mr. MARTIN. I don't see any evidence that there is a chance of the Communist elements in Mexico threatening the dominant party in Mexico.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Gore, any further questions?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The dominant party in Mexico today is prettly left wing, isn't it?

Mr. MARTIN. It has both right and left wing elements. It has all of the important elements in the country in it. It is a wide organization. But the question is who controls the government, which elements of the party? It will be very importantly affected by whom Lopez Mateos chooses as his successor.

I was told by somebody yesterday that the odds very substantially favor at the present time 3 candidates all of whom we would find fairly acceptable and one of whom is the leading candidate. The betting odds are on the Minister of Government who is a very sound person [deleted].

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Government of Mexico is neutral, but it is more neutral toward the left than the right.

Mr. MARTIN. I think the present government so tends to be. But it is not really neutral toward the Communist Party as a party, which is outside.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is extremely tolerant.

Senator SPARKMAN. Just as a court. Who are the other two?

Mr. MARTIN. Ortiz Mena, who is the Minister of Finance, I am told is in third place and Coquet, I believe it is, is in second place.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Has Cardenas' influence diminished any?

Mr. MARTIN. We can't be dead sure until we see who the candidate is but there has been some evidence it has.

Lopez Mateos has replaced Cardenas' men as governors of state including his own state which is not easy to do.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was told that in Mexico the present and the past presidents make up a kind of a council and that they really select the presidential candidate, is that right?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I think that the president in office is required by tradition to consult very closely with the past presidents. I think he also consults with other power elements in the political scene. But I think in the last analysis he makes up his own mind.

Senator SPARKMAN. He makes the decision.

Mr. MARTIN. The only thing that keeps me a little nervous about this is the last couple of times the front runners have never been selected. [Laughter]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, they are kind of passed around.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, it has gotten passed around. Lopez was not a front runner, for example.

Senator SPARKMAN. Any more questions?

CHARGES MADE BY MOSCOW

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I am disturbed about the possible accuracy or quasi-accuracy of some semblance of evidence of this charge coming out of Moscow but out of Latin America, and if this is true we ought to know it. If it is partially true we ought to know it.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, we certainly are aware that not only Moscow but other people make this charge. I don't want to pass judgment on what has happened in the past.

Senator GORE. What do you mean by the past?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, prior to a year and a half ago when I took over. Behind that, I don't know.

Senator GORE. I am concerned with the last 6 months.

Mr. MARTIN. I can't pass judgment on what the thousands of U.S. military who have contacts here and in the Panama Canal Zone and in the countries may say in private conversation over cocktails.

But in cases where this has been an issue we have checked just as carefully as we could including the Dominican Republic, and I feel confident that, on the basis of everything I have been able to discover including personal conversations with some of these people, in some depth, when this issue comes up in any formal sense they have made quite clear the position of our government, and beyond that I think it is very difficult to go.

ALLEGED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MILITARY AND U.S. AMBASSADOR

Senator GORE. Tell me about the instances in which it has come up?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, we have reports from the Dominican Republic.

Senator GORE. Tell us about that.

Mr. MARTIN. That it is widely known, for example, that the U.S. military don't agree with the position of the Ambassador of the U.S. Government with respect to Bosch.

Senator GORE. You analyzed that, you say you have had reports?

Mr. MARTIN. No more specific than this. I can't attribute any specific conversation. We have had reports that this is the consensus.

Senator GORE. What do you mean by reports?

Mr. MARTIN. People who have visited the Dominican Republic, government people, newspapermen, private individuals have come back and have said this is the common gossip in the country. We know the Ambassador had made it quite clear what our position is, and the position he expects his team to follow. He is aware that we are aware that this question has been raised and to be alert to followup and check on it in every way possible and has not come up with any evidence that they are taking any other position other than the U.S. Government position and I have had conversations with some of the military and quizzed them very deeply, I think, on their conversations with individual dominican military and what they said.

Assuming that these are honest men and I must assume they are, they are responsible, respected military people, they have been taking a correct position, and with some force and some effectiveness, because we do know that there had been two or three occasions in the last month when the Dominicans were about to move and our people have gone in and emphasized how much we would oppose this, and they have not moved, and we can't help but feel this has been a factor.

U.S. MILITARY IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DURING COUP

Senator GORE. How many military representatives of the United States are there now in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. MARTIN. I couldn't tell you offhand the number of military personnel who are there.

Senator GORE. Approximately?

Mr. MARTIN. The attaches, the key people, I would guess there are 55 all told, officers and enlisted men in the attaches offices plus the military mission. Something in that order.

[Material supplied for the record follows:]

55 officers and enlisted men and 12 Marine guards at Embassy.

Senator GORE. To how many of them have you talked personally?

Mr. MARTIN. I have talked to the senior attaches and the head of the military mission at one point or another in the past 6 months, most recently I talked to the Naval attache who is the senior attache, just on Monday.

Senator MORSE. Will you yield for one question at that point?

Senator GORE. Yes.

INFLUENCE OF U.S. MILITARY

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary as a matter of approach to the problem is there any basis for feeling that what our military has been doing in the Dominican Republic is to persuade the Dominican military not to overthrow Bosch rather than persuade the Dominican military to support Bosch?

Our military can't perform our functions unless they maintain very close associations with the foreign military. We know that. I think that is where the pregnancy of danger develops, too. But you can't avoid that. But what I want to know, can it be said with any justification that our military is devoting itself to trying to get the Dominican military not to overthrow him rather than to support him?

Mr. MARTIN. I think it is hard, Senator, without having tape recorders of the conversation to know exactly the tone and framework in which this is put.

I do know the line they are taking is that we support Bosch strongly, and we don't want him overthrown and I think the implication of that is we hope they support him but just what the nuances they would draw from this, whether it is a matter of no overthrowing or positive support, I just can't say.

REASONS FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Senator GORE. Well, the question arises in my mind, why do we need 55 military personnel there. Why are we giving military assistance to the Dominican Republic? This is one of the coup d'etats, this was one of the hazards we are going to face not only in Latin America but Africa and Southeast Asia by military aid putting big guns with great fire power in the hands of irresponsible military.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I would say that the basic philosophy on this is when Trujillo left, he left a very badly trained, disorganized military establishment, morale and otherwise, on the whole badly-equipped. It was our feeling that it was desirable to have a professionally better qualified army, that this on the whole is more military and less political and less apt to go back to a Trujillo type operation if it had some professional pride and if it had some equipment in which it could take pride, but also we felt that there was a real threat of communism. We wanted a force which could assist in patrolling the seas. We had given them some small patrol craft and which could take care of the problem if the local Communists went into the hills of which there are a lot in the Dominican Republic and have talked about this and deal with them as a threat.

As they stood they were wholly incompetent in terms of training or equipment to do any of these jobs with any degree of effectiveness and this is what we were trying to do. As they become more effective at their job, they are less apt to be political active.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, thank you, gentleman very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in joint executive session with the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry at 2:40 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams and Mundt.

Also present: Chairman Ellender, and Senators Eastland, Talmadge, Jordan of North Carolina, McCarthy, McGovern, Edmondson, Walters, Aiken, Young of North Dakota, Hickenlooper, Cooper, Boggs, and Mechem, of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

Also present: Senators Dirksen, Proxmire, and Pearson.

Senator Ellender was designated as chairman of the joint group.

The chairman (Mr. Ellender) said that the meeting had resulted from a previous meeting and informal discussion of the two committees on the feasibility of selling wheat in surplus to the Soviet Union, and that this session was called to get counsel on the legal aspects of same.

Appearing before the committees on the proposed wheat sales were George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; and Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 5:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered into executive session at 10:15 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection the committee confirmed the nomination of W. True Davis, Jr., to be Ambassador to Switzerland.

Joseph S. Farland, former Ambassador to Panama, then appeared and discussed aspects as he saw them of the AID program in Panama and concerning the general situation in that nation.

At the request of Senator Morse, it was decided to call upon the State Department to provide witnesses to discuss the recent political coup in the Dominican Republic.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcripts.

[The committee adjourned at 11:30 a.m.]

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MINUTES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 4:10 p.m. in executive session in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman and Hickenlooper.

The committee took testimony from Saul Joftes, Falls Church, VA, in connection with its investigation into the nondiplomatic activities of representatives of foreign principals in the United States.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 6 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

President: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1276), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]

SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator John J. Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkmen (presiding), Morse, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Mundt.

Also present: Senator Gruening.

Mr. Pincus, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Henderson, of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. This morning we have the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin M. Martin; and the Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, John B. Martin—to discuss the situation in the Dominican Republic.

And I am sure we are also going to hear something about Honduras in the course of these hearings, and maybe other parts of Latin America.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. If it lasts long enough, you may well.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well—off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. Back on the record.

We would be glad to have either one of you gentlemen to start. I suppose we might start off with the Ambassador—since we have discussed these matters with the Secretary on several different occasions.

Mr. Amabassador, we would be glad to have any statement you might make, and then have the privilege of the Senators asking questions. Mr. Secretary, we would be glad to have you backstop, and to break in at any time you see fit. In other words, we want it completely informal.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this comment: We had a very able briefing from Mr. Martin the other day. And because of events that occurred after that briefing, I asked to have you brought back, and the Ambassador brought before the committee for further discussion.

And I also made the request that we seek from the CIA any of the intelligence information that they would give to us, with regard to what they had collected in the Dominican Republic prior to the fall of the Bosch regime.

At this meeting I want to present some information I have about business activities in the Dominican Republic supposedly in league

with the military junta, and see if we could have the State Department find out what the facts are on the matter.

We will get to that later. But I wanted you to know the circumstances under which you were asked to come back.

I also invited Senator Gruening to come.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, we are delighted to have him with us. I would like for the record to show that Senator Gruening is present. And we will invite Senator Gruening to participate fully.

Mr. Ambassador—the Secretary knows this—you my know it, too, but I think it well to remind you of it. While we have the record taken down, it is not made public. It is kept in our files here in the office and will never be made public except by vote of the committee.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Yes, I understand that.

Senator SPARKMAN. And, furthermore, if at any time there is anything that you think should not be written down, if you will say so I am sure the committee will give permission for you to go off the record.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. So you can feel free to speak as you see fit.

STATEMENTS OF JOHN B. MARTIN, AMBASSADOR TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC; AND EDWIN M. MARTIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am grateful indeed for the opportunity to appear again before this committee, to which I owe my confirmation. I think the last time I was here was in June. At that time, I said I thought we faced considerable difficulties in the Dominican Republic, and that the serious problems were likely to come in September. I take no joy today in having been proved right.

I think I said at that time, also, that in my opinion the clear and present and imminent danger to Dominican democracy was not from the extreme left—it was from the extreme right. And I think—I again take no pleasure in saying it has been shown to be the case—although I would not at all minimize the long-run danger of the extreme left.

A SERIOUS BLOW TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

I consider what has happened in the Dominican Republic to be a very serious blow to our own foreign policy, to Dominican democracy, and to the cause of democracy in the hemisphere. I consider it a tragic fact that after 31 years of Trujillo dictatorship the first freely elected government since 1924 was overthrown after only 7 months.

The opportunity of the Dominican people was great. Their difficulties were enormous. Our commitment there was very heavy indeed.

Last year we, I, as the Ambassador, worked very hard to give the people of the Dominican Republic the chance to elect their own leaders, and they did. The election was a triumph and a tribute to the Dominican people, and I think to our policy, too.

Now, that is all gone, and gone in a few hours, and destroyed by a few men and machine guns. And I think this is a tragic fact.

It was our policy—and I executed it vigorously to the best of my ability during Juan Bosch's tenure—to support him, because he was, first of all, and whatever his shortcomings, the elected President of the Dominican Republic. And I personally believe deeply in the principle of government by the consent of the governed, and this is also the policy of the United States Government.

DISAPPOINTMENTS AND FAILURES

As you gentlemen know, I am not an apologist for President Bosch. I think he made many mistakes. I think he disappointed many of his own voters who expected him to produce for them a better way of life, which, in my opinion, they certainly deserve. I must say they were impatient.

In any case, he disappointed them. And, further, he disappointed many people in the United States and Latin America who hoped that he could make a democratic revolution work in the Dominican Republic.

But I do not think that these disappointments and failures in any way—and this is my opinion only, and I am speaking for myself—I do not think that these disappointments and failures in any way justify the military coup against an elected government which has occurred—because, in my opinion, nobody benefits from a military coup, except Castro.

This disaster obviously has implications for us far beyond the Dominican Republic, for our policy. I am not competent in this broader field. I would suggest that this Dominican situation raises very fundamental questions which have to be decided by you gentlemen and the executive. But I do know I think a good deal about the Dominican Republic, and I think perhaps there are some lessons to be learned by a brief autopsy. And it is for that reason, I think, that I am here.

THE FACTS ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED

And, with your permission, I would like to tell you the facts about what happened in the Dominican Republic.

From the outset of his administration, President Bosch was simply unacceptable to certain elements, important elements in Dominican society, elements among the business and professional groups, and he was viewed with suspicion by certain elements in the church, and the military.

The main issues on which they based their attacks against him were the redistribution of wealth he envisaged, particularly the law of confiscation and the Plus-valias law. And the question of his handling of the Communist issue. And it was on the latter question that they primarily based their attacks.

This question of communism—we have two things here. We have in the Republic many people who genuinely fear and hate communism, and thought Bosch was handing the government over to the Communists. And we also have a large number of people that I would consider unscrupulous and discredited politicians and adven-

turers who used this fear of communism as a pretext to overthrow him.

I am speaking of the people in civilian life there on the extreme right who tried almost from the beginning to knock Bosch over, and finally pulled the military in and succeeded.

Bosch faced many formidable difficulties in the Republic, as any president would in that country, after 31 years of Trujillo, and I know you gentlemen are fully aware of this, and I won't take your time by going into that.

BOSCH'S MISTAKES

President Bosch made, I think, a number of mistakes. This is my opinion. Summarized briefly, the way he spent his brief tenure—he spent the first 2 or 3 months trying to balance his budget and get his financial house in order. He spent the next month or 6 weeks involved in Haiti. And this brings us to the summer. By that time, he was occupied fully by warding off the increasing attacks against him and the plots against him, some real, some imaginary.

And the sum of this is he never got the programs off the ground, he never got going. And so he disappointed his people, his voters, the common people of the Dominican Republic, who are in the long run the sufferers from what has happened now, and what happened under Trujillo. But he lost them.

He also turned his back on his own party, the PRD. And in these 2 ways he created a political vaccum, which I think could only have been filled by the far left or the far right, and the far right filled it. The far left was not ready, and the far right got ready.

During August and September we knew this was happening. And we, and I personally, stopped several attempts at coup d'etats against him, several golpes against him—that is the Spanish word.

THE FAR RIGHT

Earlier in the spring, the far right had never crystallized. In the beginning they attempted their attacks under the banners of their own parties

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What do you mean "the far right?"

Are you using the term far right as a term of odious reference because they are anti-Communist?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. No, sir, it is not because they are anti-Communist. It is because they were absolutely and unalterably opposed to the constitutionally elected president of the Republic and were determined to overthrow him. That is what I mean by the far right in the Dominican Republic.

Some of these people made their first attempts in the spring under the banners of the parties which he had defeated in the election. This failed. The parties were distintegrating and they have to date disintegrated. Then they tried to use the U.S. press for their attacks, and this failed.

During August and September they began a series of what they called pro-Christian demonstrations—actually political attempts to raise the people against Bosch. These failed primarily because they were rejected by the church itself.

Then the provisional government of last year, led by former President Bonelly, for whom I have a great deal of respect, went on national radio and TV and attacked President Bosch. They did not mention the Communist issue, which had by then become the chief issue. They attacked mainly on the basis of incompetence, and I must say they made a rather good case against the Bosch government as an—ineffective government.

SHRILL ACCUSATIONS

The attacks then became shriller, much more shrill. They attacked one of Bosch's—by "they" I mean a columnist in a newspaper which spoke for this civilian group. They attacked one of Bosch's advisers on the grounds that he was a Jew, thereby injecting into the Dominican Republic an issue which we don't need there, and I don't think we need anywhere else.

This is one reason I refer to them, Senator, as the far right. This is one of their weapons.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was this in a Dominican newspaper?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is right, sir.

They accused me of being a Communist. Once I was publicly virtually so accused by a leader of this group, who is, incidentally, at present a member of the cabinet in this new regime, which is in the palace now, put there by the military.

On Friday and Saturday, September 20th and 21st, they tried to pull a general strike. This is not a general strike in terms that we mean. We would term it more a lockout. The businessmen closed their businesses. This was not a spontaneous affair. It was well organized, and I know as a fact in some instances some businessmen were paid $100 on Saturday to keep their stores closed.

We did not think this could succeed unless they could bring the military in to support it. They failed to do so at that time, and the strike collapsed.

UPRISING IN HAITI

On Monday there was an uprising in Haiti, Monday, 23 September.

Bosch doesn't think, and many people don't think, this had any effect. I think it might have, because some of the military, I know for a fact, believe that Bosch had engineered this affair in Haiti in order to distract attention from his problems at home, and to keep his own military occupied and off his neck. I have no knowledge of that.

Bosch had denied it to me. I don't know whether he instigated this uprising or not. I just don't know anything about it. But, as a matter of fact, it occurred.

Senator MORSE. What was the nature of that uprising?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I know very little about it. My understanding of it is that there was something on the order of 100 or perhaps 200 Haitians who rose in Haiti, in the northwest frontier—near the northwest frontier line of the Dominican Republic, near the town of Ounaminthe. This uprising was quickly put down by the Haitian military, and I understand a number of the rebels filed into the Dominican Republic. This quickly disappeared and got lost in the

events of Tuesday and Wednesday, when Bosch fell. He fell that night.

THE COMMUNIST PROBLEM

Now, I would like to address myself for a moment, with your permission, to the Communist problem, because this was the question. Bosch's handling of the Communist issue was the question on which the attacks of the far right are based.

Gentlemen, am I taking to much of your time?

Senator SPARKMAN. No, go right ahead.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Thank you.

I believe I told the committee in July what Bosch's policy on communism was, and my own view of it. He said he thought the way to defeat communism was to do it better, and also he wanted to avoid a confrontation with the far left which would provoke an uprising and confront him with a Venezuelan sort of situation.

I told him I agreed with him in principle, that I wished him success, and that if he did succeed he would be the first Latin American president to do it—that is, to stay ahead of them, and make a revolution first, and do it better—but I was for his trying it, and I hoped he could.

When I speak of the far left, the extreme left, what I am talking about is the Castro Communist left. I think——

Senator MUNDT. Is Castro in charge of the Communist movement in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Certainly they have lines to him, yes. At various times his influence is high, at some time it is low. It partly depends on his own relations as we read it with the Kremlin, and with the PSP in Cuba.

Senator MORSE. Communism in the Dominican Republic is a Russian and not a Chinese communism?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Primarily that is correct. Although there is a Communist group in the Republic which follows what is now the Peking hard line, that is terror. But I do not believe that that means they are directed from Peking. I think they simply decided terror is the correct tactic at this moment. They, incidentially, have not been very active.

COMMUNISTS HAD A FREE HAND TO ORGANIZE

I think that it is probably true that Castro communism gained ground under Bosch during this spring because they had a free hand to organize and indocrinate. Their tactics this year were to indoctinate the people and infiltrate the government covertly, and at the same time to support openly, publicly to support Bosch, and attack us and the golpistas. This was their tactic.

They didn't do anything illegal under Dominican law. And Bosch always said he could not do much about them, because they had done nothing illegal. And it is true there were not Communist-inspired riots and the sort he could have dealt with forcibly.

As I say, we considered the far right the immediate danger. We considered the far left in the long run the real danger to Dominican democracy.

COMMUNIST SCHOOLS

I, many times, discussed this question with President Bosch. For example, I discussed with him 4 or 5 times the school run by Dato Pagan. Dato Pagan is a Communist, there is no question in my mind. He was running a school in a public school building in the capital city, and on five occasions I told Bosch I though this was dangerous to him tactically, because it gave the right an issue. But more importantly it was dangerous to his country, because it indoctrinated people in this country in communism, and furthermore, we didn't like it, and we wanted him to stop it.

Senator MORSE. What age groups went to it?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Young people mostly, Senator, we had a man in and out of there at various times—not as a member of the faculty, I hasten to say—ostensibly as a student. We were trying to make sure the thing was still open before I went to Bosch and told him he had to close it.

Senator MORSE. High school age and up?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Yes, I would say from 16, 17, and on up to the middle 20s.

Senator MUNDT. Did he close it?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. No, sir, it was, when he fell, still open. He promised me in, I believe, May, that he would close it when all the schools closed June 16th, as I remember.

It did not close. Whereupon, having ascertained that, I went back to him and said the same thing.

He said he would write a letter to the Minister of Education, instructing him to close that school, and he did write that letter. And the minister brought a copy of it to my embassy. I did not see it, but I am told it exists, and that somebody in the embassy saw it.

The school was still open a month later, and I went back again. I went to him as least 4 and probably 5 times. I don't know why it wasn't closed. But the fact, is it was not closed, and the fact is he was the president.

Senator MUNDT. And could have closed it?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. And could have closed it, obviously.

TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA

Secondly, I discussed many times with the president the question of travel of Dominicans to and from Cuba.

We estimate that during the time that Bosch was president, something like 200 Dominicans went from the Dominican Republic to Cuba, and some returned, some are still there. We estimate that perhaps something like 10 to 15 went to Prague and Moscow, or other bloc country capitals. We assume that they went there for indoctrination and instructions, and other subversive purposes.

I told President Bosch a great many times that this was very dangerous to his country, and it was contrary to our policy. And I told him I thought he had to stop it. He said he was unable to do so because the Dominican constitution contains a provision which says all Dominicans are free to travel anywhere.

I am referring now to the 1963 constitution, which was drafted by the Congress after he was elected in January, and adopted.

This provision exists in the Dominican constitution.

I told him that what I thought he should do was if he didn't want to amend the constitution, I thought he should put some teeth in his passport restrictions. The original passport restriction in the Dominican Republic said that the passport was not valid for travel to Russia and Russian satellites.

On my urging, and on the urging of my DCM, who spoke to the then foreign minister, Andres Freites, and on Freites urging, President Bosch ordered that Cuba be added, and stamped into the Dominican passports specifically. It was.

However, there was no Dominican law which put teeth in that passport restriction. By that, I mean there was no law which made it a crime to violate an administrative passport restriction.

I urge Bosch to pass such a law many times. He said it would be unconstitutional, which at least perhaps it would have been under this constitution. [Deleted]. Nothing was done.

Third, I discussed the question with him several times of Manuel——

CUBAN AND RUSSIAN NATIONALS

Senator MUNDT. Before you leave the question of transmigrations of people, what, if any, penetration into the Dominican Republic was there from people moving in from Russia and Cuba?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. You mean Cuban or Russian nationals, Senator?

Senator MUNDT. Russian Communists and Cuban Communists coming in.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I know of no Russian nationals who came into the Dominican Republic. I hesitate because now that you ask it sticks in my mind that one Russian or another bloc country—I mean one of the other countries in east Europe—did turn up some time in the early summer very briefly, came in and out. And I tell you quite frankly, I have forgotten the details of that, and am unable to give it to you. I will get it for you.

Senator MUNDT. Did Cubans come over?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. A good many Cubans came into the Dominican Republic. But it is my understanding all of them came from Miami, and other places, and they were anti-Castro Cubans, exiles from Castro's Cuba.

To my knowledge, I cannot tell you that I know of a Castro Cuban who came into the Dominican Republic. That wasn't the way they were doing it. They were using Dominicans. It comes down to the same thing. That is the best answer I can give you on that.

ANTI-AMERICAN PARTY

The third specific thing I discussed with President Bosch was the question of Manuel Tavarez Justo. Tavarez Justo is the leader of the 14th of June, which is a far left party with a base of popular support among young people. It is a nativist party, an extreme nationalistic party, an anti-American party. It is the only party of the 4 that we consider Castro Communist left, which has any popular following, which has a mystique, martyrs, heroes, and a real chance of some day winning an election there.

We do not know how good that chance is, because they have never been willing to go to the elections. They did not participate in the election last year, December 20th. My opinion is that they did not participate because at that time they did not want to reveal their own weakness. I think they probably are stronger now, because I think a good many Bosch voters gravitated to them when he disappointed them. I could not make an estimate of their strength. It would be meaningless at the time.

However, the danger here is not really in the native element in the leadership of the 14th of June. The danger is that the 14th of June is being infiltrated by the real Communists in the Republic, most of whom belong to the PSP, and the MPD. Particularly the former. Those are the hard core Communists that are trained in Cuba and/or Moscow and Prague.

In my opinion, PSP, that is the real Communists, see their road to power as being the 14th of June. And, for that reason—and they have at various times had control of it. Not always, it varies. This 14th of June has split 4 or 5 times in the last year and a half that I know of on this issue of infiltration. In other words, they have not got it yet, but it is dangerous.

And I thought it was, therefore, contrary to our interests and to those of the Dominican Republic to have Tavarez Justo making speeches in city halls throughout the Republic, which he was doing shortly after Bosch took office.

I brought this to President Bosch's attention, and he said he had not known about it, and would stop it immediately, and he did. He sent telegrams to all the mayors, and, I believe, aldermen, in the cities and ordered them to stop this. And they did stop it.

And, to my knowledge, Tavarez Justo never again spoke in a public building inthe Dominican Republic. That does not mean he did not make speeches. He did. He was free to speak, because he never said anything that was illegal, and he never incited any riots, or did anything illegal that Bosch could move against under the public order powers that he possessed.

COMMUNIST BROADCASTING IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Fourth, right at the very end of things, I spoke to Bosch about Tavarez Justo's appearance on a government-owned Dominican radio-TV station. To my knowledge, this happened once. It could have happened other times, and as soon as I brought it to Bosch's attention he stopped it. But this was in the last few days.

Fifth, I several times suggested to Bosch that——

Senator MUNDT. Had you monitored those speeches? What was the nature of the speeches on television and radio?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. We monitored them. My recollection of them, Senator, is that in general Tavarez Justo took the line of supporting Bosch against the Yankee imperialists and the extreme right golpistas, the extreme right people who were trying to overthrow the Bosch government. This was the official line that it was to the advantage of the Castro Communists left to take during this year.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask, Mr. Martin—this extreme right goup—were they Trujillo people?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am trying to get their political complex—as to whether or not they wanted to restore a dictatorship ala Trujillo.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I would not go that far. I don't know just—may I come to that a little further, because I think what they said and did will reveal a little more clearly than an opinion of mine what they were.

I suggested to Bosch that he enact a piece of legislation similar to what we have here, the Smith Act—conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the government. He said he thought it would be illegal and unconstitutional under the present constitution. Perhaps he was right.

In any case, it might not have been effective, because, as I say, the far left wasn't doing anything public that was illegal, even under our own Smith Act, this year. That is not to say they would not, obviously.

Senator MORSE. There is one difference. They could not function at all here, because they are outlawed—under their constitution they never outlawed them.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is correct.

PROTECT GOVERNMENT AGAINST INFILTRATION

I also, sixth, recommended to President Bosch that he build an effective security apparatus to protect his government against infiltration. The first man he put in charge of this was fired, because he was a thief and was caught in a petty shakedown. The second man never was fired, but should have been, because he was the same kind of man.

And may I take this occasion to point out that in this area, and in every other area, Bosch's single greatest handicap was the lack of experienced capable people to help him run his government. And I cannot emphasize that too strongly. This is the number one problem that Bosch faced. And when we say that Bosch failed in many respects, I do not think it is entirely a personal failure of his—in some respects it is a failure of the Dominican people. And we cannot really blame them, because we lost a generation under Trujillo. And I don't think it is surprising that able, experienced, educated people are scarce. They are scarce anywhere in the world today. [Deleted.]

I suggested to him other measures he might take. But they were not taken.

Senator MUNDT. May I interpolate to say that I wish that part to be made a part of the public record, because it is a great argument for a freedom academy which the Senate has consistently rejected. You just don't develop government leaders out of professional classes or business classes, in my opinion, without getting some experience in the responsibilities that you have to have. And I think Bosch or anyone else could have recruited them if they are not there.

BOSCH BROKE STRIKES LED BY COMMUNIST UNIONS

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Now, if I may continue—it is my opinion that he made a mistake in his handling of this issue. Nevertheless there are some facts that the committee should be apprised of.

I have told you how many people traveled to Cuba, we think, and how many traveled to the bloc countries.

It has been charged that Bosch gave the left a free hand. And insofar as I have described it, that is true. But there is another side to that coin, too.

I would like to inform the committee that Bosch broke a strike by the Fenepia Union. Fenepia was a Communist-dominated union of government employees. Last year's Council of State refused to stand up to them when they struck. Bosch stood up to them, and he smashed that union, and it does not exist today.

Second, approximately the same thing occurred in the Electricidad, that is the public electric company there, quite late in the game, late August, early September, those workers threatened to strike. They, again, were inspired by members of the far left. And Bosch fired all of them out of the Electricidad, and took a very firm stand—which, again, the provisional government had refused to do.

Third, he held firm, or reasonably firm, at La Romana, a sugar mill which is owned by an American company. There was a leftist-inspired strike there last year, and the provisional council caved in. It occurred this year, and Bosch did not cave in.

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF BOSCH GOVERNMENT

It has been said that Bosch's government was infiltrated by Communists. I know of no member of the Bosch cabinet who was a Communist. I know of one man who had too many allies and friends in the far left for comfort, as far as I am concerned. I could not say he himself is a Communist, but I did not like to see him in the Bosch government. [Deleted.]

We thought that the Castro Communists had succeeded in infiltrating sections of the Bosch government at rather low or middle bureaucratic levels as follows:

In the Foreign Affairs Ministry, in Inapa—that is the Institute of Potable Water, and the Planning Board. Perhaps in the Government-owned radio-TV station, but I emphasize at a rather low level. Civil aviation, the Electricidad, which he broke, and the Agrarian Reform Institute.

But I think this committee should know that the golpistas, who overthrew him because they said his government was infiltrated with Communists, arrested some 400 people, and they have not announced that they found a single Castro Communist in the Bosch government among those 400 people.

Furthermore, they have released all but two of the 400 they arrested. Of those two, one was not a member—neither, I believe, was a member of the Bosch government. One was, without question, a leftist extremist. His name is Pablo Johnson. And he was head of the 20th of October group. But a second level Communist.

And the other is Modesto Amerigo Monegro. He was a labor leader, the leader of Foupsa Cesistrado. Those 2 are still locked up. Everybody else had been released.

But to my knowledge, the golpistas, in their dragnet, found no Communists in the Bosch government. Furthermore, they have since issued a decree stating that all public employees will be kept in their jobs.

SHIFT OF EMPHASIS TO BOSCH'S "INCOMPETENCE"

Now, it is perfectly obvious that if they overthrow this government in order to get the Communist out of the government, they would not keep them in the government. It appears to us, to me—and I base this on a very recent report, I believe as of yesterday, from my embassy, that the strategy of the ruling group now appears to be shifting away from emphasis on communism and toward emphasis on what they consider Bosch's incompetence, administrative failures and so on. They are saying very little now about Communists in government, or Communists period.

Furthermore, I would like to point out, and this committee should know, that the golpistas in their round-up, their dragnet, captured no one of any importance in the PSP, MPD, or the 14th of June. I emphasize this because I think this committee should know that in my opinion the golpistas had other motives than their opposition to communism. Some of them, I think were motivated by their fear of communism and their determination to oppose it. But I feel others of them had other motives.

I would like to speak to that for a moment.

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ADVENTURERS

Among the civilians, some were politicians who had been rejected by the electorate last year, and whose political parties really are vestpocket parties, and they have no popular support whatsoever. These men are adventurers, and have no political beliefs. What they would like to get hold of is some money and power—particularly the former. And I would mention in this connection Horacio Julio Ornes Coisceau, who now controls the Ministry of Public Works, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry is the vast Haina sugar complex, the heart of the Dominican economy. This man has that.

I think the same can be said of the military. Specifically, for example, General Luna, Chief of the Air Force, is one of the 2 leaders of the military goipes, had on the fire in recent weeks a deal to buy $5 million worth of airplanes. This, we know, in a fact. It is also said—amd I cannot give you proof of this—that he was to get 10 percent of the $5 million. We know of other instances of graft in the armed forces during the last year——

Mr. MUNDT. You said it has been said. What kind of evidence do you have he was going to get that 10 percent? Is this gossip?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. No, sir, it is more than gossip.

Mr. MUNDT. What basis is there for it?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I understand—it is rather difficult for me. I am not entirely clear on my legal position here.

Mr. MUNDT. Well, I am just seeking information, We cannot take as a committee that it has been said—by whom?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I was informed by my attaches they were sure this was true—my military attaches.

Mr. MUNDT. Where did they get it?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I am afraid I cannot tell you, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. I said if there was any information you did not want to put in writing you might ask to go off the record, and give us that information. Then there would be no record of it at all.

Senator MORSE. Do you think the CIA could supply us with that?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. You might ask them.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, let me break in there just a minute. Senator Hickenlooper and I were talking. You might leave this off the record——

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. Back on the record.

OPPOSITION TO EXPENDITURES FOR AIRPLANES

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. We were strongly opposed to their spending $5 million for these airplanes, for which they had no use. And it came up especially with Bosch, because the Ambassador at our instruction was telling Bosch how strongly we did oppose this expenditure.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is correct. I told this to Bosch. General Imbert told me Luna would get 10 percent. Bosch told me he knew Luna would profit, by how much he did not know. And may I also say with respect to Luna—and I do have documentary proof of this, which I obtained, because Bosch and I both had heard of this, and we agreed we wanted to confirm it.

And I asked the Department to see if they could get it, and they got it, in the United States—that Luna was personally involved in a smuggling ring that was bringing merchandise, such as refrigerators, TV sets, and other things into the Dominican Republic without paying duty on them, using Dominican aircraft, military aircraft to do so, landing them in Miami, loading them up with this stuff, bringing them back into the Dominican Republic free.

I don't know what he did with them. I presume he sold them. But I have proof that he did—I have the bills of lading and all the papers and so on—not in my hands—they are in my embassy locked up in my safe. I know Luna was in that activity for a considerable length of time before the golpes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was Luna a part of the Bosch government?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Luna, Senator, was a general. He was the chief of the Dominican Air Force.

Senator SPARKMAN. Under Bosch?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Under the last year provisional government, and under Bosch.

Senator MUNDT. What is he now, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. He still is at this moment. He and Wessin y Wessin were the military men who finally led this golpes.

Now, if I may, I would like to inform the committee of the events of that day, of the day of the golpes.

SOURCE OF THE MONEY

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman,—may I ask a question before you get into that? This $5 million that was to be used for the purchase of these planes, where was this money coming from?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. It was coming from the Dominican Government. And one of the main reasons I opposed it and that it was our policy to oppose it was that in our opinion it would be almost impossible to justify our requesting the Congress to appropriate money to help the Dominican people and to further our aid program there if they were going to spend $5 million on airplanes that they did not need. This was our main point to Bosch.

And I made it very forcefully to him—under instructions from the Department. And I was happy to make it.

AMERICAN PRESS COVERAGE

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask you this. I don't remember seeing anything in the newspaper stories regarding General Luna. It seems to me that a person that has played the important part that he has in 3 different governments, that there would be some publicity regarding him. How has he gotten by, and why was there no publicity on this matter of the proposed plane deal?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. The only answer I can give you, Senator, is that the American press covers the Dominican Republic the way they do a police beat. And I speak as a former reporter myself. They only come down there when something goes wrong, noisily.

Senator SPARKMAN. Come and look at the blotter,

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is right. That is the only answer I can give you. What I am saying is there is no American correspondent stationed permanently in the Dominican Republic. And I don't say this to be critical of the American press. It is a big world, and they have limited resources. They cannot keep somebody in a little country like that all the time. I understand that, as a former journalist.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. [Deleted.]

WITHHOLDING FOREIGN AID

Senator SPARKMAN. What do you see as the purpose of our withholding of foreign aid from the new government in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. What was that, Senator?

Senator SPARKMAN. We have suspended foreign aid, have we not?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. What will be served by that? Will this civilian junta fall, you think, as a result of withholding of foreign aid?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Senator, I think this gets into the whole question of where do we go from here.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what I am digging at.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I realize you are. You want me——

Senator SPARKMAN. In that connection, let me pose another question: If that government should fall, what government is likely to succeed it?

THE DAY OF THE COUP

Senator MORSE. John, could we have him tell us about that day of the coup? I think that is his next point.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This coup was afoot for several days, and we knew it. We had been trying to stop it. And when I say that, I mean we had been telling these military fellows that we supported President Bosch and constitutional democracy in the Dominican Republic [deleted].

On Tuesday, at 1 p.m., President Bosch called me to a place where he was hiding out. He said he thought he was going to be killed or overthrown that afternoon or night. I said that I agreed. We had the same information.

I recommended to him a course of action which in my opinion would have averted that coup. [Deleted.] I suggested that he send a message to congress convening congress on an emergency basis, and ask it to either amend the constitution or enact legislation, whichever was necessary, to, No. 1, stop Communist travel to Cuba; two, write something like the Smith Act to curb subversive activities on either the right or the left.

I told him I thought he should do this publicly and do it immediately. [Deleted.]

"I know you cannot do this, Mr. President," I said "under pressure from the military. What I am proposing is that you take the initiative, that you do this right now, [deleted]. And I think if I do that, the military will support you, [deleted].

This is the course I recommended to him. [Deleted.] He disagreed.

He then said, "I have sent General Vinas," who was the Minister of Defense, "out to try to stop Luna and Wessin y Wessin."

MILITARY IS THE CENTER OF POWER

I would like to have you informed, gentlemen, that in the power structure in the Dominican Republic, the center of power is the military. Within the military, the center of power is at San Isidro. That is the air force base. That is where the old Trujillo Luftwaffe sort of air force was established. It contained not only airplanes, it contained also air force infantry and tanks.

[Deleted.] The tanks were at this point in the armed forces training center, right next door to San Isidro, under the command of Wessin y Wessin. The airplanes were at San Isidro, under the command of General Luna. And so was the air force infantry.

[Deleted.]

I said, "Do you want me to send my attache to them right now?"

He said, "No, I have sent General Vinas out to see if he can stop Luna and Wessin y Wessin."

Vinas, as I say, was Minister of Defense, and had been loyal to the government throughout all last year, which was very difficult, and up until these last few days loyal to Bosch. I had myself discussed on Monday's at noon with Vinas the question of whether he was going to continue loyal to Bosch. He said he was. [Deleted.]

I asked him if he thought he could hold the military, because he was losing control. And he said he thought so. [Deleted.]

And he said, "No, I think I can hold them."
And I said, "All right."

TUESDAY AFTERNOON

Now, back to Tuesday afternoon.

The President said, "I am expecting Vinas back at 4 o'clock with his report."

I said, "Do you want me to stay with you?"

He said, "Stay with me now until 3, and if they have not come to kill me by then, you can go."

I said, "I will stay with you from now on if you want me to." And we waited until 3. I left. I went to my embassy, and sent these messages.

Bosch had planned to go to his own house to receive General Vinas at 4 o'clock.

Senator MUNDT. Sent these messages?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I am sorry, sir, I did not make that clear. I sent immediately on the highest priority basis messages informing the Department of the situation. That is what I meant.

Senator MUNDT. I see.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. But I called the attaches in and I said, "I think it is going to go"—they said "we think so, too." I asked them if they knew where everybody was—that is, all the military. And they did not at that time know where Wessin y Wessin or where Luna was.

[Deleted.] I waited. In typical Dominican fashion there was a mix-up, and Vinas and the president did not get together at 4 o'clock. And I believe this simply was a mix-up.

USE INFLUENCE WITH THE MILITARY

Along about, I will say, 5 or 6 o'clock, something like that, the president called me, said he had talked to Vinas, that Vinas had said that he was loyal to the president and would still continue to try to stop the coup. And he asked me, then, to use all the influence I had on the military.

And I turned my attachés loose, and sent them all over town, trying to find all the military people they could find and tell them they better not do it.

[Deleted.]

When I talked to the president we agreed that—I asked him if he thought they were going to kill him in the next hour, and he said no. And I said, "Because if you think so, I will come to your house right now." My theory was on this that my presence might deter them. It might not have—I don't know.

VISIT OF ADMIRAL FERRALL

In any case, he thought it was all right until 7 o'clock, and he and I agreed we would meet at 7 o'clock at the Armed Forces Club, where there was a reception for an American admiral, Admiral Ferrall, a reception given by the Dominican Armed Forces. I would like to say that Admiral Ferrall had been scheduled for at least a month and perhaps longer, to arrive that weekend in the Domini-

can Republic on a routine inspection trip. This was entirely routine.

On Friday, it was proposed to me that we call that visit off, because the general strike was on. I said, "No, sir, I think we should get the admiral in here as fast as possible to make it clear that we do not support the general strike, and that our military does support the president. We should get him photographed with this admiral at the palace, and try to stop the general strike on the right." And so we told the admiral to come ahead.

On Monday, the Haitian thing blew up, and I was afraid of having the admiral come, because I was afraid it would appear to the world that we and the Dominicans were conspiring against Haiti, against Duvalier. And I considered calling the admiral's visit off. But this was Monday, and it was too late. The admiral arrived. And I thought there is nothing we can do about this. There was a lunch on Monday for the admiral at my embassy. I gave it for him. The Dominican high command was present, that is when I took Vinas aside and told him privately what I have just said.

Now, of course, I think the Castro Communists, and probably Castro himself, are saying that Ferrall was there to help the golpistas knock over Bosch. And this is obviously not true. And this is the total explanation of Ferrall's role.

ABSENCE OF MILITARY OFFICERS AT RECEPTION

I went to the reception at 7 p.m., that night for Admiral Ferrall, saw him there, and was photographed with him.

When Bosch was 30 minutes late arriving, I had my DCM telephone his house to see if he was all right, or if he was a prisoner or if anything had gone wrong, because I noticed at that reception—Luna was not there, Wessin was not there, and neither were any of their colonels.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, was this a reception for Admiral Ferrall?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Yes. Given by all the Dominican Armed Forces.

Senator SPARKMAN. And the top military people of the Dominican Republic were hosts, and not present?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. No. They were hosts. And all of the top Dominican military was there, except General Luna, and General Wessin—Colonel Wessin. He is now a general.

None of their people were there, either. The Army was there, the Navy was there. That is all. Not the Air Force. Not the tanks.

Senator SPARKMAN. Not the armor?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. The armor is really almost a fourth branch. That is the only way you can describe it, because the line of command went straight from Wessin y Wessin up to Vinas, the Minister of Defense—not through Luna. So Wessin y Wessin was always free, except for Vinas.

At 7:30 my DCM spoke to a person in the president's house who said that the president was all right, and he was on his way to the reception. And he arrived at 7:40.

THE COUP WAS ON

I greeted him. And we made a great point of having me and the admiral and the Dominican generals photographed together with the president. We wanted this in the paper the next morning—if we got through the night. It turned out we did not get through the night.

I spoke privately to the president at the reception. I said, "Do you think it is still on?"

He said, "I don't know."

I said, "I am sure it is, because there is nobody—Wessin is not here and Luna is not here, and neither are any of their people and my attaches cannot find them. I think it is going on."

And it was perfectly obvious from the tension in that reception that the coup was on.

I said to the president, "I would recommend to you, Mr. President, that I stay with you from now on tonight."

And he said, "Yes, of course."

And we left together. We left the reception about 8:30, as I recall it. We went to his house, and we stayed there.

Very shortly, General Vinas, Commodore Rib, Chief of the Navy; Hungria, chief of the Army, and a couple of colonels under Hungria, came to the House, spoke privately to Bosch. I had suggested to him that I be present. But he chose otherwise. He is, as you know, a proud man, independent man, which I respect, though I did not always consider wise—but that is a matter of my opinion.

He took them into a private room. I did not hear that conversation. It only lasted 15 or 20 minutes, and they came out. I asked Bosch what they had said, and Bosch told me that they had said they were going out and try to round up support and save him. I asked if he thought the coup was still on, and he said he thought it was.

I told him I had my attaches out trying to find everybody they could and stop it. I offered to stay with him. He said he was going to meet with the military at 11 o'clock at the palace. I said to him that I would be very happy to accompany him and stay with him the rest of the night at the palace on the same theory—that my presence might deter either his killing or his overthrow. He thought about it and in the end declined.

BOSCH RETURNED TO THE PALACE

At 10:30 he left the house and took with him only one member of his cabinet, the secretary of agriculture, minister of agriculture—excuse me. My opinion is the reason he took that man is that that man is a brother-in-law of General Vinas, and relatives are very important in the Dominican Republic—perhaps even more so than here.

In any case, they went to the palace, and I went to my embassy. And Bosch told me he would call me at 11:30. He did call me at 11:30. He said, "They have not arrived."

I thought this meant that Vinas had failed, and that the likelihood was that Vinas and the army and the navy may have caved in and joined the military coup. My attachés could still not find these two.

By this time—the attachés kept reporting to me by telephone—by this time, they could not find anybody. Vinas and Rib and Hungria were not where they should have been, which is at their headquarters trying to rally support. Nobody knew where anybody was at that moment.

I told the president to call me again, keep calling me. And, again, I offered to go to the palace immediately, and he declined, and said he would call me. He never called me again.

At about 2:30 a.m., my Army attaché called and said he had talked to Wessin, he had found him, talked to him, and Wessin had told he would not overthrow Bosch that night. He obviously lied to him.

I asked him if he thought this was the truth. He said as far as he knew it was. He said he now knew where General Luna was, and was going to go talk to him.

[Deleted.]

ADVISED APPEASING THE MILITARY

I heard nothing more until about 3:30 a.m., quarter of 4 a.m. My Army attaché called me and said he was in the palace, that there was a meeting still going on between the president and the military, that a confrotation had occurred between them.

I forgot to say, and I would like to add, that when the president left for the palace at 10:30 p.m. I urged the president to be very careful, to be moderate, and not to provoke a confrontation, because he didn't have the power. [Deleted.] He gave me no commitment on that.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Didn't he, as a matter of fact, say he was going to take the offensive and make demands of them?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. You are right, thank you.

He said, "No, I have to hit them before they hit me."

I told him I thought this was unwise. And he gave me no commitment, and he left. That was at 10:30.

Senator SPARKMAN. A.M.?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. P.M. I jumped back, Senator—I am sorry.

The next call, as I say, came to me about 3:30 a.m. something of that order, from the Army attaché who said the meeting was still going on, and the confrontation I feared had taken place. That is to say, Bosch had demanded that Wessin be fired, that the military had unanimously opposed this. Bosch had thereupon said he would resign as president the next day.

I asked my attaché if he thought I could come to the palace and change the military's mind, and he said, no. I asked my attaché if the president wanted me to come to the palace and talk to him. And he apparently consulted the President, and came back and said, no. And so I did nothing more in that direction, except to instruct him to continue trying to keep in tough with the military and the other attachés.

POLICE ROUND-UP

And I got everybody else in the embassy out of bed and called them to the house—I mean by that all the senior officers. And I was told then that the roundup by the police had begun at 3

o'clock. Later, the President told me that he had actually been overthrown at 2:30.

My attaché was about an hour behind what was going on, I am afraid. And I certainly am not surprised. These people don't tell you the truth, certainly not in those circumstances.

About 4:30 in the morning I sent word to the chief of police—a very tough guy—his name is Belisario Pegeurto.

I said, you go tell that General Belisario Pegeurto, and tell him it is from the American Ambassador, that civilized world opinion will not condone killings. There were no killings that day. Whether there would have been or not, I don't know.

I went to the President's office at 6. The colonel, who was his bodyguard, was there, but he had been deprived of his machinegun. He had only a 32 caliber pistol. He said to me, "We are all prisoners."

I said, "_ want to see the President."

He said, "I can't give you permission. You will have to get it from General Vinas."

I went to General Vinas, told him I was there to seek information only, that I was speaking to him as Minister of Defense in the Bosch government, and I requested permission to see the president. He gave it immediately, and I went to see the president.

I asked the president what the situation was. He said he had been overthrown, he was a prisoner, he had demanded the resignation of Wessin y Wessin. The military unanimously had refused, and he had said to them, "Leave my presence." This had been at 2:30 a.m.

They left his presence, walked down the corridor to the other end of the palace, decided to stand firm, and came back and told him he was a prisoner.

I made one last effort. I tried to persuade Bosch to recede from his position on Wessin, and offered to act as an intermediary and go to the military and try even at that late date to get them to accept this recession, but he refused. He said, "It is all over. I am a prisoner. I will not recede from my position."

PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the chain of authority in the appointment or dismissal of military personnel in the Dominican Republic? Or what was?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. General Vinas was Minister of Defense.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who has the power to promote, to assign, to reassign?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. He is the ultimate authority.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does the President have no authority?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. He is the commander-in-chief by the constitution; yes, sir. I misunderstood you, Senator. I am sorry.

It was on these grounds that Bosch refused—when Bosch's demand was refused, he permitted himself to be taken prisoner, because he felt he had been stripped of his authority as commander-in-chief by the military, on whom he had made a demand which he had been refused.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. There is a report, I might add, that the military in refusing said he would have to go before a military court and face charges.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That Wessin would.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. That Wessin would, before they would fire him. And, therefore, they would not fire him out of hand. This has been reported.

BOSCH DID NOT RESIGN

Senator MUNDT. Did he in fact resign? You said at one time he resigned. You said at another time he was made prisoner.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Under the constitution, the president can only resign to the congress. So he has not resigned. He has not to this moment resigned. On the contrary, he still considers himself the president of the Dominican Republic. Instead of resigning, he was taken prisoner by the military.

To wind this up quickly now.

Senator MORSE. Take your time.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. In the presidential suite, I spoke to the vice president and the president of the senate, who is third in succession, and about half the cabinet, and I spoke to them all separately because I wanted to be sure that everybody had the same story, and I wanted to make sure that they were, A, prisoners; B, that they had been so informed by the Dominican military; C, whether they thought their lives were in danger. They all said that they had been made prisoner by the Dominican military, and they did not at that time consider that their lives were in danger.

I then went to the other end of the palace, which was much gayer and full of people, all with machine guns, and went into the Minister of Defense's office, which was crowded with these generals, with their machine guns—many of whom I knew quite well, have known quite well in the past.

They took the attitude that now we are all friends, and I simply avoided the abrazos, and observed the amenities only, and went to General Vinas, and asked him what the situation was.

"WE HAVE TAKEN OVER"

He told me roughly the same thing that the president and the others had told me—that the president and his government were prisoners, and that "We have taken over."

Senator MORSE. This is——

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. The Minister of Defense, General Vinas.

Senator MORSE. At that point he was no longer loyal to the president?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is correct; yes, sir.

He said, "What does this mean?"

I said, "What does this mean?"

He said, "We have overthrown Bosch."

I said, "Who is in charge now?"

He said, "I am." He said, "We are going to appoint a civilian junta just as fast as we can to govern the country, because we in the military do not want power."

I only made a few comments to him. I suggested that if this was the case they would preserve constitutionality, and it appeared to me the vice president, president of the senate, and the speaker of the house, one of them should succeed Bosch, if Bosch resigned. This is the constitutional line of succession.

And I also made very forcibly the same point I had made to the chief of police indirectly, vis-a-vis human life.

I then left the palace. I have not been back since. And I have not had any contact with the Bosch government nor with the regime that is now in power since that moment.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. May I just add one point there?

Vinas rejected the idea of letting Bosch resign, because he said, "We have already abolished the constitution and dissolved the congress."

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is correct. Thank you very much.

Vinas told me that Bosch could not resign, there isn't any congress, because we have abolished the 1963 constitution. And the communique was already by that time on the radio.

ASSURANCES OF BOSCH'S SAFETY

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Did he not also say something to the effect that "We do intend to deport him, with the courtesies to which his previous high office deserves"?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is correct—him and the rest of them, he said.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. So you had assurances from Vinas as to his safety?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. Say that once more.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. He had assurances from Vinas, the then head of State, as to the safety of Bosch and his immediate entourage. They would be deported with all the courtesies of their position.

Senator MORSE. He took a position that the other civilian officers under the constitution were out, too, because they had destroyed the constitution?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is right, Senator.

Now, before I went to the palace, about 4:30 I instructed my political officer to find out where the constitutional successors were—that is, the vice president, the president of the senate, the speaker of the house. We could not find the vice president. We could not find the president of the senate.

And at 6 o'clock I learned why. They were prisoners in the palace along with the president. But we did find the speaker of the house at his home. And we told him to come to us, come to my house, my residence.

GRANTING ASYLUM

We do not grant asylum, as everybody knows. But I invited him to come and have breakfast with me about 4:30 in the morning. And he came. We wanted to save him from arrest and perhaps mistreatment. And, if the others were under arrest and going to be deported, under the constitution he would be the successor. And we

kept him at my house, my official embassy residence, during the morning with, of course, his consent. When I say kept him, I don't mean we kept him under any duress. He was my guest, until along about 10 o'clock when he took asylum in another embassy.

Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. Did I understand you correctly to say that we do not grant asylum?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is that our policy everywhere?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is correct.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. It has been for a great many years.

Senator GRUENING. How about Hungary? Aren't we giving asylum to Cardinal Mindszenty?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. You have to ask the legal staff how they argue around this one. They have an argument.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I am not competent to speak on that, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. Isn't there an element of their being in immediate danger?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. It may be immediate danger to life that would permit us to do this.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sure there is some exception to it because we know of cases in which it has been done.

COUP IN HONDURAS

By the way, may I put in the record here; we have just received a message from the New York Times reporter who was on the phone. He said that fighting is in progress in Honduras, it is not a peaceful coup.

Senator MORSE. What is that again?

Senator SPARKMAN. Fighting is in progress in Honduras. It is not a peaceful coup.

Mr. HOLT. Several militia versus the regular military.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who is on which side?

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement here that the State Department has just announced the Government of Honduras has been taken over by the military. Details are just now coming over the wire. That is the message I got.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, we had that word earlier this morning.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I was on the phone with our ambassador at 9:15. I will be glad to report on that.

Senator SPARKMAN. In fact, I had said before we came in we wanted to have time to discuss a coup in Honduras.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I apologize for taking so much time on the Dominican Republic.

Senator MUNDT. May we have the answer now to the Chairman's question? He has two very pertinent questions.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. I think that is something we are all concerned about. That is, the impact that the aid program will have, either by discontinuing, resuming. And what lies ahead?

Senator MUNDT. In other words, if this government goes down what comes in?

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, we may have to go to the floor pretty soon after 12. I am not sure. So if we could make it brief.

TRIUMVIRATE OF LEADERS

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Very briefly, the situation in the Dominican Republic that exists at the present time, as I understand it, is this. There is a triumvirate of three men whom we regard as generally decent men, well intentioned, friendly to the United States. They are civilians. They were appointed by the military high command which took over. And at this moment I would regard them as a front for the military.

The military made what I think was a serious and perhaps fatal mistake by bringing into consultation 6 leaders of discredited parties and they wrangled for 2 or 3 days and nights trying to divide up the cabinet. They now have the cabinet posts. This may precipitate quarrels within the regime. And I would not regard it at this moment as a very stable regime because of the internal quarrels inside the military and internal quarrels in the cabinet and among the politicans who are behind the cabinet leaders. The strength of the regime, however, is that there is really no opposition to it. The people did not go into the streets to support Bosch as they did to try to oust the Trujillos.

CRUCIAL QUESTION OF U.S. RECOGNITION

The crucial question is that of U.S. recognition. On that matter the situation down there is very fluid at this moment. There fortunately are a number of options and alternatives open to us. All these are being considered.

[Deleted.]

This is all under urgent consideration, I should say, in the Department and, of course, will go to the President.

The aid has been suspended. The MAAG has been suspended. And their mission chiefs came home with me on Saturday.

This has, I would think an important psychological effect on the leaders of the new regime. In my opinion, we have the option if we want to use it, of withdrawing the entire AID mission, the entire MAAG mission. I would consider this as part of an overall policy that we will adopt very shortly. And I would propose to use those 2 things as counters in the bargaining that has to go on. In other words, I would not recommend at this moment that we pull them out, because until we decide where else we go from there——

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. You are suggesting that this action be saved to be used if it should prove useful and desirable in carrying out an overall policy program?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is correct.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Might I just add on this a rather more technical point, but I think it is pertinent.

In general, we have felt that when relations are suspended, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to operate economic assistance and military assistance programs, and they have been suspended together. But the question that is the fundamental one is the conditions on which they may be resumed, if, as and when this developed.

KEEPING THE EMBASSY OPEN

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, we still have the Embassy open?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. The chargé is there, and in charge. We have felt, as the Ambassador has said, that the situation was still developing down there, the power positions, controversies, are going on. And the decision on the policy line to be taken is necessarily influenced by what we feel capable of doing in the situation down there, what are the dangers of disorders as to further aggressive action from the right or left, and who the people are that may have influence with the population generally, and be able to reestablish as nearly as possible a constitutional regime which will have authority to carry on a program. So that is still a somewhat fluid situation on which to come down in a firm position on these matters at the present time.

IMPACT ON THE REST OF HEMISPHERE

I would say, also, that we are cognizant of the influence of this kind of activity elsewhere in the hemisphere, and any decision we take with respect to the Dominican Republic must take account of the impact it will have on other elements in the hemisphere, who may be interested in this kind of activity, and what the general hemisphere position will be on this subject. These are all in the picture.

As you may have noted, the Dominicans have appointed Bonilla, the former foreign minister, who I may say was one of the most outspoken opponents of military coups when he was foreign minister, in the OAS, and elsewhere, on the Peruvian coup, for example. He has been appointed by the junta as their ambassador to the OAS, and arrived yesterday to defend this military coup.

We will not be in a position to—this presumably is to secure our recognition, as his main purpose. Under the legal principles of suspension of relations, we will be able do deal with him only on OAS matters, and not on other matters.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Excuse me. Could I ask: Do we have to deal with him on OAS matters?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. We will be participating on OAS meetings in which he is participating. In this connection, we do have to, as we do in the U.N. with people with whom we have to deal on these kinds of problems. But we don't even listen on Dominican-U.S. relations questions as things now stand.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is what I want to make sure. Because I don't think at this point we should.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I gave our representative to the OAS those instructions this morning. He is attending the meeting this afternoon.

Senator SPARKMAN. Any further questions?

BLACKMAILING THE UNITED STATES

Senator MUNDT. Yes. I would like to have him answer the last question.

Suppose this present regime falls? Will somebody worse come in from the right or the left? It doesn't seem to me Bosch is going to get his job back.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Senator, I think it is extremely difficult to predict the future in that country—it has been my experience in the last year and a half.

I think that there are almost infinite number of possibilities. [Deleted.] That is to say, one of the things they will undoubtedly say to us, I anticipate, is if we don't recognize them immediately, either the Communists of another "Trujillo" will take over.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. There are already press quotes this morning to this effect.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Well, that is exactly what I would expect them to do, because that is the way they deal with us.

Now, in my opinion——

Senator MORSE. Why not? It has always paid off.

Senator CHURCH. All over the world, it is paying off.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is right.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. And in some cases, it is true.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We were having a little talk here—and I certainly missed out on what caused all this paying off business. I don't know what you said.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. [Deleted.]

I said I would be willing—although it is difficult to predict the future—I would predict that this regime would threaten us by saying, "If you don't recognize us right now, there will either be a Communist takeover or another Trujillo takeover."

Mr. Martin informed me they have already said this.

NO DANGER OF COMMUNIST COUP

I don't think we ought to cave in under that kind of pressure. I think I can say with considerable assurance that at this moment there is almost no danger of a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic. The Communists are not ready. I would think if this government falls that the result—and if we have by that time still withheld recognition—I would expect that some sort of military rule would go into effect—direct military rule.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question. Did you at any time discuss with Vinas or with whomever you talked, trying to stop the coup, what our attitude would be with reference to continuing aid in the event there were a coup? Or did you have authority to do that?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Yes, sir, I did. And I told him, and I told others, many others, privately—I never said this publicly—that we would find it extremely difficult to recognize and next to impossible to assist any government in the Dominican Republic which overthrew constitutional democracy by force or threats of force.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Morse?

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions I am going to have answered some way, somehow by the State Department—whether they do it now or whether they do it at another time. As

far as the Senator from Oregon is concerned, I will do everything I can to get the facts to the American people about this.

I find myself so completely in disagreement with the general policy of the State Department and this Administration in handling Latin American affairs at the moment—we are going to have to have some negotiations here as far as I am concerned.

I would like, also, Mr. Chairman, through Mr. Holt, to call upon the CIA to furnish me or furnish the committee with any intelligence information they can gather with regard to the activities of one Duayne B. Luther, who is reported to me to be the business representative of the Texaco Oil Company in the Dominican Republican and who is reported as having maintained a very close association with Wessin y Wessin.

It has been reported to me he has been involved in helping finance Bosch's opponents' campaign, and may very well be involved financially with this military coup. I want to know everything that our State Department and CIA can find out about the activities of one Duayne B. Luther.

I also want to know anything we can find out about Tex Brewer, of the Esso Standard Oil Company of South American, and his activities in the Dominican Republic in connection with his relationships to opponents of Bosch in the last campaign, any relationships he may have with the coup.

And we ought to have, Mr. Secretary, in connection with that memorandum all the information we can have concerning what the Bosch administration was in the process of doing or did do in connection with placing any restrictions or any changes in the policy of the oil companies in the Dominican Republic.

Likewise, the activities of other American corporation officials in the Dominican Republic—any information at all as to their attitude, their advocacy in regard to supporting this coup. And I should propose, before I get through with this, Mr. Chairman, that we subpena the records of Texaco and Esso.

In my judgment, what is needed is also an investigation of American business activities in the Dominican Republic in connection with this coup. I am afraid that we are going to find that they were so anti-Bosch that they were in effect intervening in American foreign policy in the Dominican Republic.

That is the kind of information I want. But I have a great many questions I want to ask the Ambassador, based upon his testimony here this morning.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Senator Morse, if you would like, I would respond to what you have just said, to the extent that I am capable of doing so.

Senator MORSE. I would be delighted.

AMERICAN BUSINESSES IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. There were members of the American business community in the Dominican Republic who, to my knowledge, were extremely opposed to Bosch. They differed with him on almost everything. They regarded him as a danger to the country. And my relations with many were not very close, because it was my policy to support the Bosch administration.

Duayne Luther was a leading example of this. I do not have any information, however, that he helped finance the anti-Bosch campaign, nor that he was an associate of Wessin y Wessin.

I know of only one. I discussed with President Bosch the question of whether he thought—this was several days berore the actual coup—whether he thought any Americans were involved in the plotting that was going on against him. He said there might be one or two "but I don't think any more than that." And he gave me one name, and it was the name that I already had, and knew about, and had already drafted a message on.

As I understand it, legal position is protected here, in this being an executive session.

This man is known as Wimpy. His real name is Lorenzo Berry. He is an American citizen. He has been in the Dominican Republic for a good many years. He has let it be thought by Dominicans that he was an undercover U.S. Government agent at the time of the overthrow and the assassination of Trujillo. To my knowledge, he was not. But I was not there at that time.

I don't know if that is a fact or is not a fact. I would be inclined to doubt it. But in any case, a great many Dominicans believed him.

Every since Bosch was elected, this man has been very active in opposing Bosch. I don't mean just taiking.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is his business?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. He is a merchant. He runs a supermarket. It is named Wimpy's. That is why he is called Wimpy by everyone.

INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-BOSCH GENERAL STRIKE

I know that on the night before the general strike, which began on the Friday before the coup, that this man was present in the house of Enrique Alfau, who was one of the organizers of the anti-Bosch general strike, so-called, merchants' strike. I know this man was present in the house of Alfau when that strike was being organized, the night before the strike began. I know that.

I am told that he also, that night, was trying to find General Imbert, who is a close friend of his. Imbert was, you recall, one of the assassins of Trujillo. And my supposition is he was trying to pull Imbert into that general strike.

I, therefore, ordered a telegram to be drafted recommending that we get him out of the Dominican Republic, because I thought he was inimical to our foreign policy interests.

The first step in this process, of course, would be to pick his passport up, and restrict it to travel only to the United States, and order him home. That telegram was sent on September 24th. I believe this is the time it was sent—8:53. I am not sure if that is the time sent or time received.

In any case, the telegram was actually drafted, I think, a day or 2 before that, but in the uproar the priority got lower, because other things supervened.

He is the only American that I thought was actively trying to help pull this coup off. And I believe he was. And I thought we ought to get him out of there as fast as possible.

I still think we should get him out of there. But he does not represent any large American business interest, such as you have described.

Senator SPARKMAN. Has any action been taken?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I don't actually know.

TIED INTO THE PLOT

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. We are still looking at the legal situation. It is not an easy thing to deal with. I should point out that his connection with Imbert doesn't tie him into the plot that really took place, because Imbert was not directly involved in the plot that really took place.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. That is correct. But his connection with Alfau ties him, I think, in with the plot that finally took place, because Alfau was one of the leaders of the far right that I mentioned. So was Severo Cabral.

Those were the civilians trying to pull the military into the plot, who were egging the military on, if you want to put it that way.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question.

Even lifting his passport would not necessarily get him out, if the Dominican Republic was willing for him to stay?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. Did you ever have any conversations with Duayne Luther?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I had conversations with Luther rather early. What I told you a minute ago is based on those conversations. He made it perfectly clear to me that he was against Bosch, and everything he stood for. And I think he was opposed to our policy, and was opposed to me and my view of what should be done in the Dominican Republic, by which I mean I thought we should advance the aims of the Alliance for Progress, social justice and economic progress. I don't think Luther—this is my opinion, you should ask him—I don't think he was in sympathy with those aims, at least not under Bosch, and in my personal opinion under anybody. His relationship with me broken down because of this disagreement. And I didn't see him much.

There were several occasions when—these are personal matters. But he made it perfectly obvious at public functions and private parties that he did not want anything to do with me, and his wife didn't want anything to do with my wife. This was a basic policy matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did you have any evidence that he committed any overt acts to physically or otherwise frustrate this policy, or was that just a personal opinion of his which he expressed under a certain amount of freedom of expression?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. As I said at the beginning, Senator Hickenlooper, I have no evidence that he participated in this coup. And so far as I know, these were only his personal opinions.

I do know that he expressed these personal opinions rather frequently, and openly in the Dominican Republic. And President Bosch told me that the opinion of any American is very important in the Dominican Republic because Dominicans are inclined to think that any American speaks for the U.S. Government.

TAKES PLACE AROUND THE WORLD

Senator MUNDT. May I ask the Secretary—this must go on in almost every capital of the world. We have no control over what individual Americans say in Istanbul, or Rome, or any place else. Isn't that right?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. That is quite right.

Senator MUNDT. We just have to live with it.

Senator MORSE. Yet the record shows that you have an American businessman who heads a great American corporation in a country, who takes many opportunities to openly criticize the government and make statements, which I am going to get notarized and present later, that the government ought to be thrown out—that that citizen is certainly not helping American foreign policy in that government.

Senator MUNDT. I agree. But I remember meeting in Athens and Oslo—Americans are just that way. They don't like policy, they don't like the Ambassador, they don't like Congressmen to come and see them. What can you do about it?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I might suggest that the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Iowa have both been heard on occasion to criticize our policy abroad and take issue. I have done it under the Republican and the Democratic administrations on certain occasions.

I don't condone a man deliberately trying to get out and overtly do militant things of one kind or another to block it. But I do think there is a distinction between an American abroad—and a lot of Americans abroad feel that they don't get the support of our Foreign Service that they ought to get as American property holders. Not all of them. But you find them every once in awhile. They are very free about it. They say, "We don't get any help out of the American Embassy." Or they used to say that.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, you know of Senator Gruening's great interest in this matter. He is here as a visitor. I wonder if he has a question he would like to put.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I invited him in the beginning to speak freely.

THE ALTERNATIVES ARE ALL BAD

Senator GRUENING. I am very familiar with the Dominican situation. I was down there before Trujillo. I recognize this is a terrible blow to our foreign policy. We tried to set up a constitutional government—maybe the first time in the history of the Dominican Republic. And if this goes, the alternatives are all bad. This group is a bunch of crooks. In many of these small Latin American countries they live by graft.

What would happen if we used our full power—the withholding of foreign aid, no recognition—and said to these people, "You have got to bring this man back, he is only half an hour away in San Juan, support him, and then have that election you promised you were going to have anyhow"?

What would happen if we really insisted on that? Is that feasible? It would at least save the image of a constitutional government in our determination to try and have a legal constitutional

government established. He has only the balance of 2 years to serve.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Three and a-half.

Senator GRUENING. Whatever it is.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. February 27, 1967.

Senator GRUENING. And then, of course, at the same time, be as active as we could to give them better guidance, better advice, perhaps a little more aid and so forth.

It seems to me that that would be one way of reestablishing our purpose and image throughout the Americas. I grant you anything we do is fraught with all kinds of difficulties. But at least that would be a positive, I hope, constuctive act.

Senator MORSE. They have constitutional processes for getting rid of a president under the constitution. If they bring him back, he is still legally the president.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. You mean legally under the constitution he could come back and resign?

Senator MORSE. No, I mean legally under the constitution if they find him guilty of malfeasance they can get rid of him.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. To be perfectly frank, I don't know if there is an impeachment situation or not. I believe there is.

Senator GRUENING. There must be a method of impeaching a president.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Not always.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Sir, I am sorry. I will get that information for you.

TRADITION OF GRAFT AND CORRUPTION

Senator GRUENING. I know these gangs in these small Latin American countries. They have the terrible tradition of living by graft and corruption. The one thing you can say about Bosch, I think, whatever may be his weaknesses, is he is a very honest person, which is very rare in Latin America. It is almost traditional that public office is a public spoil.

And if we enthrone this crowd and try to help them, that money is just going to be dissipated, and there is just going to be chaos. That is my thought. I just wonder whether you would consider that.

We hold all the cards and spades, if we want to use them. These people have got to have our aid, they have to have our support. If we threaten them with no aid, and withdrawal of the sugar quota, and no recognition, they would cave in tonight.

We would be whitemailing them in return for their blackmail.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Senator, I certainly think this question is one that must be considered as we make a policy on the Dominican Republic. I think it is a very important part of any policy decision we make. I assure you that it is very much in my mind at least at this time.

I would put the emphasis—and I speak for myself alone—this way: The issue here is not liberalism, perhaps it is not the question of the "non-Communist left" in Latin America—the issue here to my mind is representative democracy, and the right of people to elect the government. I would like to preserve as much of that

principle as we can. And I emphasize—I speak for myself alone at this point—I think the considerations that you have advanced should be considered, and I assure you that they are being considered.

AVOID BLOODSHED

I think there are many other things that have to be considered. One of them is I myself would like to avoid bloodshed—I don't like it—in the Dominican Republic. If we let them go, and a direct military rule results, I don't know. I don't want to go back to Trujillo and bloodshed.

I would like to see an effective government down there. I am afraid that I have to say reluctantly that for a great many reasons—and he was working under enormous handicaps—President Bosch's administration was really not as effective as I would like to have seen it be.

Senator GRUENING. Do you think any administration under these circumstances would be really effective?

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Sir, this is very difficult to answer. I think that if the ablest people in the republic had cooperated wholeheartedly with Bosch and helped him, he would have had a better chance. I think, perhaps, if I may say so, if his temperament would have been a little different from what it was, he would have had a better chance. And I am very reluctant to say that, because I do not want to criticize the man that has failed in this great effort.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Will the Senator yield?

AN IDEALIST OR A REALIST

I just wanted to ask, Mr. Ambassador: it is my general impression of Bosch that he was an idealist of types, but his administrative or executive force was not very great. That is, he was an idealist but not enough of a realist. And therefore he did not bring consistent administrative or executive force to bear in functioning in his office.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Senator, he certainly had high ideals. I would consider him a pretty realistic politician. I think he knew a great deal about the realities of politics. I do not think he was as vague and as idealistic as the press has often pictured him in that respect. I think he left a good deal to be desired as an administrator, or as an executive. He delegated authority very badly. He spent the first 2 months of his regime attending to his budget. I think he deserves credit for trying to balance his budget. But I think he allowed himself to be distracted from what I consider more important aims than that, and he thereby lost an opportunity to put effective programs into operation immediately after his inauguration.

I think if he had spent those 2 months on substantive reform other than budget balancing, he might still be president today. I do not think he would have lost the people I think he allowed himself sometimes to become distracted by things that were not important, and lost sight of the main things that were important. I am quite reluctant to be critical of a man in his position.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have no quarrel with you on that. I am just stating an impression I gained.

DISHONEST PEOPLE AROUND BOSCH

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I would like to finish up Senator Gruening's question—because he was asking both our views. I would like to supplement this on one or two points.

In the first place, as far as I know you are quite correct. Bosch is honest, and this is not too common. On the other hand, it is also correct that he surrounded himself with very dishonest people, and was very reluctant to do anything about it, when we told him how dishonest they were.

The key position of Minister of Commerce and Industry, which is a leading position in the government—gives the export licenses and has all the opportunities for graft—was put in a man we told him was an international crook and had a long record of being an international crook. He eventually fired him.

While Bosch himself was honest, he was not careful about his associates.

Secondly——

Senator GRUENING. I do not know of any Latin American country where that is not almost always true.

BOSCH'S DEFICIENCIES AS AN ADMINISTRATOR

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. There are degrees, yes. The second point I would like to make is—we have talked a little bit about Bosch's deficiencies as an administrator and executive. I think they were considerable, and then his record of accomplishment is a relatively poor one. I think we did a great deal, an enormous amount, to give him advice. The Ambassador has talked about a few instances. But even since he has been in office, both through the Ambassador providing him personnel, aid, getting other Latin American countries to provide Latin American exports—he has been surrounded with advice. He has taken almost none of it. And I do not foresee the prospect if he should return that he would be any more likely to take advice than he was before.

Senator GRUENING. You do not think he would have learned his lesson?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I do not. [Deleted.]

Basically, I cannot see that having him returned to office by United States pressures of the kind that you have described, and being thereby labeled by wide segments of the community as a U.S. puppet would make it any more easy for him to have an effective regime and popular support. I think it would make it a more difficult task for him to run an effective government.

Basically it seems to me that democracy cannot be created from outside. You are really having a sham of democratic government which is apt to collapse and prove a sham at a very early date. Now, this doesn't mean there are not margins around which you can work to prevent minority forces from destroying democratic government. I think there are.

But when a man has no support except outside support, this seems to make a mockery of the democratic government, and not get us ahead with the problem.

MAKING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS STRONG

What we have to do is create conditions within the countries that will make civilian democratic governments strong enough to resist the military pressures. This is what the Alliance is about.

Now, I do not think this is something one does any place overnight. Our western world, which has had quite a lot of advantages in terms of education and wealth and relative ease of problems, has still done a lot of stumbling in creating democratic regimes. There are very few countries that have a perfect record—including ours. We had a civil war to try to fight out a problem we could not settle peacefully.

The British have had a number of revolutions. In this century the Germans and Italians have stumbled quite badly. The French are not really perfect at the moment. The Spanish and the Portugese have never succeeded in doing it. And for us to expect the Dominicans which, as you say, have never done it in 150 years of independence, to do it in 7 months, that seems to me—it would be highly desirable, and we ought to be able to do better than our predecessors have done. But still it is not to my mind a major surprise that they did not start off running rather than walking and stumbling a couple of times first—and that we must have patience, and try to evolve a policy that, having learned from this experience, will be more effective next time in enabling them to run their own democratic regime. This seems to me to be the framework within which our policy has to be developed.

NATIONS OF CHAOS AND DICTATORSHIPS

Senator GRUENING. I agree with what you say; you cannot impose democracy. But unfortunately the history of the Latin American countries, with the exception of Costa Rica and possibly Uruguay—for 150 years, they have been nothing but nations of chaos and dictatorships.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I would add Chile and Mexico now.

Senator GRUENING. Well, some are a little less flagrant than others. And you go back to the mother countries, Spain and Portugal, which were exposed to Western Europeanization a thousand years, and they still have a Franco and a Salazar.

The only thing is we did have an honest election there. And the only thing we are asking people to do is stand by their election. And if they can work out a formula to remove him constitutionally, it might have an effect.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Morse?

ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the Assistant Secretary's statement about American affairs. But there are so many implications involved in this presentation here this morning with which I disagree, that I think the State Department should be

made to understand the basis of the disagreement of some of us. The real issue down here is constitutionalism.

There was set up a constitutional government. The people of the Dominican Republic did not overthrow that government. And as long as we give support to maintaining a government, we are not maintaining a puppet. We are maintaining the existing legal Government of the Dominican Republic.

Now, it may very well be that under that constitution that we ought to at least make available the opportunity to the civilian citizens of the Dominican Republic, through their Congress, to get rid of this President by constitutional processes and put the vice president in.

But the important thing is if we come out and recognize what in fact is a non-constitutional government in relationship to this government, I think we are going to do ourselves terrific damage all through Latin America. I think we are going to pave the way for more coups. And I would like to get an appraisal on Honduras before we adjourn.

If it meets with the pleasure of the committee and the Ambassador and the Secretary, I am perfectly willing either to meet myself with the Secretary and Ambassador or submit my questions in writing rather than take more time today.

HOLD SUPPORT FROM THOSE WHO OVERTHROW CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS

But I want to go on record here now completely opposed to the Ambassador and Secretary's suggestion that we should not withdraw these missions now. I think they ought to be on their way back to the United States right now. I think this military junta—that is why I signed the wire yesterday, some 21 of us—this military junta and those civilian stooges running it—and don't try to tell me these civilian leaders—don't try to sell me this fellow they have sent to the Organization of American States; he is acting outside of their constitutional system, he is a stooge of the military.

I think we ought to bring them home and start all over again in regard to an aid program, after we are satisfied with the government down there. I think, Mr. Chairman, that we are reflecting on ourselves keeping them down there. It raises the charge that we do not act in good faith.

We have got the Honduras situation in front of us, and we have a couple more on the brink in Latin America.

What we need is to announce to the world that we are not going to support regimes that overthrow constitutional governments, and we are not going to yield to the blackmail that the Ambassador referred to. They are going to blackmail us if we yield to it.

I will submit my questions and the information that I ask for.

I do think, however, that you ought to get the CIA up here for further meetings as soon as you can, because we, as the Foreign Relations Committee, cannot brush this off by passing the buck to the State Department. It has gotten beyond that stage.

Senator SPARKMAN. Gentlemen, let me say this: there is a live quorum upstairs. It is preceding a roll call that is coming on the

amendment offered by Senator Russel for correction in the Journal. And we cannot carry these hearings on further at this time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just ask one question.

DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS

I would like to ask for any comment you want to make.

Is it possible that there is a confusing situation here involving this question: that we are going on a basis of constitutionalism, which we understand—we think we do, anyway—and that the problem there is the confusion of constitutionalism, which they do not necessarily understand by tradition or anything else—but the question there is effective government?

Now, we say that we must apply constitutionalism as we understand it in order to get effective government. They say constitutionalism goes by the board—what they are looking for is effective government.

I do not mean that I justify one or the other necessarily. But isn't there that kind of a question possibly involved here?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I think quite definitely in much of Latin America the idea of constitutionalism or legitimacy, which I think is a little more pertinent to the problem of governmental succession—the idea of legitimacy has very few roots.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Hasn't it been characteristic of the Latino concept that armed revolution is perfectly legitimate?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Much more prevalent. This is what we are figting. This is what the fight is all about. We are trying to establish legitimacy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will give you an illustration. I was down in Latin America after the Presidental election between President Kennedy and Nixon. I talked to some legislative groups down there. They said, "What are you going to do—you are a Republican, you are against President Kennedy."

I said, "Politically I am against him."

They said, "What are you going to do?"

I said, "Well, if it comes down to that he gets the most votes, he is my President and the President of all of us."

They said, "We will not stand for it. We would have a revolution."

Well, that is their basic philosophy of effective government. And the constitutional sanctity with which we clothe constitutional government—I do not think the concepts are identical.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I think our view would be in the long run a constitutional regime of the principle of legitimacy provides more effective government. But it takes a long time to build in a tradition like this, and this is what we are working at and trying to follow with policies to that effect.

Senator SPARKMAN. Gentlemen, let me make this suggestion. We can keep this going—we can go up one at a time and get on this quorum call. Personally I feel I must get on it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We haven't gotten to Honduras yet.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you want to do that or adjourn and look to a future meeting?

Senator CHURCH. I have to go to lunch with Haile Selassie.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Maybe if we go up and get on the quorum call and come back, would that be all right?

COMPARISON TO HAITI

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. May I say one thing for the record, Senator. I would like to associate myself with what Assistant Secretary Martin said about the facts of the Bosch regime during its existence in the Dominican Republic, particularly with respect to the appointment of the Minister of Commerce and Industry and so forth. Those facts are all true. On other matter I do not consider myself competent. On the facts of the Dominican Republic I want to associate myself with what the Secretary said.

Senator MUNDT. May I ask the Secretary, is there any relationship betwen what we are doing or not doing here and what we did with Haiti and Duvalier? He kicked the constitution as completely in the teeth as this group down here.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I do not think so in this case.

Senator MUNDT. We cut a pattern of some kind.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. What did we do in the Haiti case? Well, we brought what pressures we thought we could legitimately bear with ourselves and our friends in the hemisphere to weaken the position of Duvalier, and in this case strengthen the position of the army, which was the main force opposing him. And so far we have not succeeded in making a change.

Senator MUNDT. Have we withdrawn aid and recognition?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. We have withdrawn both military and economic aid. There is none going to Haiti at the present time. We still have diplomatic relations. The judgment thus far has been the objectives which we have there can better be accomplished by a mission working within Haiti than by not being there.

Senator MUNDT. And we have not contemplated going down there with American military muscle and kicking him out, have we?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. No.

Senator MUNDT. If we superimposed some American government there, I think the cry of Yankee imperialism would penetrate the hemisphere and do us harm.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I agree. We did have military forces close by in May when we thought the discord might break out, and for the safety or our personnel we wanted to be close. But this did not happen and we withdrew.

SIX MILITARY REVOLTS

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, the thing disturbing many of us here—I do not personally think it is possible to forceably reimpose President Bosch through the external use of American muscle. But unless we look at this within the context of the larger policies and objectives of the United States, I think we are inviting further collapse of constitutional regimes elsewhere in the hemisphere. Therefore I would say that this problem could not be looked upon as a sui generis problem. It has got to be looked upon within the fabric of the whole posture of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

Now, we have what we call the Alliance for Progress. The whole theory of this Alliance for Progress has been that reform has to take place if the Castro type regimes are ultimately to be avoided in a great many of these countries. And the only way reform can take place is by acquiescence of the landed families and the powerful rich, entrenched families in these countries.

Now, since the Alliance for Progress, God knows that Cuba ought to be a sufficient example. If there was one prolonged and heinous dictatorship, it was Batista for many years, and it brought us Castro. And in the wake of that experience, and from what we learned out of it, we launched the Alliance for Progress. Since the Alliance for Progress has been launched, there has been 5 forceable military overthrows of Latin American governments—Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Dominican Republic and now Honduras.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Guatemala.

Senator MUNDT. Guatemala—that is strengthening my argument.

All right. Now, events are fast making a mockery of the Alliance and its objectives. And these regimes cannot possibly furnish us with an answer to the long-term advance of communism in the hemisphere.

Our policy has got to be directed, it seems to me, toward doing what we can do to prevent this kind of thing from happening throughout the hemisphere. And all eyes are upon us when something like this happens in the Dominican Republic. It is an open invitation to the military in Honduras and the very groups that are not going to permit the Alliance for Progress to ever work, if they are going to be able to seize and hold control in these places. One day they will be thrown over by a Castro. Therefore, we either have to take a firmer, harder line, or they will all have advance notice that when the showdown comes, they can get away with it, and we will continue as we do.

Now, I am speaking in the national sense, the national posture—decisions creating precedents which lead them to believe that they can get away with it, because others have gotten away with it, and that words do not match our deeds.

A MORE FLUID SOCIETY

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I think that I could endorse heartily nearly everything you have said. I think you have described our objectives, what the Alliance is all about, very effectively. I would just like to make 2 or 3 comments.

In the first place, this outbreak of military coups the last year or so I think has to be commented upon from 2 standpoints.

First, the fact that we have so many fewer dictatorships in the last 4 or 5 years than we had previously means that there is a much more fluid society and much more opportunity for people to react militarily. In other words, as long as Peron was in Argentina, and Jimenez was in Venezuela, there were no coups. This was unhealthy. Democracy opens up opportunities for these kinds of people. This is one reason there have been more opportunities and more coups in a recent period than previously.

Second, I said probably last year repeatedly that I thought the situation in terms of political stability in Latin America under the Alliance would get worse before it got better, because I felt that this is a 10-year program, that it would create the kind of tensions and frictions between the people that want the change and the oligarchy. That in a situation of relative political democracy, these tensions would lead to what has in some countries happened, and that we would have to accept this.

I said it again just last week in Los Angeles, that I thought disorder was one of the things the United States people have to expect to happen while we are fighting this battle—that there were people in Latin America that would not accept the Alliance peacefully, both the right and the left, and the right was just as important as the left, because they had on the whole more power for disorder.

Therefore, I feel in one sense—we have to fight them because they defeat our purposes—there is evidence that people are afraid and are trying to protect their position.

Now, the third point I would make is that I do not think it is possible to describe these six events as fitting any overall pattern of opposition to reform.

In Argentina, I think it was clearly opposition to Peron and not reform, because reform was not going on. It was tyranism that was the fear there. I do not think military intervention solved this problem in Argentina. I think it was a great mistake. But it was not imposing Alliance reform that caused the military outbreak in Argentina. And I think the government they have now is a more reform minded government than the Frondizi government was ever.

In Peru, it was in part opposition to reforms, but it was very much a matter of fighting between the Apristes and the military. And people had been killed. And they thought there would be further reprisals against the military. It was the military defending their position rather than imposing reforms that was central. And you now have a government which the military have accepted, which is the most reform minded government that we have ever had in Peru in my judgment. In terms of intent, this is the best government we have had in Peru following the military dictatorship.

In Ecuador, we have a military junta which has also so far taken some actions toward reform to a greater extent than any government since Diloplaza's. I think it is running out of stream myself very quickly, and I think the oligarchy is trying to oppose the government. We had a message this morning saying the conservative party was now withdrawing its support from the junta. This means this is splitting up. But you do have there a younger military group which is more reform minded than the military tradition in Latin America.

In Guatemala there were two reasons for the military takeover. One was fear of Arevlo and communism, which has been a real threat to Guatemala, and could be again. Another equally important fact that was not widely publicized—they had handpicked a man named Roberto Aloyos as a successor. And the military and the population generally which supported the military at the time it took over felt that the corrupt, inefficient government would be

perpetuated by him, and that Vigros was fully competent to rig the election machinery to assure his election. So this again was not against the Alliance in this particular sense. It was in the democratic sense. But in this particular sense it was not, and a major battle now which the junta is losing popular support it has is enforcing a rather modest—from our standpoint—improvement in the income tax law and other tax legislation of this kind affecting the business community.

Now, in the Dominican Republic, I think our case is made, although there ineffective government is also a factor, and the Communist threat is also a factor, although I agree with the Ambassador, not a real one in the sense—currently in the sense that they have made out.

ARMY VERSUS DICTATORS

I would also point out as a final point that the military rule here is again not a uniform one in Latin America. We do have to remember that we now have 2 brutal dictatorships in Latin America, and in both cases they secured power, Haiti and Cuba, not military men as dictators—a doctor and a law student, and that they secured power by breaking the army. And the big battle of Castro—he destroyed the Cuban Army. Duvalier is now in office because he managed to destroy the Haitian Army, and only by destroying those armies are they maintaining themselves in power.

So that in Argentina, and Venezuela, in Colombia, the army was the major instrument in throwing out the dictators.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have their own army.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. They built up their competing armies. But they destroyed their regular army with whom we had connections and worked with.

Now, in Honduras I may say you have a similar competing army situation.

Senator MORSE. Let's have a briefing on Honduras, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right.

SITUATION IN HONDURAS

Mr. Secretary, give it to us rather briefly, if you can, something of Honduras.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. The Honduras situation has rather long roots, not all of which I am familiar with.

There was a military dictatorship until about 1956 there, with which the present regular army forces were associated. This was the so-called Nationalist Party, I believe it is called. They had an election in which Villeda Morales of the Liberal Party, after a great many years of the other party, was elected president. It took him a year to be able to be sworn into office before he was allowed to be, but he was.

But what you had was a regular army whose officers had all been appointed under the dictatorship, and it was a politically oriented regular army to the Nationalist Party.

Morales felt, in Central American tradition, that his position was not secure as President unless he had a military force to counter

the regular army. He therefore built up a civil militia, which he armed, to provide him a military force which would keep him in office, as he saw it.

He also, I believe, did a fair amount of arming of good members of the party outside of this. I believe he kept those arms in the prisons, and as part of the head of this political army, as distinguished from the militia, which was a public political army, he was superintendent of prisons. It was his job to pass out the arms when the orders came from the party bosses. In addition to this, in somewhat old-time western fashion, most Hondurans, including cabinet members, carried arms rather traditionally. It is a well-armed country, in terms of small arms.

U.S. RELATION TO HONDURAN ARMY

Our policy has been consistently to try to integrate these armed forces into one regular army of a nonpolitical orientation. We have made very little progress at this. We have insisted in not providing any arms to the civil militia and in providing only the most limited military equipment. We want to confine our work almost entirely to training, to the regular army.

Now, Morales and his party, from the standpoint of the Honduran people, have done a relatively good job of governing for Honduras. And all the political experts have felt that in the election, which was scheduled for October 13th, his party would win.

I might say this was facilitated by the fact that the opposition was split on whether they should run in the election at all or not, on the grounds that it would be corrupt by nature and that they should not run. The only candidate they got was a very weak lawyer without much popular appeal.

So it looked like a pretty shoo-in election—whether it was honest or not. Whether it would be is a question. They did ask the OAS to come down and observe it.

THE LIBERAL PARTY

However, in the process of the electoral preparations in the Liberal Party, the Morales Party, Mr. [Modesto] Rodas, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, built up a quite tough and closely-knit political machine. And against many people's expectations, and against the wishes of the President, who thought he was head of the Party and should be able to have an influence in the next election, Rodas was selected as the nominee. There was a bitter convention battle.

Rodas has taken a very hard line that nobody in the Liberal Party is to be considered in the future as having any status who was not for him before the convention. This is something we can understand a bit. But he has taken an unusually arrogant and dogmatic line on this and other issues. And this is a matter of personal character from all I can find out from people who know him well. He is a very narrow, rigid individual.

Now, in these circumstances, with the possibilities that Rodas would be elected, honestly or not, and he is a very hard Party man, the regular army rather widely felt that he would carry the civilian militia program one step further and obolish the regular army

and replace it completely with the civilian militia, or at least eliminate the officer corps that had any affiliation and replace them with his officer corps.

I think it is only fair to say that there is some evidence that the present administration, the individuals on Morales' government, was sore enough at Rodas but they were not willing to get very excited about a military coup.

At one time, 2 or 3 days ago, we rather thought Morales might be conspiring in the coup. There was some evidence of this. And we thereupon pulled all the stops we could to put pressure on him to do everything he could to deal with it.

I think as of this morning we do not think he probably was conspiring in relation to the way things happened. But he certainly was innocent as hell because he consistently said publicly that there was no danger of a coup, as recently as yesterday, and refused to do anything about it. We had lots of evidence. We told him everything we had and urged him and the other Central American governments urged him to take action, partly on their own initiative and partly at our instigation. Yet he was not willing to face the fact that it was a real threat.

PREVENT THE ELECTION

There is one curious incident in which our Ambassador was with Colonel [Osvaldo] Lopez, the head of the coup and the Army, and the President, in which the President gave all these assurances that nothing was going to happen in the election, and Colonel Lopez, when the President left the room a few minutes, said, "He is lying." And Lopez has made no bones to us for a week now that he felt he had no choice, in all the circumstances, but to prevent the election from taking place.

Two or 3 months ago——

Senator SPARKMAN. To prevent this new man?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. To prevent Rodas from being elected, that he had to prevent this.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, what relationship does it have to the present President?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Morales—that is against him, too, because he is still the present President. And as of this morning he is a prisoner in the palace.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will it force him out?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Yes. He is not a candidate in the election. It will force him out. And the election will not be held.

PALACE WAS SURROUNDED BY TANKS

Now, as of the moment this has not in fact happened in the sense that I was on the phone with our Ambassador about 9:15—the international phones were still working, the local phones are not. They think they may go off shortly. And the President had been in communication with the Ambassador and his wife had been also, who is quite a gal. They were prisoners in the Palace. They had not been taken over physically by the coup people.

Senator SPARKMAN. You mean the Ambassador had contact with the President and his wife?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think you said it the other way.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. The Palace was surrounded by tanks and army. But he had not been molested as yet.

There had been some fighting in the streets and some people, civilian militia, apparently were killed or wounded. A lot of trigger-happy people were around. We picked up a few wounded. Now people are out trying to find out what is going on. Some parts of the city are absolutely quiet. Other parts there are a lot of military in evidence. As I say, there has been some shooting. We don't know how much was a real pitched battle and how much was a condition where people came around the corner and you got shot. There is no evidence as yet of disorders in other parts of the country. It is still quiet. Although we were able to alert Villeda of the coup—this first word was through us. Our embassy, our consul, on the north coast saw 300 heavily-armed people moving out last evening about 6 or 7 o'clock. This was pretty obviously a move for action. And they got word down to the Ambassador—the President happened to be at our embassy residence at a dinner. And the Ambassador told him we would do anything we could to help him, and was there anything that he wanted us to do. He tried to get in touch with Lopez, the Colonel, but was unable to reach him. He got in touch with Rodas who is in hiding as far as we know.

A NONPRODUCTIVE VENTURE

Now, I may say that being aware of Lopez' views about this, we have been pulling all the stops we could to persuade him that this was a nonproductive venture, that it would be apt to create bloodshed, becaue of the political opposition that was armed, and that the United States thought this was most unhelpful.

We did 2 things, particularly in the last 24 hours. One, we asked the Governments of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Costa Rica to have their ambassadors and their military attaches instructed to make very strong representations to all the civilians and the military they knew that might be involved opposing this. We got General Bogart, who is the army man in the Canal Zone, a very close friend of Lopez; he flew up yesterday and met with Lopez yesterday afternoon to reinforce the protestations of our embassy military people on the importance of not doing this.

As a result of this conversation, he said he did not dissuade Lopez from going ahead, but he agreed to meet again with Morales to talk about whether there was any accommodation that would satisfy Lopez. Lopez never held that meeting, although he promised Bogart he would do so.

The representatives of the Central American Republics released a couple of days ago a quite important declaration against coups, and a common stand in favor of constitutional government. We have made statements welcoming that.

We had the President send a personal message to Morales urging him to take every step, and our complete support in trying to stand against Lopez. We have, I think, made all of the noises we could make to influence the situation. But as far as Lopez and some of the Colonel underlings in particular who are pressing him, they

felt their lives were at stake, that if Rodas won the election, this was the issue, and they would not permit it to happen.

Now, they too have made noises about communism, that Morales was soft on the Communists and that his successor would be softer. Morales did come in with the reputation of having accepted support for the Communists. We think he has done on the whole reasonably well.

CANDIDATES IN THE ELECTION

Senator MORSE. May I ask a question or two, Mr. Secretary?

On this election that was planned for October 13th there were these 2 candidates.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Rodas and a gentleman representing the Nationalist Party with which the military are affiliated.

Senator MORSE. You say he is a lawyer, but not of any great standing.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. No.

Senator MORSE. Who was it asked the OAS to come in as an observer?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. President Morales. They had 3 people down there, and there was a larger group coming down at the time of the election.

Senator MORSE. So they were going to have an observation team there to check on the military's claim that it was going to be a rigged election?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. This election was being called in accordance with existing constitutional processes?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. What happens there is in the preparation of certifying of the ballots—there was a lot of room for chicanery. We have learned some of the tricks. They have all of those and probably some more. But in terms of form, it was going through the normal process.

Senator MORSE. But it was a duly called election.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Absolutely. There is no problem of that, sir.

Senator MORSE. And the military decided that they had to stage this coup.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. That's right.

UNITED FRUIT CO. INTERESTS

Senator MORSE. We saw this article yesterday and it was denied. As far as I know, their conduct has been examplary in recent years—nevertheless there was this newspaper story yesterday that alleges the United Fruit Co. had an interest in the matter. What do we know about the United Fruit Co.?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I am familiar with that story. Before the story appeared I talked with the United Fruit Co. people here and someone else talked to the Standard Co. which are even more important in Honduras than United Fruit, and asked them if they had any friends in Honduras or the military that might be supporting the coup, to get them and tell them how bad it would be. They agreed 100 percent they would get on the phone and do it right away. They have been just as opposed to it as we have.

We have checked this stuff very carefully with our embassy and with the United Fruit Co. people. They deny flatly. And the reporter who wrote it was so told before it was published. He said he thought his sources were better than ours and proceeded to publish it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What paper was that in?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. The Washington Post, yesterday morning.

If the proposal was made, I am personally convinced that United Fruit gave the answer alleged, that they would have no part of it. I think that is their position, but they say it was not made.

A LAND REFORM PROGRAM

Senator MORSE. They have gone a long way the last few years in trying to work out a land reform program.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. A year ago they had trouble with the land reform law that was passed by the Honduras Congress. They had serious objections to it. And in cooperation with the Villeda Morales and ourselves, they worked out a series of amendments to that law which were passed in the course of the last session of the Honduran Congress, and I think at the present time they feel their legitimate requirements have been met.

Senator MORSE. That is my understanding.

Senator SPARKMAN. Anything further?

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT COMES FIRST

Senator MORSE. Can I ask this question. What more, if anything, can we do? What do you do if this coup continues?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I don't know, Senator. Except as I say, I have felt for a long time that the major problem of the Alliance for Progress was not economic development, but political development, because that comes first. You cannot have sound economic development without political development, and the whole history of mankind is that political development comes slowly. And we have to keep doing everything we can to promote and buttress it, educating the people so they can play a responsible role, and at the same time educating the military as to what is their proper role, and thereby getting a better balance of forces. This is a balance which is uneasy in some countries. It is not always stable in our own, as to what is the proper function of the military on policy matters. We all have this problem.

FIGHT BETWEEN MILITIA AND REGULAR ARMY

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that this might evolve into a fight between the civil military and the regular force?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. It is possible.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is the civil force of comparable strength?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Not in terms of organization, and it has more limited equipment. But in numbers it is similar. There have been reports in the last several days that the head of the civil militia, a newly appointed man, had instructed the people to turn in their arms, to help promote a peaceful election. Now, some people think he may have been somehow in cahoots with Lopez, and this

will have deprived the civil militia of the opportunity to have really fought it out. We cannot be sure how many guns they may still have left and how willing they will be to fight against the regular forces.

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not presume it is a very large force on either side, is it?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. A few thousand on each side.

This was getting under way when I had left. We were trying to see if an aricraft carrier within reasonable shouting distance if serious disorder should break out threatening American lives, if there could be one there.

Senator MORSE. That is what I wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman.

SYMBOLIC SHOW OF FORCE

What about some of this so-called symbolism approach? We had an admiral down in the Dominican Republic the very day of the coup. But apparently he did not come in with any ship on a visit, with any large number of naval personnel, did he?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. No.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. No, sir. He came by air.

Senator MORSE. If we saw this coming—I don't know what the effect of these things would have been—I do not know how sound they are. I am just thinking off the top of my head. What is wrong with having some show of our navy around Honduras? What would have been wrong with some visitation on the part of a ship or carrier in the Dominican Republic before the coup occurred, when we had pretty good reason to believe it was going to occur?

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. This question of a show of force as an instrument in this situation has been discussed a number of times. Several times it has been discussed in connection with the Dominican Republic, in the past 18 months. We discussed a little bit yesterday on the Honduras situation.

On balance, the consensus of the government is that a show of force is in most situations not likely to have much effect on people who feel their lives depend upon their seizing power, and that it is not sound policy from the United States standpoint to make a show of force which we are not ready to follow up on. This is a bluff not apt to work.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No more gunboat diplomacy.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. If we do shoot, it is gunboat diplomacy. If we do not, it is a bluff that will be called.

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. May I say a word about our experience with this in the past in the Dominican Republic.

USE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Last year, when the regime was shaky, the provisional regime, which was not an elected regime, we a couple of times brought an aircraft carrier in and took the President out with a lot of noise and publicity for lunch aboard it. And this I think helped quite a lot. I suggested doing the same thing rather early with President Bosch when I though he was getting shaky, and he rejected the suggestion because he wanted to maintain a posture of independence with the United States.

And so we did not do it obviously. I thought we should have. But we could not do it without his permission.

The point here is he was an elected President. The other government was not elected. He was the man who went in with 60 percent of the vote. It is a different situation.

It would have been, I think, a mistake to bring a carrier in after it had gone too far. It is a question of timing. If you do not do it before things get bad, it is very difficult to do it very late in the game. If you are not prepared to back it up, you better not do it, because it won't work.

Senator MORSE. I would like to say this, Mr. Chairman.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Again, I will change in the next minute if somebody can show me that this line of approach would not be sound.

You are going to have to lose a country or two to save many. I am very much worried about the attitude if we do not do this something worse is going to happen. I am not so sure it may not be a good thing to have something worse happen in country X in order to save countries, A, B, and C.

And I do not know of a better setup than the Dominican Republic, because they did have an election, they have got constitutional processes to correct the inefficiencies or the wrongs of the Bosch administration. And by George, if we are going to go ahead now and let them go through a lot of face saving and set up what they claim is a civilian administration, but not elected, and obviously is controlled by the military, I am afraid you are going to encourage that all over Latin America.

Therefore, I am inclined to have pretty strong economic sanctions at the present time. I never said anything about a blockade. I am talking about an embargo of American goods. After all, the civilians in the Dominican Republic have got to be tought that they have some responsibility in this.

There is a question I am going to send down to you for a memorandum on how pro-civilian participation was in this coup and what civilian groups were behind it and so on, connecting it up with the information I seek on the American businessman.

But at the present time I am turning over in my head the idea that I am not so sure we should not say to the Dominicans, "If this is the grave you want to dig, bury yourself. When you are ready to come back to constitutionalism, we will be there with a helping hand."

It is going to cost us a lot of prestige abroad, and I think it is going to cause us a lot of confusion and opposition here at home among many groups in our own country. We have our own political system that we have to pay some attention to also, the rights of our own people.

I think you are going to lose a lot if you make any compromise with these people. I think you ought to say "We are through from now on until you are ready to come back to a constitutional form of government."

DO NOT CUT PROGRAMS THAT HELP PEOPLE

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, I want to confess quite frankly, Senator, that the line of argument you just put forward of losing 1 to save 2 or 3 is one which has attracted me a number of times. I think it is a defensible line of policy. So far on balance, considering all the risks, we have not chosen that line of policy in any particular case. But I do not think it can be ruled out in any case.

The other thing I wanted to say that has not been said here but I think ought to be on the record, because I do not want to conceal it from anybody—is that while we have suspended aid we have not suspended Peace Corps operations. We have not suspended the CARE or CARITAS feeding programs; or the Public Law 480 program—and this is the same position we took in the case of Peru. We feel this helps people at the bottom fringe, said they were not responsible, and we should not punish them.

Senator MORSE. I don't call that economic aid, Mr. Martin. I never have. I would help my worst enemy if he were bleeding to death. I am talking about economic aid in a sense that you are helping the economy.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I understand.

Senator MORSE. The whole people have to pay the price it seems to me of not being willing to take civilian action against what has happened down there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Anything else?

Senator MORSE. I may not get this material to you, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Secretary until tomorrow morning.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. We will do our best to provide you answers.

EFFORTS TO PROMOTE BOSCH

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. I feel that I have imposed on this committee, and taken too much time this morning, but I would like permission to say about 5 minutes more on the basic that I put 2 years of my life into this thing. I would like to just inform the committee of a few things.

I don't want the committee to have the impression that we only pay lip service to Bosch in our support for him. I worked to get support for him very hard. I did things like bringing him together with members of the oligarchy who had voted against him, and with American businessmen, I gave a series of dinners in my embassy trying to get support among them for him. I spoke to many, and hundreds privately.

In July I came up here and I went to considerable effort to get President Kennedy to associate himself with me in my visit, had a photograph taken, and then went back and made a statement publicly reiterating our support for President Bosch and his government, and had this photograph locally, so there wasn't any mistake about that. Everybody knew where we stood.

Furthermore, I made it very clear, all the time I was there, both publicly and privately—and some speeches I think I made are in the Congressional Record on this point—that we supported Bosch.

I instructed my staff at least twice they must follow this line. And my staff and the collateral missions—and it was their respon-

sibility to make sure all of the people under them followed this line. And specifically, for example, I said it was not enough to stand silent when you hear this man criticized—you must speak up affirmatively and say that the United States Government nevertheless supports this government, because it is the elected government of the Dominican people.

In the face of obvious failings and ineffectiveness of Borsch at various times, I continued this support personally to a point where I was losing the support of some of the members of the American community, and some of my Dominican friends.

I believe, also, that the thing that knocked Bosch over—we have to take these things country by country.

THE OLIGARCHY OVERTHREW BOSCH

In the Dominican Republic, I don't think anybody should conclude that the oligarchy so-called as a whole is what overthrew Bosch.

In fact, some of the so-called oligarchy in Santiago ended up being Bosch's best friends and most staunch supporters. The civilians that overthrew Bosch were the defeated political leaders, some political adventurers, some large land owners, and in the final analysis a politically naive military that was persuaded of the danger of communism, which, I think, at that moment has exaggerated.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have been called to the floor.

Senator Morse, will you keep going? And some of these newspaper people want to talk with you after you get through.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have to go to the floor, too.

STATE DEPARTMENT SUPPORT FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Mr. JOHN MARTIN. Finally, if I may just for the record say so, it has been said in the American press that I at the embassy did not keep the White House and the Department fully informed of the Dominican situation. I feel that I did. The best judges of this, of course, would be the Department and the White House. And I would welcome any inquiry, and encourage any inquiry this committee would like to make on this point.

Mr. EDWIN MARTIN. I would just like to say for the record that I had not heard this charge. I would deny it flatly. I think the reporting has been of unusually penetrating and high quality.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Amabssador, if you had heard Secretary Martin before us the other day you would have no reason to doubt that you had the complete support of Secretary Martin and the State Department. He made very clear, and the record will show, that they were thoroughly informed.

But I want to say to both of you gentleman that this has been exceedingly helpful to this committee. It has been one of our best briefings. It has been very helpful to me.

There are some policy questions here we are going to try to work out, and I am sure we can.

ALL IN THIS BOAT TOGETHER

I think one of the worst things that could develop is a strong divergence of opinion between any substantial segment of this committee and the State Department.

We are all in this boat together. If you sat here yesterday morning, when we started to go back to marking up the foreign aid bill—we were going to consider the amendment we left off with 3 or 4 weeks ago—we never got to the amendment. The rest of the morning was devoted to a general discussion of a matter of policy, as to whether or not we should not advise the President informally and unofficially through the chairman of this committee that the foreign aid bill was in a serious situation in this committee and in the Senate. All the rest of the morning was taken up with that discussion.

And the Latin American situation can create a very serious crises in connection with this foreign aid bill.

I want to do everything I can in my capacity here to try to get these things worked up. I may end up voting against foreign aid, but I will do everything I can to save everything best in foreign aid, as I see it.

I think this briefing this morning has meant a great deal to everyone of us.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

SITUATION IN VIETNAM

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—As the domestic turmoil in South Vietnam worsened, President Kennedy dispatched Defense Secretary McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Taylor on a factfinding mission in September, 1962. On October 2, they submitted their report to the President, concluding that the military campaign was making great progress but that the "Diem-Nhu government" had become increasingly unpopular. They warned that the government's further repressive actions might reverse the favorable military trends, and that moderation of domestic controls might mitigate the political crisis. However, McNamara and Taylor saw no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup, "although assassination of Diem or Nhu is always a possibility."

[The McNamara-Taylor report recommended that certain U.S. aid be withheld as a means of pressuring the South Vietnamese Government to reduce repressive practices and improve the effectiveness of its military effort. "At this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage actively a change in government," they wrote. "Our policy should be to seek urgently to identify and build contacts with an alternative leadership if and when it appears."

[The report concluded with a suggested position for presentation in Congressional testimony and in public statements: "(a) The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United States security. . . . (b) The military program in Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle. (c) The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply serious. . . . (d) The U.S. has expressed its disapproval of certain actions of the Diem-Nhu regime [and] will do so again if required. Our policy is to seek to bring about the abandonment of repression because of its effect on the popular will to resist. Our means consist of expressions of disapproval and the withholding of support from the GVN activities that are not clearly contributing to the war effort. We will use these means as required to assure an effective military program."]

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Long, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, Mr. Tillman, Mr. Yingling, and Mr. Pincus of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have a great deal of competition this morning, I may say to our witnesses. Senator Byrd is holding hearings, as you probably know on the tax bill, several of our members are on that committee, but I think we will proceed. There are several others who will come in a little later.

The committee is here to hear this morning the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have just returned from a visit to South Vietnam to report on the situation there.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you, and you may proceed in your own way. I understand you have no formal written statement but you will make a statement and then answer questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; MAJ. GEN. VICTOR H. KRULAK, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY, AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES, JOINT STAFF; AND CAPT. A.H. BERNDTSON, MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps I can introduce it very briefly and then call on General Krulak to summarize the deployment of the enemy and friendly forces in South Vietnam, after which General Taylor will report upon our appraisal of the progress in the military campaign.

As you know, the President asked General Taylor and me to visit the country to report upon the progress of the military operations against the Communist guerrilla attack on the government forces.

To do so we traveled extensively in the country. There were 5 distinct regions we felt it necessary to visit, the area south of Saigon, the Delta area, Saigon itself, which has characteristics different from the rest of the country, the coastal plain which is within the coastal plain and the 17th parallel, the area behind the plain, and the plain containing the majority of the people containing most of the people between Saigon and the 17th parallel but the area is important because the mountain tribes are being resettled and finally behind that the mountains lying behind South Vietnam and the possible trails of infiltration of personnel and equipment of North Vietnam leading from Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam.

We traveled the width and breadth of the land as you can see by these lines indicating our journeys. We visited 15 of the 43 provinces, we talked with over 170 of the U.S. and South Vietnamese military personnel. We met with between 10 and 12 province chiefs. We talked with 13 of the U.S. AID administrators in the area. We visited each of the corps headquarters, many of the divisional headquarters and many of the combat field operations.

And based on this we have certain very clear ideas and views of the progress in the military campaign. General Krulak will summarize for you, as I said, the disposition of the enemy and friendly forces and after that General Taylor will review the progress of the military operations after which he and I will be able to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

OPPOSING FORCES IN VIETNAM

General KRULAK. Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, the opposing forces in the Vietnam war are on the Vietnamese side a force built around a 9 division structure, aggregating armed men of one form or another, something over 450,000 men.

On the Viet Cong side a force built about very small units in the main, aggregating somewhere on the order of 100 or slightly over 1,000 men. They are disposed in this manner: tactically the country is divided into 4 corps areas, first to fourth, from north to south.

In the first corps area there are about 100,000 assorted Vietnamese armed men built around a structure of 2 divisions, and they are opposed by about 20,000 Viet Cong.

The Viet Cong are divided in turn into 2 parts, a hard corps regular force built around well-trained guerrilla soldiers, many of whom had their origin in North Vietnam in years past, and an irregular force recruited in the countryside who serve some full time and some part time. about 100,000 versus 20,000.

In the second corps area, until very recently, the structure was built around 3 Vietnamese divisions aggregating say, 150,000 assorted forces, versus 20-odd-thousand Viet Cong.

In the third corps area 2 Vietnamese divisions is the nut of the friendly force, versus about 25,000 Viet Cong.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many Vietnamese in the third?

General KRULAK. Third corps area 100,000 assorted, built around 2 division force, versus about 20-odd-thousand Viet Cong.

In the fourth corps area, albeit smaller, the density, both of enemy and friendly are greater. Until very recently it was built around the 2 division friendly force, versus about 30 to 35,000 Viet Cong.

Recently, the balance has been changed substantially by the withdrawal of the third division which was in the second corps tactical area, and its introduction into the fourth corps, so now there are 3 Vietnamese divisions in the fourth corps area, a hard strength of 120,000-odd, versus a Viet Cong strength of 30,000-odd. And the second corps has been correspondingly reduced.

ARMAMENTS

With respect to their armament: the Vietnamese divisional forces are armed lightly in terms of American divisions. It is much smaller, about 9,000 men, and its armament is considerably lighter. Its armament is good, its training is good. They have all passed through a series of training centers organized and supervised by U.S. trainers. Their tactics are sound, their performance of duty is substantially good.

The Viet Cong, on the other side, the hard corps of the whole force which you may have added up comes to slightly over 100,000, the hard corps is 20 to 25,000, are dedicated, well-trained guerrilla jungle fighters. The irregular force varies with the length of time that they have served in the Viet Cong forces.

Their armament, essentially light weapons, rifles, carbines, machine guns, light and medium mortars and recoilless rifles, 50 and 75 millimeter caliber. Their armament, of course, is substantially inferior to that of the Vietnamese whom they oppose.

This represents the line-up of forces against which General Taylor will project his discussion of the operations in progress now.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

General Taylor?

REASONS FOR VISIT

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, Secretary McNamara has indicated the primary purpose of our visit to South Vietnam was to find out how the war was going, are we winning, if so, are we winning fast enough, and further more has the conduct of the campaign been adversely affected by the political event

which took place in South Vietnam starting in May, I refer primarily to the Buddhist demonstrations and the student demonstration.

The Secretary and I went to South Vietnam, not uninformed. Obviously we have been watching this area with great attention ever since our step-up program started 2 years ago in this country. We were aware that the indicators which we had, were receiving in the Pentagon by our weekly reports indicated a favorable trend of the conduct of military operations.

On the other hand, we saw with concern the adverse political reports and we went out primarily to balance the two off and see if we could determine really what the true situation was.

I would like to invite your attention to the chart which shows those so-called military indicators which lead us to believe as we departed that indeed the conduct of the war was favorable. Let me just run over each one and comment on a few of them.

First, the number of government-initiated operations would measure the offensive activities of the South Vietnamese forces. The small operations are 2 company size or less, large operations large than 2 company size.

You will notice we have 3, really 4 months, June, July, August and September of this year. September is estimated in the sense that only 20 days of reporting was in when we got the figures so this is really a projection of the last 10 days.

The column on the right indicates the situation a year ago.

You can see that insofar as offensive actions are concerned, a very encouraging upward swing. These forces are really getting into the field now and have been in the last year, are pursuing the Viet Cong, cleaning wide areas and keeping the Viet Cong constantly on the move.

RATIOS OF KILLED TO WOUNDED

In terms of casualties, first I would say this figure is far more reliable than it was, say, 2 years ago when I first went out in October of 1961, I was impressed with the unreliability in all of the intelligence which we have had.

From that time on we have had enough American observers in these units so we actually count the bodies on the field. So I would say I have considerable confidence in the Viet Cong killed figure and you can see that it has maintained a high which was roughly the same as the year before, but in terms of activity resulted from many more military operations, actually the enemy is thinning out in many areas and it is hard to find enough to kill.

The friendly killed also has been fairly regular in both years. This is a bloody war, this is a costly war and I might comment that the ratio of killed to wounded is much higher on the killed side than any war we have ever engaged in.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Pardon me, ratio of what?

General TAYLOR. The ratio of killed to wounded.

In most of our wars, World War II the figure runs one killed to 5 or 6 wounded. In South Vietnam the ratio is 4 killed to one wounded. In other words——

The CHAIRMAN. That is that?

General TAYLOR. Four killed to one wounded.

This combat right at 20–20 paces in the jungle where a man is blasting with a weapon and the chance of his being killed is much higher than has been the case in the so-called conventional war.

WEAPONS LOST

The next item is the weapons loss, which is always an interesting indicator. We realize that the enemy's great problem is weapons and ammunition and food. He has increased his ability to get weapons rather notably. It goes up to as high as 802 in September in contrast to something over 400 a year ago.

Senator MORSE. I don't want to interrupt as a rule but on this weapons business, what kinds of weapons do they have? Are these Russian weapons?

General TAYLOR. These are light weapons, pistols, carbines, rifles.

Senator MORSE. Russian made?

General TAYLOR. It is hard to say. I have looked at many displays and they are almost never marked. It is believed that most of them are made in Communist China. But many times they are copies of ours. For example, 75 recoilless which probably is Chinese made.

The reason for the unfavorable trend in this particular field is that we are arming more people all the time, particularly the paramilitary irregular village guard who necessarily are first in the front line where they are highly vulnerable of being hit quickly by the enemy and secondly, they are not as well trained as the regular army forces in the field.

I think it is a hazard we are bound to run as we extend our defended hamlet program. The very weapons captured have been about the same. If you look at the whole year you will find the trend has been perhaps a little favorable in our capture of enemy weapons.

DEFECTORS FROM THE ENEMY

The next item is particularly encouraging namely the defectors. The enemy are deserting, they are coming across in response to the amnesty program which Diem has proclaimed. The Secretary and I visited one of these camps where for several months the defectors are fed and clothed and taught and the local and world situation explained by the representatives of the government and then they are resettled, sometimes put in the armed forces and sometimes put back on the land.

The Secretary and I had the unusual pleasure of meeting a really hard corps second lieutenant in our visit to a camp who had been a Communist for 15 years and had finally deserted to the South Vietnamese side.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of them North Vietnamese?

General TAYLOR. Some are. Just as some on the South Vietnamese side are North Vietnamese. Just as in Korea, many of the senior commanders or a significant number of senior commanders are from the north who preferred to move south at the time of partition.

Secretary NCNAMARA. As an incidental point this particular officer we spoke to had been a Communist for 15 years, joined the Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam a year or two after he became a

Communist, joining them in 1949. In 1954 went north, was armed there and brought back battalion of some 600 men from North Vietnam into South Vietnam in 1955.

Senator AIKEN. Are some of them infiltrators rather than defectors?

General TAYLOR. Most of them are local people who have been recruited locally. Some like our lieutenant came down years ago.

ENEMY ATTACKS

The next 2 items represent the activity of the enemy in initiating incidents and attacks. An incident is almost anything, any kind of hostile action on the part of the enemy, and the trend was downward all through 1963 until September when it turned up rather sharply. The reason there is again the increased number of fortified hamlets which I will discuss later, a program which menaces the heart of the Viet Cong movement.

By keeping the populace away from the Viet Cong, and sealing up the sources of recruits and also of food which are essential to the continued life of the guerrillas in the field, hence there have been an increased number of attacks on the villages trying to get in.

ENEMY STRENGTH REMAINS THE SAME

Now, as to strength, General Krulak has already given you the figure. It is always significant and almost in some ways inexplicable that we kill all these people year after year yet we say the strength remains essentially the same.

I would emphasize we are talking about the hard corps and it is run by estimates between 20 and 25,000, the figure there is 21 to 23,000.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is killed?

General TAYLOR. No. They are the hard corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Hard corps, Viet Cong.

General TAYLOR. I would emphasize how uncertain our figures are on it. We simply do that by the continued existence of units, we know a unit is in existence. We know the past strength of that unit and we assume that strength has not been diminished by the movement, by either recruiting or by moving the irregular guerrilla types into the hard corps category. Because there has been a decrease in the irregulars. You will notice it goes in June, 85, 8276, to 70 and 70,000 in September, whereas the estimated strength a year ago was 90,000.

So, there is an overall net decrease but the hard corps we consider to be constantly refreshing itself, or restoring its strength by pulling up the irregulars who look most promising.

DEFECTORS TO THE VIET CONG

Senator CARLSON. General, you mentioned the defectors from the Viet Cong. What about the defectors in reverse from the people who live there?

General TAYLOR. The actual armed intervention?

Senator CARLSON. Those who go over to the Viet Cong.

General TAYLOR. There are very few, very few we can identify as actually going to the Viet Cong. It is hard to determine just as we have a deserter in the United States who may go back to farm on his own land and not go to the enemy, so actually what happens to the deserters we don't know but the desertion rate in the armed forces is very low.

Senator CARLSON. What about the citizens generally?

General TAYLOR. We know a great deal of the recruiting that goes on is still enforced recruitment in the villages, of course, which are still under control of the Viet Cong. A primary military objective of the campaign is to get government control in these areas so that the pressures to obtain recruits can be less on the population.

VIETNAMESE ARMY ON THE MOVE

Well this, gentleman, was the picture we had based on statistics when we took off some 10 days ago for South Vietnam. The question was on the ground, would we verify that these statistics indicated indeed the true situation in the military sense?

Let me then discuss the military activities under two heads: The operations against the Viet Cong as we found them in the field, and the strategic hamlet program, because the two together, one represents the offensive side of the war, the second, the defensive side.

We found that indeed in the course of the last year the Vietnamese army had got on the move. The previous criticism, particularly 2 years ago, was that the Vietnamese army was largely tied down to static missions, they were guarding bridges, they were guarding towns, they were patrolling roads, and were not chasing the enemy, they were not taking the field. This was partially due to the fact the paramiliary forces the self-defense corps and the civil guards were not sufficiently trained to take over this kind of static job.

In the course of 2 years, however, that situation has drastically changed so that we do have enough paramilitary people to do most of the static job and to get the regular army into the field.

The Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese army had set the standard that a regular army unit should spend at least 20 out of 30 days in the field in offensive exercises. We found in the vast majority of cases that standard was being maintained—in two places it was not, in two divisions for somewhat special reasons and I so reported and commented to President Diem before I left.

We found that the clear-and-hold operations, particularly in the north, were being well conducted and well done, in other words not only was the area being swept through but then it was being held by placing defensive posts and also by starting fortified hamlets. This was not so well done in the south. I will comment later on the so-called Delta problem which remains the toughest area from a military point of view.

SUPPORT FROM THE POPULACE

We found that a favorable circumstance that the populace, the farmers, the rural population, was giving more information to the Vietnamese forces than in the past. As long as the villager is afraid

of his life, and it is known he is communicating with the government forces obviously he is not going to talk. He is not going to give intelligence. Because of the increased territorial control on the part of the government forces, that situation regarding intelligence is changing very favorably and many of the most favorable operations in which we have rounded up and killed significant numbers of the enemy have resulted primarily from obtaining accurate intelligence in advance from the farmers.

INFILTRATION ACROSS THE BORDER

Two years ago, the problem of controlling the border, to the west, the Laotian and Cambodian border, appeared to be insoluable and probably in the long run make virtually impossible a military solution to this guerrilla war in South Vietnam.

The problem still remains but I was very much impressed with the fact that there is very little hard evidence indicating any significant infiltration across that border at the present time. It is one of those things it may be but it can't be proved and I am reasonably sure if the infiltration were of significant size it would be impossible to conceal the evidence.

On the other hand, the Secretary and I were impressed with the evidence of the infiltration of heavier weapons in the Delta areas, problably coming down the Mekong, or by water from the Gulf of Siam.

Now, to control a sea frontier there is a very large junk force which our navy has organized and does an excellent job. But nevertheless in view of the tremednous mileage of that water coastline obviously it is impossible to seal it off.

Those, I think, gentleman, are the principal comments I wanted to make about the active offensive operation against the Viet Cong. I would like now to talk about the strategic hamlet.

STRATEGIC HAMLETS

The strategic hamlet, we would call it a village, a conglomeration of rural populations running, say, a thousand to two thousand, variable in size.

There are three kinds of strategic hamlets, the so-called A, B, and C. The A type being a rather loose organization, very lightly defended hamlet within an area where the Viet Cong are no particular threat.

The other is a C hamlet which is a combat hamlet and is indeed a small tropical fortress surrounded by a deep moat, doubled-barbed wire fence, many times intertwined spiked bamboo fence in addition so it take a very determined man to get his way through even if no one is shooting at him.

Inside a C type hamlet there would be about 2 platoons, of hamlet militia. These are local dwellers. They live in the hamlet, they are the milita who farm their fields at times and other times carry weapons. They have been armed, sometimes with shotguns, sometimes with rifles, sometimes with carbines. They have been given reasonably good training in firing their weapons by our own people, so they provide the immediate guard within, behind the stockade. Also within the hamlet will be a watch tower and prob-

ably there will be a radio. There will be some signal device by which the hamlet can announce attack.

In the area outside the hamlet there are 2 kinds of irregular forces: First, the self-defense corps who are also generally living in the locality but they operate in small mobile units outside the villages, and are the first forces available to come to help the village under attack.

Then the provincial chief at the provincial capital will have in addition civil guard forces somewhat better armed, somewhat more trained to a greater degree, which can back up the self-defense forces. Then, finally, there are units of the army itself stationed throughout the area, which represents the final military force in case of an attack.

FORTIFICATION FROM ATTACK

A year or two ago a village would be attacked and sacked and long before anybody could come to help.

Now, with the fortifications which have been erected, with the alert system, with the better training on the part of all military forces, it is quite normal for a village under attack to receive help within a half hour, something like that, 15 minutes. In other words, the stockade is strong enough usually to prevent penetration.

Now all hamlets are not as good as the ones I have described particularly in the Delta, the construction of hamlets has been very difficult. That area, gentlemen, is the Delta created by the Mekong River. It is crossed by the Mekong itself, and 5 or 6 major channels, one of the great rivers of the world, and then endless canals going back and forth through.

Now, the people generally live on the perimeters, really on the banks of the canal so that it is really a long string of houses along waterways as you view this country from the air.

It obviously presents much more difficult problems just from a construction point of view to have an effective hamlet in that kind of country in contrast to the situation up in the north and you have good hard ground on the plateau and no construction difficulties at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Where are the farming areas within these villages, are they within the compound or outside?

General TAYLOR. No, they are nearby, they are not within the compound, but the fields are within easy walking distance.

Senator MORSE. I have never been there, but it is something like that canal system in Thailand near Bangkok.

General TAYLOR. More so. When you look at it from the air in the rainy season it is loose like all water. Ridges rising from the ground where the houses are and when you go down the country, the country can be traversed on foot without much difficulty.

PRESSING LOCAL OFFICIALS

Furthermore, in the south, where the hamlet program has been more difficult, the government has been pressing for more rapid action from the local officials and in our judgment they have responded by moving too fast.

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They have built without first the necessary structure which is required to give a good hamlet, and secondly, they have gone much too fast. They have not cleared the areas around villages before they have created the fortified hamlet. So as a result, numbers of villages in this area have been penetrated although none have been actually destroyed.

But the program is going too fast, and needing a reorganization, all of which we recommended to President Diem before we left.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF HAMLETS

Now, in addition to the military aspects of the hamlet program, there is important political and social aspects to it. Because the government is quite aware that it has a real problem in wooing back the rural population from the Viet Cong, I don't think it can be said that the rural population has had any basic affinity for the Communists but it is on the question of safety and being on good relationships with the guerrillas.

So it's a question of separating the rural population so the guerrillas can't get to them and then in terms of being good citizens to the central government.

In the villages the government is conducting a reasonably good civic action program. I say reasonably good because in some places it is good and in others it is deficient. In some places there will be a school built within the compound, there will be a school or school teachers provided, there will be some discipline and medical supplies, there may be some instruction in better farming methods, all the things which a thoughtful government should do for its people are slowly working their way into the program.

The magnitude of the hamlet program, the growth in the last year has been very impressive. A year ago there were 2,700 of these strategic hamlets. Today there are 8,200. Today there are, of the rural population over 9 and a half million live within these strategic hamlets representing some 76 per cent of the rural population. The program is still to continue, so that virtually all of the rural population except in what we call white areas where there is no threat will live a strategic hamlet of the A, B, or C type.

SUCCESS OF THE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WAR

In summation, then, I would like to go back and just talk about the success of the offensive and defensive war in terms of regions.

In the north, we have the first and second corps areas. There the progress has been very good. We could hardly fault anything that we saw, either in terms of the use of the military forces, or of the hamlet program.

In the third corps area, which includes Saigon, the picture was somewhat mixed. In some cases a very excellent progress, other indications that there is still considerable unfinished business.

In the south, in the Delta, we recognized, and the Diem government recognizes is the real heart of the military problem. This area has been, I wouldn't say neglected but given low priority deliberately up to now primarily because President Diem felt that last year the major effort of the Viet Cong was to cut the country in half reaching through the high land area in the second corps area,

will you indicate that, there was every evidence they were pressing through to really cut off, cut the country in 2, and hence the bulk of the military forces, the bulk of the effort was in the north, I think properly so.

Now, that situation is well in hand and it is recognized we should now start shifting the center of gravity of our military efforts into the Delta. That is being done as General Krulak indicated first by shifting the ninth division from the second corps area into the fourth so they will have 3 divisions and in addition to that, General Harkins is pressing on an entire reorientation of the program so that everything that can be used in the Delta will be moved down there at the expense of areas which are now relatively advanced in terms of pacification.

Senator CHURCH. General?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

HOW GUERRILLAS MAINTAIN THEIR STRENGTH

Senator CHURCH. How have the Communists managed to maintain their strength so well in the Delta area in view of the progress that has been made over the past 2 years in cutting off their supply sources from North Vietnam and Laos, and so forth?

General TAYLOR. Really 2 reasons: One, it is an easy area to live as a guerrilla. Food is on all sides. No problem at all. Whereas food is becoming a tough problem in the north primarily because of the hamlet program.

Secondly, in the south because the hamlet program was held back by the terrain and also by the strength of the Viet Cong, everything has moved slowly and has favored the side of the Viet Cong.

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I add to that, Max, that in the south we are roughly 40-odd percent of the population, the area had been under the control of the Communists for nearly 20 years. The French never really had control of the area south of Saigon, and hence, for all practical purposes it was a Communist state, and the guerrillas found no difficulty in draining off from the peasant farmers sufficient food, medicine, supplies to continue their campaigns. To a much lesser degree that is true today. But there has been an immense improvement in the control over the geography and the population of the Diem government over the past year and a half despite the fact that today we can point to these very serious weaknesses in the hamlet program and a continuation of a strong guerrilla campaign in that entire Delta area.

SUPPLY LINES TO GUERRILLAS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Couldn't you also say, General, that the contours of the southern part of Vietnam along the shore make it easier for them to supply their people from the sea there than other places?

General TAYLOR. Not only from the sea but perhaps more importantly from Cambodia, because the Mekong offers endless waterways to bring supplies and weapons.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you trace the line of the Mekong there please?

Captain BERNDTSON. Actually that goes up into here into Cambodia. This is the Delta area here.

General TAYLOR. Actually there are 6 vast arms, all vast rivers. Every one of them is like the Missouri River.

Senator SPARKMAN. The river itself is not shown.

General KRULAK. No, it is not.

Captain BERNDTSON. These are the province boundaries, you can see the Delta, the mouth.

Senator CHURCH. One of the biggest rivers in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement?

General TAYLOR. I have a little more.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him complete it and we will go through the questions.

Go ahead.

IMPACT OF POLITICAL EVENTS

General TAYLOR. As we went from north to south discussing the war and checking progress, the Secretary and I were extremely interested in asking all of our people whether the political events in Saigon and other urban areas, the Buddhist issue, the student issue had any visible effect on the military operations, did they find any reaction from their counterparts in the Vietnamese army.

Away from the immediate area of Saigon, I found, I can recall, absolutely no one who felt that the political situation had affected in the slightest the conduct of the military campaign.

The closer you got to Saigon, obviously, one would not be surprised to find that the political events inside the capital did lop over to some extent, did have some impact on the people nearby. It was not so much the issue of principle involved but the individual interests of officers who may have had their children, a child picked up by the police at the school and put in jail.

Well, obviously the frame of mind of an officer who has had that happen is not good toward the Diem government so there was some indication, and obviously when that kind of situation arose that the individual who was very deeply affected as an individual, and was certainly hostile toward the government that would do that kind of thing. But insofar as having this so widespread as to constitute a military problem or even to affect the performance of military duty on the part of an affected individual we found no evidence to that effect.

My overall conclusion was that while it is quite likely that the Diem government is unpopular, even detested in the mind of some or perhaps many of the military leaders, the hatred of communism and the determination to crush out the guerrilla enemy is a far greater source of motivation than any political feeling toward the local government.

HOW WOULD WE KNOW WE WON?

Another thing that we obviously were considering all the time is are we, the United States, going to be in South Vietnam forever. Can we put a time limit, a time objective on our efforts, and the first is what would we consider to be a definition of success. In

other words, how would we know we had won the war, if indeed we think we are winning now.

Obviously in a guerrilla war it is almost impossible to say that you have finally eliminated the final guerrilla. That has been shown in many of the guerrilla wars of history and recent years that one never exterminates the enemy. At some points the enemy may well give up or become so insignificant as to cease to be anything more than a nuisance in the police sense.

It seems to us we should define success from the point of view of the United States as being that point where we have so reduced the insurgency campaign of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, that henceforth it can be handled by the normal security forces of South Vietnam. Taking that as a rough definition in a military sense then we talked to all these advisers and our own military people.

It started with General Harkins and it went down to majors and captains and so forth. What are we doing, when can we clean out the guerrillas so they don't affect the normal life of the local population? After listening to them we then applied a safety factor because they were more optimistic than I was or the Secretary, and came out generally feeling this way, that in the north the first and second corps, and perhaps half of the third corps, that by the end of 1964 the situation, if no new factor comes into the picture, if the same energy or increased energy is placed into the field campaign, that that northern area can be turned back to the Vietnamese, feeling they have the resources of their own and their own leadership to control the situation.

FACTORS WHICH MIGHT CHANGE SITUATION

Senator AIKEN. What new factor might come into the situation?

General TAYLOR. I beg pardon?

Senator AIKEN. What new factor might come into the situation?

General TAYLOR. Any serious political upset, an overthrow of the government, for example, in Saigon, some massive infiltration, a real shift of strength coming down from the north.

Senator AIKEN. From China?

General TAYLOR. A new campaign out of North Vietnam or conceivably out of China although that is not in my own imagination at the moment, those are the kind of things we have in mind. But if the factors in the picture remain essentially unchanged we think our estimate is a reasonably good one.

END AMERICAN EFFORT BY 1965

Now, for the Delta, Saigon south, I will put it this way, where the problem is much harder we would certainly feel we would need another year behind 1964, through calender 1964. Hence we feel those are the goals we should set for ourselves, we should resolve to press with maximum energy during this entire period, we should be training constantly the Vietnamese in those skills which they don't presently have, to take over whatever equipment they may need to continue by themselves after 1965.

When I say we would end our American effort in 1965, I don't mean literally every American be home. I think we will need the MAAG kind of mission, some specialized communicators, for exam-

ple, in the troposcatter system but nonetheless numberswise the vast bulk of our people would be home and there would be some return to normally insofar as our relationships to the South Vietnamese government are concerned.

So that is about the frame of mind in which we returned, feeling that the war itself is going well, recognizing that we have a long term problem, or a longer term problem in the Delta; that we have the resources over there now that are probably sufficient to attain victory as I have described victory by the end of 1965.

And I will close by saying General Harkins, the man on the ground with responsibility, says he has everything on the ground he needs to complete the schedule I have described.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

I have one or two questions.

DISSENTION WITHIN OUR RANKS

What puzzles me, Mr. Secretary, is it seems the newspapers as well as the magazines were almost unanimous in their view in their articles about the dissention within our own ranks; that is, the differences between military and civilian authority in the American Government. Sometimes it is the State Department versus the military and sometimes the State Department versus the CIA. I was handed this morning from the Washington Daily News a new article, you have seen these articles.

I wonder how you can explain this? Please comment on it and try to clarify the situation for us.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I will be happy to, Mr. Chairman.

I think it is natural that different components of our government assigned responsibilities in connection with the operations in Vietnam, should see the situation differently. The AID mission has one set of responsibilities, and is working with one group of people. The CIA had quite a different mission. The Defense Department still a different role. The political counselors, both in Saigon and in the State Department, were concerned with another facet. So I think that it was natural that there should be different opinions, different conclusions expressed by the several sections of the government.

One of our responsibilities was to draw these together, and determine whether it was possible to come up with a program of action which could be conscientiously supported by each of the separate divisions. This was did.

I think that it is fair to say that the report that we submitted, a report which was the responsibility of General Taylor and me to present to the President, was nonetheless endorsed fully by the representatives of the State Department, the CIA and the White House who accompanied us, and endorsed fully by Ambassador Lodge, General Harkins, and the key members of their staff at Saigon, presented to the National Security Council, and unanimously accepted by that body and endorsed by that to the President. So, I think we do have a program of action supported by all of the elements of the executive branch at the present time.

I don't wish to in any way gloss over the differences of opinion that have existed, and the differences that I think may develop in the future as each of us view the operations from a particular vantage point. As General Taylor has emphasized, there are almost 40 different wars going on in Vietnam, and one's point of view regarding the total operation is frequently restricted by the particular war that he is most closely associated with, whether it be the analysis of their economy, the analysis of the strategic hamlet program, a particular military operation, in a particular section of the country, or the appraisal of the changes, if any in the political structure of the country.

REPRESSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. He emphasized that the military didn't react to the events in Saigon adversely, but how about the other people, that is the non-military, are they reacting adversely to this Buddhist business and the political, alleged, now understand, I am repeating what I heard, of the alleged tyranny of the regime. Is this having any effect on the non-military populace?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it is fair to say that not only this government but many other governments in Southeast Asia today are carrying out programs of repression which they consider necessary to maintain their positions of power.

Such acts of repression have been going on for years in South Vietnam. They reached a peak during the period May through August. I am certain that the secret arrests, the possible brutal treatment of the prisoners after they were arrested, the uncertainty associated with day-to-day living in Saigon, in particular, eroded away some of the popular support that the government previously enjoyed, and in this type of way, which is not solely or perhaps not even primarily a military operation, the erosion of popular support is a serious factor.

It is very difficult for an American to determine how far that erosion has gone. In our view, after discussing the situation with literally hundreds of people, Vietnamese and Americans in South Vietnam, we don't believe it has progressed yet to the point where it will prevent any successful conclusion of the military campaign. It may do so in the future, and one of the points that I think all of us are agreed upon is that we must watch very carefully the possible further erosion of the foundation of support for the Diem government.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LODGE AND HARKINS

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand, then, that any alleged differences between our Ambassador and General Harkins did exist and now they have been cured?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think the Ambassador, for example, had not had an opportunity to become fully acquainted with the military operations in the brief period during which he had been in Saigon. At the time we were in Saigon he had only been there 4 or 5 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary McNAMARA. And I am certain General Harkins had been so actively pursuing his military mission that he had not had an opportunity to appraise as fully as the Ambassador had or as some of the political advisers had, the possible effects on popular support of some of the government's recent actions.

I think that in part as a result of our mission, in part simply as the result of the passage of time that there is a better understanding both there and here, among all parties of the point of view of the other party.

COORDINATING ACTIVITIES OF CIA

The CHAIRMAN. Are the activities of the CIA coordinated with the Ambassador?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir, they were never otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN. Never otherwise?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir

The CHAIRMAN. Those reports are erroneous?

Secretary McNAMARA. They are. I think the CIA has been unfairly criticized in the press for its operation in South Vietnam. The CIA, and I believe I speak correctly on this, has never acted in any way contrary to the instructions that it received from Washington and through proper channels in the Embassy in Saigon.

I think it was given a mission which is perhaps contrary to its long run role. Initially, for a variety of reasons, it was assigned a very active role in the counterinsurgency campaign, an operational role. The CIA was charged with the training of many of the Vietnamese counterinsurgency forces. To carry out that training they were provided a rather sizable budget, and they were assigned to the several hundred U.S. military special forces personnel. This occurred in 1959 and 1960, and led to a substantial operational responsibility, which the CIA carried out very ably with the assistance of the military personnel assigned to it. That responsibility has gradually been transferred to the Defense Department over the past year. There are a few tag ends left to be reassigned from CIA to defense at the present time, but, generally speaking, we now are carrying out that function, in addition to our normal military operations in South Vietnam.

In any event, I believe that the reports that the CIA acted contrary to instructions, either from the Embassy in Saigon or from the departments here in Washington are quite without foundation.

RELATIONS BETWEEN DIEM AND NHU

The CHAIRMAN. Lastly, about this international situation, Madam Nhu and Diem, is there any doubt in your mind about who is in control there and is there real feuding going on between the forces under Nhu and Diem?

Secretary McNAMARA. I can't speak with certainty of the situation. As I say, it is difficult for an American to penetrate the thoughts and even the actions of the Vietnamese.

My own view is that Diem and Nhu are directing the governmental affairs as a team. I think one needs the other. I doubt very much if one could survive without the other. Nhu is the active political manipulator. Diem is the public figure, respected by a high

percentage of the people in Vietnam, particularly those outside of Saigon.

So my first answer to your question is that I don't believe there is feuding between Diem and Nhu. I think that Nhu has a position of great power and influence in the government, but that Diem remains the final control and exercises that control.

I don't believe either of them can control Madam Nhu. We have much evidence that both have tried to do so without success. Certainly we protested vigorously to Diem about her statements and about her forthcoming trip to this country. It is a tragedy that she is in the country at a time such as this.

The CHAIRMAN. It is most peculiar.

Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. She is going to get quite a play while she is here.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Twenty-seven appearances scheduled in public.

Senator SPARKMAN. I heard some commentator this morning lamenting the fact that the press which was complaining of mistreatment by Diem's government, was the very agency that was going to play up Madam Nhu in this country.

OBJECTIVES OF STRATEGIC HAMLETS

Let me ask you this system of depriving the Communists of food, that is what the prime article is aimed at, isn't it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The strategic hamlet program——

Senator SPARKMAN. Isolate it?

Secretary MCNAMARA [continuing]. Has two objectives; one, isolating the Communists from the food supply, and two, equally important, protecting the peasants from attacks, terror raids by the Communists.

Senator SPARKMAN. Incursions. Isn't that the same plan basically that was followed in Malaya?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is very similar to the plan followed in Malaya.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was in Malaya during that time and I saw some of these villages that had been protected, and the people moved in from the countryside, and I was told at the time that one of the greatest accomplishments they were aiming at was depriving them of food.

CIA ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM

Back to this CIA, one of the things that I read about it, and I read it several times, and I think it was in this Scripps-Howard article here that was headed, " 'Arrogant' CIA Disobeys Orders in Viet Nam." That was an article that had been referred to here in the committee several different times. The statement was made that the CIA had been supporting the very forces that had been carrying out these raids or these deprivations on the Buddhist monks, even gave the amount of money. I think it said a quarter of a million dollars a day, something like that, they were spending it.

Secretary MCNAMARA. To some degree that is true, Senator Sparkman. But it was doing so under proper instructions from the Government. This was not a unilateral action on the part of CIA.

Senator SPARKMAN. But did it not create a conflict between our interests there?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It may have, and I will have a comment to make upon that a little later. But let me first describe the situation.

There was built up by direction of the government to CIA, a series of what might be called irregular forces, counterinsurgency forces type of personnel, to carry out a series of missions preventing infiltration across the border from Laos to South Vietnam, for example, staging guerrilla type operations into North Vietnam under certain circumstances, training the mountain tribesmen who are a near aborigine race, to actively support the government which they had never recognized theretofore, and carrying out counterinsurgency operations of that type.

These missions were assigned to Colonel Tung,[1] and certain of the forces under his command. Colonel Tung, in turn, was supported by military assistance from the military assistance program, primarily equipment, and by what might be called defense support funds furnished through CIA. CIA, in particular, was responsible for the training of Colonel Tung's forces and the day to day administration of the U.S. support to those forces.

At the time of the Buddhist crisis, Colonel Tung's forces were taken off what might be called their combat duties and assigned to certain duties in and around Saigon, and under the terms of that assignment did participate in the raids on the Pagodas. So, in that sense, I would say U.S.-supported rather than CIA-supported, because I don't think we should charge this responsibility to CIA.

This was a Government decision, and a Government program. CIA was the agent carrying out the instructions of the Government.

But there was U.S. support to forces that participated in the Pagodas raids, and that were not at that time primarily devoted to combat operations against the Viet Cong.

RECALL OF CIA CHIEF IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. I noticed from press reports that the Director of CIA in South Vietnam, Mr. Richardson, is to be recalled and the speculation in those news items is that he will be replaced with someone else in Saigon. Why is he being recalled if everything is in order?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think that this would be a question that John McCone should answer rather than I. I am completely familiar with the circumstances, but I think it would be inappropriate for me to respond.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Sparkman, I asked for a meeting of the subcommittee on the Far East, to which I suggested that Mr. McCone come on this Thursday. That is the day after tomorrow.

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[1] Col. Le Quang Tung, who was assassinated during the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem on Nov. 1, 1963.

Senator SPARKMAN. Fine. I shall hope to be there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

COMMENDATION FOR GENERAL HARKINS

Secretary McNamara, how long has General Harkins been in Vietnam?

Secretary MCNAMARA. He will have been there 2 years next January or February.

May I say one further word, Senator Hickenlooper?

I think it is my strong personal impression, and I believe it is shared by General Taylor and the Chiefs, we have no other military commander abroad today who has done a better job than General Harkins.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had no criticism.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I knew you hadn't, I wanted to report this to the committee, because I was surprised when I arrived at Saigon that there had been newspaper reports both there and here that among our other responsibilities was the one of relieving General Harkins from his command. It amazed me even to hear those reports, and thinking you had heard those, too, I wanted to comment on the effectiveness with which he had carried out his assignment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have a particular curiosity about this area and some of the happenings that have gone on.

COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION OF VIETNAM AID

I have been down there 2 or 3 times and participated in a little investigation one time growing out of some rather startling charges which were made by this same newspaper we have been talking about, except another writer.[2]

The result of our investigation at that time disclosed as far as we could find that the source of the information upon which this reporter based his story was a psychopath in the aid program. A man who was definitely a psychopath with delusions of being put upon and watched from all corners, and eyes were looking at him, and they eventually put him under a series of treatments. The second source of the story was a discredited broker who had been thrown out of the Philippines, who had migrated over to Vietnam in order to try to sell a bunch of questionable merchandise to the Vietnamese, and they wouldn't buy. Based upon, as far as we could find, the interesting stories—and we talked to these people, too—we got the same story from them. The broker was shortly after that asked to leave Vietnam officially, and so on.

I did visit the military school and, incidentally, General Taylor, is the military school still operating up north in about the Second Division area?

General KRULAK. Yes, sir, it is. At Hue, sir.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

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[2] In December, 1959, the Foreign Relations Committee investigated charges of corruption in U.S. aid to Vietnam, raised in the Scripps-Howard press.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was impressed at the time by the plans which they had, although the school was not operating as a full 4-year school at that time, when I was there.

Now, one other question, and then I have a series of a few questions that I would like to ask.

BUDDHIST DISTURBANCE

In connection with this business of the Buddhist disturbance, not having been there for several years I don't have any firsthand impressions except those that I got at that time. In the time I was in Saigon I never heard the least suggestion of any kind of a conflict between religions in Vietnam.

I never heard the slightest suggestion that any religion, Buddhist or otherwise, was being put upon or being given treatment that was not fair and equitable. Suddenly this spring we find this Buddhist explosion in Vietnam.

I wonder if you found, either of you, any evidence, whether it is conclusive or not is beside the point, but any evidence that actually some of the Buddhist leaders are infiltrated a little bit by Communist propaganda to revolt against the government.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I can answer that, I believe. I have a strong personal impression and opinion on the subject.

First, Buddhism in South Vietnam in contrast to Buddhism, let's say, in Ceylon or other parts of Southeast Asia, is not a religion in any normal sense of the word. It is a very loosely organized concept and philosophy. There has never been a formal organizational structure to the comparable structure of the Catholic Church or comparable to the structure of the religions elsewhere in the world.

Undoubtedly, the initial incidents, the May 8th incident and those that immediately followed it, were religious in character. But very quickly after that, the movement became a captive of political opportunists. I hesitate to say that they were primarily Communists. I rather doubt that they were. Undoubtedly some Communists infiltrated.

Almost certainly it shifted from a primarily religious attack to an attack by Diem's political opponents, and certainly in the later weeks it was dominated by political opponents as contrasted to religious personnel.

DOUBTS PERSECUTION OF BUDDHISTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did you find evidence that prior to these outbursts or outbreaks which we all, of course, regret and which were tragic, that there had been actual religious persecution of the Buddhists or a denial to the Buddhists of the right to practice their religion?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We heard some charges that Catholics or Catholic-activity had received certain forms of preferential treatment within Vietnam but I would say quite frankly that these are far less than the preferential forms of treatment that are granted to certain religious groups elsewhere in the world. So I don't believe that in any sense of the word a conflict between Catholics and Buddhists was the primary cause of the crisis.

General TAYLOR. Can I make a comment there?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General TAYLOR. I asked this question which was an intriguing one, we asked this many places. I discussed this with one of the senior Vietnamese generals over a period of time, I just can't get my hand on this. He said there was essentially at the outset a competition for government privilege between the Buddhists and the Catholics in certain provinces. That in numbers of provinces the provincial chiefs were Catholics. There are many privileges a common citizen seeks in time of war. He wants to permit to travel. He wants a permit to sell his goods, endless restrictions of that sort, and the complaint of this general was it was largely the Catholics who were getting the breaks from the government.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, General.

NEWSPAPER ALLEGATIONS AGAINST CIA

Mr. Chairman, I want to put this article from the Washington Daily News of October 2 in the record, because I want to canvass these allegations.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Daily News, Oct. 2, 1963]

"ARROGANT" CIA DISOBEYS ORDERS IN VIET NAM

"SPOOKS" MAKE LIFE MISERABLE FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

(By Richard Starnes, Scripps-Howard staff writer)

SAIGON.—The story of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in South Viet Nam is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power.

Twice the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, according to a high United States source here.

In one of these instances the CIA frustrated a plan of action Mr. Lodge brought with him from Washington, because the agency disagreed with it.

This led to a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson, chief of the huge CIA apparatus here. Mr. Lodge failed to move Mr. Richardson, and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were unable to resolve the conflict, and the matter is now reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy.

It is one of the developments expected to be covered in Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's report to Mr. Kennedy.

OTHERS CRITICAL, TOO

Other American agencies here are incredibly bitter about the CIA.

"If the United States ever experiences a 'Seven Days in May' it will come from the CIA, and not the Pentagon," one U.S. official commented caustically.

("Seven Days in May" is a fictional account of an attempted military coup to take over the U.S. Government.)

CIA "spooks" (a universal term for secret agents here) have penetrated every branch of the American community in Saigon, until non-spook Americans here almost seem to be suffering a CIA psychosis.

An American field officer with a distinguished combat career speaks angrily about "that man at headquarters in Saigon wearing a colonels uniform." He means the man is a CIA agent, and he can't understand what he is doing at U.S. military headquarters here, unless it is spying on other Americans.

Another American officer, talking about the CIA, acidly commented: "You'd think they'd have learned something from Cuba but apparently they didn't."

FEW KNEW CIA STRENGTH

Few people other than Mr. Richardson and his close aides know the actual CIA strength here, but a widely used figure is 600. Many are clandestine agents known only to a few of their fellow spooks.

Even Mr. Richardson is a man about whom it is difficult to learn much in Saigon. He is said to be a former OSS officer, and to have served with distinction in the CIA in the Phillipines.

A surprising number of the spooks are known to be involved in their ghostly trade and some make no secret of it.

"There are spooks in the U.S. Information Service, in the U.S. Operations mission, in every aspect of American official and commercial life here," one official—presumably a non-spook—said.

"They represent a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone," he added.

Coupled with the ubiquitous secret police of Ngo Dinh Nhu, a surfeit of spooks has given Saigon an oppressive police state atmosphere.

The Nhu-Richardson relationship is a subject of lively speculation. The CIA continues to pay the special forces which conducted brutal raids on Buddhist temples last Aug. 21, altho in fairness it should be pointed out that the CIA is playing these goons for the war against communist guerillas, not Buddhist bonzes (priests).

HANDS OVER MILLIONS

Nevertheless, on the first of every month, the CIA dutifully hands over a quarter million American dollars to pay these special forces.

Whatever else is buys, it doesn't buy any solid information on what the special forces are up to. The Aug. 21 raids caught top U.S. officials here and in Washington flat-footed.

Nhu ordered the special forces to crush the Buddhist priests, but the CIA wasn't let in on the secret. (Some CIA button men now say they warned their superiors what was coming up, but in any event the warning of harsh repression was never passed to top officials here or in Washington.)

Consequently, Washington, reacted unsurely to the crisis. Top officials here and at home were outraged at the news the CIA was paying the temple raiders, but the CIA continued the payments.

It may not be a direct subsidy for a religious war against the country's Buddhist majority, but it comes close to that.

And for every State Department aide here who will tell you, "Dammit, the CIA is supposed to gather information, not make policy, but policy-making is what they're doing here," there are military officers who scream over the way the spooks dabble in military operations.

A TYPICAL EXAMPLE

For example, highly trained trail watchers are an important part of the effort to and Viet Cong infiltration from across the Laos and Cambodia borders. But if the trail watchers spot incoming Viet Congs, they report it to the CIA in Saigon, and in the fullness of time, the spooks may tell the military.

One very high American official here, a man who has spent much of his life in the service of democracy, likened the CIA's growth to a malignancy and added he was not sure the White House could control it any longer.

Unquestionably Mr. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor both got an earful from people who are beginning to fear the CIA is becoming a Third Force, co-equal with president Diem's regime and the U.S. Government—and answerable to neither.

There is naturally the highest interest here as to whether Mr. McNamara will persuade Mr. Kennedy something ought to be done about it.

JOURNALISTIC VIOLENCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is an extremely disturbing situation because this story is a story of violence, journalistic violence, and allegations of violence.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the title of it?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is this story in the News.

From your standpoint, I think we have to know one way or the other, we have to find out, the truth or the falsity of these statements or the foundation or lack of foundation.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is a copy for you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to put the whole article in, and then I want to go down through this article, Mr. Secretary, and I am going to ask you questions about each allegation in this thing, and I would either like to lay this ghost, or I would like to find out what the truth is about these startling allegations.

First, in the first paragraph,

> The story of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in South Viet Nam is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power.

Do you have a short succinct comment on that statement?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do, Senator Hickenlooper. I would like to preface my remarks by saying, however, that I can only answer based on the knowledge I have.

My knowledge may be incomplete. My knowledge, however, is based on a close association with the governmental decisions in Washington relating to the assignment of responsibility to CIA in South Vietnam and it is also based upon a discussion of the problem in Saigon and elsewhere in South Vietnam with both members of the Embassy staff and members of CIA. And beyond that it is based on discussion with a representative of CIA who accompanied General Taylor and me to South Vietnam.

So while I wish to qualify my answer by saying it can only be based on the knowledge I have, not the knowledge I don't have, nonetheless I believe the knowledge I have to be a sufficient basis for the answer I am going to give you and would simply say that I have no evidence whatsoever to support the charges in the first paragraph.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. From your standpoint the charges are unfounded with in the limits of your knowledge?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe them to be so.

CIA CARRIED OUT INSTRUCTIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Moving to the second paragraph it says,

> Twice the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, according to a high United States source here.

Do you have any evidence that the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge?

Secretary MCNAMARA. None whatsoever. On the contrary, I have some evidence they have faithfully carried out the instructions they have received both from Washington and also from the Embassy in Saigon.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, within the limits of your knowledge—and General Taylor, if you disagree with any of these I would be delighted to have you inject any comment.

General TAYLOR. I shall. I am in entire accord.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, Mr. Secretary, and I take this it will go for General Taylor as a result of his investigation and knowledge, the second paragraph, within your knowledge is unfounded?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe so.

CIA COOPERATED IN CARRYING OUT PLANS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Moving to the third paragraph:

In one of these instances the CIA frustrated a plan of action Mr. Lodge brought with him from Washington, because the agency disagreed with it.

Secretary McNAMARA. First, it implies Mr. Lodge brought a plan of action with him from Washington. I don't know of any formal plan of action he brought with him.

Certainly he must have had some idea in his mind what he could do when he arrived in Saigon, but I think to imply he took a formal plan of action endorsed by the Government with him to Saigon constituting some major change in approach is untrue.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And the CIA frustrated it.

Secretary McNAMARA. Secondly, I have no reason to believe they frustrated any plan of action he took with them or any plan he had when he arrived.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you then say within your knowledge so far as you know the third paragraph is unfounded?

Secretary McNAMARA. I do.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Senator yield at this point?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did the CIA collaborate in carrying out the plan that has been outlined by General Taylor and yourself as our approach to the solution of the problems in South Vietnam?

Secretary McNAMARA. The CIA has always, to the best of my knowledge, cooperated completely in carrying out the plan of action agreed to both here and in South Vietnam.

RELATIONS BETWEEN LODGE AND RICHARDSON

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, moving to the fourth paragraph, I shall read it,

This led to a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson chief of the huge CIA apparatus here. Mr. Lodge failed to move Mr. Richardson, and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were unable to resolve the conflict, and the matter is now reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy.

Now, my question: Within your knowledge was there what you would describe, or anybody else could describe as a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson?

Secretary McNAMARA. I know of none, Senator Hickenlooper. But I obviously have but little knowledge of circumstances under which such a confrontation might have taken place. But I know of none.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not asking you to speculate on Mr. McCone or the Secretary of State except those matters within your personal knowledge.

Now, do you have any personal knowledge that would support the statement, for this second sentence, "Mr. Lodge," and I am quoting:

Mr. Lodge failed to move Mr. Richardson and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were

unable to resolve the conflict and the matter is not reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy.

Within your knowledge, Mr. Secretary, is that statement founded or do you know—or unfounded? In other words, do you have any knowledge that would give any substance or substantial foundation for that statement?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, first let me say that it is quite clear, I think, in the mind of all of us that the Ambassador is the head of the country team, and he is under specific orders from the President, as are the other members of the country team, that he is to carry out those responsibilities, and, therefore, the implication that Richardson failed to do something that the Ambassador wished him to do and that the Ambassador did not have the power or the authority to order him to do it or in the event that he failed to accept such an order to order him out of the country is an implication I can't accept.

THE AMBASSADOR IS BOSS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My last question after I get through with these questions was going to be who is the boss in Vietnam.

Secretary MCNAMARA. There is absolutely no question as to who is the boss in Vietnam, the Ambassador is. That doesn't mean that General Harkins normally receives his orders on military operations through the Ambassador. Those orders are sent through the proper chain of command from the President through the Joint Chiefs to General Harkins.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to hurry along, and I don't want to circumscribe your answer in any way, but I do want to get through with it.

The fifth paragraph, which starts, "It is one of the developments expected to be covered in Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's report to Mr. Kennedy"—I will pass over that because I suppose that would be a general matter that would come under your general examination while you were there.

Secretary MCNAMARA. We did examine it and we did comment to the President upon it.

"SEVEN DAYS IN MAY"

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, moving down to the sixth paragraph beginning after the subtitle "Others Critical, Too," it says

> Other American agencies here are incredibly bitter about the CIA.
> "If the United States ever experiences a 'Seven Days in May' it will come from the CIA, and not the Pentagon," one U.S. official commented caustically.

In your examination of this situation, did you find any evidence of any substance whatsoever that would give a foundation or substance for that kind of statement?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I did for the latter half of it. I don't believe "Seven Days in May" would come from the Pentagon.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But it is the last phrase of that sentence. I am talking about the whole connotation.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir, I found no evidence to support that, Senator Hickenlooper.

CIA PENETRATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN SAIGON

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, then, there is a parenthesis there, and what I will refer to as paragraph 7, beginning "CIA 'spooks' ", it says:

> CIA 'spooks' (a universial term for secret agents here) have penetrated every branch of the American community in Saigon, until nonspook Americans here almost seem to be suffering a CIA psychosis.

In your examination and investigation, or within your knowledge, is there any substantial foundation for that allegation in this article?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I know of none. I didn't associate with more than a handful of Americans in Saigon, and, hence, I can't speak in my frame of mind of those I didn't meet, but I saw no evidence of whatsoever that CIA penetrated every branch of the community.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And nothing came to your attention that would support this?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I saw no evidence of this.

CIA AT MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Moving to paragraph 8, and General Taylor, I would think, should have come in contact with this in some way, because it refers to a military officer, it says:

> An American field officer with a distinguished combat career speaks angrily about "that man at headquarters in Saigon wearing a colonel's uniform." He means the man is a CIA agent, and he can't understand what he is doing at U.S. military headquarters here, unless it is spying on other Americans.

Now, I will ask either you or General Taylor whether that military outburst occurred to you or was brought to your attention in investigation.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Perhaps we should both respond. No such comment was ever made to me and I think that it was the opinion of the military officers whom I spoke to, some to whom had actually served under the direction of CIA in carrying out the special forces training, that the CIA agents, some of whom are actually military personnel on semi-permanent assignment to CIA, were brave and imaginative and acting fully in accordance with instructions they had received from the government, but I would like to hear General Taylor.

General TAYLOR. I think this is one area where our judgment had some basis, because we talked to endless numbers of our American military officers, and I never heard any criticism of CIA from any of them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that within your knowledge or as the result of your investigation there is no foundation for that statement?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I an not saying, you can't say that the statement never was made by anybody, but within your knowledge?

General TAYLOR. I never heard anything like that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But, within your knowledge and experience.

General Taylor, as one of our completely top and most experienced military men, wouldn't it be your opinion that if a situation of that kind had come to the point where "An American field officer with a distinguished combat career" felt so keenly about this that he would talk to either the reporters or all and sundry that he would own an obligation to discuss this very serious matter with you—I say, wouldn't that be the normal thing to do?

General TAYLOR. Yes, it would be entirely out of character in the bahavior of an officer not to speak on that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am going to skip over the next paragraph because I don't want to canvas every paragraph in this.

The article is such an inflammatory castigation of operations there—and some of it without specification—that is is rather difficult to get right down to specific questions there.

Senator LAUSCHE. Bourke, you are showing great skill as a lawyer. I have never seen it better exhibited in this room.

CIA ACCOUNTABILITY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you, going down under the heading, the subheading—"Few Know CIA Strength," and under the fifth small paragraph I quote, "They represent a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone,' he added"—that is quoting some mysterious source of information. Did you find any evidence to support a statement that the CIA considered itself or is actually totally unaccountable to anyone?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, certainly not, and I want to differentiate now between an opinion on whether the Government has properly assigned responsibilities to CIA on the one hand, from an opinion as to the manner in which they have carried out responsibilities assigned to them on the other.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand.

Secretary MCNAMARA. With respect to the latter point, I have no evidence whatsoever that the CIA has operated loosely, contrary to instructions or without instructions. On the contrary, the CIA's operations are controlled very carefully and at very high levels within the executive branch, and I feel that I, myself, am fully informed about them in all corners of the world, and General Taylor, I think, would say the same.

I think you should hear from him on this point.

General TAYLOR. I would simply say that is true. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are fully informed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand your position, and I am trying to differentiate, myself. Certainly there can be disagreement between the propriety sometimes of the assignment of missions, but when a mission is assigned under proper authority the question here is not a dispute on the assignment of missions.

The question here is a statement that runs all through this article that the CIA is a complete law unto itself and it is not answerable to anyone, and it is an arrogant, as the heading says, arrogant CIA, and isn't taking, won't obey orders. That is the frame within which I am attempting to hold these questions.

I am not trying to talk about tactics now or particular manipulation or particular performance of individual duties. I am talking about the question of authority, autonomy, and these charges of complete irresponsibility from the standpoint of answerability of the CIA.

The last paragraph under that subheading to which I referred, the Nhu-Richardson relationship, and the Buddhist raids, I think you covered that, Mr. Secretary, so I will not—I mean I think you covered the association with the CIA there.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think I did. Some of the CIA people had trained some of the people who had participated in the raids.

SATISFACTORY INTELLIGENCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Under the heading "Hands Over Millions" under that first paragraph I think there is a color of truth in that to the extent that the CIA furnishes funds for many of these, but the objection I would find to that statement is the twist that is put on it which my own guess is that it is a support operation, but is is presented as something insidious and so on.

Now, then, the next paragraph under "Hands Over Millions" it says:

> Whatever else it buys it doesn't buy any solid information on what the special forces are up to. The August 21 raids caught top U.S. officials here and in Washington flat-footed.

Now, is it true or is it not true that the CIA has quite generally been able to furnish information in advance on at least major and substantial movements in that area?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. I believe that considering we are operating in an oriental state, the CIA's intelligence has been quite satisfactory.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is normal to say that itinerant raids by small parties suddenly rushing out of the jungle and striking and then moving back can certainly not be anticipated. We can't have an informer in every small raiding group of a general warfare type.

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Having been over through that country I can appreciate, at least from a layman's standpoint, some of the difficulties there.

I think I am about through, Mr. Chairman.

DAVID HALBERSTAM'S CHARGES

The CHAIRMAN. While you are looking at the next paragraph, I just wanted to call the witness' attention to an article by David Halberstam of the New York Times. Do you happen to know him?

Secretary McNAMARA. I have met him.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he more responsible would you say than the others? His articles are not as flamboyant but with regard to CIA they seem to support the thesis of this other one by Mr. Starnes. Do you have any comment?

Secretary McNAMARA. What specific points does he make?

The CHAIRMAN. About this matter of the CIA differences with the Ambassador. The headline is "Lodge and CIA Differ on Policy,

Ambassador and Agency Chief at Saigon Clash on Conduct of War." This is October 3, Saigon, by David D. Halberstam.

This is the sort of thing that if it is untrue it certainly is doing a great deal of harm because we are accustomed to thinking the New York Times, at least, is a responsible newspaper.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I can't speak to whether John Richardson had a different point of view than Ambassador Lodge may have had on some aspect of the U.S. operations in Vietnam. I think that is entirely possible. I don't know that it is true or it wasn't true. But I could visualize it being true.

But the fact that it is true is really unimportant because the Ambassador, as I said before, is by specific direction of the President the head of the country team, and as such he has full authority to direct all members of the country team. Whether one member or another had a point of view different from the Ambassador should not in any way influence our policy or the application of that policy.

AN INCORRECT IMPRESSION

The CHAIRMAN. These articles seem to leave the impression that the CIA doesn't accept that particular thesis. That he feels he is directed from Washington and he is not under the Ambassador.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, that just is not true, that is an incorrect impression.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean it is incorrect as to the CIA, Mr. Richardson's, in this instance, own attitude or as a matter of policy.

Secretary McNAMARA. It is incorrect in both counts.

The CHAIRMAN. Both counts.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did Ambassador Lodge tell you that he had received complete cooperation from Mr. Richardson?

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't want to try to speak for Ambassador Lodge on his relationships with Richardson.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am just asking on what he told you.

Secretary McNAMARA. At no time did he indicate that Mr. Richardson had failed to carry out, to the best of his ability, an instruction given to him by Ambassador Lodge.

CIA INDEPENDENCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, the last paragraph under that subheading, "Hands Over Millions" is as follows:

> And for every State Department Aide here who will tell you 'Dammit, The CIA is supposed to gather information, not make policy, but policy-making is what they are doing here', there are military officers who scream over the way the spooks dabble in military operations."

Did you learn or have you learned that the CIA is making independent policy in Vietnam independently of directions or programming in their instructions?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir, I have no evidence that is the case either there or here. Nor have I any experience of military officers screaming about the way spooks dabble in military operations. I do want to say there has been a transfer of certain military operations of CIA in South Vietnam from CIA to the Defense

Department, this at my recommendation and the full concurrence of CIA, John McCone, and at the direction of the President.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It would seem to me it would be perfectly normal for the heads of agencies to discuss various phases of operations and to express their own opinions from their viewpoints prior to the making of a decision, is that quite customary?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, that is certainly so.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there anything wrong with that?

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is the function of the country team to serve as a body within which individual opinions will be expressed and out of which will come Government policy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But after individual opinions have been expressed based upon the experience or the views of the individual team heads, and a decision has been made, do you have any evidence that there has been a failure or refusal or an arrogance in not carrying out that decision?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, I have none.

BORDER PATROLS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, moving then to the last subhead called "A Typical Example" the first paragraph says:

> For example, highly trained trail watchers are an important part of the effort to end Viet Cong infiltration from across the Laos and Cambodia borders. But if the trail watchers spot incoming Viet Congs, they report it to the CIA in Saigon, and in the fullness of time, the spooks may tell the military.

Well, of course, that connotes, at least to me, that he is trying to say that the CIA operates utterly and completely independently and that they won't tell anybody unless they get good and ready. But I rather imagine in any operation of this kind that a spotter has his chain or reporting authority which must be coordinated for the area command or the area operations, isn't that correct?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. There is no question in my mind but what the border patrol activities supported in the past by CIA, and operating with the advice and assistance of CIA, the reports of which went initially to CIA should be transferred to the Defense Department and to a large degree they already have been, and the remaining activities should be transferred and are being transferred to Defense.

But never at any time has there been anything other than the closest of cooperation between CIA and military activities in Saigon, and the impression left by this paragraph that there was a wall between the two is entirely false.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, as Secretary of Defense, and also General Taylor, do you have any complaints of any importance or substance with the way information is handled along these lines or do you feel there is a concealment of information or a withholding of information?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, I have no feeling there is a withholding.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On that part of CIA or any of these trail watchers?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have no feeling there is withholding of information.

General TAYLOR. This suggests that CIA actually runs the operation and controls the report. This is a Vietnamese operation and all the CIA does is advise them. If there is any fault in reporting it is the Vietnamese fault and not CIA's.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand. I am only trying to develop the connotation of this whole article. I said it was an article of violence and it is an article of violence and I am just trying to find out whether there is a basic fibrous substance of truth in it or whether it is unfounded.

I am sure you haven't talked to everybody, and I am only asking within the competence of your own investigation and knowledge and responsibilities.

CAN THE WHITE HOUSE CONTROL THE CIA?

The second paragraph of this last subheading says;

> One very high American official here, a man who has spent much of his life in the service of democrary, likened the CIA's growth to a malignancy, and added he was not sure even the White House could control it any longer.

Well, leaving out somebody's opinion as to whether any organizations is a malignancy or not, do you have any feeling as to whether or not the White House can control the activities of the CIA?

Secretary MCNAMARA. As I stated earlier, the operations of the CIA are reviewed by and responsive to personnel in the executive branch at a very high level, and fully under the control of the President.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that from that standpoint, within your knowledge, there is no foundation to the speculation that even the White House can't control it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. There is not.

PROPER ROLE OF THE CIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The next to the last paragraph there reads as follows:

> Unquestionably Mr. McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor both got an earful from people who are beginning to fear the CIA is becoming a Third Force, co-equal with President Diem's regime and the U.S. Government—and answerable to neither.

What kind of a comment do yo have on that?

Did you get an earful that would substantiate that statement?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We did not. I would like to say beyond that, however, that I think that the article in part reflects a difference of opinion perhaps as to whether the CIA had been assigned operations that fell within what might be considered its accepted role in the Government or whether it has been assigned operations beyond that role.

I think this is a very proper question. But it should be asked of the people assigning the responsibilities to CIA and not of those who are merely carrying out the orders that they have received from properly constituted authority.

NEITHER ARROGANT NOR DISOBEDIENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, Mr. Secretary, and because I have taken more time away from other members than I should on this, considering the number here, in general, then, do you have any substantial evidence of any kind--and I realize, that there never was a military outfit where a lot of them didn't grouse about the food or somebody was disgruntled, and somebody used to say if they didn't have a bunch of bellyaching soldiers he didn't think they were any good—but I realize those things do happen and that on occasion somebody will have an irritant of one kind or another, whether it is well-founded or not, but as an investigator and both you and General Taylor and as administrators, and people in authority, did you find anything that taking this whole story, its connotation, its verbiage, the style of the story, and the impression that it created, did you find anything in Vietnam that would give a real basic substance to the allegations, the suggestions, that are contained in this story?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No. I believe the story is summed up in the headline in the 2 words "Arrogant" and "Disobeys", a headline saying "Arrogant CIA Disobeys Order in Viet Nam." I don't find they were arrogant or disobedient.

SENSATIONALIST REPORTING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that answers it. But like anything else, stories of this inflammatory nature take a hold and I presume that all the correction with facts that one can put out will never quite put the fire out, unfortunately.

I have some other clippings which I will not go into but they indicate that some other newspapers have picked it up based on these allegations, and have created in the minds of some people the fact that we have an autocratic, arrogant organization that the President can't control, you can't control, nobody can control, that is it is not within your province to control it necessarily, it is within the President's province. But that that is an uncontrolable law unto itself.

I think it is a most unfortunate article published under the so-called privilege of the press and so on by a reporter who sought sensationalism, and it seems has made a bunch of allegations here which are without foundation, at least as far as we can find in this hearing this morning. We are going to pursue this further with other departments of the Government that would have some reason to know about this, and I hope we can get further basic facts on all sides of this question.

I have a feeling that there has been a consistent organized insidious movement in this country to discredit two of our information gathering agencies, the CIA, and the FBI, and we see that crop up every once in a while. I don't say that this writer is a part of any movement of that kind, I don't know.

But unfortunately, and very dangerously, we see completely unfounded articles casting aspersions upon our information gathering agencies, and attempting in many ways to destroy them, and if we don't want information, if we want to be caught completely by surprise, then the thing to do is to destroy the information gathering

agencies. Articles of this kind, I think, are not good for our country, and not good for the joint effort which is hard enough as it is, with all the assistance and help and cooperation we can get.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, may I respond to this in just one sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

A RESULT OF THE ASSIGNMENT

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't see any evidence in this particular instance that the newspaper articles are a result of a move to discredit the CIA. I have no evidence whatsoever to support that contention, and in response to the Chairman's question to me about the New York Times reporter, I would simply say that the character of the operations assigned to CIA was such as to lead to a criticism of its operations. The criticism that, as I say, should not be directed to CIA but to those responsible for the assignment of this particular type of operation to it, and I really think that it was the type of operation assigned to it that led to this spate of articles rather than the way in which it performed those operations. My own recommendation which I don't think needs to be discussed here in relation to this matter reflected what I think was an incorrect assignment of responsibilities, the result of which was a destruction of the capability of CIA to carry out certain of its proper assignments.

You can't have an agent in charge of a covert operation whose biographical sketch appears in the New York Times. Obviously he can't any longer carry out covert operations and direct those operations.

Now, the fact that his biographical sketch appeared in the New York Times was not of his doing nor was it the result of some attempt to destroy the CIA. It was simply the result of an assignment of a function to him that could not be handled covertly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't by the slightest stretch of the imagination accuse anybody—individual writer or anybody else—ever conspiring to destroy the CIA. That isn't the point. I am talking about the net result.

Now, when under the so-called freedom of the press biographical sketches are reported and people are named in the CIA one way or the other it certainly compromises the operations of the CIA in many cases and I can understand that, and it could be done without any intention on the part of the writer to really do anything which the net result would bring.

I understand that. I am not accusing anybody. But I say that too often we see this spate here, or this volume, these concerted attacks on the FBI, we see the attacks on the CIA. They seem to come up like pigeons out of a barn when they go out to feed on occasion and then they seem to die out, and then they return to the fray with vigor.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator from Oregon.

BRING CIA UNDER CHECKS AND BALANCES SYSTEM

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I am not conspiring against the CIA but I want this record to show that I am proud to be a party to the movement in this country to bring the CIA under our checks and balance system as we have the FBI under it. I am a strong supporter of the procedures of the FBI. I shall continue to recommend that we continue to bring the CIA into check power, too. In order to carry on this kind of an examination, I think it is very important now that we get the Secretary of State and Mr. McCone before this committee, and that is all I will say about it here. But, my view are pretty well known in regard to the CIA.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND DEFENSE

Now, Mr. Secretary, are there any Vietnamese policy differences between the Department of State and the Department of Defense?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I know of none, Senator Morse.

The report that we presented to the President was endorsed unanimously by the members of the National Security Council to the President.

RETIREMENT OF COLONEL VANN

Senator MORSE. I have been advised that there is a Colonel by the name of John Paul Vann, is it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Colonel Vann, I don't know his first name, there was a Colonel Vann; he is now retired.

Senator MORSE. Did he retire or did he resign because he seemed to have some differences with American policy?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't know the reason for his retirement or resignation. It was a voluntary one in any case.

Senator MORSE. Was he a good officer?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I am told that he was a fearless officer, a brave officer, but one who was one of that small minority that misappraises the situation he find himself in, and certainly the reports that he has presented to the Chief of Staff of the Army, with whom he talked on several occasions are completely misleading in relation to the trend of events in South Vietnam.

Senator MORSE. Was he scheduled at one time to address the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then did not make the address?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Perhaps General Taylor would care to comment on that.

General TAYLOR. I found after seeing the newspaper article, I went back and reviewed the events he had been quoted as making comments about, and at one time General Hamlett, the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army indicated that he thought the Chiefs might be interested in hearing him. He was scheduled to be heard, but because of other things on the agenda there was not enough time to hear him.

Later on, when I talked to General Wheeler, the Chief of Staff of the Army, to find out whether this officer had something of real importance that the Chiefs should hear, General Wheeler said, no, and the Chiefs didn't hear him.

Senator MORSE. Was he critical of our policies, military and otherwise, in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. Was he what, sir?

Senator MORSE. Was he critical of our policies and otherwise?

General TAYLOR. I have never seen any full statement of it. He was with the 7th Division and he was critical of the operations of that 7th Division, I don't know whether his comments went beyond.

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I answer that?

I think he was very critical of them and I think for the press or the public or this committee to put any stock in it is quite contrary to the national interests. Certainly you, as a lawyer, would qualify a witness before you accepted his testimony.

QUALIFICATIONS OF THE CRITIC

This man is not qualified to speak with respect to operations throughout South Vietnam. He is qualified to speak with respect to operations in a narrow part of the country, and only partially qualified to speak with respect to those.

Senator MORSE. May I say, Mr. Secretary, as lawyer all I am seeking to do at this point is trying to find out what his qualifications are.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Exactly.

Senator MORSE. Then I will pass judgment on what I think of his criticisms if I can then find out what his criticisms are.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Right.

Senator MORSE. I know nothing about either his qualifications or his criticisms so I can't very well as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee to read what I interpret to be apparently comments that he has made elsewhere to the press—and thank God we have a free press, free even to disseminate bad information which I deplore, and I sit before you as a victim of that many, many times, but I wouldn't take away the right of the free press in this country to scalp me any time it wants to because that is essential to the safety of this Republic. The fact is that it is alleged, and I don't know that he has been critical of our policies in South Vietnam and apparently has talked not to officials such as members of this committee and to you and others, but apparently to the press.

And it has been told me, I don't know how true it is, and I am trying to find that out of this source, among others which is a source of a leak, comes a lot of this criticism of our policy in South Vietnam.

REASON FOR BELLYACHING

I am simply trying to find out what it is he is bellyaching about.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think the facts are very clear, Senator Morse.

He is very critical not only of the operations he was associated with and perhaps has some basis for judging, but very critical of operations that he was in no position to judge properly, and secondly, it is a fact I have acquainted myself with the extent of his criticism. We requested a special report on it. I have read it and examined it in great detail and consider it unfounded.

Senator MORSE. I am not going to burden this record with it, Mr. Secretary, and I certainly don't want to impose on your time outside of this committee room either. But I think I have got a pretty good record of backing you and the State Department up when the facts warrant backing them up.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, indeed.

Senator MORSE. And if on a confidential basis you want to supply me sometime with what this man's allegations are so that I will be in a position to deny them, if we can show they are factually deniable. I would be glad to see them because I have had this information—I will tell you what kind of information, I don't have to tell you, you know how this works, "General Taylor and Secretary McNamara will be before you, ask them about this Colonel," which means that he has gotten to them.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Surely.

Senator MORSE. And I think it is important that if possible, without burdening this record we on this committee be advised as to what he is bellyaching about.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would be very happy to supply it to you, Senator Morse.

[The material referred to follows:]

ALLEGATIONS BY LT. COL. JOHN P. VANN

In evaluating major criticisms of the effect in Vietnam expressed by Lt. Col. Vann, it is useful to note that those which have been most fully treated by the press are the very ones on which he is least qualified, by virtue of assignment and level of experience, to comment. His major allegations, expressed in a New York Times article of 21 August and U.S. News and World Report of 16 September are shown below. While Vann's allegations are not classified information, one of the Comments provided below is classified SECRET, as stated in the margin.

1. *Allegation.*—The Government of Vietnam doesn't want to win the war because:

(a) "President Diem, or whoever is running South Vietnam, fears that the people—and the Army itself—would revolt against the Government after the Communists are defeated" and

(b) The Government of Vietnam believes there would be a cut in U.S. aid when the war is ended.

Comment.—With regard to a. above, it would be more logical to reason that the Diem government would run a greater risk of overthrow if it does not demonstrate continuing positive progress in defeating the insurgency. The insurgents certainly intend to disrupt the government in every way possible and to reduce governmental control over its people. A successful revolt is more likely against a weakened, losing government than against a government growing stronger as it gains effective control over its people and territory.

The positive progress that has been made toward the ultimate defeat of the Viet Cong supports the view that the Diem government has the goal of winning the war and the motivation to accomplish that goal.

The Government of Vietnam is well aware that there will be a drastic cut in U.S. military assistance when the war is over, and is, in fact, working toward this end as avidly as are we. Vann seems not to take into account the vast economic drain of the war effort upon Vietnam's own resources.

2. *Allegation.*—The Government not only does not encourage its commanders to fight but reprimands those who lose soldiers on offensive actions.

Comment.—This allegation is a long standing rumor in Vietnam, and one which President Diem has disclaimed directly to General Harkins. During the early days of the active build up of forces in 1961-1962, some commanders, anxious to make a reputation, committed untrained (or poorly trained) forces to action in situtations wherein unncessary losses were incurred. It is true that President Diem reacts vigorously in such situations. However, there is no evidence that he takes commanders to task when their operations are properly planned and executed. In fact, the very commander Lt. Col. Vann worked with was promoted to General rank as a result of

aggressive action in combat. Others who were more cautious were not even considered for promotion.

3. *Allegation.*—The belief of many American officers is that the organized military forces of the Viet Cong could be crushed in six months to a year if there were a proper effort.

Comment.—The implication of this allegation is that there is no proper effort. There is no reason to presume that Lt. Col. Vann is fully cognizant of the classified national military strategy for the overall utilization and deployment of forces, other than for the unit with which he served. Vann's tour in Vietnam spanned the planning and training phase preparatory to the coordinated national campaign, and Vann's unit was essentially committed to an aggressive "holding" action in the Delta.

4. *Allegation.*—Is the war being won? "From what I saw first hand, as a senior U.S. military adviser, the answer has to be "No". This is especially true about the Mekong Delta region, where 80 percent of the fighting is going on".

Comment.—The implication is that Vann is commenting on the progress of the war in an overall national sense; however, his experience was limited to a single unit and geographic area. The Campaign Plan for Vietnam provided for a phase strategy, with first priority going to the northern provinces of the I and II Corps, which border North Vietnam and Laos. The IV Corps, in the Delta, was charged with "holding" the Viet Cong until additional military forces could be shifted southward as the northern areas came under control. Vann's figure of 80 percent is inaccurate in that as matter of statistical fact about 50 percent of the activity is in the Delta. The war in the northern provinces has proceeded satisfactorily as planned, to the extent that an entire army division has now been shifted from the north to the Delta to build up the forces for an intensification of operations in that area. It is important to keep in mind that winning in Vietnam is as much as economic and political problem as it is military. The people must be "won over", to eliminate their support of the Viet Cong. To this end, the heart of the national strategy is the Strategic Hamlet Program, which is designed to secure the people from Viet Cong depredations and provide them opportunities for a better life. Military operations are conducted to support this massive civil program. From a small beginning in 1962, the Strategic Hamlet Program now embraces over 8,500 hamlets which contain over 9,500,000 people (of the estimated 12,500,000 rural population). The success of this program in the northern areas has developed a relatively high degree of security, and has now permitted the shift of emphasis to the Delta region. As the enemy is constricted in ever smaller geographic areas, he is expected to react violently; being forced to fight for his life. The major battles in the Delta, are yet to be fought—but this does not mean the war is being lost.

5. *Allegation.*—What is it that accounts for the optimistic military reports from Vietnam often brought back by U.S. officials? "There has been a lack of firsthand information. High ranking people are sent there from Washington and told to get results. It becomes a kind of consuming desire on their part to show some palpable results * * *".

Comment.—Lt. Colonel Vann is, of course, in no way qualified to make such an allegation. Probably no other situation has received more personal, continuing study by the U.S. Government's highest officials than Vietnam. In dealing with the intricate problems engendered by the difficult internal political situation in Vietnam, it is especially important that we not delude ourselves as to the actual situation. It is precisely this danger which has occasioned our checking and double-checking evaluations, to insure our courses of action are prudent and practicable.

LT. COL. JOHN P. VANN

1. Lt. Col. Vann was assigned to duty in Vietnam in March 1962. At that time he was under orders and en route to duty in Korea but, along with many others, was diverted to Vietnam during the rapid build-up of U.S. strength there. His assignments in Vietnam were:

23 March-20 May 1962: G-4 staff advisor (logistics), Hq. III Corps, Saigon.

21 May-25 June 1962: Assistant division advisor, 7th Vietnamese Division (Delta area).

26 June 1962-1 April 1963: Divison advisor, 7th Vietnamese Division (Delta area).

1 April 1963: Returned to United States. Upon his return to the United States, Lt Colonel Vann was scheduled to attend the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, but declined to accept this advanced schooling in favor of retirement. He remained assigned to the Department of the Army Staff in Washington until his retirement

on 31 July 1963. His official request for retirement was based on his stated desire to achieve greater financial security. He is now employed by Martin Aircraft in Denver, Colorado.

2. With respect to the qualifications of Lt. Colonel Vann to appraise the over-all conduct of the war or to evaluate U.S. and Vietnamese national policy, the following are pertinent:

Lt. Col. Vann was well qualified to act as a Senior Division Advisor. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and, in addition, is a graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger Training Course. He commanded a Ranger Company in the Korean War. However, his experience in Vietnam was confined to a single division and to its operations in only one part of the Delta area. Observations on operations in any other area, or upon broad matters of policy, would necessarily be conjectural.

3. In the view of General Paul D. Harkins, U.S. Military Commander in Vietnam, Lt. Colonel Vann was an effective advisor to the 7th Division Commander, Colonel Huynh Van Cao until about December 1962. During that period the 7th Division was engaged in both static security duties and offensive operations. In December 1962, Colonel Cao was promoted to Brigadier General and became the commander of the new IVth Corps which was created as a part of the reorganization of the command structure of Vietnamese forces. During the initial phases of reorganization, General Cao continued to exercise close personal control of the 7th Division to the degree that the new division commander had little latitude or freedom of action. At this point it is General Harkins view, Lt. Colonel Vann went beyond the limits of good judgment in pressing the new division commander to conduct operations which were not included in the Corps Commander's plans. When unsuccessful in this, General Harkins concluded that Lt. Colonel Vann became frustrated and subsequently used poor judgment in dealing with the Vietnamese, to the extent that his usefulness to the division commander was substantially diminished.

4. In Washington, Lt. Colonel Vann went through a normal debriefing program. The Department of the Army conducts such a program for all returning personnel who, by experience and not rank, may contribute useful information which can be utilized in the field to develop better doctrine, tactics, and solutions for the counter-insurgency effort and in our military schools to improve preparatory training of U.S. military personnel. Lt. Colonel Vann was interviewed, as a normal matter, by representatives of the Department of the Army, Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, during which he contributed useful information about the division with which he worked, and the Delta region where its operations were conducted.

5. The Department of the Army offered the Joint Chiefs of Staff an oral debriefing report by Lt. Colonel Vann. This was scheduled for 8 July 1963; however, as frequently happens, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were confronted with a full agenda of top priority matters requiring their attention, and the briefing was cancelled. However, Vann's views, as presented during his debriefing sessions, are known by the U.S. Military Advisory Group, Vietnam, the Department of the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

AID AND CIA IN VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. Do you know how many AID mission people are really working for the CIA in South Vietnam?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I really think Mr. McCone should answer the question. I have an idea but I think the more accurate data would come from him.

Senator MORSE. All right.

CAN VICTORY BE WON UNDER DIEM REGIME?

My last line of questioning and you have already covered it in part but it goes to this question of the relationship between the political regime in South Vietnam and the American program in South Vietnam. General Taylor has pointed out in his comments that after all, the program in South Vietnam is a South Vietnamese program, that is it is their responsibility to run it, and we have the job of trying to carry out some assistance.

But that strengthened my view that you can't separate the political policies of the South Vietnam Government from our policies, they are bound to intertwine, and so my question is, do you really think that the war against the Viet Cong can be won and the victory consolidated under the political regime that now prevails in South Vietnam?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it depends upon how they behave in the future, Senator Morse, and I can't predict that behavior with accuracy.

Senator MORSE. Would I be fair in interpreting that remark to mean that you might share the criticism of some that the conduct of Diem and Nhu hasn't been very helpful from the standpoint of their political policies to the American program in South Vietnam?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it is fair to say that the actions that the Government of South Vietnam has taken in relation to the Buddhist crisis and the student riots between May and August reduced the degree of popular support of that government, and this, therefore, is an action that weakens the military campaign against the Communists. But I want to add, having said that, that the military campaign, although perhaps weaker than it would otherwise may have been, has progressed during that period of time.

EXPECT REPRESSIVE ACTS

Senator MORSE. What about hte problem, and I still don't know the facts that prove the degree, of the denial on the part of the Diem government of a good many civil liberties in South Vietnam which have resulted in a large number of anti-Communist exiles fleeing the country, and who keeping flooding us—we have discussed this at some previous meetings of the committee—with literature and information alleging that what we are really supporting over there is a tyrannical form of government, of a police state type.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think that the situation in South Vietnam is illustrative of that which we face in many areas of the world today, the difference being primarily that in South Vietnam the government is faced with a Communist attempt to subvert it.

Where you have seen as many as 100,000 armed Communist agents or soldiers inside its borders, carrying out terror raids, brutal attacks on duly elected village and hamlet officials, under these circumstances I think it is only realistic to expect that certain repressive acts will in the view of that government be required to maintain even a minimum degree of stability in the political structure.

I think this particular government has been singularly awkward and clumsy in conducting the affairs of state. I hope that it will have learned its lesson to some degree from the events of the May through August period and that it will be less clumsy in the future; but I don't believe that we should expect an oriental nation seeking to transition its people from a near feudal state to the political, economic and social institutions of the 20th Century in almost literally a matter of months to do so applying the same forms of democracy that we do in this country today after 2 or 3 centuries of

time to accomplish the same goals. So I find it very difficult to judge exactly how that government should carry out its affairs.

But I have no hesitancy whatever in saying they have acted awkwardly, clumsily and in a manner that has reduced their support among the people of South Vietnam in recent months.

GO-IT-ALONE POLICY IN VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. The last question, Mr. Secretary, goes to a topic that perplexes me very much, and is the basis, in my judgment, for a great dela of public opinion criticism of American foreign policy in South Vietnam.

I have never received what I have considered to be an adequate or satisfactory explanation from our Government as to why this is so much as American go-it-along policy in South Vietnam.

Apparently SEATO is dead, and we know it isn't but it gives the impression of SEATO being dead; we don't find even our Asiatic allies apparently doing very much, Thailand or any of the others, Australia or New Zealand or Canada, or Great Britain. But what is the basis for this unilateral American action in South Vietnam, unsupported except to a token degree by our so-called alleged allies in the fight for freedom.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Several of our allies are contributing significantly to the counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam.

Earlier today someone mentioned, I believe it was Senator Sparkman, the campaign of counterinsurgency in Malaya.

The British officer who directed that campaign is assigned permanently to South Vietnam at the present time, Brigadier Thompson, and is assisting us with advice and counsel in very valuable ways.

The Australians have a small mission there. We are receiving help from several other countries. It is limited in terms of numbers of people, it is limited in terms of financial aid, but it is valuable in terms of advice, counsel and wisdom in this situation.

I think it is quite clear that our allies, Australia, for example, and a number of others in that Asian area are facing financial demands such that they have little capability for contributing to what are very heavy financial costs of assisting the Vietnamese in countering the insurgency.

Third, I think that it would only complicate what is an already complicated situation, to substantially increase the number of the advisers that are assigned there.

TOKEN SUPPORT

Senator MORSE. Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that during a reasonable period of time you could supply this record with a memorandum that will give us the specifics of the assistance we are getting from other counties, manpowerwise, and moneywise, supplywise, because I tell you in my judgment this is a great hole in the presentation by our Government of the program in South Vietnam.

Many people are of the opinion that it is only token support we are getting, that we are carrying the great burden, and they are

raising the question why, and if you could supply us with a memorandum that we could use factually, subject to whatever restrictions need to be put upon it, I think it will be very helpful.

Secretary McNAMARA. I want to emphasize again, however, that several of the nations that might be looked to for normal support in that area of which Australia is a perfect example, New Zealand is another, have traditionally supported military budgets which are far too low to take care of other military requirements apart from those that were associated with South Vietnam, and our primary negotiations with those nations, therefore, are directed toward an increase in their military budgets to more properly support their basic military forces, rather than to place priority upon their contribution to the South Vietnamese operations.

In any event I will be very happy to supply such a memorandum.

[The memorandum referred to follows:]

OTHER FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM

In previous years, aid to Vietnam from other Free World nations, when compared to U.S. assistance, has been modest. During the past year, however, the United States intensified its efforts to obtain support for Vietnam from Free World countries. Representatives of these countries meet regularly in Saigon to consider proposals for the expansion of their aid.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Generally, other Free World nations have preferred to provide South Vietnam with economic rather than military assistance. Australia has contributed a number of military assistance-type items to the strategic hamlet program. [Deleted]

In 1961, a small United Kingdom advisory mission was set up. This mission, headed by a former Secretary for Defense in the Federation of Malaya, has been advising the Vietnamese Government on police, civic action, and counter-insurgency activities.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Assistance given by other Free World countries is indicated in the tables which follow. Table I shows total amounts of aid committed by the various countries; Table II illustrates the portions of this aid committed for commodities followed by brief descriptions of types of commodities and financing; and Table III shows numbers and types of personnel (technicians provided and participants trained).

TABLE I.—OTHER FREE WORLD ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE [1]

[Commitments [2] in millions of dollars]

	Calendar year—				
	Cumulative through 1959	Revised actuals			Estimated 1963
		1960	1961	1962	
France—Total	34.6	40.3	4.8	3.2	3.3
Grants	34.6	4.3	4.8	3.2	3.3
Loans		14.0			
Guaranteed exporter credits		22.0			
Germany—Total	[3]	0.4	0.3	0.4	16.6
Grants	[3]	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
Loans	[3]				16.3
Japan—Total	55.6	[3]	[3]	[3]	[3]
Reparations	39.0				
Other grants		[3]	[3]	[3]	[3]

TABLE I.—OTHER FREE WORLD ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE [1]—Continued

[Commitments [2] in millions of dollars]

	Cumulative through 1959	Calendar year— Revised actuals 1960	1961	1962	Estimated 1963
Loans	16.6				
United Kingdom—Total	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.7
Grants	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3
Loans					1.4
Australia—Total grants	2.2	0.5	0.6	2.8	1.4
New Zealand—Total grants	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Canada—Total grants	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
United Nations organizations—Total grants	1.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

[1] From data received since preparation of Other Free World Assistance shown on page 162 A.I.D. Congressional Presentation, FY 1964, Vol. I. Current data reflects certain differences from Congressional Presentation due to computation based on calendar year and minor revisions.
[2] For grant assistance, disbursements data is used to represent commitments.
[3] Less than $0.05 million.

TABLE II.—OTHER FREE WORLD COMMODITY ASSISTANCE

[Commitments in millions of dollars]

	Cumulative through 1959	1960	1961	1962	Estimated 1963
France—Total	8.8	37.6	2.0	0.4	0.4
Grants	8.8	1.6	2.0	0.4	0.4
Loans		14.0			
Guarantee exporter credits		22.0			
(Ha Tien Cement Factory)		(12.0)			
(Commercial imports)		(10.0)			
Germany—Total	([3])	0.1	0.2	0.1	16.4
Grants	([3])	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Loans					16.3
Japan—Total	55.6				
Reparations	39.0				
(Da Nhim Dam) [1]	(29.5)				
(Commercial imports)	(7.5)				
(Other) [1]	(2.0)				
Loans	16.6				
(Transmission line)	(7.5)				
(Commercial imports)	(9.1)				
United Kingdom—Total	0.1	([3])	0.1	([3])	1.4
Grants	0.1	([3])	0.1	([3])	([3])
Loans					1.4
Australia—Grants total	2.5	0.5	0.5	[2]0.6	N.A.
Canada—Grants total	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
New Zealand—Grants total	([3])	([3])	([3])	([3])	([3])

[1] Includes underdetermined amounts of technical assistance personnel costs. Major portion, however, is for commodities.
[2] Including items of military assistance.
[3] Less than $0.05 million.

The following are descriptions of types and financing of the commodity assistance shown above.

FRANCE

Textile dying and finishing machinery, coal mining equipment, machine tools, agricultural equipment and other commodities have been provided under grant economic aid programs.

A 15 year loan of $14.0 million to provide equipment costs for construction of an industrial complex at An Hoa and Nong Son and a 5 year repayable export credit guarantee of $12.0 million for foreign exchange costs of a cement factory at Ha Tien were extended in 1960. To date loan disbursements for the industrial complex have been awaiting signature of a supplementary German loan; however, the entire amount of the credit guarantee has been drawn and construction is underway on the cement factory.

In addition, general commercial import aid was extended under another export credit guarantee. Terms are 5.7 percent interest with the principal repayment in francs over a five year period after disbursement. Of the $10 million commercial aid extended in 1960, it is estimated that $9.0 will be drawn by the end of 1963.

GERMANY

Machinery and equipment (approximately $360,000) for an engineering and trade school in Saigon was provided under grant assistance from 1960 to 1962. A loan for the German contribution to the development of the An Hoa-NongSon industrial complex was signed in March 1963 and another loan for general commercial imports of $3.8 million has been committed but is not yet signed.

JAPAN

Construction materials and equipment for a hydro-electric project at Da-Nhim and $7.5 million of consumer goods for generation of local currency have been provided under war reparations payments. Construction is underway and scheduled for completion in FY 1966. Another $2.0 million of reparations remain available, some of which will undoubtedly be used for commodities.

Another $7.5 million has been committed and disbursed by the Japanese Eximbank under a 7 year loan (with 5 year grace period) for capital equipment for the transmission lines in the Da-Nhim hydroelectric project. A $9.1 million loan has been signed for commodities and technical services not yet specified.

UNITED KINGDOM

Grant assistance had included equipment for the Faculties of Science and Medicine at the University of Saigon, the mining engineering department of the University of Hue, and several agricultural schools, and a cessium unit for the National Cancer Institute. A 15 year loan of $1.4 million for a dredge was agreed upon in June 1963.

AUSTRALIA

Australian commodity aid has been divided into three programs-Colombo Plan aid, relief, and aid to strategic hamlets. Colombo Plan aid has consisted of equipment provided under technical assistance projects and commercial assistance in the form of railway cars, construction and agricultural equipment, telephone and electrical equipment and some chemicals and condensed milk. Relief assistance has been directed toward the mountain-dwelling Montagnards and has consisted of food, medical supplies and tools. Aid to strategic hamlets has provided barbed wire, steel fence pickets, galvanized iron roofing and other construction equipment and materials.

CANADA

Commodity assistance from Canada has consisted entirely of wheat shipments.

NEW ZEALAND

Small amounts of woodworking machinery and veterinary equipment have been included in New Zealand's technical assistance programs.

TABLE III–A.—OTHER FREE WORLD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TECHNICIANS

[Numbers of personnel]

Country/Organization	Fiscal year—			Types
	1961	1962	1963	
France	420	380	330	350 (gradually reduced to 260) elementary and secondary school teachers, 30 college professors, and about 40 experts in such fields as agriculture, geographical survey, coal mining, geology, aviation, industrial arts and railway construction.
Germany	10	18	23	Medical professors at Hue University increased from 4 in FY 61 to 9 in FY 62 and 14 in FY 63; vocational educators at the Cao Thang Trade School increased from 3 in FY61 to 6 in FY62 and FY63; other experts are in German language, forestry, musicology and architectural engineering.
Australia	2	4	4	1 veterinary surgeon and a livestock feeding expert arrived in FY 62 to join the dairy specialist and English teacher who were here earlier.
Canada		1	1	Entomologist for insect control work.
Japan	10	10	10	Salt production, fisheries, textiles, silkworm production, handicraft and banana growing.
New Zealand	1	1	7	English teacher; six-man surgical team arrived in FY 1963.
United Kingdom	1	2	2	English language teachers at Hue University.
FAO	6	7	4	2 soil experts, irrigation specialist, regional veterinary expert for rinderpest eradication (FY 61–63); agricultural statistician and agricultural research technician (FY 61–62); fishing consultant (FY62).
ICAO	3	1	1	Short-term air worthiness and teletype maintenance consultants (FY 61); personnel licensing standards (FY 61–62); electronic maintenance instruction (FY 63).
ILO	3	2		Cooperative and family budget study experts (FY61–62); labor statistics consultants (FY61).
UNESCO	2	2	2	Primary education and community adult education.
UNTAO	7	6	2	Fisheries and photogrammetry experts (FY61–63); physiotherapist and 2 power engineers (FY 61–62); mineral geologist and financial legislation expert (FY 61); economic planner (FY 62).
WHO	21	20	12	Maternal and child health, tuberculosis control, malaria eradication, communicable disease control, hospital administration, pharmaceutical supply, health statistics, environmental sanitation, psychiatry and health laboratory services. (Maternal and child health and tuberculosis control team reduced in FY 1963 upon achievement of goals.
U.N. Special Fund		1	2	Mekong Mineral Survey personnel.

TABLE III–B.—OTHER FREE WORLD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PARTICIPANTS

[Numbers of personnel]

Country/Organization	Fiscal year—			Types
	1961	1962	1963	
France	50	50	50	Civil, mechanical and electrical engineering as well as most academic fields.
Germany	11	10	10	2 in music and remainder on in-service training at German industrial plants.
Australia	47	47	46	Principally in engineering, economics, education.
Canada	30	30	30	Principally in engineering, business, medicine.
Japan	7	8	10	Textiles, fisheries and handicrafts.
New Zealand	29	30	30	Wellington English Language Institute (1 year) followed by various Academic fields.
United Kingdom	5	10	10	Principally trade unionism; 1 each in social welfare, medicine and community development.
China				Provides maintenance stipend to U.S.-financed participants studying in Taiwan.
India	4	1	2	3 engineers; 1 in-service fisheries trainee through FY 62; 2 statisticians in FY 63.
Malaya		2		Psy-war methodology.
Belgium			6	Various academic fields.
FAO	1	2	2	Agricultural statistics & soil survey.
ICAO			2	Basic electronic maintenance.

TABLE III–B.—OTHER FREE WORLD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PARTICIPANTS—Continued

[Numbers of personnel]

Country/Organization	Fiscal year—			Types
	1961	1962	1963	
ILO	5	7	7	Industrial relations, labor inspecting employment norms, employment security, cooperatives, and professional orientation.
UNESCO	3	.....	2	Community education.
UNTAO	2	2		Power development, photographic surveying and geological core drilling.
WHO	1	1	3	Preventive medicine, malariology and pharmaceutical supply.
WMO	2	.....		Hydrometeorology and electronic meterological instruments.

Senator MORSE. Thank you very much, and accept my apologies, I have to go to the floor. I am the floor leader on this education bill and that is the only reason I am leaving the room.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Very nice to see you this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE

Mr. Secretary, in commenting upon the State of Democracy or the lack of it in South Vietnam, I think you quite rightly said that there is not much we can expect in this kind of situation but I don't think that is the issue.

The issue is are we going to have effective dictatorship in South Vietnam or effective government that can, in fact, carry out and conduct sucessfully the war effort. What concerns me, and I think many others in the Senate, is the growing amount of evidence that the present government may not be that kind of regime.

I think that you indicated at the outset of your testimony that one of the primary purposes of your mission was to determine the extent to which the political deterioration in recent months in South Vietnam affects or might affect the war effort.

Now, when I was there some months ago, I thought that the most vivid impression of all that I took away with me, was the difference in the character of life in the countryside and in the cities, two different civilizations that exist side by side. Obviously the nerve centers and brain centers of the country that are competent to direct government and its activities are confined to the cities, and Saigon, of course, is the brain center and has a significance in South Vietnam that is out of proportion to many other countries in terms of its political importance.

Now, if I may go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

AVOID FURTHER DETERIORATION OF POLITICAL SITUATION

Senator CHURCH. In answer to Senator Morse's question, Mr. Secretary, you said that whether or not the present regime successfully could carry on the war depended upon what happens in the future, and you have already indicated that there has been a dete-

rioration in public support for the regime in the past 4 months owing to the student and Buddhist repressions.

Do you think that we, as a government, having a vital interest in the future conduct of the war can and should attempt to exert influence and direction on this government to avoid further deterioration in the political situation?

Secretary McNAMARA. I do, and I believe we are.

Senator CHURCH. What form of leverage can we apply, apart from protesting these acts when they occur, apart from attempting to give advice to this government?

Isn't it within our capacity in view of the fact that the government totally depends upon the aid that we supply it, isn't it within our capacity to exert definite pressures?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, it is within our capacity to exert pressures, but it's not within our capacity to assure action in accordance with our recommendations. This is an independent government and I think it is quite inappropriate for us to think of it as a colony or to expect it to act as a colony.

Senator CHURCH. I would agree with that. But in response to my question, it is a government in which we are mightily involved, both with American lives and money, to the point where we have 15,000 men there now and have spent billions, and the object of our policy is to win the war against the Communist infiltration.

Therefore, it would seem to me that we would want to use whatever opportunities are available to make the government with which we are attempting to deal effective in carrying out that object, and if mere protests don't result in changes of policy, then it seems to me that we are in a position to go further withholding certain kinds of aid, or taking action that can help to force changes in Government policy.

CUTTING AID TO VIETNAM

Now, this morning, in the paper this morning from Saigon there is this report:

> The United States reportedly has taken a first step in cutting economic aid to South Vietnam to force the ruling Ngo family to change its political tune.
>
> The American-owned, pro-government Times of Vietnam said today in a front page story that the United States cut off the U.S. money that had been paying for South Vietnam's imports. The newspaper said the move was taken to put pressure on the Ngo family regime.
>
> U.S. aid mission officials here said only that Washington has not yet authorized them to release any more funds for import financing. U.S. Embassy officials declined comment.
>
> The suspension so far has frozen nearly $12 million that the Vietnamese Government would have had to pay for its imports. If the commercial aid well is kept dry for several months it would be tantamount to stiff economic aid cuts, sources said.

Do you know anything about this, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I am familiar with this action.

Senator CHURCH. Would you care to comment on the action?

Secretary McNAMARA. You suggested a moment ago that we should seek to obtain from the Diem government an agreement that they would act in ways that furthered the popular support which is a necessary foundation for completing the military campaign successfully. I agreed with that. I said that we are so acting.

For example, I spoke earlier of the fact that certain of Colonel Tung's forces supported by CIA and the military assistance programs had not participated in combat operations in recent weeks but had been diverted to other activities.

In recognition of that we have authorized the withholding of further support to those forces until such time as they are again assigned to their proper duties, combat operations.

This is illustrative of the kind of measure that we can and have brought. But I again emphasize that we are dealing with an independent government, and that government has the right and the power to accept or reject our suggestions.

REVIEWING AID COMMITMENTS

Senator CHURCH. No one would question that proposition. About this article to which I have referred, are you aware of this step and what's your viewpoint?

Secretary MCNAMARA. As the President said 2 or 3 weeks ago, we are reviewing our aid commitments. We are seeking to support those activities of the Diem government that support the war effort and to withhold support from those that don't, and this review of aid is in conformance with that policy.

Senator CHURCH. And in your judgment utilizing aid in this way to help effectuate our purpose is sound and supportable policy?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it is a reasonable approach, taken in conformance without major objective which is to defeat the Communist aggression against the government.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND DEFENSE

Senator CHURCH. Just one final question—if you can't answer the question, I am not certain it is an entirely fair question—but I am interested in knowing whether the evaluation or the appraisal that I made originally of the Diem government corresponds generally with the State Department appraisal of that government, and if there is a difference in viewpoint between the State Department and the Defense Department regarding the present Government of South Vietnam?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We are dealing perhaps with something that is not on the record and it may be a little difficult to compare exactly but I think it is fair to say that the State Department would more closely, their view would more closely, conform to the view I expressed than the view you express.

And I think if I may say so you phrased the wrong question. It isn't is the Diem government an effective government. The proper question is is the Diem government the most effective government we can obtain under the circumstances.

Senator CHURCH. And as to this is there any difference of viewpoint presently between the State Department and the Defense Department?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe there is any difference whatsoever between the State Department and the view that General Taylor and I hold at this time.

Senator CHURCH. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question or two.

VIEWS OF U THANT

Your last answer here has raised a question in my mind and that is is the Diem government a government that we should cooperate with and support looking to the future? The reason I bring that up is I think it would be generally agreed that the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. U Thant, who is a Burmese, should know that area and that country, and I want to quote from a press conference that he held just about a week before you left for Saigon and here are his comments and I quote:

> The situation in the Republic of Vietnam is going from bad to worse. I cannot think of any other country today where the situation is as chaotic as in that unfortunate country. One of the great virtues of democracy is the ability to change governments by peaceful constitutional procedures, and without resort to force, a feature that is completely absent in Vietnam.

My question is, based on that statement, if that is a correct analysis of the situation, should we be greatly concerned about keeping our contracts with this government?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think we should be greatly concerned about the situation in Vietnam, Senator Carlson. But I completely disagree with the Secretary General's appraisal of the situation.

I would draw attention to his own country, for example, as one which is far from stable and far from orderly in the processes of their government today, and we only need look at what happened since he has made the statement in the Dominican Republic and Honduras, we should add Algeria as well and the Congo and several other nations.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT

As I say without in any way carrying the torch for the Diem government and without in any way diluting the justifiable criticism which has been directed to its actions in this period May through August I do draw attention to the fact that for 10 years that government has held a country together when during that period it has been under intense attack from the Communists, adjacent to it on all sides. It is an extraordinary accomplishment today, and I can't overemphasize this problem which I think all of us fail to place in perspective: that is a country made up of political, social and economic institutions out of the feudal ages, and the problem that the government faces, this government, the Diem government or any other government, is how to transition that country from a set of feudal institutions to a set of 20th Century institutions in literally a matter of months.

This has not been accomplished successfully anywhere that I know of in the world to date, and certainly it hasn't been accomplished successfully when the government has been under attack from either the Soviet Union or the Communist Chinese on its very border, and particularly it hasn't been accomplished by any government which not only has been under attack externally but has faced what I said was a separate internal Communist state containing 43 percent of its people.

So that it is extremely difficult for us to appraise, I think, the exact balance of what I would call democratic and autocratic actions that that government should be expected to carry out.

But going back to your first and more basic question, I think, which was, as I noted it, is the Diem government a government we should continue to support now and in the future. I would answer very clearly by saying so long as it acts effectively, and I use that word in the broadest sense, both political and military sense, to carry out the campaign against the Communist aggression, I believe we should support it.

That is an iffy answer in a sense but it is the only answer I can give you and it is an answer that I think requires that we watch very closely both the political and the military actions of that government in the months ahead.

General TAYLOR. May I comment on that?

Senator LAUSCHE. Would General Taylor comment on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

NEED FOR A STRONGMAN

General TAYLOR. I would like to make a point which I am sure we have all had in mind.

Regardless of how we feel about the Diem government and there are critics of this government and some of the criticisms are justified, regardless of that I have heard no one suggests what the alternatives are. We need a strong man running this country, we need a dictator in time of war and we have got one. I seem to rule that in our civil war we also had dictatorial government. We also suspended the writ of habeas corpus.

This country is in the heart of a civil war and I think to try to apply what we might call normal democratic standards to this government simply is not realistic.

IMPROVEMENTS OVER PAST YEAR

Senator CARLSON. General, you and the Secretary have discussed, I think, very frankly the situation militarily. I am not a military man. I don't know how to assess military operations and the progress we are making but if we took that second chart and that is all I have seen, let's have the second chart. Just as an observer sitting around this table, I looked over that figure down at the bottom there, where we have gone, it seems to me that we were down in the last column, what was that, that was the June, July, and August, we were going along pretty well but then we come in here to the last part of this year, the summer when it looks like some of these difficulties arose between the government and their citizens, we went from 70,000 to 98,000.

General TAYLOR. No, sir, may I correct it.

On the right that is a year ago.

Senator CARLSON. That is a year ago. In other words, you are down?

General TAYLOR. So we are down.

Senator CARLSON. I stand corrected.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator Carlson, even though we are down and that is a favorable factor I wouldn't put too much em-

phasis on these figures because it is extremely unwise to count them a year ago and count them today.

I think more important than the numbers although as I say they do show favorable trending in that respect, more important is the fact that in gauging the progress of the war effort, we can see freedom of movement today that didn't exist a year ago.

There is a railroad that runs the entire length of the country along the coastline and that is the major form of land communication between Saigon and the bulk of the population lying north of there up to demarcation line. A year or a year and a half ago that railroad was so frequently ambushed and cut by the Viet Cong that traffic along it was handled very irregularly. Today I am told there are 36 trains a day along that road.

Similarly, in Quangnam Province, the province capital of which is also called Quangnam, a city, we spoke to the U.S. adviser to the province chief, Colonel Wilson. He visited the area a year ago last July.

At the time he visited there he moved from the airport which is on the outskirts of the city into the city, that movement of but a few miles, perhaps 2 or 2½ miles, required an escort of 2 platoons—2 companies, I should say, of armed troops. The market place in the province city capital, in the province capital, was controlled by the Communists at that time, the whole province was controlled by the Communists.

There are 20,000 families in this single province that have relatives in North Vietnam.

Today, a year or a year and a quarter later there is relatively freedom of movement in that province.

THE PEOPLE ARE SECURE

Now, this is typical of what we mean when we say, as General Taylor did, that the military campaign in the first corps and the second corps and to some degree in the third corps is progressing very satisfactorily. We mean simply that the people are secure. They are protected against the raids and terror of the Viet Cong and they have reasonable chances for normal day to day life.

With that security, and this gets back to Senator Church's point, there has been introduced into their lives a degree of education and an economic foundation which they have never had before. In this particular province, for example, one of the major accomplishments is a pig program which has introduced I have forgotten how many thousands of pigs into the hamlets in which the people of that province have been concentrated. There is also in that province the introduction of 13 medicine dispensaries which provide a minimum level of medical care they have never had before.

We haven't mentioned today something we should mention and that is the introduction of a very primitive form of democracy in these hamlets and villages. One of the requirements for certification of a hamlet as a completed hamlet is the requirement that the hamlet chief be elected, and more than that, that there be established what I call ladies' aid societies, a series of committees, a series of community activities, that draws those who are interested into community affairs.

Now, I don't wish to overemphasize this or lead you to feel there is a sophisticated form of democracy in the countryside. There isn't. But there is at least the beginning of the elements of democracy, something they have never had before.

Now, these are accomplishments. They should be offset against the brutal repression that that government has applied during the period May to August, and as a matter of fact, I personally believe had been applying theretofore but doing it in a somewhat more sophisticated fashion, at least to the points of keeping it out of the newspapers.

Senator CARLSON. I appreciate very much the information, and I trust we are making good progress there.

SOLDIERS CANNOT DISCUSS THE WAR

There is one question, the press is carrying stories and I have talked with one of the GI's who has returned and I have 2 or 3 letters where they have stated when they leave Vietnam they have to sign an order or at least advised by the commanding officer they cannot discuss the war operation when they return. Is that true?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Partially.

They sign this statement, and this is a statement signed by all personnel returning from combat theaters worldwide:

> I properly accounted for or turned in all classified material both military and of civil nature. I will not communicate or transmit orally or in writing to any person except Department of Defense agencies any classified documents, memoranda, personal notes or other classified recorded information pertaining to official government business.

This is a standard form that has been used for years, was misinterpreted by the wife of one of the returning officers, who, in turn, wrote the letter, I think, that was the foundation of the newspaper article.

Senator CARLSON. I actually talked to one of the boys from my own state and that is the reason I bring it up. I didn't know it was general, I didn't know you were doing it but he said, "I signed a statement that I would not in anyway discuss the war operations in Vietnam."

Of course, privately he told me that he wasn't feeling very good about the way he had been taken care of over there but of course I have had a little service myself, but I am glad to get that information.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe this is the only document that any individual returning from military service in Vietnam has been asked to sign.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary MCNAMARA. And it relates solely to classified information.

The CHAIRMAN. And this is general in all theaters?

Secretary MCNAMARA. General in all theaters.

[Subsequent information supplied by the Defense Department follows:]

> You may recollect that Secretary McNamara was also asked (by Senator Carlson) if military personnel returning from Viet Nam had to sign a statement that they would not discuss the war operations in that country. The Secretary replied that he

believed that the only document being signed was a security form relating to classified information. These remarks can be found on pages 91-92 of the transcript.

The Secretary has since learned that in completing their check-out and clearance forms personnel departing Viet Nam had been required to indicate that they understand and will comply with theater guidance in the public affairs area.

It is the intent of existing public affairs guidance for U.S. military returnees to prohibit only the discussion of subjects or items of military information that are classified. Clarifying instructions on this point have been transmitted.

In addition, a Department of Defense Instructions has been issued to insure that all security termination statements follow uniform procedures. This Instruction limits the coverage of such statements to classified defense information.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator from Ohio wish to ask some questions?

OUR DICTATOR

Senator GORE. I would like to ask some questions, I yielded to Senator Church.

Mr. Chairman, I just jotted down here two statements by General Taylor which disturbed me.

He said, "We have a dictator," and I emphasize "we," he didn't. I fear we do have, and I am not questioning the accuracy of the statement but not only do you recognize that we have a dictator, but the Vietnamese people seem to. He is regarded, as I understand the situation there, by the Vietnamese people as our lackey, "Our dictator," as you say. We have one.

IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS

Another statement was that the country is in a civil war. I wonder how many of these coolies down in the rice paddies of the Mekong Delta have made an ideological commitment to communism. So these two statements seem to me to tell a great deal about our difficulty there.

Before going to something else, I am not asking you to, or soliciting any comment but if anyone wants to make some I will be glad to hear them.

General TAYLOR. I would just say, Senator, that I found nothing in my visit to South Vietnam to lead me to believe that the majority of the Vietnamese people, one, want to overthrow their government and, two, regard the president as an American lackey. I have heard many criticisms of this nature in the Saigon area or in the Saigon press but certainly I didn't find anything that led me to believe this was a generalized condition.

Senator GORE. Did you find it moving in the circles in which you were moving?

General TAYLOR. Yes, I did find it among the intelligentsia, the wealthy classes in Saigon, this has been endemic. I have been going to South Vietnam and to Saigon since 1953 and many of these same charges have been there all the time. I am not posing as an apologist for the government but anyone who suggests there is a seething revolution about to throw this fellow out which reached deeply into the hearts of the people we found no evidence of it. At least I am speaking for myself, the Secretary might want to speak for himself.

Senator GORE. You didn't, of course, have an opportunity to speak with, nor did I, with the people in the areas controlled by the Viet Cong.

General TAYLOR. Mainly you can't.

Senator GORE. That is right.

General TAYLOR. And we certainly found no reason to believe that the people were not very happy to be relieved of the Viet Cong burden when the government comes through and liberates them and furthermore they start talking and reporting on the Viet Cong activities to the great advantage of military operations.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think that is the point I would like to emphasize, Senator Gore.

You asked how many coolies in the Delta have made an ideological commitment to communism. I don't believe they have made an ideological commitment to either communism or democracy. They are not concerned about ideological commitments. They are concerned only about their personal security and the security of their families and some reasonable opportunity, unlikely as it may seem, for their children to lead a somewhat better life than they have.

Senator GORE. Well, I didn't quote these statements to challenge the accuracy. I think they are accurate. But that makes them all the more disturbing.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR NHU ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. Secretary, does the U.S. Government directly or indirectly finance either the Viet Cong organizations controlled by Mr. Nhu or the Vietnamese women's organizations reportedly controlled by Madam Nhu?

Mr. CHAIRMAN. You said Viet Cong, did you mean that?

Senator GORE. Vietnam.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Not to my knowledge, Senator Gore. You are speaking of the so-called Republican Youth movement, I believe.

Senator GORE. Women's organizations.

Secretary MCNAMARA. And the other one, I have forgotten the name of it, Women's Solidarity group or something similar to that.

Senator GORE. What do you mean not to your knowledge?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I am sorry, I couldn't hear.

Senator GORE. What do you mean not to your knowledge? Are you saying yes or not?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have no knowledge we are supporting it. I think it quite unlikely that we are. But I know very well the Defense Department is not, let me put it that way.

Senator GORE. You know, of course, there have been widespread public reports that the U.S. Government was financing the special forces which Mr. Nhr used in the Buddhist attacks?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I think before you came in, I addressed a question on that subject.

Senator GORE. Would you mind repeating that, I am sorry I missed it.

U.S. SUPPORTED PARAMILITARY FORCES

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I would be happy to. The forces under Colonel Tung included certain border guards, infiltration units and other detachments that over a period of years, have been supported by either the military assistance program of this country or a supporting assistance program channeld through CIA. Those forces are normally committed to combat operations. They were——

Senator GORE. You say "normally"?

Secretary McNAMARA. They normally are committed to combat operations. They were, however, withdrawn from those operations and some of them were utilized in the pagoda raids of August. To the extent that they are not committed to combat operations we are withdrawing our support from them.

Senator GORE. Isn't it unusual for the CIA to have combat units?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, in this——

Senator GORE. A combat organization?

Secretary McNAMARA. To go back over some of the ground we have discussed at some length earlier today, I explained that several years ago, I don't know exactly the date, but I would believe in 1959 and 1960, the U.S. Government decided to try to assist the Government of South Vietnam to try to develop paramilitary forces to counter the Communist covert aggression against that government, and that mission being a non-typical military mission, was assigned to the CIA. The CIA drew upon certain special forces personnel from the Department of Defense to carry out a training function, which it organized in South Vietnam, and from that day to this, the CIA or from that day until a few months ago, the CIA has been charged with the responsibility for carrying out the training and the support of such forces.

Gradually the responsibility for the continuation of that training and support program has been shifted to the Department of Defense, and today the great bulk of it, I would say 95 percent of that, has been transferred to the Department of Defense. The remaining portion is presently under discussion and I believe will shortly be transferred.

DIEM'S REFUSAL TO ARM CIVIL MILITIAS

Senator GORE. To what extent has the Diem regime refused to arm the civil militia on the grounds that they lack confidence in its reliability?

Secretary McNAMARA. In the Delta area, which I mentioned had for 20 years been under control of the Communists, the Diem regime as it establishes the area establishes a hamlet there, very carefully reviews the background of the hamlet population before it arms the militia drawn from this hamlet.

This may be to what you are referring. They at present in several of the provinces we visited have men under training as members of hamlet militias, who have not yet been armed and will not be armed until they determine that they have given up ties with the Viet Cong with whom they associated for 20 or 30 years. I think this is a very reasonable policy and one we would encourage.

QUESTIONS IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM

Senator GORE. I certainly can lay no claim to being an expert on the situation in Vietnam. I spent no more time there than you have. I am certainly not a military man. I have had no more training in that regard than you have, but I must say that as a layman, I have questioned the enormous importance which the military attaches to South Vietnam. I know of no strategic material that it has, I know of nothing in surplus supply there except ignorant population and rice. It seems to me we have no need for either.

Why must we suffer such great losses in money and lives for an area which to me seems unessential to our welfare, and to freedom, there being none there. I don't ask you to comment on that. I suppose General Taylor might. But I really questioned the advisability of the United States picking up this burden at the time it did.

The French having been there for 7 years, with an Army of 400,000 people, men, lost, and then we moved in and picked up what seemed to me an impossible burden, I thought unwisely so. That is history. I don't blame you for that. I don't blame you for the situation there now and I am not attempting to assess blame. I say to you frankly, though, I have made no public statement on the current crisis in Vietnam none whatsoever. I had hoped that our Government would use the only legitimate excuse I have seen that would permit us to pull out of there since we took up the impossible burden, and that was the suppression of the Buddhists as a means of withdrawing from this area, which, though we would regret to lose it to the Communists, nevertheless from our expenses there it might be good riddance.

If it cost them as much time and life and trouble as it has us, it wouldn't be a very valuable thing to them.

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I comment—you go ahead.

KHRUSHCHEV'S CHALLENGE

General TAYLOR. Senator, you disturb me and worry me because of the sentiments you have expressed.

It is not so much Vietnam as a piece of real estate so to speak, it is not the natural resources that are present which to me represents to the great stake.

In January, 1960, Khrushchev made a very significant speech. He announced that henceforth the expansion of Communism worldwide would not rely upon direct military force. He pointed to the dangers of general nuclear war. He pointed to the danger of limited war as escalating inevitably in his judgment into nuclear war, hence the way in which the area of expansion could be obtained could be through wars of liberation, and he cited South Vietnam as a typical, classic example of how that was to be accomplished.

We as a government took up that challenge and said we will prove by our democratic method and by the resources available to the United States he cannot win this——

Senator GORE. We didn't pick it up then, we picked up after Dien Bien Phu. We didn't pick it up as the result of Khrushchev's speech.

General TAYLOR. We actually made the big effort, the decision, in October 1961, to initiate the program which is now in effect but we responded as directly and cost-consciously in our Government to meeting this threat of the head of a Communist state, and not to let him win in this particular area, and that to me is a great test.

We have indeed taken up this glove and we must win and we can win, it is within our resources, we have everything necessary there now to win, if by winning you take the definition I indicated at the outset, reducing the insurgency to the point that it can be controlled by the local forces.

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I comment also on it, Senator Gore.

A PRIMATIVE KIND OF FREEDOM

You indicated there was no freedom there. I don't agree. There is freedom there. It is of a primative kind, but there is more of it there today than there was 10 years ago, and there is considerably more today than there was 20 years ago and I think there is less there today than there will be tomorrow and certainly less than there will be 5 or 10 years from now if we continue our support. I can go into the details of——

Senator GORE. I thought it was General Taylor who said we had a dictator.

General TAYLOR. We have, indeed in time of war you need a dictator.

Secretary MCNAMARA. They are nonetheless free, and I will be happy to support my statement if you wish me to do so.

Secondly, you mentioned there is nothing we need or want there. I think there is very much we need or want there. There is a state that is resisting the encroachment of communism that has struggled successfully against that for 10 years, that I believe can do so in the future with our assistance; and it seems to me we do want non-Communist states, not necessarily allied to ours, but independent states throughout the world, and this is one of the major reasons why we are struggling as we are to assist and to maintain that independence.

EXAMPLE OF A STATE RESISTING COMMUNISM

Furthermore, we need and want the example of a state resisting communism.

If South Vietnam loses this struggle, particularly if it loses it despite our assistance, I think it is almost certain, and I believe the State Department and particularly the Secretary of State would agree, that there will be a domino effect throughout not only Southeast Asia but extending both east and west of there, almost certainly it would affect Malaya.

Surely it would affect Thailand and Cambodia. Those who can speak with some authority on this believe that the influence would go clear to the borders of Turkey on the west and certainly would influence Japan on the east. So there again is something we need and want.

NOT AN IMPOSSIBLE BURDEN

Finally, you have commented that it was an impossible burden that we were accepting. I don't believe it is an impossible burden. It is a burden that we are able to finance at present, and it is a burden that we in the Defense Department can see shrinking in size in the future. We do believe it will be possible to bring back a thousand of the men that we presently assigned there before the first of next year, not that we expect to win the war in that time, of course not.

But because these thousand men have fulfilled their function. This is a war we must depend primarily on the Vietnamese to win. We can train them into developing a capability to carry on that war. We will have partially completed that training task by the first of next year, 90 days from now, and at that time we can bring back the men who have fulfilled that portion of the task, roughly 1,000.

I believe that in fiscal 1964, the year we are currently in, we will see a very substantial reduction in the total dollar costs of military assistance to South Vietnam. We spent roughly $211 or $212 million for that purpose in fiscal 1963.

I am certain it can be brought down rather substantially in fiscal 1964, and I see the possibility, as a matter of fact the probability, or reducing the expenditure substantially in subsequent years, and we have a plan to accomplish that.

So I see (a) great advantages to continuing the military assistance program to South Vietnam, and (b) a means of reducing that program both in terms of men and dollars in the years that lie ahead.

A DIFFICULT SITUATION AT BEST

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, you make a very encouraging statement. I hope that your predictions, your optimistic forecasts, are verified by future events.

I seem to have been listening to just such optimistic forecasts by the military though for the past several years none of which have been verified, or very few of which have been verified by subsequent events.

Now, obviously my hope is that the government, our Government, would use the stark and brutal suppression of the Buddhists as an excuse to rid ourselves of this what seems to me, if not impossible, at least a situation with very little hope and a very costly one, which has passed.

The decision has been made to support the Diem government. I have been one of your strong supporters. I must say that I was considerably let down when General Sylvester began to give your report an optimistic report on the day of your arrival back. Obviously this decision to support the Diem government was made before you and General Taylor departed.

Now, I understand how governments operate, I have been a part of this one for a quarter of a century. But I don't want to see you put too optimistic a face on this situation. We have there a very difficult situation at the very best, and you have earlier said that

the success of the military depends and is interwoven with the political fabric in the country, the political problems in the country.

That political problem is made up in part by religious strife, by racial hatred, and by the civil war between factions and elements within the country.

Now, I did not make my views public on this. The time has passed to take advantage of this. You say it is the falling domino effect. Let me call to your attention that the very countries you mentioned, Ceylon, Thailand, Cambodia, and others by resolution of their assemblies and otherwise, vigorously protested the suppression of the Buddhists by the Diem regime.

Had the United States used this as a pretext to withdraw its aid to a despotic dictatorial setup, then we may have supported, indeed the bell of freedom may have run even at Philadelphia as well as in other parts.

But what you are doing her is identifying yourself all over again and all anew, with "our dictator," as General Taylor calls him. And around the world we are becoming identified with suppression of freedom, with dictatorial regimes.

Perhaps this exchange is passe because our Government has made the decision to support him however bad he is. And since the decision was made I hope your optimistic reports are validated.

But I did not want to let this opportunity pass to tell you for one I have been disappointed.

A FRESH APPROACH TO THE SITUATION

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, may I just make one brief comment on Senator Gore's point.

There are several points I would disagree with but only one I think deserves comment, and that is that we did not make a decision to support the Diem government before we visited South Vietnam.

General Taylor and I were specifically charged with making a fresh appraisal of the situation there. We did so. We had representatives of the State Department, CIA, the White House with us during that time. We didn't prepare our report until we returned. We arrived in no position in relation to our recommendations to the President until the last day we were in Saigon, and during the return trip.

Senator GORE. I must say that my information upon which I had every reason to rely was to the contrary.

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, I would be very happy privately to go into it in more detail, but I can assure you there is absolutely no foundation to that report.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator from Ohio.

COLONEL TUNG'S ASSIGNMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. I will try to be very brief.

How is this Colonel's name spelled?

Secretary McNAMARA. T-u-n-g.

Senator LAUSCHE. T-u-n-g.

Was his assignment to lead forces that did sabotage in areas of the Viet Cong?

Secretary McNAMARA. His assignment was to train and command border patrol activity, which to some degrees were behind the Viet Cong, between the Viet Cong and the Laotian border and acted in effect as trail watchers measuring the degree of infiltration and stopping as best they could the infiltration across the Laotian border.

Senator LAUSCHE. That answers the question.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE HATRED OF COMMUNISTS

Why is the hatred of the South Vietnamese of the Communists so intense that it neutralizes the difficulties that result between the Buddhist philosophy and the Catholic religion.

Secretary McNAMARA. For two reasons: One, there are not strong hatreds between the Buddhists and the Catholics. The Buddhists, as I mentioned earlier, in South Vietnam are not organized into a typical religious structure, and in any event there are not strong hatreds between the two groups.

Secondly, the South Vietnamese carry an intense dislike and hatred of the Communists because many of them have relatives in North Vietnam and are familiar with the conditions, economic and political that exist there, and both are very, very bad.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then, we can assume that from the standpoint of the will of the people, there is a purpose not to become communized?

Secretary McNAMARA. There is.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Secretary McNAMARA. That may be affected in the future by further repressive acts committed by the government.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

INVASION OF PAGODAS

Now, what excuse did Diem give for the invasion of these pagodas, and the second question, in your opinion, were religious differences in anyway the motivation for the invasion? You may answer.

Secretary McNAMARA. He stated that the Buddhist movement had been subverted by his political opponents and had turned from a religious to a political opposition. I think there is considerable truth on that charge.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you feel that he, on the basis of the fact, could have honestly and logically come to that conclusion?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe he could have, but I think he equally so should have come to the conclusion that the methods he used to deal with it were improper methods and would only lead to the development of further opposition which has been the case.

CATHOLICS AND BUDDHISTS IN THE MILITARY

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the proportionate representation in the leadership of the military as between Buddhists and Catholics?

Secretary McNAMARA. I haven't made a statistical study of it, but I asked many military officers of the Vietnamese army and air

force whom I met as to their religion and the great bulk of them were Buddhists.

General TAYLOR. May I just made one comment.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I would like you to.

General TAYLOR. Under the French system everyone not a Catholic was rated as a Buddhist so we are just assuming everybody who is not a member of the Catholic Church as the term is used is a Buddhist. That doesn't mean he has any real religious feeling toward Buddhism. Actually there are more devout practicing Confucists in South Vietnam than Buddhists.

So these are just relative, and the idea that you have two conflicting religions here doesn't check out.

Senator LAUSCHE. It doesn't check out?

General TAYLOR. No.

DISCRIMINATION REGARDING PROPERTY RIGHTS

Senator LAUSCHE. There is a discrimination with respect to the rights to hold property between the Catholic faith and others, and I understand that that discrimination is not the creation of Diem but that is a hangover from the laws of France when it was in control. Are you familiar with that?

General TAYLOR. I am not personally.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are you, Secretary McNamara?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I am.

I am not familiar with the evolution of it nor am I completely familiar with the degree of it but there has been some discrimination. But in no real sense was this a basis for the religious friction that appeared to develop in May of this year.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield? Is that on religious grounds or nationality? Did it originate between the French and the——

Senator LAUSCHE. My testimony is that it was offered, who is it—Hilsman, was it?

The CHAIRMAN. Hilsman.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was to the effect it is a holdover from the French law dealing with the right to hold property. The Catholic Church was given a greater right than other philosophical devotees.

FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

Now, since I have been on this committee, the military men, the State Department have argued that the Far East for our own security must be the first line of our defense. General Taylor, will you discuss that subject? If we pull out of South Vietnam I think everyone goes over there.

General TAYLOR. I would not make the statement quite as you did. I would certainly say we have a first line of defense in Europe as well as in the Far East. But certainly China, the growth of China, is one of the most significant political and military phenomena of this decade. I would suspect that our military stake and our political stake in the Far East will increase.

Also, I have the feeling, as Secretary McNamara suggests, if we walked out of Vietnam, that not only would Vietnam fall, but ev-

erybody who has any faith in us in that part of the world would immediately try to get on the Communist bandwagon which would result at least in the loss of all of the states in Southeast Asia.

What that would mean eventually in opening up that area to the pressures of Chinese population, I couldn't say. But if you look at 700 million hungry Chinese to the north it is not difficult to imagine that this relatively unpopulated part of Asia will eventually be a subject, a target for attack by the Red Chinese.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all that I have. I want to commend both of you for a very illuminating description of conditions and I think a thoroughly objective one. I don't think there has been any coloring of the facts, and I appreciate that very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask one or 2 questions.

Yes?

U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM

Senator GORE. I wanted to follow up the last question of Senator Lausche.

I would agree that if the United States withdrew from South Vietnam merely for the sake of disengagement, that the political consequences might well be cataclysmic in that part of the world.

That is why I said I thought the time when we could do so had passed. But if the United States withdrew its support from a regime which was dictatorial, which was practicing religious oppression, then it might very well redound to our credit not only in that part of the world, but in many other parts of the world.

But, obviously as I said earlier, this proposition is now passe because we did not use what I thought was the only face-saving excuse we have had since Dien Bien Phu, so to speak. So I wanted Senator Lausche to get my point of view.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I am glad you made that.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to ask, could you just briefly say just what relevance, if any, does this have to our foreign aid program? We are in the middle, I hope, of the last stages of considering our foreign aid program. Is this development here going to require greater assistance or less? How would you relate it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I believe it would require all of the assistance that is included in the administration's request for both economic and military aid in fiscal 1964.

In respect to military assistance we requested $159 million, if I remember the figure correctly, for South Vietman for 1964. That compares with $211 million actually spent there in 1963. It will be difficult to hold the expenditures to $159 million in fiscal 1964. That is substantially less than Admiral Felt and General Harkins asked, but I believe that we can accomplish our program for that amount.

I am certain we cannot provide the assistance that it is in our interest to provide if the funds are cut very substantially, as has been suggested. I can speak less authoritatively of the aid program, but I have examined that in some detail as well. South Vietnam

has almost miraculously been able to avoid to date the kind of inflation that has struck other areas of the world. I think it has been able to avoid that inflation only because of the degree of economic assistance we have provided to the government.

When I left Ford Motor Company in 1960 the Cruzeiro was 200 to the dollar, it is 1,400 to the dollar today. Had that kind of inflation occurred in South Vietnam we couldn't possibly have carried on the effective military campaign that we have done, that we have realized in the last year and a half.

VIETNAMESE CURRENCY

The CHAIRMAN. Is the currency stable?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Their currency is much more stable than I anticipated it would be. It is a controlled currency, it is difficult to measure exactly the amount of inflation at any one time. But the inflation in the past 2 years has not been great in relation to the pressures placed upon the economy. It will be very great in the next 12 months if we are forced to reduce substantially our economic assistance. If inflation runs rampant through that country this will simply add an additional element of instability into the political situation and I am sure will be reflected adversely in the war effort.

So, I strongly urge the Congress to support both the economic and military assistance programs in South Vietnam. We saw absolutely nothing there that would in any way support a reduction to those programs. My recommendations are supported wholeheartedly by the Ambassador and I am sure by General Taylor and the other members of the Government who traveled with us.

The CHAIRMAN. You agree with that?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any evidence that the French are meddling in this affair? We have had these reports.

Secretary MCNAMARA. There is some evidence that the French have discussed with members of the Government of South Vietnam conditions in North Vietnam, and suggested that they take account of these in relation to their own military campaign and possible future dealings with North Vietnam.

The economic conditions in North Vietnam are apparently considerably worse than had been anticipated, and I think the French have endeavored to create the impression that because the economic conditions are as bad as they are in North Vietnam that the South Vietnamese should consider the possibility of approaching North Vietnam and attempting to negotiate a settlement of the insurgency that North Vietnam is sponsoring.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the feeling among our people in South Vietnam about the French Ambassador there? Was he on his own or was he speaking for de Gaulle?

Secretary MCNAMARA. This is very difficult for us to penetrate——

The CHAIRMAN. What does our Ambassador state?

Secretary McNAMARA [continuing]. Intensively, and our Ambassador has only been there for 5 or 6 weeks. I did discuss that exact question with a number of people in South Vietnam and it is my impression from what they said, and from other evidence that we obtained, that the French Ambassador was acting under instructions.

DEAL BETWEEN NHU AND HO CHI MINH

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any likelihood that Nhu is considering this proposal of trying to make a deal with Ho Chi Ninh?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe that Nhu recognizes that any negotiation with North Vietnam that represented an accommodation to the Communists would result almost immediately literally within a matter of hours, in a revolt against the government in South Vietnam, a revolt that would have so much popular appeal that almost certainly it would be successful.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think he would consider it?

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't believe so.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you talk to Nhu?

Secretary McNAMARA. I didn't talk to Nhu.

The CHAIRMAN. Why didn't you all talk to Nhu?

Secretary McNAMARA. Because it seemed unwise in the view of the Ambassador to accord him that attention.

The CHAIRMAN. They recommended against it?

Secretary McNAMARA. They recommended against it.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, why then does the Secretary say he does not believe that Nhu would do thus and so, upon what does he base, if I may interject, his conclusion?

Secretary McNAMARA. I base my comments regarding Nhu upon the views of those who have had very close association with him.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

TALK WITH DIEM

The CHAIRMAN. You did talk to Diem?

Secretary McNAMARA. We did indeed or he talked to us.

The CHAIRMAN. But you didn't talk to Nhu?

Secretary McNAMARA. He talked to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he lecture you as reported, does he give you a lecture?

Secretary McNAMARA. He held forth a monolog for over two hours before we began our discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Before he allowed you to say anything?

Secretary McNAMARA. I wouldn't say he prohibited us from saying anything but before we started to discuss our views with him.

General TAYLOR. This is quite normal. This was not a special treatment.

Senator GORE. I agree, I had the same experience.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the normal procedure.

Secretary McNAMARA. It is indeed.

But, Mr. Chairman, if I may take just a second, so you may understand the position we took with him off the record I would like to read you very quickly some notes of our conversation.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]

CURBING MADAME NHU'S TONGUE

The CHAIRMAN. What did Diem say in response to your comment about Madame Nhu?

Secretary MCNAMARA. He gave indications that he and Nhu had both made efforts to curb her tongue, and neither had been successful. And we have evidence of that from other sources.

The CHAIRMAN. Can't keep her at home.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, we were partially instrumental in moving her out.

General TAYLOR. We didn't know where she was going to land.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know where to send her?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We certainly didn't plan on her coming to Washington. [Laughter.]

Neither did he.

HILSMAN TELEGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. What is the story behind this so-called Hilsman telegram which has been in the press which, according to the reports, was not cleared with Defense.[1]

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, it has been stated that the telegram wasn't cleared with me. This report has appeared in the press on numerous occasions. One of the reasons was that I was at the top of the Grand Tetons at the time. There was no wireless communication.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it cleared by someone acting in your place?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe there was full discussion of it inside the Government, Mr. Chairman. But part of the problem was that many of us who normally would have participated in such discussion were absent from the city at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. It was ill-advised, is that——

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; I am not commenting on the substance of it or the wisdom of the action.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? In hindsight why can't you comment? Was it a wise thing?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would just rather not.

The CHAIRMAN. You would just rather not. Who should comment on it if not you?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would like to get the telegram out and read it before I comment, and I think undoubtedly State as well as Defense representatives should comment on it. I would be happy to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Haven't you already in a sense answered it when you said you couldn't see any alternative to Diem, nobody that you

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[1] On August 24, 1963, Roger Hilsman, Averell Harriman, and Michael Forrestal drafted a cable advising Ambassador Lodge that the "U.S. Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands. Diem must be given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and replace them with best military and political personalities available. If, in spite of all of your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved." The cable was circulated among top administration officials over a weekend, and did not go through formal departmental review.

know of that you think might carry on as well? Isn't that what some of your preferences amounted to?

TREMENDOUS PRESSURE ON DIEM

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. I specifically mentioned earlier that I think the proper question we must ask ourselves at the present time is is there a more effective policy than the one we are following, and I don't know of any.

The CHAIRMAN. Any alternative?

Secretary McNAMARA. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would primarily include a leader, wouldn't it?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you don't see any?

Secretary McNAMARA. The policy we are following is a policy of tremendous pressure upon Diem. That is the only reason I read you some of these notes. We have stated as forcefully as we possibly can to him the necessity for his government to reform and to modify its approach to its own people, and we have applied considerable economic and military pressure in the form of withholding of military assistance to support those statements to him.

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. Well, lastly, what do you think, if anything, would be proper to say to the press?

Would your statement about Madam Nhu be——

Secretary McNAMARA. No, I think not.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Appropriate?

Secretary McNAMARA. It would be quite inappropriate, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything about the statement?

What would you like us to say. We normally do not say anything of a specific nature. Sometimes it may be useful to say something. You should consider that.

Secretary McNAMARA. I didn't propose myself to say anything, unless you or the committee members wish to comment upon the discussion.

I think there is nothing I would add to the statement that the President issued following our initial report to him and to the NSC last week.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an occasion when if you think something might be beneficial to your policy and the Government policy you might take advantage of it. I am not urging you to do it but just asking your advice.

POLITICAL UNREST AFFECTS MILITARY SITUATION

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I think there are 2 points which need repeating over and over again, perhaps this is one occasion when that could be done.

The first is that the military program has proceeded satisfactorily to date. But secondly, there has been a substantial degree of political unrest and there continues to be a substantial degree of po-

litical unrest in South Vietnam, and if this continues it may well adversely affect the military program in the future, and, therefore, it is a matter of great concern to this Government.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant. This you think would be——

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it is appropriate and desirable for that to be said. In effect, this is what we have tried to tell your committee today.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else you wish to add that——

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. I have overlooked?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have nothing further unless General Taylor wishes——

General TAYLOR. Unless you want to end on the thought with an effective government by the end of 1965 we can essentially conclude our military program.

WARNING TO DIEM

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make the observation that nothing appears in the notes of the Secretary's conference with Diem to indicate that there was any question about the United States continuing to support his regime. There were criticisms of shortcomings and warnings of loss of confidence perhaps in the American people, but nothing appears in those notes that I noticed raising any question about the continuance of U.S. support of his regime.

Now, that doesn't mean that the Secretary may not have had such a question in his mind but nothing appears in the notes.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think that it was quite clear to Diem when we said that the Secretary warned Diem that public opinion in the United States seriously questioned the wisdom of the necessary of the U.S. Government's aiding a government that was so unpopular at home and seemed so unlikely to forge the kind of national unity and purpose to bring the war to a victorious conclusion, that the point was made very, very clearly and we were told later by one of the members of the Diem government present that is exactly the way the President interpreted the statement, which was our intention——

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary MCNAMARA [continuing]. To accomplish.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to ask any questions?

Thank you very much.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

SITUATION IN VIETNAM

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room S-116 U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have the Secretary. We are very pleased to have you. I apologize there are no more members here. They show a great interest in having you and then something occurs and they can't come, they have other meetings. They say they will come but I don't know when.

Do you want to start with that before the others—Senator Hickenlooper has some special questions before we get into general things, and maybe some more will come in and maybe that will be a good way to proceed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yesterday Secretary McNamara was before the committee and General Taylor, and I called attention to this inflammatory article, whether it is true or untrue, it is inflammatory, of the Washington Daily News of October 2, saying arrogant CIA disobeys orders in Vietnam. Perhaps you saw this?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DAVID E. BELL, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Secretary RUSK. I saw the article, yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I went through this with General Taylor and Secretary McNamara allegation by allegation. I think we, and maybe some other committees ought to know whether there is truth in this or not.

I talked to Mr. McCone the other day on the telephone—I haven't seen him privately at all—and I told him very frankly if his outfit had been doing this something ought to be done to them and if they hadn't somebody ought to let the public know whether this is an unfounded, generally basically unfounded untrue statement, or whether there are elements of truth in it. If there are elements of truth in it, it's a very unsatisfactory statement.

So, while we are waiting, Mr. Secretary, I would like to go through these paragraphs categorically and ask you whether there is basic substantiation for these allegations or whether there is basically no support for them. I can say for your own information that from the standpoint of Mr. McNamara and General Taylor, in every instance they said that within their knowledge there was no basic support for the allegations. We tried to eliminate the fact that you have a disgruntled officer, soldier or something.

Secretary RUSK. This is very pointed. It tends to be the source.

INFLAMMATORY ALLEGATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Or the other stuff, but I am talking about the fundamental basis for these allegations which are inflammatory and have excited many people, and which, if true, should be corrected and which, if not true, is doing a disservice to our fine efforts. That is the only purpose of my questions.

I put this article in the record yesterday. I would like to offer this article for the record.

Secretary RUSK. I assume we are very much in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, this is very much in executive session.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I assume so. Except that I am frank to say that depending on what I find out, I expect to make some generalized statement, not put anybody else on a personal spot, but I have had some experience with stories like this before from this same publication which I found to be very shifting sands.

Mr. Secretary, the article, which will be included in full for the record—and you can look at this any time you want to—starts out and with a major headline and says, "'Arrogant' CIA Disobeys Orders in Vietnam." That was the title of this article.

BUREAUCRATIC ARROGANCE

The first paragraph under Saigon, date line, starts and says:

> The story of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in South Vietnam is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power.

I am only asking you within the circumscription of your own activities, I won't ask you to go into the military, but things that have come to your knowledge.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER.

In your experience, and within your responsibilities, would you say that there is a substantial or reasonable basis to support that statement?

Secretary RUSK. I have no basis to support it. In fact, I have just the contrary. Senator, if you will permit me, I would like to make just a few comments for background on this problem.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We will go through it, there a lot of questions here. I will ask you about all of them.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. It might set all of these questions in a little framework.

REPORTING OF DIFFERENCES AMONG AGENCIES

There has been a good deal of speculation in reporting of differences among the agencies and within the agencies on this Vietnamese problem.

I think we ought to distinguish between the movement upward of estimate and advice from down below, up to the top where there obviously are and should be differences of judgment, differences of advice as to what ought to be done in a particular situation. Indeed, on a matter as complex as this, if I were to get unanimous advice from my colleagues in the Department of State, I would start to worry about whether all the elements had been looked into, because people's judgments just don't fall that way.

On the basis of all the information that we can get hold of and on the basis of the judgment and advice from our colleagues, then those of us at the top sit down and come to conclusions about what the situation seems to be to us as a basis for action. Then we decide what our action policy ought to be. On the basis of that, instructions then go back down the line to the people in the field, to all who have operational responsibilities.

I would like to say categorically that I do not know of any differences among Mr. John McCone, the Secretary of Defense, and myself on our policy and action in Vietnam, and I do not know of any instances—and I have seen detailed and full reporting throughout—I do not know of instances where any one of the agencies or branches of the agencies acted contrary to their instructions from the top. I make that as a categorical general statement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We understand and we discussed yesterday the fact that on the way up or even in the higher echelons of divisions of an agency there may be disagreements as to tactics, as to procedure, as to how a certain thing ought to be done.

CIA AND AMBASSADOR LODGE

The point is once the decision is threshed out through discussion and the decision is made, then I take it that in your view and in your experience and within your knowledge, there is no support for the statement that "the Central Intelligence Agency's role * * * is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power."

Secretary RUSK. There is no basis whatever in the facts as I know them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The second paragraph:

> Twice the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, according to a high United States source here.

I don't know what the high United States source is as is alleged here, but you are the head of the show.

Is there any support for saying that the CIA twice flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge?

Secretary RUSK. I have no information whatever about any such refusal, nor has Ambassador Lodge ever indicated to me through reporting home—which he almost certainly would have done—of any of these things on the part of CIA.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Paragraph 3:

In one of these instances the CIA frustrated a plan of action Mr. Lodge brought with him from Washington, because the agency disagreed with it.

Secretary RUSK. That is not correct. In the first place he did not take with him a plan of action from Washington. He was to go out and report back as to the basis of plan of action.

NO DRAMATIC CONFRONTATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Paragraph 4:

This led to a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson, chief of the huge CIA apparatus here. Mr. Lodge failed to move Mr. Richardson, and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were unable to resolve the conflict, and the matter is now reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy.

You are right mixed up in the middle of that one.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, I don't identify the circumstances.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, as far as you are concerned and within your knowledge there is no foundation?

Secretary RUSK. I know of no such dramatic confrontation.

Mr. Richardson is here for consultation. I have not had a chance to see him.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are going to talk to Mr. McCone about that.

Paragraph 6—I am jumping one statement of conclusion there. Paragraph 6 says:

Other American agencies here are incredibly bitter about the CIA.

Now, I draw a difference between some disgruntled individual like a soldier grousing about the mass and saying the beans are always burned or something like that, and the agency as such in its responsible echelons.

Would you say that there is any support for the statement that other American agencies, from the standpoint of the responsible echelons of other agencies, that other agencies are incredibly bitter about the CIA?

Secretary RUSK. I don't know of any such feeling of bitterness in the high levels of the Department of State. I can't speak for any others.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand. I am talking entirely within your responsibilities.

"SEVEN DAYS IN MAY"

"If the United States ever experiences a 'Seven Days in May' it will come from the CIA and not the Pentagon," one U.S. official commented caustically.

I presume that somebody in the personnel at Saigon might have said that, but do you think that is the opinion of the belief of the responsible people in the agencies?

Secretary RUSK. I can't think of anybody saying that. It is just as much nonsense as anything just as fictional as "Seven Days in May." [1]

The CHAIRMAN. Don't expose yourself too far. There is no sense in asking you to prophesy. There is no need to go that far.

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[1] A 1962 novel by Fletcher Knebel about a future military coup in the United States.

Secretary RUSK. I spent many years in uniform in the intelligence and I have never heard the slightest indication of anybody thinking or talking about any kind of unconstitutional action in the system. I just don't believe it one bit. A great many things would have to change in this country before that was anything other than fictional.

NO HIDDEN PEOPLE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Because you work in the main through our Ambassador, paragraph 7 says:

> CIA "spooks" (a universal term for secret agents here) have penetrated every branch of the American community in Saigon, until nonspook Americans here almost seem to be suffering a CIA psychosis.

Do your reports or any information you have support that?

Secretary RUSK. Those of us in the official circles here or in Saigon know who these people are. There are no hidden people There are no people carrying responsibility that we don't know about. I don't have any basis to substantiate that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Paragraph 8 says:

> An American field officer with a distinguished combat career speaks angrily about "that man at headquarters in Saigon wearing a colonel's uniform." He means the man is a CIA agent, and he can't understand what he is doing at U.S. military headquarters here, unless it is spying on other Americans.

That is one individual's statement. I asked General Taylor about that, if as a responsible military commander pretty high in the echelons of this government, whether or not he thought if a distinguished combat career officer in Saigon didn't have a duty to tell him about it if things were wrong. He said he heard nothing about it and didn't know anything about it.

I suppose you know nothing about it?

Secretary RUSK. I do not.

Mr. McCone could tell you whether there is a colonel in uniform.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I expect there is. I don't doubt that there is. I would be surprised if there were not. I think you have answered the next paragraph about the fact that comparatively few people know who the spooks are. I suppose the responsible people do know and I suppose if you advertise it to everybody that would sort of destroy their effectiveness if everybody knew who they were.

Secretary RUSK. In some places it is possible to guess because of the differences in the purpose.

AN UNACCOUNTABLE POWER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This paragraph: "They"—referring to the CIA operative—"represent a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone, they said." They are quoting some mysterious "he said" person.

So far as you know, is the CIA organization totally unaccountable to anyone?

Secretary RUSK. As a matter of fact, Mr. McCone gets regular reports, some of them extremely private, from his own people. Those are usually known to the Ambassador. In any event he shows them

to me and I have a chance to take those into account, but there is so far as I know no unaccountability in this process.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not going to canvass every one of these because there are so many of them nebulous in their sources of authority.

Here is a paragraph and I am quoting the reporter.

CIA'S ROLE IN POLICYMAKING

"And for every State Department aide here who will tell you"—this is allegedly the quote of State Department aides—"Dammit, the CIA is supposed to gather information, not make policy, but policy-making is what they're doing here."

Does the CIA make policy in Saigon or does it carry out policy?

Secretary RUSK. It carries out its part of the policy.

Of course, its input of the information it furnishes is taken fully into account in making policy. But where there is a key operational like Vietnam in front of us, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of CIA, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the National Security Council sit down and review the situation and decide what ought to be done. I don't know of any policy made by the CIA that is not part of that policy, or I know of none——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, you know that the CIA does not independently make policy. It carries out policy of which its counsel and advice may be a part?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

WHITE HOUSE IS FULLY INFORMED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This paragraph:

> One very high American official here, a man who has spent much of his life in the service of democracy, likened the CIA's growth to a malignancy, and added he was not sure even the White House could control it any longer.

Do you have any knowledge or any feeling that the President can't control the activities of the CIA?

Secretary RUSK. None whatever. Insofar as CIA representation abroad is concerned, or their presence abroad, I, as Secretary of State, am fully informed about that, make the decisions about it, and we have a man who sits regularly on a special and highly discreet committee in which these matters are taken up on an interdepartmental basis.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any knowledge within your experience whether CIA as an organization has either refused to carry out policy that is laid down for it to operate under or has gone off on frolics of its own completely independently of policy which would indicate a defiance of policy?

Secretary RUSK. No, I think that is not the problem. Once in a while in an attempt to gather information or something else, something goes wrong, but that is an operational problem rather than a policy problem.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Something like a clerk putting a letter in the wrong basket, something like that?

Secretary RUSK. There have been some mishaps along the way. There is bound to be in this back alley kind of fight we are in.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am talking about deliberate defiance of policy and deliberate origination of policy of their own which is either contrary to or in defiance of.

Secretary RUSK. I have none of that in my experience as Secretary of State.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think you probably cover the field pretty well in your knowledge of what the problems are. I just thought we would take this time while we gather.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the Washington (DC) Daily News, Oct. 2, 1963]

"ARROGANT" CIA DISOBEYS ORDERS IN VIETNAM

(By Richard Starnes)

SAIGON, Oct. 2.—The story of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in South Vietnam is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power.

Twice the CIA flaty refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, according to a high United States source here.

In one of the these instances the CIA frustrated a plan of action Mr. Lodge brought with him from Washington, because the agency disagreed with it.

This led to a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson, chief of the huge CIA apparatus here. Mr. Lodge failed to move Mr. Richardson, and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were unable to resolve the conflict, and the matter is now reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy.

It is one of the developments expected to be covered in Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's report to Mr. Kennedy.

OTHERS CRITICAL, TOO

Other American agencies here are incredibly bitter about the CIA.

"If the United States ever experiences a 'Seven Days in May' it will come from the CIA, and not the Pentagon," one U.S. official commented caustically.

("Seven Days in May" is a fictional account of an attempted military coup to take over the U.S. Government.)

CIA "spooks" (a universal term for secret agents here) have penetrated every branch of the American community in Saigon, until non-spook Americans here almost seem to be suffering a CIA psychosis.

An American field officer with a distinguished combat career speaks angrily about "that man at headquarters in Saigon wearing a colonel's uniform." He means the man is a CIA agent, and he can't understand what he is doing at U.S. military headquarters here, unless he is spying on other Americans.

Another American officer, talking about the CIA, acidly commented: "You'd think they'd have learned something from Cuba but apparently they didn't."

FEW KNOW CIA STRENGTH

Few people other than Mr. Richardson and his close aides know the actual CIA strength here, but a widely used figure is 600. Many are clandestine agents known only to a few of their fellow spooks.

Even Mr. Richardson is a man about whom it is difficult to learn much in Saigon. He is said to be a former OSS officer, and to have served with distinction in the CIA in the Philippines.

A surprising number of the spooks are known to be involved in their ghostly trade and some make no secret of it.

"There are spooks in the U.S. Information Service, in the U.S. Operations mission, in every aspect of American official and commercial life here," one official—presumably a non-spook—said

"They represent a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone," he added.

Coupled with the ubiquitous secret police of Ngo Dinh Nhu, a surfeit of spooks has given Saigon an oppressive police state atmosphere.

The Nhu-Richardson relationship is a subject of lively speculation. The CIA continues to pay the special forces which conducted brutal raids on Buddhist temples last Aug. 21, altho in fairness it should be pointed out that the CIA is paying these goons for the war against communist guerillas, not Buddhist bonzes (priests).

HANDS OVER MILLIONS

Nevertheless, on the first on every month, the CIA dutifully hands over a quarter million American dollars to pay these special forces.

Whatever else it buys, it doesn't buy any solid information on what the special forces are up to. The Aug. 31 raids caught top U.S. officials here and in Washington flat-footed.

Nhu ordered the special forces to crush the Buddhist priests, but the CIA wasn't let in on the secret. (Some CIA button men now say they warned their superiors what was coming up, but in any event the warning of harsh repression was never passed to top officials here or in Washington.)

Consequently, Washington reacted unsurely to the crisis. Top officials here and at home were outraged at the news the CIA was paying the temple raiders, but the CIA continued the payments.

It may not be direct subsidy for a religious war against the country's Buddhist majority, but it comes close to that.

And for every State Department aide here who will tell you, "Dammit, the CIA is supposed to gather information, not make policy, but policy-making is what they're doing here," there are military officers who scream over the way the spooks dabble in military operations.

A TYPICAL EXAMPLE

For example, highly trained trail watchers are an important part of the effort to end Viet Cong infiltration from across the Laos and Cambodia borders. But if the trail watchers spot incoming Viet Congs, they report it to the CIA in Saigon, and in the fullness of time, the spooks may tell the military.

One very high American official here, a man who has spent much of his life in the service of democracy, likened the CIA's growth to a malignancy, and added he was not sure even the White House could control it any longer.

Unquestionably Mr. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor both got an earful from people who are beginning to fear the CIA is becoming a Third Force, co-equal with President Diem's regime and the U.S. Government—and answerable to neither.

There is naturally the highest interest here as to whether Mr. McNamara will persuade Mr. Kennedy something ought to be done about it.

AMERICAN REPORTERS IN VIETNAM

Senator CARLSON. Will the Senator yield?

There have been many reporters, and instances of writing from Saigon. I was a little concerned about the editorial that appeared in the Christian Science Monitor, and I wanted to ask you about it. It is titled "Ungaged". This is a quote now from the editorial from the Christian Science Monitor.

It is not difficult to dispose of the State Department directive seeking to influence American reporters in Saigon in favor of the Diem regime.

Did you issue a directive?

Secretary RUSK. This must refer back to a directive about 2 years ago, a year and a half ago, which has gotten to the attention of the Moss Committee.

The Moss Committee from our point of view had quite incomplete hearings on that. I think that has not been fully explored. I would be very glad to go into that directive with this committee.

Senator CARLSON. My only point for bringing it up is there has been so much concern about the reporting, and many of these articles have been critical of our operations. I was interested when

they used the word "directive" and I not only discuss it from this angle, but is it the policy of the State Department to issue directives to reporters over the nation in many areas?

Secretary RUSK. This was not a directive to the reporters, but to our own people about press policy. This was at a time when the operations were being stepped up and when the question of the limitations of U.S. armed personnel under the Geneva Accords was very much in the picture, and where the presence of Americans in excess of those agreed in the Geneva Accords had not been completely made public and put on its own merits. We did not want at that moment—this changed in a very few weeks—we did not want at that moment the kind of complete coverage of the country in a way that would create acute embarrassment with us in dealing with other governments on the Geneva Accords.

I will be glad to go into that. I need to get the directive itself in front of us, because the directive itself is not sinister as editorials of this sort might indicate.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put this editorial in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, without objection.

[The editorial referred to follows:]

UNGAGGED

It is not difficult to dispose of the State Department directive seeking to influence American reporters in Saigon in favor of the Diem regime.

It didn't work.

The directive has been the subject of an inquiry by a House subcommittee on foreign operations. A report by the subcommittee now criticizes the State Department, saying that "Instead of hiding the facts from the American public," the department "should have done everything possible to expose the situation to full view."

The reporters, speaking generally, were not deprived of the facts. On the contrary. If anything, whatever efforts were made by the United States Embassy in Saigon to drum up support for President Diem, under the enthusiastic direction of former Ambassador Nolting, were counterproductive.

It is characteristic of American reporters that they regard authority, which seeks to defend and perpetuate itself, as their special concern. Where they suspect or find suppression or "management" of the news they will dig their way around or under or through the barriers and make extraordinary efforts to get at the facts.

Reporters for United States newspapers in Saigon have reported the political shortcomings and advantages of the Diem regime with great candor. They probably thought very little about the former embassy attempt to slant the political news from South Vietnam. This sort of thing happens often, with greater or lesser degrees of subtlety. At its best the press takes it in stride.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I have a chance, Mr. Chairman, to insert a comment on that after I have looked at and remined myself of the directive itself at this point in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, without objection.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITIES

The CHAIRMAN. Could I just ask one question?

As I gather from yesterday's discussion, it is possible that from Washington, with complete agreement among the heads of the agencies, State, Defense, and CIA, that certain operational responsibilities were given to the CIA in the field which resulted, as you have mentioned and indicated mishaps, in certain misunderstandings between news officials and local embassy officials. This may

have been the cause of some of this dissension, but it wasn't because they were being contemptuous of other agencies, that is, the people in the field, but simply because of the nature of their assignment that caused this.

Is that a possible explanation?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is a possibility, Mr. Chairman, because of this circumstance. At the beginning, that is beginning in the period of which I have a responsibility, the CIA people were those who were most up to date on the techniques of countersubversion activity. The Armed Forces went into that at President Kennedy's direction much more intensively in the past two years than had previously been the case.

When we first started the training programs in Vietnam in counterinsurgency, the CIA had the personnel, the training, the background for it and they were used very extensively.

Now, that responsibility, as Secretary McNamara undoubtedly pointed out yesterday, has been shifted over to the Armed Forces.

In the course of that shift-over some of these irritations could occur.

I think in a broader sense—I must say when I get these impressions of differences down the line, I am reminded of the period the last 2 years of the war in the China theater, where it was the lowest priority theater, had an unlimited mission to perform, where nothing that could be done was ever enough, because we were trying to get the Chinese on the one side and the British on the other to fight while we ourselves did not have forces to throw into those operations. It was a kind of frustrating situation because those who were single-mindedly intent on getting on with the war found all sorts of things going on around them that got in the way.

FRUSTRATION IN VIETNAM

There has been a good deal of this kind of frustration in Vietnam. The war itself is a mean kind of war. It has been very hard to organize, to deal with, and so many things go wrong to administration, communications, transportation, and so up and down the line there, it is possible for a newspaperman to get almost any kind of story he has a taste for.

I am sure from the sergeant's right on this—the obstacles in the way of getting on and finishing this situation up and getting back home and leaving an independent and secure country behind have been very formidable, and this creates some of the psychology of discontent that is responsible for much of this reporting.

The CHAIRMAN. The essential point to me is that while this friction may have arisen, there has been no serious disregard by one agency of another agency's jurisdiction and that at the head you have major decisions. Possibly some may not be right, but that is not here nor there, you make them; but there is not any original friction between the leaders of these various agencies.

Is that about right?

Secretary RUSK. In the most literal sense I am not aware of any acts of indiscipline, and no acts of indiscipline have been reported to us by Ambassador Lodge or General Harkins or through CIA channels to Mr. McCone.

The CHAIRMAN. That is quite a different thing from having had an assignment which perhaps——

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

SERVICEMEN'S COMPLAINTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had a series of letters one time, I remember—I used to get a lot of these during the war—I had a series of letters the mother of a homesick boy sent me from the South Pacific. He wasn't fighting. But he wrote her about every week or so and he told her about the officers having all the food and the men having to go scrounging around the garbage cans of the officers' mess and they didn't have any food at all, and his mother was about crazy, and the boy was homesick, and he wrote the most glittering and ghastly stories you ever heard of.

I finally had to send her the menus they had for 3 months, and it was pretty good. They had steak——

Secretary RUSK. The interesting thing is that these stories come out of the bars of Saigon rather than from the field where the real fighting is going on.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And the morale problems out there are in good shape, but back in Saigon it is quite a different problem.

This is true in most wars. The further away you get from the front, the more of this sort of thing you get.

FOREIGN AID BILL

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we, of course, had you here for a discussion of the foreign aid program. I think you have been informed about the attitude of the committee as expressed last Tuesday, a week ago, and it looks as if there has been some re-evaluation by some members of the committee. I wondered if you could address yourself to this as related to these recent developments.

By way of background, the committee voted on the various provisions of this bill, particularly the amounts, a long time ago, two months ago, I guess. We thought we had approached the final stages of it when the treaty intervened and we laid it aside.

Now there seems to be a revulsion of feeling against it and I wondered if you could address yourself to this question now.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would be very glad to.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt?

I will follow the Chairman's wishes; he can discontinue the discussion that Senator Hickenlooper and he and some others started before I came. I had to testify before another committee this morning, but there are a great many matters left hanging from the testimony of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor yesterday that in my judgment require State Department clarification, but I don't want to interfere.

The CHAIRMAN. He will be subject to questioning after he starts. I am just getting him back on this other thing.

Senator MORSE. That is perfectly all right with me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I may say for Senator Morse's benefit, there wasn't anybody here when I started and I thought I would

use the time to canvass these allegations. This is somewhat collateral.

Senator MORSE. I didn't know what went on before I came here. I didn't want to dismiss this subject matter either in this conference with the Secretary or some other conference. I think we ought to have an early conference on these other matters, because we are not going to be able to prevent discussion on the floor of the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, will you proceed?

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for this opportunity.

In the last 3 weeks I have not been able to be with the committee as much as I would like, because we are in the annual invasion of foreign ministers from other countries and that invasion is still on.

I would like to open briefly in order to permit time for full questioning on the aid aspect, and then I would hope we would have a little time before the morning is over to let me report to the committee on a very restricted basis on my talks with Mr. Gromyko in the last few days.

Mr. Gromyko is coming to Washington tomorrow, by the way, for further talks.

OPPOSITION TO U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM

You have heard a good deal now from Mr. McNamara and General Taylor about the present situation in Vietnam. It seems to me we have to keep our eyes on the main alternatives that are open to us. We could abandon it and let events take their own course out there regardless of what they might be.

My own guess is if we were to do that, pressures and additional efforts would be made by the Communist side, that Vietnam would almost surely become Communist.

We could, on the other side, move in with U.S. forces and enforce and insure another kind of system and regime. My guess is if we were to do that with U.S. forces that we would be in exactly the same position that the French were out there earlier, that most of the Vietnamese people would turn against us, and we would have almost no support internationally.

The middle course is to try to find ways and means of reversing the political trend that developed about the middle of May when, for a variety of reasons including actions taken by the government, the solidarity of the Vietnamese people began to erode, a solidarity which could, in fact, affect and perhaps even negate the military effort itself.

PROBLEM OF NHU AND MADAME NHU

Now, the key problem there has been, we believe, Nhu and Madame Nhu. We feel it is important to find ways and means to reduce their influence and get them out of the picture, because they have become a symbol of the repressive measures which have become so unsettling to the Vietnamese people and has come between the citizenry in the countryside building the total effort.

It seems to me we are in a position where we must retain the capability in our aid effort of supporting that effort, because if we don't do that we must have the first alternative of abandoning the country.

I cannot report to the committee that everything is satisfactory there. I do think the military effort has been going well, that we will be making a real turn of the corner there, but I am gravely concerned about the threatened erosion brought about by the problem with the Buddhists, the problem with the students, the disaffection of the intellectuals, the sense of fear existing in Saigon and in Hue among officials themselves in the government. Our present object is to try to clarify that situation, to try to get it straightened out and get it back on course.

In the Indonesian situation——

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, before you move away from Vietnam——

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

HOLDING BACK AID TO VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. I am fully in accord in the objective you stated and also in your appraisal of the seriousness of the political situation and the erosion there.

In the last couple of days there have been reports in the newspapers which suggest for the first time that the aid program itself, the umbilical cord which sustains this regime, may be utilized for purposes of bringing pressures to bear that can have this effect hopefully.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator CHURCH. As you know, I have a resolution that now has 33 sponsors in the Senate, which relates the aid program to this very problem of reform and regaining popular confidence and support.

I am interested in knowing whether these recent reports in the papers are accurate and what, in fact, is now being done to use aid as a tool for forcing an end to these policies of repression, and as a tool for bringing about the kind of reforms we feel are necessary.

Secretary RUSK. I believe Secretary McNamara told the committee yesterday that we are holding up support for certain forces that are not actually involved in the fighting against the Viet Cong and who, therefore, are more likely to be involved in these repressive measures. I am thinking particularly of those elements of Colonel Tung's forces, special forces that are in Saigon as distinct from those who are out where the fight is going on.

We also are creating a situation where President Diem just come to Ambassador Lodge to ask for aid at certain points, in order to create the leverage which Ambassador Lodge needs to get President Diem to take action on some of these desperately needed reforms.

EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE

Now, this has to do with such things as the commodity import program where there is a little foot-dragging at the present time. It may be extended to other aspects of aid, but the purpose here is to

put President Diem in a position of the demandeur, so that the leverage begins to be effective rather than have a situation which the aid flows more or less automatically on the basis of longstanding agreements, flows down the line where there is no opportunity to make direct use of it for leverage purposes.

I think that I would—I am not sure that this covers in as much detail the questions you would like, but I would try to be responsive.

The CHAIRMAN. I approve very strongly of this, and I would like to know if it doesn't represent a new departure.

Secretary RUSK. To a degree this has been something which we have been building up to since August. In other words, it is not all that new but, on the other hand, I think it may be biting into the situation a little bit more than it was now than in August.

Senator CHURCH. Has the government acknowledged publicly that aid in support of Tung's forces has been interrupted and that the foot-dragging on commodity imports as a policy—how is this being handled, for my guidance.

Secretary RUSK. I don't think we have indicated that publicly yet, because if we were to do so I think we might lose the leverage itself.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. In other words, if you play the card you have played it, and it may create problems for us. I think this is one thing we would want to keep in touch about with respect to your amendment on the subject.

If, in fact, it expends the card, then aid isn't leverage any more, and I think we would want to watch that part of it very seriously.

We have the same problem in the case of Indonesia, for example. I was going to comment on in just a moment.

Mr. BELL. Could I add one word, Mr. Secretary, in direct response to Senator Church's question. When the Department and aid agency were queried yesterday about these newspaper reports, all we said was that the aid programs are being reviewed to make sure that they fully accord with the President's policy as enunciated last week after McNamara came back and that, for the reason the Secretary has just indicated, is all we expect to say.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

SITUATION IN INDONESIA

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I might say just a word about Indonesia because that, too, has a bearing on the aid situation.

There is a real prospect that President Sukarno is once again going to refuse to turn his attention to the desperate problems of this own country, particularly in the economic field, and try to live for a while on the atmosphere of a foreign adventure. He has been threatening the new state of Malaysia, and there is in prospect the possibility of a first-class crisis there, because not only the Malayans but Britain and Australia are committed to the defense of Malaysia and this could lead to a direct engagement.

We are trying to mobilize all of the diplomatic action that is possible, Thailand, Japan, ourselves, Australia, to bring to bear on the

situation to cause Sukarno to stand down and open the way for further talks among the foreign ministers and the chiefs of government of the three Malayan countries, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The Philippines themselves have been helping in this direction of moderation.

We fell that we need the possibility of aid as an important element of leverage in terms of our own influence on Indonesia in this situation. I can say to the committee that if Sukarno does not get on with his, with a stabilization program, and if he, in fact, gets into an adventure with Malaysia there isn't going to be any aid. It is just as simple as that.

On the other hand, if we say by legislation or otherwise that there isn't going to be any aid anyhow, then we lose one of our most important influences on that situation.

Since this is a matter that could lead to direct conflict in the military field out there, we would hope very much that the committee would with understanding leave the way open for aid if Indonesia qualifies for it both economically and politically.

INDONESIAN ECONOMIC POLICY

I might ask Mr. Bell just to comment briefly on how this relates to the stabilization program, but I wanted to make this comment as a matter of broad policy.

Mr. BELL. Just a word of amplification, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

The Indonesians in May had appeared to start on a sensible course with respect to their own economic policies. They did undertake a currency reform, they did undertake steps toward bringing their budget into better balance, and they put before the International Monetary Fund a stabilization program which the fund approved on July 24 or thereabouts. We and several other countries, including the French and the Germans and the Japanese, were considering in August an appropriate arrangement, sort of an informal consortium under which we would undertake to assist the Indonesians as they pursued this stabilization program.

All of that, of course, has been moved into suspension. It has been held in abeyance since the difficulties with Malaysia became so acute, and today the prospects for successful carrying through of that stabilization program look rather dim, among other reasons that Sukarno has taken the foolish step of cutting off his economic relationships with Malaysia. This is going to make his economic circumstances worse and not better.

So we do have in contemplation, as the committee knew and was indicated in our submission for the next year, some assistance to Indonesia for this stabilization program, but at the present time that is all in abeyance. None of its was in fact committed.

PLACE SUKARNO ON NOTICE

Senator CHURCH. I have had drafted an amendment relating to Indonesia. I understand why you wouldn't want any statutory prohibition of aid for the reasons you stated and I concur in that. But would it be useful to write into this bill an amendment to the effect that wherever, in the judgment of the President, a nation is en-

gaged in military aggression, that the aid program to that country is then cut off, the idea being to place the Sukarnos of the world on notice that one of the penalties that would follow acts of aggression would be the loss of American aid as a matter of law, but leaving the discretion to the President as to when a country is in fact involved in military aggression?

AMENDMENT TO THE HOUSE BILL

Secretary RUSK. I will ask Mr. Bell to comment on the Indonesian measure that is in the House bill.

Mr. BELL. There is an amendment already, Senator, in the House bill relating to Indonesia, which does require for any aid to be undertaken to Indonesia from the point of passage of the statute, a finding by the President that such would be necessary, would be necessary for the national interest of the United States, I have forgotten how it goes, and the President has to report his findings specially to the Congress. That is a little different from the point you have made.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Mr. BELL. But it would relate directly to the Indonesian situation.

Secretary RUSK. The administration has accepted that part of the House bill with specific reference to Indonesia. Your broader proposition is one as a matter of policy I think we could all accept.

I would like to see the language.

Senator CHURCH. Let me submit it to you. I think it might be useful not only with respect to Indonesia but other places in the world where we have somewhat similar problems.

AID TO IRAN

Senator AIKEN. May I ask a change of location for a minute now?

How much aid are we giving to Iran now? How much have we given it in 1963?

Mr. BELL. I am sure my colleague, Mr. Miller, has it.

We have a modest program on the economic side. We have a fairly substantial program on the military side.

Senator AIKEN. What is the total? We get some disturbing reports from Iran.

Mr. BELL. Fiscal year 1963 total was about $25 million, Senator, which included, if I am not mistaken, a $15 million loan.

Senator AIKEN. Is that economic only?

Mr. BELL. That is economic only.

Senator AIKEN. The total, I thought, was some nearly $300 million in Iran.

Mr. BELL. Not one year, no.

Senator AIKEN. Not one year, no?

Mr. BELL. No, military assistance program in fiscal 1963 was about $70 million.

Senator AIKEN. $70. So about $100 million?

Mr. BELL. Yes.

AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES IN IRAN

Senator AIKEN. Does the Government of Iran still permit the American oil companies to retain 75 percent of their net earnings?

Mr. BELL. I don't know exactly what the arrangement is with the American oil companies. It was an agreed, there has been an agreement——

Senator AIKEN. A couple of years ago, permitting them to retain 75 percent of their earnings compared with 50 percent of the other Middle Eastern countries, as I remember.

Mr. BELL. I hadn't realized, Senator, they were different from the other countries.

Senator AIKEN. I think it is worth looking into.

Mr. BELL. Would you like us to send you something or put something in the record on that point?

Senator AIKEN. Yes, I would be glad to know what the situation is.

Secretary RUSK. This has not come to my attention recently, and I did not realize there was any problem there.

Senator AIKEN. I don't say it is a problem.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is a problem, because $120 million or $130 million of that money has come back to one American promotion outfit.

Senator AIKEN. One American private concern has got back some——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Got back $40, $50 million.

Mr. BELL. Out of the oil?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It comes out of the pot there. It doesn't make any difference if you put it in the pot.

Senator AIKEN. Tell them—Dave Lilienthal.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Lilienthal and Clapp have been doing very well in Iran, and they have been milking that cow——

Senator AIKEN. I think the last I heard this one company had taken the $159 million out of Iran.

A SMALL TVA IN IRAN

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand it that way at all. This was devoted to the development of a small TVA. They didn't take it out of Iran. They took a fee out of it which was, as I recall it, around a million dollars over a number of years. There may be something wrong with it, but they did not take $150 million out of Iran. They developed the river and put in dams and irrigation systems and so on under the direction and authority of a contract from the Government of Iran.

Now, I don't think it is fair to say they took it out of Iran. They invested that in the development of a river basin there. We had them here once before this committee, and inquired about its operations. He was very reluctant about revealing his full books for reasons of his own. I don't know whether or not it's serious enough to require going further than that, which is a matter to be determined. But I don't think you can say he took $150 million out of Iran.

Senator AIKEN. In contracts, in payments.

The CHAIRMAN. This was for the construction of a development river program. Just like saying they took a billion and a half out of the United States to build the TVA. Isn't that about what happened, George?

Senator AIKEN. Those reports are getting a little pressing, a little more and more, and it will be just a question of time before they erupt maybe along this nature, maybe no more accurate than this story from Vietnam, but prevalent enough to be disturbing.

DISENTANGLING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND U.S. AID

The CHAIRMAN. There was a program—I don't know that any American money went into it; it is very difficult to disentangle local governments from our aid—but they had a very substantial income from their own oil and set up a development system.

You knew about that, didn't you?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I knew about the arrangement. But these figures surprise me. There were some important development contracts let and private enterprise played a considerable role.

The CHAIRMAN. They weren't all Lilienthal. Many of those contractors were Italians and Germans and so on. That was the general approach.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Here is what the Lilienthal and Clapp outfit did. They took all the money in their pocket and they parceled it out and paid the contractors and so on, and in the process, undoubtedly some of the gold dust kind of stuck.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no secret about it; they had a fee for their services. Whether the fee was a reasonable one could be questioned. But that was the arrangement. Whether or not it was too much, I think that could be gone into if there is any feeling that is out of line. I don't know that it is. This man is one of the most experienced men in this country. He really was the father of the TVA. I don't know why, unless there is some real feeling about it, which if there is—if I recall it, he testified his fee was one percent of the total program, wasn't it about that?

Who remembers it? Do you, Newhouse?

Mr. NEWHOUSE. One percent.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he testified it was one percent.

Secretary RUSK. In any event, Mr. Chairman, both Mr. Bell and I have expert inspectors who are available to us to look into these questions. I will get my inspector to look into this.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you do that?

Secretary RUSK. He is very good at running down this kind of thing.

QUESTIONABLE ALLEGATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. He came in here and alleged there were all kinds of funny business. He approached this committee, and I had the staff, I think Mr. Holt and Mr. Marcy, to look into it to see if it was worth going into. They decided that it was very questionable, the allegations, to them; it ought to be looked into by a real investigation such as FBI or CIA or someone, and it was not suitable for this committee.

It later went over to McClellan's committee and he had one or two front-page stories, and that is the last I have heard of it. Whether there is anything to it or not, I don't know.

The man himself was reported to me as a disreputable character. That is about all I know about that.

Secretary RUSK. Does this relate to that Persian who came over here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I have a lot of information on him and I would not urge the Senators to tie onto him any way, shape, or form. He is bad medicine.

The CHAIRMAN. These stories about Clapp, it seems to me they keep coming up. You, or both of you, ought to give the committee a report and if you can't satisfy the committee, why, then we will consider what else should be done.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Iranian Government fired the fellow they were dealing with over there. Didn't they put him in jail or something? He was the fellow who was dealing with this development outfit.

The CHAIRMAN. If I recall correctly, that was on political grounds and change of government. I do not recall they fired him because even they allege that he had been misappropriating any money. It is true, I think, that particular man was removed; that happens whenever a change takes place. But I am not in a position to guarantee that there hasn't been too much fee, because I haven't seen anything that looks very persuasive yet. Anyway, why can't you supply us——

Secretary RUSK. Of course, I would be very happy to.

PREVIOUS TESTIMONY OF LILIENTHAL AND CLAPP

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, didn't we have Mr. Lilienthal and Mr. Clapp before the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. We did.

Senator SPARKMAN. Didn't we go into it very fully?

The CHAIRMAN. Not as fully as the Senator from Iowa would like.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was under the impression the committee was satisfied we got a pretty straight story.

The CHAIRMAN. That hearing is here. I have forgotten a little about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are chiefly interested in that hearing in finding out whether there had been a failure to register and report the application of fees and basic income. As I recall it, it was left dangling in the air, quite fuzzy, and we still don't know what really happened to the details of the money.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Lilienthal's recent crusade seems to be directed to showing the undesirability of generating electric power from the atom, and I don't know what the reason is, but the thing I would like to know is, does Iran give our oil companies special consideration which they do not receive from other Middle East countries, and in effect is our aid to Iran a subsidy to our oil companies?

If it is, you had better give the oil companies a check here and it would save us a lot of work.

Secretary RUSK. I was under the impression that the oil companies were operating under the terms of a broad agreement with all of them for many years, but I will inquire.

Senator AKEN. It is my recollection that Iran was giving them 75 percent of the earnings compared with 50 percent of the other countries. I may be wrong.

Mr. BELL. We will find out about that.

Senator AKEN. If so, why should we subsidize the companies.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, go ahead.

JUSTIFY THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

Now we have a pretty good representation, and some of the most vigorous critics have now arrived.

Would you now proceed to justify the foreign aid program? We haven't got much time. I wonder if you couldn't proceed on the general program. Time is slipping by and the first thing you know, they will be leaving for another assignment.

Would you go on?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of personal privilege inasmuch as I was the latest to arrive, I would like to respectfully say I have voted for the foreign aid program. Since you brought it up, I intend to vote for less this time than before.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think the chairman's classification of all those who entered the room late is entirely appropriate, starting with me.

The CHAIRMAN. You enter too late too often.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I hope I will be smiling in two moment's time.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

What about this program as a whole? We need not go off on every little country. The committee, as I see it, has got to make up its mind to vote this bill out fairly soon or do something else, I don't know what.

I thought they were going to do it, but the other day they acted as if they didn't want to vote any bill out at all. I don't know whether they do or not.

Senator HUMPHREY. Why not extend last year's bill? That is a good idea.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have to come to a decision and we have to do it next week. I think you should address yourself not to every little incidental matter but to the broad program as a whole.

UNITED STATES IS NOT IN DÉTENTE WITH SOVIET UNION

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I will speak very briefly to that point because I do want to get to the questions that are on the members' minds.

We have discussed this foreign aid program now for 15 years. There are not very many new elements in the problem. I think at the present time I would want to emphasize if there are those who want to cut back on the foreign aid program because they are in

some sort of détente, I would urge them not to go down that trail because we are not in a détente with the Soviet Union.

I want to have time to go into details of my talks with Mr. Gromyko before the morning is over. But the big dangerous questions are still with us: Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba and Berlin.

Now, I think that we ought, however, to take some encouragement from the fact that the effort that is possible for the other side is being reduced both politically and economically. I think it is a matter of real importance to the general international situation that the Soviet Union this year apparently feels forced to come into the world market and spend up to a billion dollars of its foreign exchange for foodstuffs. Inevitably it is going to affect its opportunity, its ability to get out into the foreign aid field and do some of the things it has tried to do and on the scale it has tried to do them in the past.

There are already indications they are cutting back on their foreign aid. I would think that, given the opportunity of the present situation, this is not a time for us to cut back sharply on our total effort.

I think there is another element, too.

WESTERN EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTIONS

We have been working in the last 3 or 4 years, beginning with the previous administration, to get our friends in Western Europe, who are able to do so, and who now can do so, to step up their foreign aid. That has been moving along reasonably well.

We are not content with the amounts yet, nor with the terms on which their foreign aid is being extended, but nevertheless the total of the OECD countries in this field is now becoming really quite significant.

Now, I gather from Western Europe that they are facing the same political problems that we are in this country of continuing the effort. I am afraid if we reduce our own efforts sharply that we would double the impact of it by making it that much more difficult for these Western European countries even to sustain the effort which they are now making, much less making it possible for us to get them to step up their effort still further as we would really hope they would do.

There are particular situations which are of concern to members of the committee and to us, but we deal with 112 countries. We are going to have more than 40 changes of government in this one calendar year, somewhere in the world.

There are going to be problems to deal with. We need the tools, the leverage, of actual foreign aid or the prospect of foreign aid or the ability to terminate foreign aid to give us the maneuver room that we need in dealing with changing situations that are going to occur in many parts of the world.

I would hope very much that somehow the executive branch and the leadership of the Congress could find a way to agree on what is necessary and do it, without being tempted to write into legislation particular points which put us in handcuffs or to legislate with respect to particular countries in a way that remove this card from our deck in dealing with these particular situations.

I made this remark not only in relation to this year's situation, but to the next year when the Congress will perhaps want to have a shorter session than it has this year. I would hope that we would somehow get together at the beginning of the session and determine approximately what really needs to be done and then do it, because the process is time-consuming for everybody concerned, the Congress as well as the executive branch, and in the process we complicate our ability to resolve some of these international problems in the American interest, by the way in which we now handle some of our debate on aid problems.

I would be very happy to go into any specific questions or general philosophy that the Chairman or members of the committee might wish to.

GENERAL TURBULENCE IN THE WORLD

The CHAIRMAN. First, you said we were dealing with 112 nations. We are not giving aid to 112 nations, but we have diplomatic relations.

Secretary RUSK. No, just referring to this fact as an aspect of the general turbulence of the world in which we are living and the fact that 40, more than 40, will be changing governments at the end of this calendar year, either by scheduled or unscheduled changes.

The CHAIRMAN. The other day the sentiment was expressed that this whole approach is, well, say obsolete, that it has served its purpose and that some new approach should be found. I think maybe there is some merit in it, but it is a little late to do it for this year's program.

Is there any idea that you have that you have a new approach?

I have in mind, to illustrate what I mean, the recently concluded, I believe, agreement under IDA for $750 million contributions over the next three years. It is not very large, but the great merit, it strikes me, is that we only contribute 42 percent of IDA and the others contribute the remainder.

Is that an approach which we might continue to develop instead of continuing this same program? I am beginning to feel the same way, not that it means it hasn't been good, but new developments have come about. You are talking about bringing in Europeans to contribute, and they ought to be brought in, and it looks as if that is a mechanism by which that ought to be done.

Is there any thought being given to this and can the committee have any feeling that you may have a new approach next year rather than the same dish of tea for the next year and the following years?

This, I think, might reassure the committee.

MULTILATERAL MACHINERY

Secretary RUSK. There are some attractions to the use of multilateral machinery, both because we get other contributors taking a larger part and because in certain situations international machinery can act more directly and with more discipline in a particular problem than perhaps straight bilateral relations can. I must say I think that one of the most helpful things that has developed in recent years has been the ability of the International Monetary

Fund to impose financial discipline upon countries as a preliminary step that has to be taken before countries like the United States or Western Europe would actually give them bilateral aid. The Monetary Fund can exercise a high degree of discipline without injecting into it some of the political factors which turn into concealed blackmail of one sort of another before they are finished.

The CHAIRMAN. The Montary Fund, the Bank, and IDA are all coordinated and they have the common director. If they can coordinate their effort, why shouldn't this be a more efficient way to approach these problems than the way we have been doing it in the absence of the development of these organization?

Now, one reason we didn't do it before, these organizations did not have the prestige, nor the experience, to do this job.

Secretary RUSK. I think that could be, that is, and can be perhaps even more so, a main instrument in the economic development side. But where you get into situations that are highly strategic in character, where there is a confrontation of conflicting forces, where there is a direct struggle with the Communist bloc, it isn't easy for the international organizations to deal with that kind of problem and on the scale that is required if these countries are going to be able to maintain their existence.

The CHAIRMAN. You could deal with that with your contingency fund if you had a contingency fund on an ad hoc basis. All I am trying to suggest to you is that some of the Senators here suggest that this approach is no longer an appropriate one and I am trying to suggest to you that you give some thought to some new device here that would give more promise in the future.

Of course, our immediate problem, our immediate job is to get this bill through. I think it is too late to take a new approach in this bill, but what can you say about the next bill?

Maybe if they feel you are going to do something more original and more effective in the next step they might swallow this bill with more relish.

CONFERENCES WITH GROMYKO

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, could I take just 30 seconds?

I want to hear the Secretary on what I think is the most important thing this morning, his conference with Gromyko.

Secretary RUSK. I am sorry, Senator, what?

The CHAIRMAN. Speak up a little, he didn't hear you.

Senator MORSE. I want to give you all the time I can to have you talk about your conferences with Gromyko. I think that is more important than talking about foreign aid anyway, because we know the lines are drawn. The Secretary himself has pointed out, even in his comments, that he realizes that we have our own political problems in this country and we want to face up to them.

I have been talking to the Secretary about a good many things, but not this morning. We ought to hear him on Gromyko.

I am going to have to answer the State Department before the Senate today because of the article in yesterday's Washington Post. I don't think the State Department ought to be, by innuendo, replying to U.S. Senators by starting to say a high spokesman in the State Department said such and such, and putting you in a position

where you don't know whether it is the Secretary or whether it is Ball or whether it is Bell or who it is. They ought to know when they get stories out like that they ought to be answered, and if they want the kind of answer that kind of story calls for they are going to get it, but we have this whole Latin American problem we need to discuss with the Secretary.

We can't do it this morning. I think we ought to hear the Secretary, in whom on most matters I have not only confidence but I have great trust. I disagree, if I am correct in my understanding of what the policy of this State Department is, on Latin America. I think this article of the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America the other day is one of the greatest mistakes the State Department could have made in letting that kind of stuff get out, because if they want to draw the line that way we will meet them on that line.

But let's this morning hear him on the U.S.-Russian situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, will the Chairman yield for a minute?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

BAD ADMINISTRATION IN AID PROGRAM

Senator SYMINGTON. I have to leave around noon. Before we get on to Gromyko or anything else I want to make my position clear to the Secretary and to my Chairman and the members of the committee.

With one of the ablest members of this staff, who is in the room, I toured the Middle East and South Asia and Europe, and I did it also in the previous year with the former head of the aid program, and we found a tremendous amount of bad administration. We found in many countries we were literally throwing the money away because of maladministration.

For years I tried to get a bill on a Foreign Service academy. So has the distinguished Senator from South Dakota and so, I am sure, have many others.

I gave up this year and I took the President's bill, the administration bill, whatever it was they wanted, to further educate these people. I am sure that the Secretary of State, knowing him, had nothing to do with it, but I have not been able to get to first base with respect to educating these people to handle the billions and billions of dollars—and I am almost through, Mr. Chairman—that the American people put up in this aid program.

Some of the things that we found out around the world are unbelievable—I couldn't believe it—unless you had business experience and actually went there and saw it.

Nevertheless, we got nowhere with this program, in my opinion, because it has been cut and gutted by members of the Foreign Service under—well, down the line.

The distinguished Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Curtis, told me one place he went to there were 42 people representing the United States and only four of them were members of the State Department. The others were all these new and ancillary agencies, AID, USIA, and so forth.

You cannot run anything unless you have proper administration, and the reason that I am very much cooler on the entire aid program regardless of whether it is right or wrong, is that we really had no banking or heavy effort to get something into law, which would require very little money, a small fraction of one percent of the money that is expended, in order to train these people to handle this type and character of work. I see no reason to put up a big plant to build something in electronics and then have a lot of plumbers operate it, and that is the reason I feel the way I do.

I wanted to express my opinion to you, Mr. Secretary, because I am sure that some of the things I feel with respect to this bill--my great respect, and I could not mean it more for you personally, is not what I am talking about—I am talking about the people right here in Congress who cut this bill that I have had for more training for these people, cut it to pieces.

It hasn't been pleasant for me to take. I started out asking for what you wanted, and I said give the people the training that they need and I will do my best to get it through Congress, and I haven't gotten to first base.

The CHAIRMAN. I should respond to this. I take some responsibility for this unfortunate thing. I don't think it is dead yet and I don't think the Senator has given up entirely, but I do think we ought to have the Secretary—I may say I was here at 10 o'clock and the Secretary was here, and there were only two or three members here. We have wasted a big part of the morning. The Secretary has been here all the time.

Will you go on now with Gromyko? Perhaps that may clear the air a little.

Senator HUMPHREY. I would just like to say with reference to the attendance, Mr. Chairman, I was Chairman of a subcommittee this morning and I can't be at two places at 10 o'clock, no matter how hard I try. I started out at 8:00 and I left my office at 3:30 in the morning. This dang business of trying to be at six different places has just about gotten us all down.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary, tell us about Gromyko.

Secretary RUSK. Would it be agreeable to the committee for me to take it off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. I think so since it is so current, and I think it is better. Close that record, and let's have a completely off-the-record session.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee proceeded to other business.]

SITUATION IN VIETNAM

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey presiding.

Present: Senators Humphrey (presiding), Fulbright, Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Pincus of the committee staff.

Senator HUMPHREY. We will call the meeting to order.

This morning the committee is pleased to have Mr. John McCone, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who will discuss the activities of the CIA in Vietnam, and other questions relevant to American policy in that country.

Mr. McCone, I assure you have been accompanied by associates who have specialized in Vietnamese or Southeast Asian affairs and it will be helpful if you would please identify them for the record and then proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McCONE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD HELMS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS; RAY S. CLINE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE; WILLIAM E. COLBY, CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION; AND LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON, GENERAL COUNSEL, CIA

Mr. MCCONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to introduce the members of the CIA organization with me. First there is Mr. Cline, who is Deputy Director for Intelligence and as such he is in charge of all of the reporting functions of the agency.

There is Mr. Helms, who is Deputy Director for Plans, which is his official title. However, he is in charge of all of our operational aspects of the agency, including the stations that we have in various places throughout the world.

Mr. Colby, who is next to Mr. Helms, is in charge of our Far Eastern Division, and is particularly knowledgeable in the Vietnam situation because it is under his direction and furthermore he was our station chief there for several years prior to the time that Mr. Richardson took the position in early June of 1962.

Senator HUMPHREY. You mean in Vietnam?

Mr. MCCONE. I mean in Vietnam, I beg you pardon.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCone. So these men are all thoroughly familiar with the situation.

I do not have a prepared statement. However, there are a few remarks I would like to make and then answer any questions.

TRAINING SPECIAL FORCES

I have been informed of the testimony that this committee has received from Secretary McNamara and General Taylor and also Secretary Rusk and Mr. Bell, and there is not much that I can add to what they have said concerning conditions in South Vietnam, and in our stations as well as the Embassy at large.

I feel that the station's activities have been under the complete control of the Ambassador at all times. They have been somewhat larger than might normally be expected. The reason for this was explained by Secretary McNamara, and due to the fact that in 1959 and early 1960, when it became apparent that a serious insurgency operation was to be undertaken by the Viet Cong, that the station was asked to train some special forces of the Vietnamese army.

The purpose of that training was to equip them to counter this guerrilla activity. This requires special training which the CIA was particularly well equipped at that particular time to perform. The training went forth, and then in late 1961, early 1962, when our military program expanded following General Taylor's mission in the fall of 1961, this activity necessarily expanded and became increasingly visible and the CIA personnel associated with it became known in a manner that is not customary with agency people assigned overseas. This was recognized and it was decided that CIA would phase out of these activities as rapidly as possible, and that they would be taken over by the military because they were overt at that point, they were no longer covert. This was arranged and that transfer of responsibility has been progressively carried on in a satisfactory manner, so that by the first of July of this year the military had complete responsibility with the CIA in support.

There were, however, certain activities which remained with CIA, and for reasons thought wise by the then Ambassador Nolting, and General Harkins.

The point is that this transition of responsibility from one in which the CIA had primary responsibility with the special forces and the military in support to a situation where the primary responsibility was with the military with CIA in support, was accomplished in an orderly manner, and with no difficulty whatsoever.

Senator Humphrey. That was between 1959 and 1961, right?

Mr. McCone. No, this was between mid-1961 and summer of 1962.

Senator Humphrey. I mean you started your activity in 1959.

Mr. McCone. Started our activity in 1959 and 1960.

RECENT HISTORY OF VIETNAM

At this point it might be interesting to go back over the history. You see after the Geneva Accords in 1954, the Government of South Vietnam was under the Emperor, Bao Dai, and Diem was the Prime Minister.

In 1954 and 1955, this situation was changed. By referendum the form of government was changed, and Diem became the President. From that time until some time late in 1959, the Communists felt that they could take over the government by political action. Therefore, there was very little in the way of guerrilla warfare during those years.

However, in late 1959, as a result of elections and the attitude of the government, and the fact that Diem had pretty well established himself as in control, the Viet Cong apparently reached the conclusion if they were going to take over South Vietnam they had to do it by guerrilla warfare, contrasted with political action.

It was at that time that we sensed the increasing tempo of guerrilla warfare, and it was that time that the decision was made that the established units, military units, in the Viet Cong area be trained as special forces and they had to be trained in a way that could interdict the activities or communications lines of supply and all the rest, of the Viet Cong concentrations. It was at this point that the CIA, because of their particular skills in this field, were given this assignment, and I have recounted how this grew from a small covert activity into quite a large visible activity, and this is why the transition was made.

Now, the station has conducted other activities in Saigon as well, all under the direction of the Government—of the Ambassador and consistent with policy decisions made here in Washington.

We have, for instance, assisted in the development in the South Vietnamese Government and of the military of an intelligence apparatus. This has been one of our principal activities. I went over in June of 1962, and was given quite a thorough briefing of the intelligence organization that was set up, the training of the intelligence organization that was set up, the training that had been given to these people, a system that had been developed and it appeared to me to be quite a satisfactory beginning although this has been one which we have been working on for several years.

We have——

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Chairman permit me?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, sir.

CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH MILITARY

Senator LAUSCHE. At that time were you working under the direction of the military or in charge of the operation yourself, in training these people.

Mr. MCCONE. Well, we were in charge of the operation, but it was in closest relationship with the military because they, at that point, had presented substantial numbers of their special forces for training. It was being done really as part of their mission and under the direction of the Ambassador. There, of course, had been the requirement for a liaison with the various political factions within the government, and these have been carried on by the station in the usual manner.

In general, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that it is my opinion that the activities of the station have been handled well, their reporting which I have reviewed with great detail has been accurate, and has been recognized as such by authorities in the Government here.

There have, to my knowledge, been no cases where the station has gone off indepenently either in its operations or has attempted to make policy.

RELATIONSHIP WITH NGO DINH NHU

The relationships that we have established, such as the one with Ngo Dinh Nhu, which was often referred to in the newspaper. It was an assignment Mr. Richardson had, and Mr. Colby performed before him, as did the station chiefs who were there before Mr. Colby.

This was considered essential in knowing the political temper of the government.

Senator HUMPHREY. So the news stories that indicate that your CIA chief in Saigon was acting somewhat independently in his relationship with, how do you pronounce that?

Mr. MCCONE. Nhu.

Senator HUMPHREY. Nhu, that this was to the contrary. It was an order, explicit directive, is that correct?

Mr. MCCONE. An explicit directive, yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are familiar with this——

Mr. MCCONE. Perhaps it would be best for me to suspend at this point to answer specific questions because it is a broad field and I might go into areas that would be repetitious of a great amount of testimony you have heard.

WHY WAS RICHARDSON RECALLED

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I have this clipping here, Mr. McCone, of the New York Times a few days ago, I am sure you are fully familiar with it. It reads:

"Lodge and CIA differ on policy. Ambassador and agency's chief in Saigon clash on conduct of war." I might note that there is no indication in this story that there was any independent activity by the CIA or any failure to carry out orders, but there was apparently a strong personality difference here, which leads up to the next question. Why was Mr. Richardson recalled?

Mr. MCCONE. Mr. Richardson was recalled by me for consultation, and to give consideration to transferring him to some other post for the reason that he had been extremely active in his contact with Nhu, and it was felt that it would be more for carrying forward on our current policy if a new face was there, a different face, and one who might not, because of his long and intimate contact in the field, be suspect, let us say of too close a relationship.

Senator HUMPHREY. How long had Mr. Richardson been in Saigon?

Mr. MCCONE. He had been there since June 1st, 1962, but he had picked up the relationship which had been carried on for several years by Mr. Colby, for him.

Senator HUMPHREY. Had he been stationed there with Mr. Colby prior to——

Mr. MCCONE. No, he had been our station chief in [deleted].

Senator HUMPHREY. I see.

KEEPING IDENTITY OF MISSION CHIEF SECRET

Apparently, Mr. McCone, an attempt has been made to keep the identity of the CIA mission chief in Saigon sort of a secret. Do you think it is conceivable that the identity of a man of such importance is really a secret, and if so, from whom are we trying to keep this identity a secret?

Mr. McCone. We like to keep the identity of our personnel who are assigned at any station a secret from the standpoint of the public. They are under cover [deleted]. However, we feel that the very nature of our operation is such that it is best not to have any of our personnel identified to the public. We like, so far as possible, to keep their identity from being disclosed to the press. This makes it possible to carry on a type of operation the responsibility with which we are charged much more effectively.

Senator Humphrey. I would imagine it would be rather difficult, though, to keep the identity a secret if Government officials know and also because of the usual capabilities of the American journalists in detection and identification and sleuthing. Isn't that a fact?

Mr. McCone. Yes, it is difficult, but except for this particular situation, we have not had many instances where our station personnel have appeared in the press, and this situation was unique for the reasons that I have explained. The activities grew beyond the normal scope of activities of a CIA station. Hence, they become more visible.

RELATIONSHIP WITH AMBASSADOR LODGE

Senator Humphrey. Is Ambassador Lodge, in fact, in command of that post over the CIA activities as well as the military and political?

Mr. McCone. Yes. Ambassador Lodge, and all ambassadors are by assignment of the President, and this was the policy of the prior administration as well, have command of all personnel assigned in their country. The ambassador is the senior and the single responsible officer in any country, and this is so in Vietnam.

Senator Humphrey. You said a moment ago, Mr. McCone [deleted]. Is that always the case or was this particularly so but in this instance not the case?

Mr. McCone. I would like to ask Mr. Helms to answer that question.

Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, the determination on this is [deleted].

Senator Humphrey. I hope.

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Senator Humphrey. I just want to get that clear for the record.

Mr. McCone. That is right. I was speaking of a friendly government.

Senator Humphrey. Just a few more questions, Mr. McCone.

SUPPORT OF COLONEL TUNG'S FORCES

The staff, needless to say, has been assigned to survey a good deal of the newspaper stories and so forth relating to CIA activities in Vietnam, and I wonder if you could tell us, did Mr. Richardson recommend the continued support of Colonel Tung's special forces and might I also add what has been your position on this question?

Mr. McCONE. The support of Colonel Tung's forces has been explained to this committee by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. McCONE. His forces were trained for carrying on certain specified operations that were in support of the over-all war effort. We supported those forces at the direction of and with the knowledge of both the ambassador and General Harkins and their predecessors. We continued that support up until early September and since that time we have withheld it.

The deployment of those forces was not always known to us because that is a big country, and they were assigned to such operations as trail watching and interdicting the supply lines of the Viet Cong, even sorties into adjoining countries in the interest of reconnaissance intelligence and interdiction.

The use of those forces in the August 21 raid on the pagodas to the extent that they were used, is not entirely clear. It is apparently clear that Colonel Tung's forces were involved, but not entirely clear, and there have been contradictory reports to the extent other forces were also employed, was unknown to us at the time. It has developed since that time.

NEWSPAPER REPORTING ON VIETNAM

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. McCone, I am going to turn the questioning over to the other members of the committee. I have a number of more that we want to come to later on. This question has bothered me. I have made no statements at all about Vietnam either privately or publicly. I have just been so confused about what is going on there I felt that it might be well to be exceedingly careful.

How do you view the newspaper reporting, and this is said in the most friendly manner. I am not trying to get you on record one way or another, in effect that would be perfectly agreeable to me if we would take it off the record.

Senator LAUSCHE. Take it off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

REPRESSIVE ACTIONS OF DIEM REGIME

Senator HUMPHREY. Give me some indication of what you have been reporting on Vietnam.

Mr. McCONE. Well, Mr. Chairman, for years we have reported on the repressiveness and repressive actions of the Diem regime. For the last 15 months we have reported regularly that these repressive actions were causing a tarnishing of the regime's image in the minds of the South Vietnamese people and in fact world opinion. We have stated that we felt that this disenchantment on the part of the people would ultimately affect the war effort. However, we said that it was our opinion, as of the latest reports, this effect had not assumed serious proportions.

We reported that the war effort was going reasonably well. We observed that the strategic hamlets which had been built in the north had been quite effective, and that the training of the hamlet

villagers and equipping them with a modest amount of arms to defend themselves against these attacks had borne fruit.

We also observed that the situation in the south, down in the Delta was not as good as it was in the north. Now, there are two very good reasons for that. In the first place, there is a large concentration of Viet Cong there in the Delta but also it is an extremely difficult place to gather people together and create a defended village and properly protect it because there isn't much solid ground any place, and these villages are strung along the bayous and behind them are the flooded rice fields and it is very difficult to pull them together as you can in the north.

So, there is a distinct and different problem to solve than there is in the north. The Viet Cong have a definite advantage because they can come in from their hiding place in boats, and make a hit and run attack on a village, that is not a concentrated village but is strung out over quite a distance, cause a lot of trouble and make a getaway, and this they have done.

However, we believe that steps have been taken by General Harkins and by the South Vietnamese military authorities, if they are energetically implemented, and we believe they will be, we think the situation even in the south will improve.

THE BUDDHIST SITUATION

Politically, we have been concerned about the Buddhist situation since May 8. Prior to May 8th we noted that there was a large Buddhist community, but it was relatively passive. Since May 8th it has been in a high state of agitation.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is the percentage of Buddhists in South Vietnam?

Mr. MCCONE. It is difficult to say exactly because it is hard to say just who are Buddhists because of tradition and who are active Buddhists. I would say active Buddhists may be in the order of 25 to 30 per cent. By tradition it may be much higher than the Catholic population, which is on the other hand lower.

Senator LAUSHCE. What is the Catholic population?

Mr. MCCONE. Something on the order of 10 per cent.

Senator LAUSHCE. Ten per cent. And the total population is about 13 million?

Mr. MCCONE. 13 or 14 million.

Senator AIKEN. Is that of the city or the country?

Mr. MCCONE. Country.

There is some evidence, and we have a report of it that starting in May the Buddhist colony was used as an instrument of political action against the government, and this has been the cause of the repressive measures that have been taken by the government.

THE MAY 8 INCIDENTS

Senator LAUSHCE. What things were observed in May that caused you to think there was political activity on the part of the Buddhists?

Mr. MCCONE. Well, I might recite the history of the May 8 incidents.

In the morning there was a meeting with Tri Quang and several of the officials of that community and province, at which time Tri Quang made a very inflammatory political speech attacking the government, resentful of their activities or repressive measures, and so forth. This speech was private and in a small group but it was recorded.

Later in the day, there was to be a flower festival at which the Buddhists gathered, several thousand of them. Suddenly the flower festival after the group had gathered was cancelled.

Senator MUNDT. Was what?

Mr. MCCONE. Was cancelled, and the group were led to a nearby radio station for the purpose of hearing a broadcast of Tri Quang's speech in the morning. The radio station refused to broadcast on the ground they had not authority to do so and they knew if they did broadcast their license undoubtedly would be cancelled.

This resulted in a hassel between the people who led the group over there, and the authorities, presumably, of the radio station, and the police got mixed into it and quite a riot took place. There were 2 grenades exploded, as near as we can determine, and 8 people were killed. It is not clear whether all 8 were Buddhists or whether 1 or 2 of them were not involved in this particular gathering.

This has created a very inflammatory situation on that has continued ever since.

Senator HUMPHREY. [Deleted.]

Mr. MCCONE. Oh, yes, sir, we do.

Senator HUMPHREY. [Deleted.]

Mr. MCCONE. Mr. Colby could answer that best, I think.

Mr. COLBY. [Deleted.]

BUDDHISTS NOT INVOLVED IN POLITICS

Senator HUMPHREY. If the present regime were overthrown and the Buddhists took over or a Buddhist group took over, would that new regime be anti-American?

Mr. COLBY. If the Buddhists took over probably initially not, sir, but the Buddhists have indicated that they are not interested in the politics of the situation, but at that point would revert to a religious movement, and leave the politics to others. The question then would be who would fill that vacuum.

Mr. MCCONE. Historically and traditionally, the Buddhists are not involved in politics. It does not conform to their teachings nor their practices, nor are they involved in communism.

However, it appears that the resentment among the Buddhists grew to a point that they did become involved in some form of political action. They have stated they had no intention of continuing, no political ambitions, and that they want to revert to their normal conduct of their religious affairs.

While we observe their political action, as evidenced by this little incident I have outlined to you, we have no evidence of Communist infiltration into their ranks, which has sometimes been indicated.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think our Government is identified with repressive activities of the present regime in Vietnam. Is there

identity of our Government with that, that there is resentment against us?

Mr. McCone. I think there has been some resentment toward the United States because of our identification with the support of the Diem regime, and feeling that the Diem regime was a repressive, autocratic regime and since we have supported it we are being accused, there is no question about that.

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Senator Humphrey. Go ahead.

MOTIVES OF GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AGAINST BUDDHISTS

Senator Mundt. If there is no evidence of Communist infiltration of the Buddhists, what is it that motivates the regime to take these repressive actions? Is this religious prejudice? Is it pure human arrogance or meanness? What is it? Why do you take repressive action apparently against a group that has gone with you?

Mr. McCone. The answer to that is that this is an autocratic, Oriental regime that feels that to remain in power it must suppress any kind of an organization that is against it politically.

Senator Mundt. Most of the soldiers are Buddhists, are they not?

Mr. McCone. That is correct. A great majority of them are Buddhists. But here this was being fomented.

Senator Mundt. An opposition party?

Mr. McCone. Political opposition party.

You see when Diem came into power in 1955 or 1956, he immediately set out to destroy the political opposition, and he did.

Senator Humphrey. They play for keeps.

Mr. McCone. And then controlled the country under the facade of a democratic country, but in reality it was quite a dictatorial arrangement.

CORRUPTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Hickenlooper. May I just say at that point, Mr. McCone, it is my impression without upholding as a matter of principle dictatorial action on the part——

Senator Lausche. I can't hear you.

Senator Hickenlooper. I say, without getting into defending dictatorial action on the part of Diem, the government he threw out was unspeakably corrupt, the opposition too, in that Delta area was deep in prostitution, graft and everything else.

Mr. McCone. That is my impression. Mr. Colby could expand.

Senator Hickenlooper. He was dealing with one of the most corrupt organizations in the world in South Vietnam there. That is the crowd he threw out. Now, maybe he did some things he shouldn't, I don't know about that. But they weren't lily white.

Senator Lausche. I want to follow that up. What were the repressive measures that he took? Will you identify some of them? If he threw out this corrupt group, that is one thing.

Mr. McCone. I would like to ask Mr. Colby to answer that by tracing the history of events about 1955 to 1956 on forward. Could you do that for the record?

Mr. Colby. I think in order to appreciate the repression, sir, it is important to understand what Diem was faced with when he took

over. I think this has affected his entire approach toward his concept of leadership.

At that time he took over a government which, as Senator Hickenlooper says, it was very corrupt, and fragmented. It was a colonial regime. He was a Prime Minister under an ineffective emperor, who was subject to the colonial French rules.

HOLDING COUNTRY IN ONE PIECE

The country itself was divided into a series of war lord areas. Some of these were religious sect war lord areas, some of them were just plainly, some of them were the Saigon police authority, that ran that area. He spent quite a few years acquiring authority over his country and putting this into one nation and in the course of this he crushed each one of these opposition elements in turn.

This, I believe, explains his concept of the only way to hold this country in one piece would be by the strong hand at the top. In answer to your specifc question, sir, as to the method of repression, I think that the first and most significant one is what Mr. McCone referred to as the facade of democracy. There would be elections, there would be judicial systems, there would be police services and all of these would have a facade which would meet our western concepts of democracy.

But underneath it, it would be clear that the actual control, the actual authority came from the top. The election would be more in our terms a plebiscite. It wouldn't be an election. The police would be able to arrest people without trial, without notice, and they could descend and pick them up and hold them for an indefinite period. There was a certain degree of police brutality. The arrest of prisoners and the interrogation of prisoners would be handled by methods that we would not approve of.

VERY PERSONAL CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT

The control of the government would be a very personal control, running completely from the palace to the province chief. There would be efforts to make sure that the military commanders were under proper control, either by the presence of officers on their staffs who would report separately or through a transfer of an officer who got a certain degree of independence and popularity to an advisory post, rather than to a command post. There are various mechanisms created by which the military could not assemble the degree of strength necessary to overthrow the government. This would be interference in the military chain of command.

The press was controlled. Even though theoretically there was not press censorship, actually all of the newsmen knew very well that they could only print certain things, and they could not print other things.

The student movements were penetrated. The opposition political parties realized that they could not hold open meetings, gather assemblies and so forth. I think all of this fits the concept of the repressive acts to which you have referred, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. I gathered from Mr. McCone that prior to last May there was less repression than there has been since this broadcast rally which did not come off. What new repressive meas-

ures did they initiate in May that were not operating, say, in March and April?

Mr. McCone. I think the most important new repressive measures were the raids on the pagodas of August 21, the closing of universities, the arresting of a large number of students and the arresting of a substantial number of the Buddhist monks that the regime felt were political agitators.

FRENCH ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM

Senator Sparkman. Let me ask just this question, and then I am going to turn it over to Senator Hickenlooper. What activities have the French undertaken recently in Vietnam?

Mr. McCone. We have observed no activities of any serious proportion. There were some rumors that they were going to involve themselves in the situation there. There were some rumors that they were going to attempt to bring about a detente between the Diem regime and the Ho Chi Minh regime, the Chinese regime to the north. We think that those are overstated and we did not see any serious effort on the part of the French at this time.

Senator Sparkman. I know for some time after the Geneva Accords, the French seemed to have a kind of protective attitude regarding all of the Indo-China states and I was wondering if that had diminished or increased or rather played out.

Mr. McCone. Senator Sparkman, I feel that this is a very natural situation. The French were there for a long time.

Senator Sparkman. Yes, I think it is wholly understandable.

Mr. McCone. They had left their footprints around. The language was French. There is travel back and forth between Saigon and Paris both ways, and consequently they do retain an interest and an influence.

Senator Sparkman. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCone, first I want to pursue the line of inquiry that I began a couple of days ago with Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, and further with the Secretary of State yesterday and now with you. I think the general atmosphere that has been created by certain news stories must be at least in our minds and hopefully in the minds of the public, clarified with as much honesty as possible, I mean honesty of approach.

Therefore, at the outset, and I think you said that you were familiar in general, at least with what Secretary McNamara and General Taylor testified to here.

Mr. McCone. That is correct.

CIA HAS NOT DISOBEYED ORDERS

Senator Hickenlooper. I am going to ask again that this Washington Daily News article of October 2 written by Mr. Richard Starnes, dated Saigon, October 2, be placed in this record, because this will be a little different record from the other.[1]

I don't want to take the time this morning to as thoroughly canvass this article as I did with Secretary McNamara or General

[1] See insert in October 8 transcript.

Taylor and, therefore, by incorporation, I will refer to those general questions without completely repeating every one because the others have questions they want to ask you, too.

But in connection with this article the blockhead line and the smaller blockhead line, the bigger one of the two says, "Arrogant CIA Disobeys Orders in Vietnam."

I am asking you as Director of the CIA whether within your knowledge and responsibility and competence the CIA has arrogantly or otherwise disobeyed orders in connection with the carrying out of policy or policies in Vietnam?

Mr. McCone. No, sir, I can answer that emphatically.

Senator Hickenlooper. The smaller headline at the top of this story says, "Spooks"—which means the CIA personnel in Vietnam——

Senator Lausche. May I ask how this word "spook" has its origin?

Senator Hickenlooper. Ghosts. They slip around.

Mr. Cline. Invisible people.

The Chairman. Disembodied spirits.

ACTIVITIES UNDER THE AMBASSADOR'S CONTROL

Senator Hickenlooper. The second or the other headline which is smaller says, "Spooks make life miserable for Ambassador Lodge."

Now, within your personal knowledge, have your agents or the officials under you in charge over there made life miserable in anyway for Ambassador Lodge, that is so far as you know?

Mr. McCone. As far as I know——

Senator Hickenlooper. I am going to get around to Ambassador Lodge later.

Mr. McCone [continuing]. They are not. It is an entirely misleading and incorrect statement.

Senator Hickenlooper. I am going to canvass just 2 or 3 of the glaring statements in here for your categorical reply, if I may.

The first paragraph says:

> The story of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in South Vietnam is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders and unrestrained thirst for power.

So far as you know within your competence as Director of the CIA is there any basis for this statement?

Mr. McCone. None whatsoever. The total activity of the Saigon station has been to implement the directives given to the station by the Ambassador, which in turn came from Washington, and there have been no activities of any kind carried out which have not been under the Ambassador's control.

Senator Hickenlooper. The second paragraph in this story says:

> Twice the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge according to a high United States source here.

Now, within your knowledge have your agents or your subordinates in Saigon or here or in any area, location or capacity whatsoever refused to carry out instructions or proper instructions, authorized instructions from Ambassador Lodge?

Mr. McCone. In no instance. To my knowledge, there is no instance to Mr. Richardson's knowledge because I have questioned him about that and likewise I have questioned Ambassador Lodge and he has no instance.

LODGE HAD NO SPECIFIC PLAN OF ACTION

Senator Hickenlooper. I was going to ask whether you contacted Ambassador Lodge and what he said about it but I was going to ask you about that later. I wanted to canvass from your own personal standpoint.

Paragraph 3 says, that one of these instances the CIA frustrated the plan of action Mr. Lodge brought with him from Washington because the agency disagreed with him.

Is there any truth in it?

Mr. McCone. No truth in it for two reasons. In the first place we didn't frustrate a plan of action. In the second place Mr. Lodge didn't go out there with any specific plan of action. It couldn't be true.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LODGE AND RICHARDSON

Senator Hickenlooper. The fourth paragraph says:

> This led to a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson, chief of the huge CIA apparatus here. Mr. Lodge failed to move Mr. Richardson and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were unable to resolve the conflict and the matter is now reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy.

Is there any basis that within any reasonable way at all supports the allegation in that paragraph?

Mr. McCone. Well, you have to deal with all three of those statements.

In the first place, John Richardson's responsibility was to report to Ambassador Lodge accurately and objectively on circumstances within the country as he saw them. If those reports differed from the reports that Ambassador Lodge may have received from his political section or from others, it might have caused some problems in the council of the embassy. However, I know of no dramatic confrontation.

As for the second part of that statement, at no time has the question of a difference between Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Richardson been referred to me and to Secretary Rusk and been the purpose of a meeting between the two of us. We have known that Ambassador Lodge for reasons that I discussed earlier, felt at best that a change of station take place because of the initimate contact that Mr. Richardson carried on with Ngo Diem Nhu.

However, in communicating this opinion, Ambassador Lodge went to great ends to assure me, to assure Secretary McNamara, and to assure the President that he held Mr. Richardson in the highest regard and that his recommendation should not be construed as a criticism of Mr. Richardson or his work.

Finally, the last part of that paragraph, that the matter was awaiting settlement by President Kennedy is totally false because no such issue was ever presented to President Kennedy.

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CRITICISM FROM OTHER AGENCIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you know under the subheading "Others critical, too," there is a statement, a one-line statement, it says, "Other American agencies here,"—this is with the Saigon date line,—"Other American agencies here are incredibly bitter about the CIA."

Do you have any knowledge that the other agencies of our Government, as agencies, and the responsibile heads of those agencies who have the authority to speak for them are incredibly bitter about the CIA?

Mr. MCCONE. No criticism was ever advised to me, directly or indirectly, by the heads of any agencies. Quite to the contrary. In my contacts with the heads of agencies, with the Ambassador, with General Harkins, and with missions that have gone out there, such as Mr. Forrestal, General Wheeler, General Krulak, and others, quite the reverse to this statement has come back. I would like to add, however, that this is a very large community, 15 to 18,000 Americans working on a very difficult problem in a very difficult country, and I presume that you can get a criticism of anybody and everything from somebody if you search enough.

However, I was answering your question with respect to the responsible heads of the agencies and I will say categorically at no time has there been any criticism of CIA.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. McCone, I made clear or tried to make clear to Secretary McNamara, General Taylor and the Secretary of State in connection with my examination that I am fully aware that in any military or other outfit and sometimes even in a family, you will find members who are dissatisfied with the food or they complain about what the family is going to do, and in a military outfit you can find barracks generals who know more how to run a campaign than the people at the top.

So, I am aware that itinerant criticism is always available in any outfit. I am not speaking of that. I am speaking about the broad overall departmental attitude or agency attitudes which are connected with this operation there. It is in connection with the connotation of this statement, for instance, that other agencies, as such, as incredibly bitter about the CIA, and I think you have answered that question, as have others who have testified before, to my complete satisfaction.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF CIA

Now, about the middle of that article, under the subhead, "Few Know CIA Strength"—about the middle of that two-sentence paragraph—it says, referring to the CIA, " 'They represent a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone,' he added."

Now, that quotes some mysterious, alleged public official. Is the CIA in that area unaccountable to anyone?

Mr. MCCONE. Oh, no. That is entirely——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Entirely unfounded, is that correct?

Mr. MCCONE. Entirely unfounded. I think it might be well if I could just put into the record the fact that the activities of CIA, which I have been discussing, are under the direction of the Ambassador. That they are reviewed by the country team, which are

the heads of the several agencies represented out there. That they are under the cognizance of an interdepartmental committee here that has made a practice for the past 18 months of reviewing the situation in South Vietnam at least every 2 weeks and this included a review of CIA's activities.

Our station chief and either Mr. Colby or Mr. Helms, have been at every one of Secretary McNamara's meetings in Honolulu, and in those meetings, the activities of CIA have been discussed along with the activities of other agencies and the military, and there have been, first, knowledge of the activities, further directions as to how they may reorient their activity or emphasize certain things in support of the U.S. objectives, and to my knowledge I have had no criticism. In fact, I have had quite the contrary, I have had a consistent flow of commendation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. McCone, I would assume in any operation involving numbers of people and numbers of either agencies or subdivisions of an agency, in the preparation of operations of any kind that there is a freedom of discussion on the part of responsible people within the various agencies, sometimes a difference in view originally, which are freely talked out. Is that generally the case?

Mr. MCCONE. It must be the case.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It must be the case.

NO ATTEMPT BY CIA TO BLOCK POLICIES

But after those ideas, some of which may conflict in certain ways or someone may see a different way of doing it or advocate a different method or tactics or something of that kind, after those discussions are had, and the views which may sometimes be conflicting are fully expressed, and a final discussion is made as to procedure, has there been any refusal or failure on the part of the CIA to either carry out the decisions that have been made or to carry out the policy that has been adopted after discussion.

Mr. MCCONE. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Or has there been any attempt on the part of CIA to block the carrying out of those final decisions?

Mr. MCCONE. No, sir.

NO BASIS OF TRUTH IN ARTICLE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then I want to ask you this. Whether or not this article that I am speaking of, leaving out the idea that any reporter can go to my state or anybody else's state and find plenty of people who think I ought to be out of office, find some people, I hope, who think I ought to be in office—I realize that a reporter can find many people who will make statements critical of anything, any condition, but leaving out those mysterious, "It is alleged" and "according to a high authority" and all that sort of claptrap that goes into the writing of dope stories, leaving that out—would you say there is any substance or any basis of truth for this article that I have talked to you about?

Mr. MCCONE. No, I feel there is not basis.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to say that I do not question but what the author of this article may have talked to some subordi-

nates or some people in Saigon who might have told him some of these things.

But I am talking about the responsible heads of these various agencies, and I am not questioning that he may have had some member of the military or some member of something or other over in Saigon complain. I have had experience with that before. I am talking about the whole connotation of this article, the whole basis of this article, and I take it that you say there is no foundation for this article.

Mr. McCone. No, Senator Hickenlooper. These is not foundation for this article. This article is a very disturbing article to me, and it was disturbing because of the attribution to very high American officials here.

Senator Hickenlooper. I used to think a second lieutenant was about the highest official I ever knew in the Army. That is when I was more scared of the second lieutenant than anybody else, and I called him a high official . . .

Mr. McCone. This Richard Starnes is a sophisticated fellow. He has been around a great deal. He has been on the Daily News for a long time. He was with, I think, the Journal-American in a high position before that, and it concerned me when this article, so totally inaccurate, was written and, second, it would be published, and furthermore that the News would follow it up with an editorial on page 32 of the same paper, even more viciously critical of CIA than the Starnes article.

Senator Hickenlooper. I can tell you a story about another series of articles that were written a few years ago, and some information that later came to the newspaper from its own employees on that completely refuting that series of articles but that was sent into the newspaper which was never published refuting the original statements. The man who wrote it showed it to me, and I know him very well. He is a very reliable fellow.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR LODGE

Well, be that as it may, the committee has so far as I know, Mr. Chairman, contacted Ambassador Lodge, have we?

The Chairman. Not that I know of.

Senator Hickenlooper. If it is not getting you out of line of our responsibility, I would like to ask you, Mr. McCone, have you been in communication with Ambassador Lodge since this furor has been created by this series of articles or this article and the editorial making these allegations, and have you asked Ambassador Lodge whether he has any comment on these allegations? If so, and if you can give them to us, I would like to have you do it.

Frankly, I am trying to put on this thing up from the various agencies of government. And I am frank to say if you fellows have done what he says you have done you ought to be disciplined and if you haven't you ought to be cleared and given credit for a good job.

Mr. McCone. I have no direct communication from Ambassador Lodge. However, when this article appeared, I sent a message out to the Ambassador in which I summarized the article and asked that he give me his views of the allegations frankly and as prompt-

ly as his busy schedule permits. This was on the 2nd of October which was the day the article appeared.

I received back a communication from our chief of station, Mr. Richardson, and he said that he had discussed the matter with Ambassador Lodge, and I will quote:

> Lodge said there is no truth in the Starnes article. Had been no disregard of orders, no national refusal to carry out instructions, no frustration of plan of action which he brought with him from Washington, and there had been no dramatic confrontation between him and me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think those are the top of the pyramids so far as these charges are concerned.

Mr. MCCONE. Now, from that and the repeated statements made in other communications and also through McNamara, that Ambassador Lodge's recommendation that we change the chief of station should not be construed as a criticism of John Richardson, who he, as he communicated to me, looked upon as a thoroughly dedicated and capable officer which, I think in itself, serves to dispute an article of this type.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We had the Secretary of State here yesterday and I can say I know of no higher authority to speak of the State Department or the Ambassadors under him.

I don't know whether it is necessary to talk directly to Ambassador Lodge because I am sure he would report exactly as the Secretary of State and we got the confirmation yesterday from the Secretary of State that there is no basic support for this article in its details and particulars.

SELF-IMMOLATION OF BUDDHIST PRIESTS

Now, let me ask you this: Do you have any information that you can tell us about this self-immolation of the monks or Buddhist priests over there, as to whether or not these acts were committed in full consciousness or whether they were subject to drugs or other dulling or deadening devices, hypnosis or other types of human control which meant that they were really not with full and complete consciousness going out. Do you have any information about that?

Mr. MCCONE. No. There has been a great deal of speculation. There have been some reports which we have been unable to verify that they were under the control of drugs, and so forth. We cannot——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have never been able to get hold of any of the bodies to examine them?

Mr. MCCONE. We have never been able to get hold of any hard evidence on this. This incident of the other day, word got around in Saigon that an event was going to take place at 12 o'clock in the square in Saigon, and at 12:32, I believe it was, a taxi pulled up, this fellow stepped out of it, apparently in command of all of his faculties, squatted on the pavement in the Buddhist form of squatting down that we are all familiar with. He had a bag of, apparently what contained, gasoline, poured it over himself, touched a match and there it was.

The notice had gone out so there were quite a number of people around, including representatives of the press. Perhaps Mr. Colby

would expand on that a little bit. This is in substance what happened.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir. This is essentially what happened in the other cases. We have no hard information on any such preparation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sometimes people get into a state and let rattlesnakes bite them, too, things like that. I don't know just what the——

Senator LAUSCHE. Sometimes we give aid to rattlesnakes when they are sick and when they get well they sting you to death.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think I will let somebody else ask you some questions now.

Senator LAUSCHE. Pardon me.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

CONGRESS AND THE CIA

Senator MORSE. Mr. McCone, I have two topics I want to ask you about but first, I want to say I think the President's statement on CIA yesterday was very reassuring to all of us and I think it proved to be very reassuring to the country.[2] I think you made a great contribution in this whole discussion of CIA. I think you know me well enough that I follow an impersonal course of professional conduct here in the Senate on policy questions and you are also aware of the fact that I am very much disturbed about a matter which you are not responsible for and that is the relationship between the executive branch of Government involving CIA, and the Congress.

I think it is only fair to you to give you an opportunity to discuss with the committee these policy questions. I hold the point of view, as you are utterly aware, that I do not think we ought to maintain in our form of government an intelligence agency that acts almost entirely, although I am sure we can discuss some of the exceptions to the procedure, as the arm of the executive branch of government without what I consider to be effective checks exercised upon it under our check and balance system by the legislative branch of government.

I don't think that means that we have to make CIA operations a matter of front page newspaper knowledge. For those of us who sit in the Congress, I think, have the same sense of dedicated responsi-

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[2] At his press conference on October 9, President Kennedy was asked:

Mr. President, could you discuss some of the recent public accounts of CIA activities in South Vietnam, particularly the stories or reports of how the CIA has undertaken certain independent operations, or independent of other elements of the American Government, that are in South Vietnam?

The PRESIDENT. I must say I think the reports are wholly untrue. The fact of the matter is that Mr. McCone sits in the National Security Council. I imagine I see him at least three or four times a week, ordinarily. We have worked very closely together in the National Security Council in the last 2 months attempting to meet the problems we faced in South Vietnam. I can find nothing, and I have looked through the record very carefully over the last 9 months, and I could go back further, to indicate that the CIA has done anything but support policy. It does not create policy; it attempts to execute it in those areas where it has competence and responsibility. I know that the transfer of Mr. John Richardson, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to surmises. But I can just assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities but has operated under close control of the Director of Central Intelligence, operating with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions.

So I think that while the CIA may have made mistakes, as we all do, on different occasions, and has had many successes which may go unheralded, in my opinion in this case it is unfair to charge them as they have been charged. I think they have done a good job.

bility for the security of our nation as anyone in the executive branch of government.

I find it very difficult to reconcile the procedure that is maintained in respect to the relationship between CIA and the Congress and in a matter which I think ought to be a mutual trust between the two branches of government. I see no reason why a staff member of CIA who never has to face the ballot box or anyone else in the executive branch of government on a non-elective position, should be able to know the details about questions involving the security of the country and those of us on the Foreign Relations Committee cannot.

Now, this matter of the so-called watchdog committee has been bandied about until it has taken on, I think, almost meaningless connotations. When I hear this talk about a watchdog committee, I find there are so many views as to what that ought to involve that there is no difinitive agreement.

But I wanted to raise the basic policy question with you because I think it is so important that we try to reach an understanding with the President of the United States as to a relationship between his office and the Congress in respect to the operations of CIA, because I think unless some kind of an understanding is reached we are not going to be able to remove this in the field of controversy and public discussion in this country.

NEED FOR CHECKS ON CIA

I think it is increasing. I don't think it is good for CIA. I don't think it is good for the President. I don't think it is good for us. I would like to get it to an end. So I think it would be helpful to us, if you would explain first, what relationships do exist between the CIA, acting through the executive branch of government and the Congress, and there are more of them than the public realizes and I am sure there are probably more than many members of the Congress realize and probably more than I realize, and I know some of them.

What I want to raise with you, Mr. McCone, is the criticism of CIA that I think is much more basic than these present criticisms in the kind of an article that Senator Hickenlooper has been discussing with you, and many others that are patently false, in regard to which you couldn't have a stronger defender than I will be.

But on this matter of policy, whether or not in a democracy we can justify setting up in the executive branch of government, an intelligence service over which the Congress has no direct check unless you want to say the old argument check of the purse string is good for a democracy. There can be honest differences of opinion, and I happen to be on one side of that controversy. I do not think it is good. I think it is a bad procedure and precedent.

I would like to see it ended without destroying CIA, because we need it. But I certainly think we ought to be able to sit down and work out a procedure where there would be no justification in fact for a Wayne Morse or E, Y, Z, to be disturbed about a sincere fear that I have, with no relation to the personalities involved and certainly not to yours, for I know no more patriotic, dedicated Ameri-

can than you and anyone who is more dedicated to our system of government than you.

But Mr. McCone, I don't like the setup of CIA without more adequate direct checks exercised upon it by the legislative branch of government.

I want to lay out the general premise. I am perfectly willing to subject myself to cross-examination. I don't believe in this business of people coming before a Senate committee and only the Senators ask questions, because if there is anything you want to ask me in order for you to have a clearer and better understanding of my criticism of CIA you certainly are welcome to ask it. But my criticism goes to nothing but the procedural setup under our checks and balance system. I don't think we have adequate checks on your organization. I think we ought to try to work out an understanding.

We talk about the National Security Council; I am just thinking off the top of my head, but maybe we could solve the problem in part that worries me if we had the Chairman of this committee, the Chairman of the House committee, the Chairman of the Armed Services committees, sit, maybe that would provide the necessary checks. But frankly, I don't think it is good to have your organization acting as a top secret intelligence organization around the world, and Congress in fact not knowing what is going on.

That is in broad brush strokes the basis of my criticism, and you know me. I don't mind criticism. I want you to criticize this point of view, because I will change my mind if you can show me I am wrong, but until I am convinced that I am wrong I intend to continue to take the position that you know I take in the Senate—we ought to have some improvement in the relationship procedurally between the CIA and Congress.

I am all through.

Mr. McCone. Senator, this brings up a very important matter.

PRESS CRITICISM OF CIA

I would first like to say that I am extremely distrubed over the rash of articles which appeared in the press, reporting and editorial, critical of CIA, and Senator Hickenlooper has referred to only one.

However, our people who follow the press in their professional capacity tell me there have been several hundreds of them, and this is disturbing because I think that this can destroy public confidence in the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence community, not only destroy public confidence, it could destroy the agency itself.

I am in a position now of recruiting new people from universities. With the rash of criticisms it is very difficult to convince a young man that he should enter this field as his life work.

I feel that we must do something to put the Central Intelligence Agency, and, indeed the entire intelligence community, in proper public focus, otherwise what is going to happen is each article is going to be like an added few neutrons to a nuclear reaction and you get enough of them and the whole thing explodes, as Senator Hickenlooper knows so well.

Now, nothing would please the Soviets more than to have exactly that happen. I think they relish in every article, and in fact, I know that one of the objectives of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Soviet Union which is known as the KGB, is to discredit [deleted] of Great Britain and the CIA and I think we have to recognize that. Nothing would advance their cause more than to see the total destruction of the intelligence effort of the United States.

WILLING TO WORK WITH CONGRESS

Now, as far as the relationship of Congress is concerned, I am perfectly willing to work with Congress in any manner that they so desire. I have worked with a great many committees of Congress.

Senator Hickenlooper, I think, and Senator Aiken can testify as to the manner in which as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission I worked with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

I work very closely with four committees of Congress now. Senator [Richard] Russell has, as you gentlemen know, a select subcommittee of his Armed Services Committee, and I meet with him quite frequently. I would like to meet with him more frequently. He is extremely busy and it is difficult to schedule meetings.

Senator [Carl] Hayden, who chairs a small group for the Appropriations Committee, I meet with him, and quite frequently Senator Russell has Senator Hayden and members of his committee so that we meet jointly.

On the House side I meet at least once a month with Chairman [Carl] Vinson and a small select group of his military affairs committee, and in those meetings we review all the activities of CIA which are of interest to that committee.

I likewise meet with a small committee of Chairman Cannon on the appropriations side. While this is for the purpose of considering appropriations, nevertheless, it inevitably gets into an intimate discussion of our activities and questions are asked concerning what we do.

Now, whether this is adequate or not in the opinion of the Congress is something, I think, for you gentlemen to examine, and to make a judgment, and anything that is your will is perfectly satisfactory to me.

A SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW CIA

Senator MORSE. I want to see if we can't work something out in order to get rid of minority views and criticism, too, but what I would like to ask you is is there any merit in the suggestion about a special congressional committee. It probably ought to be a small joint committee, maybe the chairmen of these important committees, to be officially appointed and set up as a so-called joint CIA congressional committee. Couldn't it, if properly organized, serve as somewhat of a protection to your agency from a lot of criticism as well as serve as protection of the Congress back home so that it cannot be said that we failed to maintain an adequate check on any agency of the Government.

Mr. MCCONE. Well, as I say, this is a matter of the judgment of the Congress as to how it wishes to organize itself. The machinery I

have described was in being when I assumed my position as Director some 2 years ago.

In addition there is a rather satisfactory control within the executive branch of the Government. There is an interdepartmental group that meets regularly and reviews our activities, and certain activities of the military that are of interest to the Defense Department, to State and CIA and the White House. This involves a very comprehensive interdepartmental review and guidance of CIA's activities where matters of interest to State are involved.

If there is ever a policy decision involved, and frequently there is, it is referred to the President for his final decision. The President himself has formed an intelligence advisory board, which for several years was chaired by Dr. Killian of MIT and now is chaired by Mr. Clark Clifford and that board meets quite frequently and goes into the activities of the intelligence community exhaustively. I spend a great deal of time with that board and they report regularly to the President. This is outside of the legislative branch.

Now, if these are inadequate, they should be examined and you should make a judgment as to what should be done about it. There is no question in my mind about sitting down with duly appointed members of the Congress who understand the very great sensitivity of some of the subjects and, therefore, must protect them and discuss them with complete frankness.

POLICE STATE PROCEDURES

Senator MORSE. Part of this analysis of mine, Mr. McCone, I meet myself coming backwards. I bump into the separation of powers doctrine, too, when I give consideration to the possibility of having on the Security Council some representatives in the form of chairmen of top congressional committees. It is pretty hard to testify on the constitutional separation of powers ground, but that is why I have been talking and thinking in terms of a special CIA committee that would have the authority—it would have to be carefully selected, I fully realize it would have to be very carefully selected. But I think our committee chairmen system works out pretty well in the selection of responsible people, and I would be perfectly willing to limit it to top committee chairmen. I think it would be salutary and I think it would strengthen public acceptance of the necessity for an intelligence program, if we had a congressional committee, for want of a better term, we will call it a CIA congressional committee, that would not be barred in any way from access to whatever information it sought that might have been collected by CIA in connection with this intelligence board.

I do not think it would create unsafety, and I am so concerned about seeing to it that we keep our people satisfied at all times that we are not developing within this form of government what is frequently referred to as police state procedures. By police state procedures, I simply mean unchecked procedures, where there isn't a direct check upon the part of the elected officials of the people in the legislative branch of government.

In this branch of government, all the checking power the executive has on it, this branch of government under our constitutional system, is the paramount check in protecting the people at the pre-

cinct level, and you are bound to run into the kind of criticism that I make from time to time when we find that someone in the executive branch of government at a staff level has access to information that may very well involve the security of this whole nation, and an elected official doesn't have quick and easy access to it through such a committee as I am recommending or suggesting.

I would certainly sit here as somewhat of a kind of intellectually dishonest person if I didn't raise these questions with you while I am here. I want you to know, Mr. McCone, that the Lord knows I don't want to impose upon your time in what you are doing, but sometime at our mutual convenience I would be glad to meet with you and talk my views out because it must be puzzling to you down there to know the views such as I hold up here and, I certainly am not alone. Possibly see if we can reach some understanding, I want to do it. I owe it to you and I owe it to my constituents.

NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD CIA

I had some more questions, one has been handed to me, that this issue is not how satisfactory the present procedures actually are, it is whether the American public, including the press, thinks they are, and the indications are growing to be adverse and that is why I think we ought to come to grips with this feeling that has made you so lonely the last 30 days and sometimes make me so lonely too, when I take a position that I take.

All I am pleading for is that, number one, we recognize this problem vis-a-vis negative attitudes on the part of some and the CIA be resolved, if we can, around a negotiating table rather than in the public platforms of America.

Mr. Chairman, the committee or the staff has asked me to go to the Foreign Relations Committee room in the new Senate Office Building to plead with a group of businessmen and I was about to say that these questions will be asked by other members of the committee. But in fairness to Senator Symington and Senator Church, I will not ask them here if I can have a ruling from you, sir, that I can submit these questions—which were prepared by the staff and they are simply asking me to be the conduit—to Mr. McCone and have him answer them in a memorandum for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator MORSE. It is the policy question I wanted to raise because it is the policy questions I have raised that disturb me so much.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly that is agreeable.

Senator from Ohio.

A SUBSTITUTE FOR DIEM

Senator LAUSCHE. Having in mind and weaknesses that have been ascribed to Diem do you and those with whom you consult have an opinion as to whether there is a substitute for him that will serve our interests better?

Mr. MCCONE. It has been our opinion, and our reporting that despite the criticism of Diem throughout South Vietnam and the military, we cannot find enough of an agreed position on the part

of the dissidents so that we can evaluate the possibility of success of any one of these innumerable coups that we have heard about over there, and have reported.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, you have answered the question.

Mr. MCCONE. No second, we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively would be an improvement over Diem. Therefore, it has been our counsel that we must proceed cautiously, otherwise a situation might flare up which might result in something of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely by sitting on the sidelines.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. That answers the question.

DIEM'S POSITION ON REPRESSIVE MEASURES

What is Diem's answer to these charges that he has adopted repressive measures? Has he been talked to about them and what is his answer?

Mr. MCCONE. Secretary McNamara would be a much better witness than I. I have not talked with Diem since June of last year.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see.

Mr. MCCONE. He has been talked with innumerable times about these repressive measures. He is a very steely, positive figure, however, and not prone to release this tight grip he holds for I think he is afraid that political opposition will grow up and he will lose the control of his government.

SOURCES OF UNTRUE STORIES

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, do you have any reliable information upon which you can form a judgment as to the source from which the untrue stories about CIA emanate?

Mr. MCCONE. No, I have not. I have tried very hard to get the sources, to get Starnes to identify his sources. However, he communicated with his editor that his sources were responsible and he knew the story was true. That is as reported to me by his editors.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will not ask you if you have any surmise or suspicion. I don't want the record clogged by that type of answer.

DUTIES OF COLONEL TUNG

Now, what were the specific duties assigned to Colonel Tung before he was called in to do this work, if he was called, on the pagodas?

Mr. MCCONE. Well, he was to command the special unconventional warfare corps, who were to conduct guerrilla type or anti-guerrilla type of operations targeted against the Viet Cong concentrations, their lines of supply, and their means of communications.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did your men train his forces?

Mr. MCCONE. Mr. Colby could answer that question.

Mr. COLBY. We trained a certain number of them, yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were they also assigned the responsibility of doing intelligence work?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir, certain of them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that the training which we gave them?

Mr. COLBY. We gave his forces both intelligence training and unconventional warfare, guerrilla tactics.

Colonel Tung, sir, commands a series of different types of operations, some of which are intelligence penetration efforts against the Viet Cong, others of which are working with local people to get them to defend themselves against the Viet Cong. This has particularly included the tribal elements in the mountain areas.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, Mr. McCone, this duty was assigned to the CIA to train these Tung forces.

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.

CIA AND THE PAGODA RAIDS

Senator LAUSCHE. In your judgment, which is the incident that occurred in South Vietnam that precipitated upon CIA this unfavorable treatment that you have received, if you can pinpoint it.

Mr. MCCONE. Well, it started shortly after the raids on the pagodas on August 21, and the criticism seemed to be stimulated by reports that came out after that. One being an article that we were continuing to support the Tung forces who had brutally entered the pagodas and destroyed them and arrested the Buddhists. And the implication in the press articles was that we, CIA, were guilty of having been created and were supporting a special force whose purpose it was to exercise a repressive measure of this type.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then someone must have leaked out the word that you were training the Tung forces.

Mr. MCCONE. This was known.

Senator LAUSCHE. That was known?

Mr. MCCONE. Oh, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. And is it that link which they used as the charge that CIA was responsible for the pagoda raids?

Mr. MCCONE. It was that link, together with the fact that it was known that we were the contact with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Now, the fact that we were the contact with Nhu, that Colonel Tung was responsible to Nhu, and that Colonel Tung's forces had been involved in this pagoda raid, automatically drew CIA as having a position of responsibility.

Senator LAUSCHE. This is what bewilders me. With these untrue stories running into several hundreds, and the attacks continuing from one whole month, how is it that nobody in a responsible position did not denounce the stories? You need not answer that. There was a denunciation yesterday, and this committee has done something about it. But on a matter so vital, it seems to me that when the untrue stories were published and repeated someone should have spoken.

That is all I have. I know you could not speak up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?

SUSPICIONS OF SECRET ORGANIZATIONS

Senator CHURCH. Mr. McCone, I certainly have not given credence to many of the outlandish things that have been said about the CIA's activity in connection with insubordination and independent policymaking and that kind of thing. I do think, however, that you need to be prepared for continuing criticism of CIA if for no other reason than that the whole operation is so incongruous with traditional forms of American Government.

We are naturally suspicious of a gigantic, world-wide, large, secret operation. We come by that suspicion through 180 years of experience in wide open government.

There is noting you can do about that. But I think the very nature of the operation is such that you are going to get quite a lot of criticism. I would like to say that is quite apart from these particular stories and the President's statement yesterday, I think, went far to correct same of the impressions that had been created by these stories and I understand your frustration in not being able to speak up for yourself and your organization.

But just putting it in the context of our kind of society, I think that you are in for more criticism, and you ought to be prepared for it. It is going to come from lots of sources and it is going to continue as long as the CIA and its operations have to continue. I didn't mean to cut you off.

Mr. McCone. Well, Senator, I realize that the idea of a government of our type is to have complete openness with respect to every phase of it. We don't have that. We have labels of secret and top secret and even higher secrecy than that.

After all, we are struggling as a democracy against a communistic state whose objective it is to destroy every single country that is attempting to maintain the type of government which we espouse and support. They do this in every possible way and by every possible means. Their only attack on the problem is not only military but their attack is subversion, of penetration, of various means of undermining and destroying government, including our own.

Now, therefore, recognizing this, we have to know what is going on in order to assist friendly governments, in order to support what is the basic philosophy of this country.

Senator Church. I am fully in accord with this.

SECRECY IN A DEMOCRACY

Mr. McCone. This requires the acquisition of knowledge. The FBI has the responsibility to acquire that knowledge within the United States. They do it very well, they do it very secretly but they do it with great skill and great competence.

Our responsibility is to acquire knowledge on a world-wide basis and to report our intelligence findings which we do regularly.

Now, we have to find a defense of this procedure. We cannot say merely that secrecy in intelligence is not in consonance with a democratic form of government. Half of the Soviet personnel assigned here in Washington and in New York are associated with the foreign intelligence services of the Soviet Union, and this is something to think about.

Senator Church. Mr. McCone, I am wholly in accord with everything you have said and I appreciate the need for efficient intelligence, the kind that you are attempting to supply. In that connection I think the proceedings in this committee the last three days, when it is finally properly purged and published, is going to be helpful in establishing not only the need for CIA but the propriety of its efforts, and the general direction it is faced.

All I am saying is that the very nature of the organization is such that it is going to be a natural part of criticism no matter how it is conducted.

Politicians are absolutely essential to a free society. Yet politicians are suspect. The political profession is suspect and subject to continuous criticism and those of us who engage in it are often subject to a very unfair and malicious attacks. Nevertheless, we have come to recognize it is just part of the system, and probably it is a healthy thing for the public to regard politicians with some suspicion in a free society.

Anyway, I didn't mean to get off on a theoretical and philosophical plane. But what I wanted to ask you today relates to your intelligence gathering activities in Vietnam. I understand you have some people here who are quite familiar with the Vietnamese situation, don't you, in the room? Mr. Colby is here, I understand.

CORRUPTION AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF DIEM REGIME

I have been receiving from sources that seem creditable to me reports that are very, very disturbing concerning the extent of corruption within the regime, at the very highest level. I wonder if you could give us some information in this regard. At the pleasure of the committee it can be stricken from the record if that seems the appropriate thing to do.

Mr. McCone. I think it is our opinion——

Senator Church. I had some specific questions to put to you in this connection.

Mr. McCone [continuing]. Senator Church, that while this regime is repressive, we do not associate large scale corruption with the Diem regime.

In all regimes in oriental countries, there is either corruption or suspicion of it. However, we know of no great glaring examples. This has not been the thrust of our reporting.

Is this correct, Mr. Colby?

Mr. Colby. That is right, sir.

PAYOFFS TO RULING FAMILY

Senator Church. Let me ask you some specific questions, then, having had your general testimony. It has been reported to me that all outside businesses that seek to establish business operations in South Vietnam and have to obtain a charter or a license from the government in order to do business there, have as a matter of practice been obliged to make an under the table payoff in the form of a substantial stockholding in the company to members of the ruling family, and specifically to Madame Nhu, which holdings are on deposit and in safe keeping outside the country. Do you have any information on that?

Mr. Colby. No, sir. There have been a few cases in which payoffs have been requested in the past, some years ago. There is one case in which we have testimony to the effect that Mr. Nhu requested it at one time.

Other than this, however, it is our general impression from the other cases in which we have heard of and investigated, that there is very little ground for this, and in fact there have been a number

of witnesses who have stated that in Vietnam they have not been asked for payoffs, whereas they were accustomed to either being asked or paying of in other countries in Southeast Asia.

Senator CHURCH. So as a general proposition you have information that would lead you to conclude that this is a sound or valid charge?

Mr. COLBY. Our general impression is that it is not, sir. I am not familiar with the latest foreign investment law but it may be that this requires a certain percentage of a new company to be locally held. This is not a rare situation in underdeveloped countries. They insist that a certain percentage of the stock of a new company establishing a business in that country be held by nationals in that country. But as to the family's involvement, generally, no.

We have some indication, on the other hand, of both low level payoffs, this is a natural thing, and second, and this is more in the past than in the present, of payments for political organizations, political parties, that sort of organization. A certain amount of that, but in terms of personal aggrandizement very little, if any.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That would be rather unique in the world, wouldn't it, contributions to political parties?

Senator CHURCH. It depends on how they are made. [Laughter.]

USE OF U.S. AID FUNDS

Secondly, I have had reports within the past couple of days from sources I have the highest regard for, relating to a water works project in Saigon. The report I get is that there were two possible projects that were investigated. One was based upon local pumping which would have cost in the neighborhood of $5, $6 million. My figures may be a little off.

The other was based upon going into the river for the water, and that project would cost in the neighborhood of $14 to $18 million, at least two to three times as much.

The reports are that Madame Nhu personally intervened in favor of the more expensive project, which would be paid for by American aid money. The purpose of her selection was in order to increase her take which was a slice of the money which was to go to finance this through whatever devious arrangement was to be worked out. What information do you have on that?

Mr. COLBY. This is a very old case, sir, which I think you can get rather full reporting on from the AID agency. This question of whether the water should come from the river or from the pumps has been a subject of, I think, at least 2 or 3 surveys by American contractors to examine into the facts of whether it should be the one or the other. I am not aware of the present status of it but I know the subject of corruption was not the basis for the decision one way or the other. It was the result of several engineering studies.

KICKBACKS FROM CONTRACTORS

Senator CHURCH. What do we know about the subject of corruption, that is the point I am getting at. The allegation of a definite rakeoff of American aid money was involved. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. COLBY. I think on that I can merely refer to the testimony, and I will really refer this to the AID agency, that their impression is there is very little, if any, corruption with American aid money, practically none, and they have taken rather extreme efforts to run this type of story down.

Senator CHURCH. Have you looked thoroughly into the possibility of a kickback from the contractors themselves?

Mr. COLBY. We have certain possibilities in this. Of course, the State Department has its investigators also working independently. We provide information to them.

Mr. MCCONE. This really would not be an area of our competence, except if we, in our contacts, heard rumors, allegations, we would report them to the authorities.

Senator CHURCH. I am just trying to determine what information you had.

Mr. MCCONE. Yes. But the policing of a matter of that kind would not be a responsibility of CIA.

Mr. COLBY. With respect to this particular story about the kickback I have not heard that one.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, just yesterday when David Bell and the Secretary of State were here, they said they had good and efficient investigators to track down reports of this kind. I think this is appropriate case where we ought to know whether a large chunk of American aid is being made the subject to kickback practices.

PREVIOUS COMMITTEE HEARINGS

The CHAIRMAN. If my memory serves me right, this committee had some long hearings on that very case about 3 or 4 years ago. I don't recall that the kickback was a primary thing but it was the wisdom of the decision as to which approach should be used in the water system. Is that not correct, Mr. Holt?

Senator HOLT. Newhouse worked on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't we have hearings on this 3 or 4 years ago?

Mr. NEWHOUSE. Yes, sir, and one of the subjects investigated was this Saigon water project.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't you or someone go out there?

Mr. NEWHOUSE. Yes, sir, I was the one who went out there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to say anything, what can you say?

Mr. NEWHOUSE. As I recall, the question of corruption did not figure into it at our investigation.

Senator CHURCH. This is the question I am raising. I have seen the report in which we couldn't make up our minds as to which was the best system, the investigators, but it was the more expensive system which involved a kickback, if indeed the kickback was involved.

The CHAIRMAN. You were aware we had that case?

Senator CHURCH. Yes. Which agency of the U.S. Government, if any, has explored these charges of corruption against both Mr. and Mrs. Nhu and other high level members of the Diem family, I don't know. I don't know where we can look to find the facts of a matter of high level corruption in this country. If it falls outside the ambit of the CIA, where do we go?

Mr. McCONE. I would think where it involves economic aid, it falls in the problems for the inspectors of the AID. If it involves military aid it would involve problems with the Inspector General or General Harkins.

Senator CHURCH. I think it is matter we ought to pursue.

TIMBER MONOPOLY IN VIETNAM

The third and final charge for whatever information you may have on it, is that Madame Nhu and Bishop Thuc share in a monopoly, in a highly lucrative one, of timber operations in Vietnam. What information do you have on that?

Mr. COLBY. With respect to Madame Nhu, none. With respect to Bishop Thuc, I don't know the answer, but there are some indications that as a Bishop he does hold certain property for the church there.

Now this may also be personal property. Whether it refers specifically to timber operations, I can't particularly say but I have heard this particular story about Bishop Thuc, not Madame Nhu.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I say, didn't we inquire into that also when we were out there?

Mr. NEWHOUSE. Senator, we were informed by the embassy that it was the Central Intelligence Agency who had the responsibility for exploring the charges on that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As I recall it, and I would hate to make this as a positive statement, but the indication was there were certain church properties out there, timber properties which were being exploited for the maintenance of the church and so on. We were unable to find evidence that the Bishop himself was personally profiting from this, I mean, putting any money in his own pocket—if he had a pocket in his robes that he wore around—but that it was church property. There was church property that had valuable timber on it, and that it was being developed but it was being developed for the building of churches and advancement of the church there.

Now, I don't know if we buttoned that up completely but that is my recollection or at least the impression we got there from what inquiries we made in connection with it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask what year that was, because I went to South Vietnam with Mr. Newhouse, that wasn't when I was with you in 1961?

Mr. NEWHOUSE. It was in the fall of 1959.

THE TIMES OF VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. Well, anyway, it is very obvious from afar, that this family is not particularly pinched for funds. Madame Nhu's present grand tour of the world and the expensive dress shops of Paris and so on would indicate she has plenty of money available. It must be coming from sources within the country.

Now, do the Nhus own the Times of Vietnam? Who owns that?

Mr. McCONE. We can't say for sure whether they own it or control it. It is considered to be an instrument of theirs. It is operated by a man named [Gene] Gregory, who presumably acquired it, although whether there is undisclosed ownership, we do not know.

Senator CHURCH. What connection has this newspaper with the CIA and its mission? Does it have a present connection?

Mr. MCCONE. None at all.

Senator CHURCH. Did it ever have a connection with CIA operations?

Mr. MCCONE. It did not.

CUT OFF OF FUNDS FOR COLONEL TUNG

Senator CHURCH. We have been told that the support money we have given Colonel Tung's forces has now been cut off, is that correct?

Mr. MCCONE. I think the last payment was made when, in September.

Mr. COLBY. Cut off to the forces in the city of Saigon.

Senator CHURCH. Cut off in the forces of Saigon. The purpose being when they are redeployed for the purpose of the mission we were supplying the money then we would take up the question of resupplying?

Mr. MCCONE. What we would like to do, Senator Church, is to have Colonel Tung and his forces removed from Mr. Nhu's jurisdiction and placed under the Joint Central staff so it will be an integral part of the military establishment is what we think should be done.

Senator CHURCH. Has any announcement to this effect been made publicly by any agency of the government of this highly secret information? What is the status of this information?

Mr. MCCONE. Well, as a result of the——

Senator CHURCH. There have been speculative articles in the press.

Mr. MCCONE. As a result of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor's recommendations, the President or the Secretary of State has instructed the Ambassador to discuss this with Diem and see if that rearrangement could not be brought about. It also was contained in a letter that General Taylor wrote to Diem and left with him prior to his departure from Saigon a few days ago.

CAN THIS INFORMATION BE RELEASED?

Senator CHURCH. What I am trying to get at is is this information the kind of information that can be disclosed or is it the kind that is to be kept under wraps.

Mr. MCCONE. I would think that the whole spectrum of discussions between Diem and the Ambassador will take place as a result of the McNamara-Taylor mission and the subsequent policy judgments should be kept very classified until the Ambassador has had a chance to engage in serious negotiations. I would think it would not be the kind of thing to be made public at this time because it would damage the negotiations.

Senator CHURCH. I think that is all I have.

Senator MORSE [presiding]. Senator Symington?

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. McCone.

CORRUPTION IN THE FAR EAST

Senator SYMINGTON. First, Mr. McCone, I would say when I was in South Vietnam in 1961, based on the way the aid program was being run, if there wasn't some corruption it would be incredible. Corruption in the Far East is considered a normal method of operation as far back as 1946. The late Fiorello LaGuardia, when he found I was going to China asked if I would look into the corruption of the Nationalist Chinese forces of UNRRA which he was heading at that time and I said I would be glad to do so and I did my best in Shanghai in 1964 to find out what was going on.

I was told it was bad, that 20 percent of everything was considered the normal price but it had gotten to 80 percent and they thought that was too high. I so reported back to Mr. LaGuardia in Cairo and the Mayor was inclined to agree, as I was, with the people who told me, that 80 percent of everything that we were sending through UNRRA was being taken by the war lords at that time.

When I was in South Vietnam in 1961, there was about as cockeyed a setup from the standpoint of business management as I have run into, and I was glad that as soon as Mr. Hamilton took the job over in AID, he did his best to correct it and got rid of some of the obviously incapable job people.

PUBLICATION OF HEARINGS

I am glad to have Senator Church mention the sanitation and publishing of these hearings, Mr. Chairman, because I believe that the undercutting of the CIA, as has continued in the press, has hurt the security of the United States. I am very worried about the future security of the country, especially as it is unfortunate that your position is one in which you cannot answer criticism immediately like the public relations men of State or Treasury or Defense or Justice can do, so you have to sit back and take it. Your position, therefore, is unique in my opinion in government, with the possible exception of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. Now, however, he does have an almost immediate reactive position because of his reporting to the Attorney General.

Again I would say, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that these hearings will be published because it is about time that, in my opinion, the people of the country knew the truth about CIA, what it is trying to do and how it is to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interject there, I had to make a telephone call, printing this is rather unprecedented. I don't know if we have ever done it before.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Church mentioned it. If he hadn't I was going to ask that it be printed—let everybody take out what they wanted to take out.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about it?

Senator MORSE. I think it is a bad precedent.

The CHAIRMAN. That is my first reaction to it.

Senator MORSE. We can't call these people up with the understanding it is a classified hearing and then change the rules. I think what we can do, if we reach an agreement in due course of time, Mr. McCone and you can join, if you want to, I don't recom-

mend it, but I think it would be good procedure to join in a release or he authorize you to make a release but I seriously question we should change our policy.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I would have to take very serious consideration about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I feel very strongly about it. I would like to get a vote of the committee on it. With the premise that Mr. McCone or any Senator take out of the testimony anything they feel they should take out for reasons of any kind. But here we are again in a situation—and we will see a couple of more articles come out tomorrow maybe saying the CIA is responsible for the Yankees losing the World's Series. We will see a lot more attacks of various kinds, and then we will have some more suggestions as to how to correct it. Ultimately some time, as I see it, the people have to be told the truth, and I think this would be a good way to provide the truth.

Senator MORSE. Let's discuss that in executive session.

Senator SYMINGTON. Fine, I am just making my point.

PURPOSE IS FAIRNESS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the Senator will yield. Because I had had a little bit of background in some of this a few years ago, I thought this was a sufficiently complete lack of basis for some of these startling stories and this one, I thought was completely lacking in basis. One of the purposes of my inquiry of Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Secretary of State and Mr. McCone is, I had planned to make a short statement just saying that I was convinced as a result of canvass of this thing it was utterly and completely unfounded.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't want to run afoul of any adopted policy of this committee. But I think in all fairness that was my basic purpose and I still intend to do it unless the committee has a policy contrary to that.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think the committee has a policy against a statement like that.

Senator SYMINGTON. But when you make a statement like that it is a self-serving statement and if you put it out in the separate somebody says, "Well, here is a friend of the Director, a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, and Senator Hickenlooper is a member of the Republican Party and so is the Director and it is only natural that he should come to his defense."

That to me is not the answer. The answer to me is when somebody probes the situation, always with the premise of sanitation, not only by the questioner, but by the responder, that the way to get the facts out and to try to stop some of this gossip that is seriously affecting the security of the country, is to have this type and character of a hearing sanitized and then published.

I think the questions that have been asked have been very intelligent. It is what we do in other cases, and as long as the CIA is being tried and convicted in the press, I think we ought to do something beside make personal statements about our opinions in the

matter. However, as I say, I would like to work it out in executive session.

A CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the Senator will yield just a bit further, I had no intention of making a blanket, unsupported conclusion of my own. Any statement I would make I would expect to say that the Secretary of Defense, General Taylor and the Secretary of State categorically denied that there was any reasonable basis for these startling allegations in some of these stories. I would expect to bolster it with that kind of statement.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am for that, and the Senator knows my respect and admiration for him, and I am sure the statement would be constructive and serve a fine purpose.

But as I said I thought, on the other hand, maybe the whole program of the nature of the thinking of all of the Senators which has been very constructive this morning should be made a matter of public record.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That suits me.

AN OPERATING AGENCY, NOT A POLICY AGENCY

Senator SYMINGTON. As I understand it, Mr. McCone, you operate an agency and report to the President of the United States, in effect you are an operating agency, not a policy agency, isn't that correct?

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. That to me is one thing that should be clarified in the minds of the American people because some of these leaks always imply that you are trying to set policy. What you do is take instructions and carry those instructions out, is that correct?

Mr. MCCONE. That is right, and report intelligence.

Senator SYMINGTON. And report intelligence.

In addition, as I understand it from your testimony, you feel now that the setup of the Congress with respect to what committees you report to, what committees you don't report to and the nature of the membership of those committees is something beyond your prerogative, and you feel that should rest in the hands of the Congress. Is that correct?

Mr. MCCONE. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

"CIA BLUNDERS IN VIETNAM"

Now, I have an article here—and I want to apologize for being late, Mr. Director, but we were up at the other end of town for a while this morning—has anybody discussed this Freedman article, "CIA's Blunders in Vietnam."

Mr. MCCONE. No, that has not been discussed.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to discuss some of it.

It says, reading some of it:

> This background deserves considerable emphasis for it shows that the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency are entitled to praise for its limited achievements.

You know the article, I am sure, and in taking it in context:

As weeks dragged on however, it became painfully evident that both of them were guilty of shambling inaccuracies in reading the political situation in Vietnam.

Do you think that is a fair statement?

Mr. McCone. No, I think that is a very unfair statement. And an inaccurate statement. And that statement cannot be supported by a review of our reporting over 15 or 18 months, in fact, over several years. I was startled by that statement and other statements made by Mr. Freedman's article and other inaccuracies that personally made me review the reporting, and to this day the reporting has been accurate and today it is the very reporting and analysis that supports the policy that was adopted and is being pursued following the McNamara-Taylor mission. There is no foundation for a statement like that.

Senator Symington. Now, the article continues:

The record will show that the State Department from the very beginning saw the tragic significance of the Diem's government attack on the students. It understood the morale decay and political cruelty that prompted the campaign against the Buddhists. It was rather the timid blundering and inconsistent appeal made to the Army in Vietnam to assert its independent. It argues now if it is hard to find an alternative to the Diem group, that it——

Being the State Department it argues now, says the State Department does, that,

If it is hard to find an alternative to the Diem group the blame rests in no small part on the unfortunate alliance between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department with its disastrous impact in recent weeks on American policy. In this distribution of blame the heaviest burden falls on the CIA. The officials making these criticisms are not vindictive nor do they——

Presumably to the officials of the State Department,

Nor do they have any desire to stir up a row inside the administration.

I will reserve my comments on that. I will continue with the article:

With the evidence in their hands of the incredible and garish blunders committed in a sickening sequence by the CIA these men in the State Department would be false to their trust if they remained silent while omens of disaster steadily accumulate.

The wretched muddle in Vietnam shows the folly and the danger of allowing the CIA to be a primary force in the development of American policy. The CIA should be an instrument for carrying out an agreed policy. It should never be the architect of polilcy.

Well, first, I am glad you have on the record the fact that all you do is carry out policy.

LEAKS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT

And secondly, when Mr. Freedman, who I believe I know and I am sure is an able and responsible reporter, says that these men in the State Department would be false to their trust if they didn't break their trust by talking to a reporter out of channels. Based on my knowledge of loyalty, we could have quite a discussion about that. If they feel inasmuch as you report to the President, and the Secretary of State reports to the President, they report to the Secretary of State, if they feel that they would be false to their trust if they didn't pass this story on to a reporter, based on my knowledge

of organization in private life and government, we could have quite a discussion on that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I might interpose at the moment there is one guy being thrown out of the State Department for talking to a committee and members of Congress, it is a rather incongruous situation.[3]

DISTURBING AND INACCURATE ARTICLE

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like you to comment on "this sickening sequence of blunders by the CIA," and this apparent attack by other members of the Government on the CIA. If Mr. Freedman who, as I say, is considered a responsible reporter, is right, and if there is any accuracy in his statement that you are setting policy instead of carrying it out—I am sure you know the article. Would you care to comment please for the record.

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, I am pleased to comment on that very disturbing and inaccurate article, the source of which I have been unable to determine.

Referring to the last part of the statement you read, I think I have stated on a number of different occasions this morning that in our activities in the gathering, evaluating and disseminating of intelligence and such operational activities as are assigned to us, we are not the architects of policy. We are not involved in making policy. We report the facts and analyze the facts as accurately and as carefully as we can, and disseminate our anlysis, together with the supporting intelligence reports, so that the architects of policy can act on the basis of all facts available to us.

There is only on exception to this situation, and that is on the executive committee of the National Security Council, on which I sit as an individual and occasionally I am asked by the President my personal opinion on a policy matter. When that is done I am always very careful to disassociate myself from my competence as Director of Central Intelligence and express my views as an individual against my background in government and private life, and the President understands this.

CIA REPORTS ON VIETNAM

Now, with respect to "the incredible and garish blunders committed in sequence by the CIA," I have this to say: that we for a period of 15 months have made countless reports on the developments in South Vietnam. The thrust of our reports have been as follows: that the Diem regime was losing the support of the people of South Vietnam, and they were losing the support of public opinion in the United States and throughout the world.

Second, the war was going along pretty well. It was advancing satisfactorily in the North, and there were evidences that progress was being made in the South. Very difficult to measure the advance because this is a guerrilla type of war, it isn't a war that the success of which you can measure in real estate recaptured and arms stacked.

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[3] On September 23, 1963, the Department of State notified one of its security officers, Otto Otepka, that he would be dismissed for disclosing classified information to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

But the incidents of attack were less than previous periods, the casualties were greater for the Communists than the previous periods. The defections, which was a very important measure, were greater than the previous period, so you could only conclude that the war was going pretty well.

We reported that the disintegrating political situation, if you can call it that, had not affected the war effort notably but we expressed the opinion that it would, and in April the Board of National Estimates prepared an estimate on this situation, which was reviewed by the United States Intelligence Board, and in which I issued and sent over to the President, which said exactly that, expressed concern that this political situation might have adverse effects on the war, which we estimated at that time was going on pretty well.

We reported some 40 to 45 different times on the Buddhist problem between May 8 and August 21. We kept that under careful surveillance. We knew what the consequences were going to be, and we expressed our concern over the underlying dangers of the situation.

NUMEROUS REPORTS OF MILITARY COUPS

We received numerous reports of military coups, and we reported on them, and we evaluated them. Our evaluation of them for a long period of time dating back to June 1962 when they really became quite frequent was that they didn't seem to be a threat to the regime. The regime, we thought, was surrounded by sufficient military personnel loyal to them so that any attempted military coup would fail. This was our consistent report.

On August 14th, and on August 21st again, we again summarized the situation, analyzed all of the reports, and concluded that even though these coup reports were coming in quite frequently there was not anything that we could find that would support a conclusion that one would come off successfully and bloodlessly.

We did, indeed, explore the background of what was behind these coup movements with generals from time to time in a clandestine, covert sort of a way, and from those explorations reached these conclusions that we reported.

We, therefore, at one other point, if I might add, explored whether there was a government in the wings in the making that could replace the Diem government and be a better government than the Diem government or would it be worse, would it be more repressive. We concluded that there was no such government in the offing.

Therefore, from all of this reporting, we could only advise that we would have to move very slowly into a move to do as is intimated in this article, to dislodge the regime and replace it, because, one, there wasn't the facility to remove, and, two, there wasn't a replacement regime in the offing.

Now, I think this is an accurate analysis of the situation as it evolved over 15 months of time, and I can only say that Mr. Freedman's source, and I don't know where it comes from—quite often, you know, a writer will attribute something to the State Department when he really has gotten it out of Defense or some place

else in order to create a diversionary situation, so I don't even want to infer I am convinced that his informant was from the State Department. I don't know where he has.

But I can only——

Senator SYMINGTON. I want you to yield to me there.

EMOTIONALLY ORIENTED AGAINST DIEM REGIME

Based on his second article, if it wasn't in the State Department then he is lying.

Mr. MCCONE. I can only conclude that he was talking to someone who was highly emotionally oriented against the Diem regime, who would like to upset it and who was so involved emotionally that he was unwilling to sit down and accept an objective analysis. Whether it was possible and, two, whether there was a regime available to replace it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like, based on my statement, and because I believe Mr. Freedman is a responsible newspaperman, I ask unanimous consent that the second article appearing 5 days after his first entitled column "Hitting CIA Stirs Row," inserted at this point in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Senator CHURCH. In behalf of that request, I am happy to have that because we all know that Max Freedman is a man of great character and reputation. I am happy to have it in the record.

Senator SYMINGTON. I only know Mr. Freedman very slightly. I am sure, however, that his reputation from what my colleagues tell me, is that of a responsible newspaperman, which makes his articles doubly damaging.

COMMENDATION OF WILLIAM COLBY

I want to say when I was in South Vietnam, Mr. Chairman, in 1961, where we just had a new ambassador who had not had previous experience in diplomacy that Mr. Colby here was the one person that I could go to. I went to Mr. Dulles and asked if he would make his agents available to me on this trip, and he assured me with his typical kindness that he would. He sent a telegram around every place I went instructing these people to talk to me without reservation, and we got more information that I thought was intelligent—statements of fact, statements of opinion—from Mr. Colby then we did from all the other agencies combined.

I was especially impressed with the total lack of what I would call normal managerial capacity of the aid program. That was one of the reasons that I felt so strongly about the Foreign Service Academy bill, in order that those people could be trained because it is always good, as I see it, to have a teller in the bank who is able to count, who knows numbers. I think that is important.

I have just a couple of more questions.

COUPS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS

Recently there have been statements made in the Congress with respect to the Dominican Republic and the Honduras coups, and piling it on—which is how, unfortunately these articles developed this snowball aspect with respect to CIA. They said they were not

foreseen by CIA, but the government spokesmen denied it might take place a few hours before they actually did take place.

I was in a meeting here not too long ago with the head of one of the desks in the State Department, and we were studying Santo Domingo. I thought Honduras was in pretty good shape. I left the meeting, I think the Chairman had left earlier and Senator Sparkman was in the Chair, and I went outside and all the reporters greeted me and said, "How about Honduras?"

I said, "You don't mean Honduras, you mean Santo Domingo."

They said, "One busted out since you went in."

In any case, my question to you would be, what was the position of the CIA with respect to the Dominican Republic coup and the Honduras coup? Did you warn of these matters before or were you caught flatfooted?

Mr. McCone. We warned of both of them.

Senator Symington. Who did you warn and how did you warn it?

Mr. McCone. Well, turning to the Dominican Republic, I had an analysis of both of these situations made and I thought this question might come up this morning. So I brought along with me a summary of the record. In the first place I would like to say this [deleted].

This was one of Bosch's serious problems.

WARNINGS OF COUPS

Nevertheless, a review on this particular question you raised, starting on the 14th of June, we issued a memorandum setting forth the dangers of a coup. It seemed to us that the military was preparing to move against the government. In the Central Intelligence bulletin on August 9th we reported again that recent political developments make a move against Bosch or his resignation a growing possibility. Military leaders are increasingly concerned about the Communist activity and Bosch is unlikely to meet their demands for a crackdown.

We issued a similar statement in a special checklist that we sent to the President every morning, that was on the 9th of August.

On the 15th of August, we issued a summary that the Dominican Republic, and PRD situation is very dark. General L. B. Roman, Dominican Minister of Defense, is despised by military for collaborating with the Communists and there is particularly the fear of the overthrow of the government by the Air Force that they are plotting. That was on the 15th of August.

On the 16th of August, in our weekly review, we summarized the situation substantially as I have reported it to you. On the 16th of August we again reported the growing unrest of the military. We did so again on the 17th of August and again on the 20th of August, identifying individuals who were involved.

On the 3rd of September we said, according to undisclosed sources who have good contacts in the Dominican Republic President Bosch has been meeting daily with selected young Dominican army officers in order to win their confidence so he can count on their support when he revolts against the older military officers.

On the 14th of September, we again reported the dissidence on the part of the military, and the mounting evidence of a planned military overthrow.

Again, on the 16th of September we made a similar report. Here we pointed out the danger that an overthrow might take place during Bosch's absence for 2 or 3 days in Mexico.

POLITICAL ISOLATION OF BOSCH

On the 20th of September we reported that the growing political isolation of Bosch appears to be increasing chances of his ouster with extreme leftist elements the possible long-range beneficiaries. The survival of the Bosch regime is increasingly threatened by the president's inability to bring about a rapid economic and social revolution and by a political atmosphere charged with a mixture of opportunism and lack of genuine concern about domestic communism. The president is especially handicapped by a lack of support from military and political leaders, whose support is crucial to his remaining in office.

A great deal of this was reflected to Bosch, also by the ambassador who had all of these reports, and the State Department.

As you know, the coup took place on the 26th of September.

So the reporting on that, I think, is rather accurate.

SITUATION IN HONDURAS

Now, with respect to the Honduras situation. We, for some time recognized the imminence of a coup there, again because of the disenchantment of the military leaders over the government and the prospects of an unsatisfactory government coming into office on the election which was scheduled on October 13th.

On the 5th of September we reported in our daily bulletin that is distributed quite widely throughout the government, political tension is mounting with the approach of the general election scheduled for October 13th. The emergence of a force capable of attempting a coup may nonetheless result from Villedas' apparent effort to enlist military support against Rodas, Rodas being the candidate, and Villedas being the president. That was on the 5th of September.

On the 26th of September, we reported there are persistent reports that the military will attempt a coup prior to the general elections scheduled on the 13th of October. Both Colonel Lopez, chief of the armed forces, and Colonel Escalon, chief of the air force, heretofore supporters of constitutional government have stated to the U.S. Embassy officers within the past few days that the election would not take place.

On October 1st we reported evidence is increasing that the military may attempt a coup before the 13th of October to prevent the election of the liberal party presidential candidate Rhodas.

Colonel Lopez, chief of the armed forces [deleted] on the 28th of September that he intended to lead a coup. He claims to have the support of all elements of the armed forces and has recently taken steps to strengthen the army. A violent incident could occur at any time.

That was on the 1st of October. The coup took place on the 3rd. That was an accurate report.

LACK OF INFORMATION FOR SENATORS

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I make this observation. I don't know what the Chair knew about it or the chairman of the Central or South American subcommittee knew about it, but it is incredible to me that as a member of this committee I didn't know at least something about this. If the reports were being given to the State Department through the CIA organization, to this extent, it makes it particularly embarrassing for me to go back into my State when I am asked questions as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I answer them based on the knowledge that I have. I have never discussed this with Mr. McCone. I had no idea the reporting in these two cases was this detailed in warning, and it seems to me incredible that we don't get more information about the facts in these cases from the people who handle these policies and constantly come down here and talk to us about them.

Apparently they tell us what they want to and don't tell us what they don't want to. I, as a member of the Senate, must say it doesn't sit well with me.

Mr. MCCONE. I would like to say, Senator——

The CHAIRMAN. May I interject, the staff tells me we did have a hearing. I wasn't here, I was out of town, in which Martin told the committee he was concerned about Honduras a week before it happened. Mr. Holt told me about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I stand corrected about Honduras.

The CHAIRMAN. He was here on the Dominican Republic, but in the course of the meeting he said he anticipated trouble in Honduras.

Senator SYMINGTON. Was that the same day it broke out?

Mr. HOLT. No, he was here twice. He was here immediately after the Dominican coup, and he said he expected the next coup in Honduras.

Senator SYMINGTON. As you know, it is difficult to split yourself and go to 3 or 4 hearings. If I made a mistake, I correct it.

RELEASE OF HEARING TO THE PUBLIC

Speaking of that, Mr. Director, do you have any objection if this is propertly sanitized, as you see fit, of having this matter released to the public?

Mr. MCCONE. I think we would feel that the specifies of our report should not be released to the public [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. With the premise that you would take out of the transcript anything you wanted to take out, that any Senator would take out any questions—would you have any objection to having these hearings released?

Mr. MCCONE. On the basis of proper sanitization. I would like to see anything released that could be released that would straighten out this erroneous concept of the Central Intelligence Agency that is created from these totally false news accounts because if this continues it is going to destroy our intelligence apparatus. If it isn't important to this country to know just what happened, what is

going to happen in the Dominican Republic, and what might happen in Honduras and there are other situations all around the world that we are watching, if that is not important, then let the newspapers destroy CIA. But if it is important why then let's try to get the record straight.

This is what I feel.

Senator MORSE. I would still like to discuss that in an executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. I don't think——

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to make this point. There is nothing higher in classification in the world than war plans and yet we constantly have discussions in the Preparedness Subcommittee, and after it is sanitized, whatever the Joint Chiefs tell the Senate, to the best of my knowledge there never has been a leak in that subcommittee since I have been a member on it, and I am sure it won't be on this committee. In any event the question of a leak is extraneous at this point. When we release the testimony, especially since CIA has been under consistently heavy attack the same rules could apply to the CIA reporting to the Congress that could apply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they report on war plans.

Senator MORSE. It has been suggested to me that I run through very quickly a few questions here.

Senator SYMINGTON. One more question, and one flat statement.

COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT CIA

Is there any evidence of any American Communists that you have working with the idea they are trying to gut the CIA?

Mr. MCCONE. I didn't get it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you any information from your own efforts or Director Hoover's, that Communists in this country are trying to gut the CIA?

Mr. MCCONE. That the Communists——

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, we have evidence on that. We have evidence that we believe is thoroughly dependable and responsible that the KGB has an operation and indeed a section whose mission it is to discredit CIA [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. As of now I am allowed to sit in on meetings of the Armed Services Committee by request, I ask you now I would like to have a full report on that.

My final comment, Mr. Chairman, is that Mr. McCone come into the Government as Under Secretary of the Air Force under Mr. Truman, and he left with the highest commendation by Secretary Finletter for whom he worked. Then later he come in as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission after there had been some terrific brawls with respect to the operation of that agency in its relationship with the Congress. He left with the highest commendation from all those involved on both sides of the aisle from that position, and now he has come into this situation. I suppose you have gotten to a point where when you have breakfast you would rather read a magazine, isn't that correct, instead of a newspaper?

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.

CIA HAS NOT SUPPORTED TIMES OF VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to run through these very quickly because I didn't use very much time and it has been suggested I will save Mr. McCone and myself and the committee a lot of time if I go through them very quickly. Some of them involve some matters brought out in Mr. McCone's testimony.

Mr. McCone, does the CIA now support or has it at any time in the past supported the English language newspaper, the Times, of Vietnam?

Mr. MCCONE. No.

Senator MORSE. It has not.

Has the editor of this newspaper, Mr. Gregory, been supported by or employed by the CIA at any time?

Mr. MCCONE. No, he has not been employed, supported or employed.

Senator MORSE. Are you familiar with the circumstances of Mr. Gregory's departure from the USIS [United States Information Service]?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, we are familiar with Mr. Gregory's background and his departure from the USIS, and his activities since that time.

Senator MORSE. Did he leave under what could be called a cloud? In other words, did he leave because his services were found to be unsatisfactory or unreliable?

Mr. MCCONE. It would be better that the USIA people who are thoroughly familiar with the case answer this question than I. My record indicates that he at the time of his departure which was in January 1954, USIA was conducting personnel security reviews as were other departments under Executive Order 10450,[4] which you are familiar with, and that he resigned rather than to proceed under that regulation.

EDITOR IS EMBITTERED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

Senator MORSE. That probably explains why he seemed to be embittered against the United States.

Mr. MCCONE. Well, I don't know that that is an explanation of it. It is a little hard for me to understand his irrational and totally irresponsible statements, most particularly against the CIA. Strangely enough, his accusations are quite 190 degrees around from some of these others. He accuses us of having spent $25 million to overthrow the Diem regime where the thrust of Mr. Freedman's article was that we were supporting the regime and refused to take any dynamic steps.

Senator MORSE. It sounds so much like Mrs. Nhu that causes some of us to suspect that Senator Church's questions implied there is some connection between him and Mrs. Nhu.

Mr. MCCONE. I don't know that. We do have the feeling that the Times of Vietnam is a controlled paper of the Diem-Nhu regime. Whether that involves ownership or not. I don't know.

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[4] Security requirements for Government employees, April 27, 1953.

CIA REPORTS TO VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Senator MORSE. Would you consider it proper to the function of the mission chief in Saigon to inform either President Diem or Mr. Nhu of reports gathered by the CIA mission of anti-Diem tendency either among the Vietnamese military or the lower echelons of the Vietnamese government?

Mr. MCCONE. No, we do not do that unless that, after consultation with the Ambassador, such a circumstance very probably would be referred to higher authority here. If it was determined that such information should be transmitted to the government in the interest of stated U.S. policy.

Senator MORSE. Did Mr. Richardson or any of his predecessors after the kind of clearance that you just outlined, ever transmit such reports to the Diem regime?

Mr. MCCONE. Not to my knowledge. Did they?

Mr. COLBY. On one occasion; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Will you tell us about that occasion?

Mr. COLBY. This occasion took place this spring, I couldn't tell you exactly when, but it was roughly about April or so. There was a report that we got through a clandestine source that an individual in the Vietnamese Government was talking about launching a coup and assassinating the president, and so forth.

This was reviewed as to whether it should have been passed and it was decided that it was important for us, to the United States to do so.

Senator MORSE. That went through the Embassy?

Mr. COLBY. The decision was made with the Ambassador's approval; yes, sir.

U.S. SUPPORT FROM VIETNAMESE ORGANIZATIONS

Senator MORSE. Is the U.S. Government supporting any organizations controlled by Mr. Nhu, such as his Republican and Youth organization, or Mrs. Nhu's Women's Solidarity Movement?

Mr. MCCONE. With respect to Mrs. Nhu's Solidarity Movement, no. With respect to Mr. Nhu's Republican Youth, we are not supporting it. We have in the past given a very limited degree of training assistance to a certain number of its leaders. This is in connection with the strategic hamlet program and the organizing of local forces to defend their local villages, some of these were in the Republican Youth Movement.

PAYMENTS TO MILITARY OFFICIALS

Senator MORSE. Mr. McCone, has it been reported to you in recent weeks that Diem and Nhu have given a great deal of money, possibly as much as $200,000 in their currency, to several important army officers in order to assure thier loyalty?

Mr. MCCONE. No, I have not heard of it personally, of any money. I know that for a period of time through the summer Nhu kept rather close liaison with the senior generals. Frequent meetings were held with them, and we received reports of them.

Mr. COLBY. There was a report, excuse me.

Mr. MCCONE. Go ahead.

Mr. COLBY. There was one report that Nhu had paid certain of the generals certain sums. Our evaluation of that report was not high.

Senator MORSE. Was not high?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir.

REVIEW OF CIA ACTIVITIES

Senator MORSE. My last question: Do these high level reviews of operations that you make in South Vietnam deal with general concepts or general approaches or do these reviews deal with each specific operation itself? For example, how much of the day to day detail of CIA covert operations are discussed and reviewed outside of Saigon, here in Washington?

Mr. MCCONE. Well, in Washington, on our special group that is referred to as a Special Counterinsurgency Group, we review the operations of the military, of AID, of CIA, and USIA, in considerable detail. This did not extend, however, to an examination of what you might determine covert or clandestine activities. It did cover the training activities that we have been speaking of.

In country team level, and with the Ambassador, of course, problems were discussed in very much more detail, Here, again, it is not always either advisable or desirable to discuss clandestine operations and sources in circles outside of purely professional intelligence circles. It is usually quite satisfactory to report the results. However, at times when clandestine source is one and the same of an individual that the Ambassador might be overtly working with, we very often surface to the Ambassador the fact that we have an off-the-record contact which, and the results of that contact often give the Ambassador very great leverage and assistance in his negotiations.

The revealing of your clandestine sources and methods is a serious problem just as it is with J. Edgar Hoover. He will look almost anyone right in the eye and say, "Here are the results of my findings," but he won't tell you how he got to those findings, and the professionals in our business feel much the same way.

Senator MORSE. That is all, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Mr. McCone very much for his answers.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCone, I regret I was a little late as I was necessarily detailed downtown, and I didn't want to ask questions that had already been asked. There are one or 2 things particularly.

A JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT

Is it fair to say that some of this criticism, perhaps a great deal of it, results from the assignment to CIA operational functions by, I guess you would call it, higher authority, that resulted in, for example, the training of the Tung forces which you normally do not do as an intelligence agency?

Mr. MCCONE. I don't think the fact that we were assigned that training function necessarily was the source for this criticism.

The CHAIRMAN. What I meant by that was they attribute it to U.S. activity, whereas if it had been done by, we will say the mili-

tary, they never would have attributed it to you, whatever the revulsion might have been against you, that is what I mean.

Mr. McCone. Yes. In other words, the fact that we were involved.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. McCone. In training was the reason.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. McCone. I differentiate that. I don't think the fact that it was assigned to us created what you might say is a jurisdictional argument that brought down censure.

The Chairman. I didn't mean jurisdiction. But what I meant is having been assigned this function, I suppose it was by the Board of National Estimates or someone, they decided you were the one to do it, this necessarily involves you in whatever they may have——

Mr. McCone. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Therefore, if there is any criticism, I don't say it is to this assignment of the function which caused you to be involved. It doesn't have anything to do with the way you discharged that function, isn't that correct?

Mr. McCone. Yes.

VICTIM OF CIRCUMSTANCES

The Chairman. If there is any question in this, it is the question of the wisdom of assigning to you certain operational functions which are made, I assume, by the Board of National Estimates or someone, is that right?

Mr. McCone. Yes, that is correct. If we were to look at the problem that existed in May, 1959, early in 1960, today realizing the scale of these operations and activities, and also the manner in which the Defense Department itself has grown in the field of special forces, the activity undoubtedly would be assigned to the special forces of the military.

The Chairman. It is being shifted now, is it not?

Mr. McCone. Yes, it is all shifted.

The Chairman. That is what I understood. I was trying to understand what actually happened. In a sense, you are the sort of unfortunate victim of some circumstances which are not really your fault. It was the result of policy decisions.

Mr. McCone. That is right. These forces have to be trained, and there was a time when we had the resources to train them.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. McCone. The training back as far as the early 1950s of counterinsurgency forces in third country nationals was an activity recognized by the National Security Council as a CIA activity if it was to be done covertly.

The Chairman. I got that impression from NcNamara and Taylor's testimony, that you had been brought into this, you had not sought it, and then when Tung forces did this, well, you were blamed for it which you were, as I say, as I say, an innocent functionary here due to other decisions is what I gathered.

Mr. McCone. That is right.

IRRESPONSIBLE PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. When you said Starnes was responsible, I don't know Mr. Starnes, I don't wish to question him, but this brings back very vividly the Colgrove incident.

Mr. MCCONE. The what?

The CHAIRMAN. This was the one that Hickenlooper and others talked about. There was at that time a man named Colgrove who played the same part that Starnes is. It was my impression that he was not responsible. This was just a grandstand flamboyant play for headlines and he had nothing to base it on. The members of the committee and staff investigated that fairly thoroughly and, I am very strongly of the opinion—reasoning from that one, it is the same newspaper—that they are struggling for notice, and they love to put out this story, everybody is talking about them, and it is good business for them. I can't publicly make those statements, but I am not a bit impressed about his being responsible. He is an irresponsible reporter just as Colgrove.[5]

Mr. MCCONE. I don't know Starnes.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered if you did when you said you thought he was a very responsible newspaperman. I can't believe a responsible one would make such statements.

Mr. MCCONE. Mr. Chairman, I said it was reported to me that he was responsible. I tried to get Walker Stone on the telephone, I have known him for a good many years.

The CHAIRMAN. I know Walker Stone.

Mr. MCCONE. He was ot of the city, and I talked with his assistant and he came right back at me and he said, "He is thoroughly responsible," and he gave me the information that I told you about, having been with the paper some time and having been with the Journal-American before.

Mr. HELMS. Sir, it was the World-Telegram.

Mr. MCCONE. I was just reporting what was told to me.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very dubious about his being responsible. I think this is almost on all fours with that other case. We took a lot of trouble to look into that. I don't know that we can look into every one of these things, but it looks very much like the same kind of a thing to me. It is very good for their business, they sell more papers.

MADAME NHU'S VISIT

The other day Mr. McNamara stated, of which we, of course, couldn't repeat, that he thought it was a national tradegy for Madame Nhu to come here, and with which I am inclined to agree, not knowing her. I am mystified as to why the Government can't control her and why they do allow her to come here. Do you have any explanation?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, we debated that. She had a visa issued that would require action in revoking a visa. If it had been a situation where a visa had to be issued, it would have been an easier one to handle.

The CHAIRMAN. Had it a long time before?

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[5] Albert Colgrove. See Volume XI in the Historical Series.

Mr. McCone. I don't know how long she had had it. It had several months to run.

When she got to Paris, she was urged by a former minister not to come to the United States, but she ignored that. The South Vietnam Ambassador to the United Nations is reported to have urged her not to come. [Deleted.] She would hear nothing of it. She was going to come because she had a mission.

We concluded that the only way she might be influenced not to come would be to have her husband order her home. He apparently had a very peculiar kind of authority over a wife that prevails in the Orient, but not in the United States.

So we communicated this to the Ambassador, he and Richardson got together, and decided that Richardson would make contact with Nhu trying to persuade him to cable her. He would not see Richardson. Richardson had not seen him for some weeks, and he very skillfully set the date of the meeting October 8th which would be the day after her arrival. He knew, certainly, what Richardson——

The Chairman. He didn't want to send it?

Mr. McCone. He didn't want to send it.

The Chairman. That means he approved of it?

Mr. McCone. Well, you have to assume it, or at least he didn't want to place himself in a position to refuse an official request not to cable her.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR

The Chairman. It is very funny. Her father's reaction to her is also strange. It is quite a mystifying element in this picture as to what he is really up to. You know about her father.[6]

Mr. McCone. Yes.

Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, have you given any thought to asking him to come to this committee?

The Chairman. Her father? No. It has not been the practice, I think with exception, to invite foreign representatives to the committee on any formal basis. With respect to foreign nations, we have them come informally, if we have them to tea, and so on. But I do not recall ever having them to a formal meeting at which we take a record and so on.

Senator Church. His view of the situation in South Vietnam, and his projections of what is in store for us are matters of the utmost gravity.

The Chairman. I can see no reason why we could not do it informally. I would not invite him without consideration by the committee with respect to the policy. We have had many requests as to foreigners, and we have always turned them down. I do not wish to keep you here unduly long, Mr. Director.

As I say, I apologize for being late, but it was absolutely unavoidable.

POLICING OF U.S. AID PROGRAM

One thing for the record, I want to say regarding AID, relative to earlier testimony, that we created a special comptroller's office for

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[6] Tran Van Chuong, South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States.

looking into this question of corruption, and so on. It strikes me they are the proper people to do it, and this is not ordinarily one of your functions. It is their function, is it not?

Mr. McCone. That is correct.

The Chairman. Incidentally, if you run into anything you would report it?

Mr. McCone. Yes, we would consider it our responsibility if we run into any indicators, we would notify the Ambassador and the Director of the AID program. But I feel that they have to do their own policing to police their own situation.

The Chairman. The real responsibility is that of AID.

CIA AND PUBLIC RELATIONS FIRMS

There was one other question that is not directly related to this, but due to our very recent study by this committee, to which we gave a great deal of time in this foreign lobbying matter, has the CIA had any part in helping to finance any public relations firm acting for the Government of South Vietnam?

Mr. McCone. No.

The Chairman. You have never, or any other government, I mean public relations in this country?

Mr. McCone. Not that I recall, no.

The Chairman. That is not your policy. We had a very sketchy indication that a firm, I belive it is Kastor, Hilton, Chesley and Atherton, which had represented the Vietnamese Government, helped support or organize and support a group called the Friends of Vietnam and something indicated that the CIA had been involved in that. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. McCone. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Colby. I think those are 2 different things, sir. The Kastor, Hilton, and so forth, that came in 1960, I believe, that arrangement. We were aware of it. We talked to some of the people. We did not finance it.

The Chairman. You never do, do you, a foreign agent or a public relations firm?

Mr. Colby. Well, the other thing you mentioned was the Friends of Vietnam, which preceded that by several years, I just do not know the answer to that one offhand, sir.

Mr. McCone. Do you know, Dick, the answer to the question of the Friends of Vietnam?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not know the answer to that.

The Chairman. We had quite a study, and we hope we would have done some good. We got the first conviction about those hearings a couple of days ago, you probably noticed, and I was hoping I would get the answer I did, that you do not support these.

Mr. Colby. We talked to members of your staff earlier this year, sir, on the 1960 one.[7]

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[7] According to a committee staff memorandum: "On 5 April 1963, Mr. John Warner and Mr. William Colby, of CIA, briefed Messrs. Marcy and Pincus, of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on CIA's relationship to the public relations contract between the Government of Vietnam and the firm of Kastor, Hilton, Chesley, Clifford & Atherton Inc., 575 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. The staff was advised that CIA had given no financial support to this operation. CIA had, however, recommended this firm to the Vietnamese Government in late

Continued

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything further?
Senator CHURCH. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. McCone.

ENDANGERING THE CIA'S PRIMARY FUNCTION

I just want to say in my opinion that I do not think you ought to take this criticism too seriously. I think the nature of your work is bound to inspire such things as this Starnes article, and I think most of us, most people who are thoughtful at all about it, should put it in proper perspective. I do not think you should be too concerned about it. As Senator Church already stated, it is almost inevitable that you will be subjected to it, as we are in a different context.

I certainly do not take this kind of criticism seriously, and I am very much prone to discount Starnes' article and a lot of those articles. They do not convince me at all.

The only question I am concerned with is this same old basic question of the wisdom of the Board's assigning to you some functions which may or may not be proper for you. You are an intelligence agency. I have always wondered whether or not it does not endanger your primary function to give you some operation that somebody else ought to be doing, but you, being in being, being there, it is convenient to give it to you.

It reminds me of the old days of the RFC.[8] It was a good organization, but because it was in being, the Congress itself said, "You go pay the subsidies", and then later on they gave them hell for having wasted the money. They gave them the money to pay it. I used to be concerned about it, and it was very unfair on the part of the Congress, but because they were in being, they gave them these duties, which were entirely unrelated to their principal functions.

AN EASY TARGET

Mr. MCCONE. Well, that is something we always have to guard against because we have a farflung organization, and——

The CHAIRMAN. It is very convenient to tell you to do it.

Mr. MCCONE [continuing]. Instantaneous communications and some extremely competent people, and some specialized fields of activity. It is very convenient. We are always on the alert not to be drawn off the main track of our principal responsibility.

However, this being a secret organization, we are an easy target because secrecy in the minds of the American public is associated with intrigue, all sorts of things. Our type of business has built up a fortune for Ian Fleming, for instance, writing spectacular books that have great circulation and, therefore, an article on us sort of impinges upon the mysterious, unexplainable.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. It gives it readability.

1960 as one which might be helpful in improving the GVN's world wide image, then at a low point after the November 1960 coup d'etat. The GVN made a contract for a trial period of three months, which was apparently successful as they renewed the contract for a year. Prior to the end of the year, however, the relationship cooled and the contract was terminated by the GVN, as the firm had not done a good job after the initial months of the new contract. CIA had occasional contact with the public relations agent of the firm, Mr. Jorge Ortiz, as did the Chief of the USIS mission and others in the American community in Saigon."

[8] Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

If you sanitize this record properly it would be a mishmash, if you take out all that you object to, and I personally would be against publishing it unless some very great change occurred in my mind, because I think in the future if we set that precedent, they will be asking—we now have a precedent against this, and I think we will be asking for trouble if we change it.

Mr. McCone. It might be that we could watch the situation for a time. Maybe as a result of the President's very positive statement in his press conference yesterday that criticism, even the articles, even though, as Senator Church points out, they will occur from time to time, they may not be either as violent or as frequent as they have been.

Senator Church. We certainly all share that hope.

Mr. McCone. Maybe we can live with it.

The Chairman. Well, as long as we have the competitive newspaper situation we will have this condition.

A FRIENDLY SENATOR

Mr. McCone. Maybe a friendly Senator can get up on the floor of the Senate and say something.

The Chairman. I was going to say Senator Hickenlooper's statement of the way he is going to take this up, he has taken responsibility for that article, and he has asked every witness the questions he has asked you, and I think that will do a lot to clear the air. I do not think you ought to be too concerned about it. I think you will weather it all right.

Mr. McCone. We do not feel that the intelligence community is going to collapse or go into a state of absolute shock.

The Chairman. No, I do not think so. Do you have anything to suggest?

Mr. McCone. No, I have nothing. I would like to ask Mr. Cline or Mr. Helms.

Mr. Helms. No, sir.

The Chairman. Of course, I am not going to say anything to the press except this was, following our usual custom, a discussion of the situation in Vietnam and other places, and that is it. I am not going to elaborate on it. I never do.

Mr. McCone. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. They are accustomed to that. They can ask me general questions about the situation in Vietnam, which they always do, and I repeat what I said yesterday, and the day before. That is about all I can do.

Thank you very much.

Mr. McCone. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

BRIEFING ON LATIN AMERICA

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Church, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Pincus of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I may say for the record that the Secretary called me just about an hour ago and said due to this Autobahn fracas—he was very disturbed about it; he wanted to spend a little time on the phone with Gromyko, as the Secretary already stated. For that reason he could not come this morning, and he asked Mr. Ball to fill in for him and Mr. Moscoso or anyone else available to come. I urge that we have Mr. Ball. I am very hopeful we can examine any of the questions left dangling about foreign aid.

I think it is time the committee take some action and yet I didn't want to shut them off if they have any pertinent questions relating to this matter.

Do you have anything you would like to offer before they ask you questions on the foreign aid matter which is the matter which most concern us.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE W. BALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY TEODORO MOSCOSO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND STERLING J. COTTRELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. BALL. No. I may say, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary asked me to say he wanted me to say to the committee he was very regretful he couldn't come up and if this matter was cleared up he would come up in any event.

We are, of course, very anxious to see the foreign aid bill move forward because it makes it difficult to know just where we can go in the plans we are making.

As I understood it, the committee was interested in discussing among other things these recent coups in Latin America.

The CHAIRMAN. Particularly Senator Morse asked the Secretary to come back. He had some questions, and he is here now.

Do you have anything you wish to ask, Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Not right at the moment until it develops a little more.

THE AUTOBAHN OBSTRUCTION

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse, just before you came in, the Secretary called up about an hour ago and said this development on the Autobahn had——

Senator MORSE. On what?

The CHAIRMAN. The Autobahn, the obstruction by the military officials of one or two of our convoys, had disturbed him very much and he just had to get on the phone and so on, he was talking to Dobrynin and Gromyko and others, and he would come later if he possibly could, but in order that the meeting could proceed in the meantime he would send Secretary Ball and Moscoso.

That is why he is not here.

I don't know whether you read this morning's paper on the interruption.

Senator MORSE. I thought they let them go through.

Mr. BALL. They let them go through, Senator Morse, from the Marienborn checkpoint last night. There were two convoys that they held, and they let them both go through. They stopped one of them again in the middle of the night at the Babelsberg checkpoint, and it is still there, or was as of a quarter of 10:00 when I came up here.

Obviously it is a matter of concern. They let it go through last night because we gave them an ultimatum that it was going through anyway unless they lifted the gate at the end of 1 hour, and at the end of the hour they lifted the gate.

The CHAIRMAN. He just stated, just a moment before you came in, why the Secretary wasn't here.

Senator MORSE. I am sorry I was late.

The CHAIRMAN. He may be able to come up later but in the meantime I was very anxious, since we set the meeting, not to lose any time.

Do you have any questions about any of the matters you have been concerned about to ask Secretary Ball?

Senator MORSE. On what? Foreign aid?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, foreign aid is the reason for this meeting.

Senator MORSE. I have many.

The CHAIRMAN. I recognize you and you may proceed.

POLICY TOWARD MILITARY COUPS

Senator MORSE. Let's start with the Dominican Republic. I would say, Mr. Secretary, how large the number is, I don't know, I can't tell, but I think it is going to be very difficult certainly to get the same support you have had in the past for military aid to Latin America in view of what has happened in the Dominican Republic

and in Honduras, and I shall propose some amendments for drastic cuts. Senator Humphrey has already served notice to this committee on the floor of the Senate that he is looking with great favor on drastic cuts in this military aid.

I would, if the administration would see fit, kind of review this whole situation and see if it couldn't agree to some negotiated settlement with us in the appearance to avoid what I think ought to be avoided, a bad split with the administration on the whole foreign aid bill.

I don't think it is good. I think the administration is not going to get what it is aking for. It ought to count its noses ahead of time and not afterwards.

I am very unhappy with the President's statement at the press conference the other day, as I said on the floor of the Senate yesterday. I don't think the President's statement adds up to much sense by way of being definitive in nature as to what our policy is in Latin America in regard to military coups.

You have a constitutional government of the Dominican Republic in exile. You have got a constitutional government of Honduras in exile. The President says that he is against coups. If you want to throw a diplomatic bomb that would leave no room for doubt as to our intention to explode support to military juntas, you would recognize those two governments in exile, and that is exactly what I shall propose on the floor of the Senate at noon today.

I just don't think, Mr. Secretary, that you are selling your bill of goods that you are against military juntas when you let two constitutional governments in exile go down the drain.

I would like to hear your comments on it because I am going to officially, formally make a speech at noon today recommending the assurance of the United States that would, in effect, recognize the Bosch and Morales governments in exile.

RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS

Mr. BALL. Senator MORSE, I think that the President, in his press conference, certainly Secretary Rusk also, I think last Friday night, tried to make very clear the fact that we regard the maintenance of constitutional government as a prime objective of policy, that we don't see the policy of cooperating with any of these countries within the Alliance for Progress program in a state where they are dominated by military juntas who have taken over against the will of the people.

Now, there is always a problem in situations of this kind as to the extent to which we interfere on a unilateral basis without the full support of the other American states in what is an internal situation. What we have done so far in Honduras and in the Dominican Republic is to make clear that we cannot deal with these governments in their present situation. We are withdrawing our aid and military missions. This is visibly occurring. We have suspended our diplomatic missions.

The consequence is that I think it is very likely that we will be able to bring about the necessary steps toward a restoration of constitutional government in the Dominican Republic within a very short time.

I think that there is very clear evidence that the civilians who have been put in as a kind of front for the military in the Dominican Republic are weakening, that the military themselves are feeling under very great pressure, that steps will be taken for restoration of constitutional government.

Now, President Bosch himself has said, I think in a speech that he made in San Juan, that he does not want to be returned to the Dominican Republic, and that he is, in effect, cautioned against any effort of this kind.

CONTRAST BETWEEN HONDURAS AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

I think that we can say with a good deal of optimism that the course we are now following in the case of the Dominican Republic is very likely to lead to a fairly prompt restoration of constitutional government.

In the case of Honduras I can't be as optimistic. The situation there is of a different kind. Again the pressure is being put on as strongly as we can, of taking the same kind of measures there, but the Colonel is digging himself in and I think this is going to be a more difficult situation.

I do think we can be fairly optimistic about the Dominican Republic.

Now, as to the recognition of these governments in exile, I think that this is a problem which involves, among other things, the psychology of the Latin American people and the attitude of the American states in general. I would like to ask Mr. Cottrell, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary, if he would care to comment on that.

PATTERN OF COUP REPLACING COUP

Mr. COTTRELL. In my view it is very difficult to go back to the status quo ante after one of these operations for various reasons.

For example, President Villeda is in San Jose, Costa Rica and has not shown a clear desire to go back. In fact reports are that he is more interested in a restoration of constitutional government in Honduras than in returning himself. He would be willing to resign, so long as an arrangement were made to take the power away from the present junta and reestablish contitutionality.

I think if we focus on our main objective, the restoration of representational government, without focusing on the individuals involved, we are much more likely to come through with a satisfactory solution which will also give considerable pause to any other would-be a dictator in the area who is thinking of overturning a government.

We recognize that this ancient pattern of coup replacing coup and dictatorship replacing dictatorship, has a very stultifying effect on every one of those countries. It must be broken, and we think this is an opportunity where we can do it. I think the argument is probably over methods, not principles or intentions.

OPPOSED TO MILITARY INTERVENTION

Senator MORSE. I would like to make these comments very quickly. I think President Bosch still considers himself president of the Dominican Republic, and it may very well be that he doesn't want to go back to the Dominican Republic probably for the primary reason that he might be assassinated.

I can't speak for him, but I am telling you what I infer from what information I do have, and, of course, I would be opposed, as I have already indicated on the floor of the Senate, to reestablishing him by any military intervention on the part of the United States.

I am against that, but if he is to be replaced in the Dominican Republic under the constitutional processes, under the constitution which has been set aside by the junta, I think it would have a very beneficial effect in doing it through his office even though he is in exile.

I just don't think that the military coups can be allowed any longer to follow this course of action and think when they overthrow the government the government is dead. I think we can breathe some life into this government by channeling through the president is exile at least a statement of our policy, even if the vice president has got to be put in office, that is all right with me.

But I just don't think there ought to be this complete cutting off of any recognition on our part of Bosch as the constitutional president.

In Honduras, we don't know to what extent, we don't know how enthusiastic villeda Morales was with the leading condidate for the presidency, although on the surface he went along with the decision of the party.

But here again, he is in exile. He is still the president, not for many more days, but he is still the president. I should think it would be very salutary in Latin America for us to announce we are still doing business through that channel.

You speak about unilateral action on the part of the United States. I hope we don't have to engage in unilateral action, but sometimes we have to. We had to engage in unilateral action—not at all analogous, I would be the first to admit, but in point—in that we found a situation such that it called for unilateral action in regard to Cuba last October, so they know we will engage in unilateral action if we think that our interests are such that we have to.

I am beginning to think our interests are such in Latin America that if the Organization of American States—and all I have are newspaper stories on it, although I shall get before the day is over a briefing on what happened yesterday in the meeting—but the Organization of American States want to play cat and mouse longer with this touchy one. I don't think we can wiat for them.

U.S. POSITION IN OAS

The question I want to ask is what position have we taken in the Organization of American States calling for the conference of foreign ministers?

Mr. BALL. The situation on that, Senator Morse, is one of seeing within the OAS the possibility of a split over this issue which might have exactly the consequence that we don't want to achieve.

We have taken a poll a look at the situation, and our guess would be that including ourselves, some nine governments would be in facor of a strong action by the OAS.

I am afraid that what we would do, if we were to try to convene immediately a meeting of the foreign ministers, would be to exhibit the weakness on this issue rather than strength. This is what concerns us.

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS OBLIGATIONS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, that is as far as I want to go for the moment in the discussion of the Dominican Republic and Honduras matter, but I want to relate it now to what this last comment of yours raises. It seems to me it raises the question of how enthusiastic are our friends in Latin America about living up to their obligations in connection with the whole Alliance for Progress program, because if this is true, you have got that kind of division in the Organization of American States now, who don't want to go along with effective action against military overthrows in Latin America, I am at a loss to understand why they have any right, at least speaking for myself here, to convince me to vote millions of dollars of the American taxpayers' money for the Alliance for Progress program. It seems to me they are serving notice on us they are willing to get but not to give.

So far as they are concerned, they are willing to accept this as a one-way street. I have supported the Alliance for Progress program, as the record will show, but I am somewhat like Humphrey on it. I have just about got my fill unless we can get a better demostration from the Latin American countries that they are willing to stand with us for freedom in Latin America. If they are not willing to stand with us in opposition to military juntas, I am not for voting them any money.

They have to go through the mill, they have to have a situation that it gets worse in Latin America before it gets better. I am satisfied that most of these military juntas are nothing but a case system that reflects the social status of a large percentage of the oligarchs—it is their sons who build up this military power, and in the military do what they can to maintain this feudal economic system down there.

I don't want to support it with American tax dollars. I am not going to support the Alliance for Progress this year if by supporting it I am supporting countries which in this hour of crisis are unwilling to join with us in opposition to doing more than just protesting military juntas. You have lost me so far as my support of the program is concerned if that is to be the policy. I am all through.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken, do you have a question?

Senator AIKEN. I just have a question on the same subject.

DIVISIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

How can we talk about united action in Latin America when nine of the smaller countries agree on a strong course of action and the other ten countries, including the larger ones, don't agree?

Haven't we just got to use our own judgment and work along bilateral lines with each country?

Mr. BALL. This, of course, is what we are trying to do.

Senator AIKEN. Unless we taken strong leadership, they won't agree.

Mr. BALL. I would agree this is wholly a problem where leadership is manifested, not merely in the councils of the OAS on direct relations with these governments, but it is manifest in the kind of policy that we pursue with respect to the governments when there has been an overthrow.

Now, it seems to me that what we are doing in Honduras, what we are doing in the Dominican Republic is a very visible demonstration of the determination of the United States not to see these coups go forward and a demonstration that this kind of action doesn't pay. These countries that permit unconstitutional takeovers of power have to suffer some very serious consequences. As I say, I think that in the Dominican Republic there is every sign that this is going to work, that it is going to pay off.

Now, to the extent that this is demonstrated, I think that the possibility of being able to bring these other countries along on some action when there is the regular scheduled meeting of the foreign ministers is greatly improved.

A CONDITION, NOT A THEORY

I don't think any of us are happy with the situation. Our problem of Latin America is that it is a condition and not a theory. What we are faced with is that in more countries than not, there are weak governments, that there are governments which are trying to govern under great pressure from a variety of interests, some from the left, some from the right, and that they are not very brave or bold when it comes to taking positions on matters that affect other nations within the system.

I would agree that this is not a happy situation. But at the same time, the consequences of diminishing our assistance to these countries, in effect the rejection of the idea of trying to work with them, a substantial reduction in the kind of resources that we have available to encourage the trends in the right direction would, it seems to me, hold dangers for us that are very considerable indeed. What we are seeking to do here is work with materials which are in most cases imperfect, trying to make the best out of a situation which is anything but simple or easy. This seems to me to require that resources be available for this and that we do the best that we can.

We assert as strong a leadership as we can, without, at the same time, taking a position which bumps up against their historical aversion to American domination, to American interference in their internal affairs and so on, which can have a negative effect and can play into the very powers and pressures that we are trying to resist.

ANTI-DEMOCRATIC INFLUENCES

To return to the suggestion which Senator Morse made of our recognizing governments in exile when there has been a military takeover, it is certainly a very interesting one certainly one that

has to be carefully considered. The problem is that the most likely reaction in Latin America, which would certainly be exploited by the anti-democratic influences, both on the left and right, is that it would be viewed as an American effort to retain in power a government which has become in effect an agent or stooge of the United States by selecting the government and insisting on staying with it.

We have one effect on the psychology and reactions of the people. We have another by insisting on the principles of constitutionality which do not at all preclude the restoration of a government by an election. It seems to me that we are in a very much better position so far as the impact on the psychology of the people that we are trying to work with is concerned.

CUTTING OFF FOREIGN AID

The CHAIRMAN. To come back to foreign aid, I don't know how the cutting off of our resources to be used in case we do something would promote your ultimate objectives if you are deprived of any funds.

Mr. BALL. The degree of leverage we have over these countries is dependent to a considerable extent on our ability to restore foreign assistance, to, in effect, return them to the Alliance for Progress when they have made it clear that they are returning to constitutional government.

The CHAIRMAN. I can agree with the Senator from Oregon's objective but I can't agree with his means, that is cut off foreign aid, cut off military assistance, to make it, other words, unavailable to you. He may quarrel with your judgment in the way you use it. There is always a legitimate criticism there, but I don't see how it would promote anyone's welfare if we simply slashed the funds available.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, as the Senator pointed out before he left the room——

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't see him leave.

Senator CHURCH. I think one of the amendments he has in mind is of a different character than any cutting off of these programs. It would take the form of a provision of the Act which would terminate the aid program to military junta governments. I think it is framed in such a way that the President could restore the program when a satisfactory constitutional government were established.

I think if it is properly phrased it might be a very useful provision in the Act because it would put these governments on notice in advance that there are definite penalties which will attach as a matter of law. I think the foreign aid program ought to be formed in a way that furnishes useful deterrence and puts these countries on notice in advance that certain consequences will follow from acts that we regard as inimical to our purpose.

AN ACT OF DISCRIMINATION

One of the things that disturbs me, I noticed in the paper the other day, is Jagan [1] down in Guiana. He was in London, and he

[1] Cheddi Jagan, Prime Minister of British Guiana.

was complaining that his country was the object of very definite attack by the United States, that the United States was trying to undermine and destroy his country and government and the basis of his argument was that we had refused to give him aid. The assumption being that the refusal of the United States to give aid is an act of discrimination, indeed, an attack upon his government in an effort to undermine and destroy it.

When the attitude gets that far around, we had better take a look at our whole card. We don't owe these countries aid. They have no vested right to claim it of us. We are not discriminating against them or punishing them when we decide not to extend it.

But I think that if we were to write into the law an amendment of the kind that the Senator from Oregon is thinking about, putting these countries on notice that they can expect certain consequences following the overthrow of ligitimate governments by military juntas, that it would help to serve the objectives of the Alliance for Progress and put a little more backbone into this program.

Mr. BALL. Senator Church, let me say that a carefully phrased amendment of that kind, in my judgment would be rather useful, and we wouldn't resist it. I think that——

Senator MORSE. Could I interrupt you to say this?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

THE MORSE AMENDMENT

Senator MORSE. I certainly made no commitment and I am very, very careful when I talk about anything you men ever say to me. We didn't get a chance to go into my amendment. If reads:

> None of the funds made available under the authority of this title may be used to furnish assistance in any country in which the government which has come to power as the result of a forceable overthrow of a prior government which has been chosen in free and democratic elections.

If we can get something like that into the law, I think it would be a master stroke.

But I will go back now to what I started to say: the Secretary of State made no commitment on this at all. We didn't have a chance to talk about it. I went over to where he was sitting, which is about where you are sitting now, after the meeting was over, and I think he will tell you he said, "I want to talk to you about your amendment because I think the may be a great deal of merit to it and I am not ready to pass on it yet." He said, "I think we ought to talk about it."

That is the best recollection I can give you about what the Secretary said, which is somewhat similar to yours. I don't know whether it ought to be in this language. I don't know whether there ought to be any or not.

I just know that from two standpoints, and I can't stress it too much, from the standpoint of public opinion throughout Latin America and the strengthening of anti-Communist civilian forces of Latin America, they have got to have some such encouragement. I just want to tell you that you have got to do something along this line from the standpoint of American public opinion, because in my state, and it is not limited to my state, the tide against foreign aid at the present time when we are pouring it into countries that are

doing what these countries are doing is so strong that I am too good a politician to vote for it.

Senator SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, may I make this observation?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the Senator from Florida.

COUPS U.S. MIGHT SUPPORT

Senator SMATHERS. I agree with the Senator from Oregon that generally speaking an expression of this character would be very good. I would, however, like to caution, it seems to me, that there could be danger in tying ourselves too tightly into any kind of an amendment of this character where per se the law does not permit the United States giving help even under certain conditions which might arise.

For example, he, of course, has taken care of the situation. Suppose the military overthrew Fidel Castro. We would be very happy about it. We would want to help that government, and, of course, this amendment makes this allowance for that because in this amendment he is talking about a duly constituted government.

Suppose the military overthrew Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana. He was duly elected. He has been very unfriendly to us. He has turned the resources and the propaganda of his country against us. In point of fact, the United States in what we stand for might be better off if that were done, and yet if you got yourselves locked in where you couldn't give them any aid, the new crowd, even though the military might come in and do as they have done in Peru, turn the country in the direction of a democracy, and with certain limitations we could finally bring about a democratic system which would be friendly to us.

We could look at other countries where this same kind of a thing could easily happen. I have been around Latin America long enough and have been fooling with it, as Ted knows, since 1947, and actually this overall situation is a lot better today than it was then. We have fallen back in some respect, and I think the Senator from Oregon is absolutely right that we must make it absolutely clear we are against juntas, where they have destroyed and taken over a government which is democratically elected. But then it has also got to have a phrase which also covers continuing to stay on sort of so-called democratic course, but sometimes they don't as Jagan has done, so the amendment is going to take a little bit more of consideration before we lock ourselves.

KEEP THE FAITH WITH ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I only want to point out that my amendment applies to the countries who signed the pact of Punta del Este. It doesn't apply to British Guiana at all or any other place in the world.

And why do I say we limit it to Latin America? Because in my judgment it is necessary, if we are going to keep faith with our pledges under the Alliance for Progress program. We say we are doing this to develop democratic institutions in Latin America, and I think we have a right to say, "If you are not developing them, you are not going to get the aid."

That is what the amendment adds up to.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think the amendment is good for the immediate action, but it doesn't contain what Senator Church referred to and what Senator Smathers referred to.

Senator CHURCH. I think we have to look at the language.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is, some discretion in the President to renew when constitutional government has been restored.

Senator MORSE. You don't have any quarrel with me about that.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to be that would have to be added. You would have to have a proviso here.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

CASE OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator LAUSCHE. I have more difficulty with this subject than has been indicated here. I read the testimony of Martin fully, and I concluded that in the Dominican Republic it is quite understandable why the junta occurred. That is, that wasn't——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I might suggest that apparently Drew Pearson read the testimony fully, too, if you read his story this morning in the Post.

Senator LAUSCHE. I did not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was a categoric recitation.

Senator MORSE. I thought he missed a point or two.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He didn't have room in his column is all. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't think you can write a uniform rule applicable to all situations without exceptions. I don't know what the situation is in Honduras; Senator Smathers pointed out Jagan's government.

Now, to me it seems that when you have a situation where Communists are breaking through, as they did in the Dominican Republic, and the businessman and the peasant and the professional man and the religious man uniformly begin to complain, and Bosch, a sentimentalist, a romanticist, a poet, completely devoid of realistic knowledge what is necessary sometimes in government, does nothing about it—Martin begged him to do things and he didn't—it looks to me that the issue there was are you going to allow the Communists to penetrate and take over or is firmness of approach going to be needed. I think that the objective of procuring a situation where constitutional selection of officials will be made without saying it must be Bosch is a far better approach, and I think in these instances you have got to look into each country separately to see what the circumstances are and then determine how you are going to treat it.

This thing may rise to plague you; it could rise to plague you in Cuba, in Guinea, Ghana, Mali, over in Africa, and other places if you simply declare that where constitutional government is overthrown all aid ceases. I just want you to understand that I don't subscribe to the proposal that this is as easy of solution as it has been presented.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.

REVOLUTION IS ACCEPTED IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I presume that I should take a great deal of sadistic pleasure in listening to the discussion on the other side of the political fence here on foreign aid, but I don't because I think it has got a most necessary place in our policy and our future. I merely want to recite some things that I think we too often fail to take into consideration.

Beginning with O'Higgins and Bolivar and a lot of other people in Latin America, the accepted way of changing the government down there for 150, 200 years has been by revolution. We don't like it particularly. We don't think that is the way to do it. That is the way they have done it in these countries.

We have got countries down there—until Galo Plaza went in Ecuador they had 120-some heads of governments and 125 years of freedom. In Bolivia they had about the same kind of history until Paz Estenssoro was elected and he served out his term, and he had to come in as the result of a revolution after he was elected.

SITUATION IN COLOMBIA

In Colombia we had a series of dictatorships, arbitrary centralized government. They finally elected a fellow who had the most high-sounding democratic speeches you ever heard in your life. He had been allegedly supporting democratic principles. He got into office. I was told six months after he got in there that his background and his platform were excellent, but—this was a Colombian telling me, a very smart Colombian, too, who had supported this fellow—he said, "Our tradition down here is power-corrupt and we have our fingers crossed on this guy."

He said, "I supported him." But he said, "We are watching him. If he carries out the principles that he talked about years before and in his election platform, we can make some progress."

Within 2 years the fellow became a dictator. He grabbed power and seized power. The army threw him out and then they put in this rather interesting and unique system of letting one party have the presidency for four years and then automatically have another party have the presidency without any determination by the people as to who they wanted.

Can you say they have got democracy in Colombia? Well, not according to our philosophy.

Fortunately, up until now they have been having sort of a rough time but a fairly stable time. It is not the kind of democracy as we talk about democracy, because the people haven't elected these fellows. They made an arbitrary constitutional provision that one party could have the presidency for a certain period of time and automatically, without a general election as to selection, the other party would name the president.

WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

What is democracy? We have our ideas and our views, and we believe in our concept of it; it has been about the best the world has ever seen. We are pretty well satisfied with it. But here we are dealing with a tradition that is centuries old, that revolution down

deep is a pretty well-accepted means of changing political situations in some of these countries, and I am convinced that a great many people in these countries down there will say maybe revolution is the way we get things done sometimes.

We can't understand that system. We don't understand that. We don't like it. My feeling goes along the line that we developed here the other day womewhat, that our objective may be better served not by maintaining a form which we call democracy but by maintaining from time to time a stability of government, even though it changes, but a certain stability which moves toward the responsibility of the individual and a free society and all that sort of stuff in the long run.

It is a difficult thing. As I have said before repeatedly, I don't like military coups, which are foreign to us, as a country. But I am convinced that we have not yet been able to put ourselves in a position where we understand Latin America's political thinking fully and they understand ours fully; the mores, the background of our economic system and our political system, they have not been quite the same.

We have never been able to make those things fully compatible, because either we have not taken the trouble to understand them fully or they have not taken the trouble to understand us fully. The fact is that we don't see eye to eye on many of these things and the methods of arriving at what they believe to the their political and economic results and advancements.

IMPROVED CONDITIONS IN LATIN AMERICAN

If you will look at the whole Latin American picture, I think they are better off now than they were 25 years ago. We have got some countries down there that have maintained a very substantial degree of stability over a period of time and that is to the good.

I think even though they had a military coup in Peru, the general net result was, looking at it 20 years ago and looking at it now and the period in between, that there has been a substantial stability along lines of self-determination, along lines of democracy, developing along a line that they didn't have beforehand.

I think that is true in Ecuador; I think it is true in Bolivia. I think regardless of the fact we don't quite understand that form of government they have in Colombia—we know what it is, but I don't know whether we understand it fully—I think they have succeeded in maintaining a stability which is probably something which has extended their economic development somewhat. They have great potentials in Colombia, great areas, the mineral resources, and so on. I think progress is being made, and for that reason I would hesitate to circumscribe these things with too meticulous details in what we will or what we won't do.

I think somebody pointed out here, some of these military coups we sit back and applaud in our living room and say it is a good thing, not all of them, but occasionally. If somebody overthrew Castro in Cuba we would be very happy about it, but that would be a military coup. Whether that is a democratic government in Cuba, it is not our form. But it is a government which has been imposed

upon the people and it is a government which the police and authorities have maintained.

Senator MORSE. Bourke, will you yield for 30 seconds?

GOVERNMENT IN COLOMBIA

I don't think Colombia is a very good example of the point you are making. This fellow you talk about in Colombia never was elected. He came into power by military coup himself and furthermore their constitution was approved by a plebiscite.

Now, it isn't the same kind of democratic process we have but that was remarkable to get that plebiscite in Colombia, and it may very well be that this is the best way for them to work out a constitutional system.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not talking about the present government. I am talking about the predecessor government.

Senator MORSE. That come into power——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When they overthrew the dictator.

Senator MORSE. Rojas came in by coup.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He was elected. He preached democracy, he preached constitutional government, and his background and history of discussion was that. He was in office for about two years or maybe a year and a half, I don't know, before he began to become a dictator.

Senator AIKEN. If you will yield, what the Senator from Oregon has indicated is, that situation in Colombia is "coup-coup." [Laughter.]

Senator MORSE. I think the man you are talking about came into power in the first place as a military junta leader, and the people have approved of this arrangement down there. It isn't the kind of system we have, but it certainly isn't dictatorial. Furthermore, I do not agree that Latin America is better off today than 25 years ago from this standpoint; I think there is a much greater threat of Communist takeover today than 25 years ago, because probably for one reason the Communists have more to take over.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

THE SITUATION IN PERU

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you describe the situation in Peru? If you can, make it brief, please.

Mr. BALL. As you will recall in July 1962, there was a coup in Peru, after the election in which the APRA party [2] member had been elected. Following that and I think to a considerable——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You don't want the record to show the APRA party had been elected. It was 33-33; it never was determined.

Mr. BALL. That is correct. It was never determined; that is a more accurate statement.

I think it was not following the action we took, but it was to some extent and it is always hard to know how the causal connnections move, but the junta did move toward an election that did

[2] American Revolutionary Popular Alliance.

occur. Mr. Belaunde was elected, and we are very encouraged by the progress the present Peruvian government is making.

This was a situation in which a firm position taken by the U.S. Government both before and after the coup resulted in a move toward constitutionalism, and I would say, I think the situtation is a more stable one than if other action had been taken at that time.

AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it the same pattern that you have in mind here for the Dominican Republic?

Mr. BALL. Yes. What we are hopeful for in the Dominican Republic and we are already seeing signs of, very considerable signs on the part of the junta—actually it isn't a junta, it is actually a three-man civilians group but backed by the army—and both on the side of the civilians and the military that they have now got to begin to move toward a restoration of constitutional government, and I think that we will probably succeed there, just as the situation was restored in Peru.

Of course, the problem in the Dominican Republic is that you have a people who existed for so many decades under the authoritarian rule that they really have had no experience in the adult lifetime of most of the active people in the Dominican Republic. They have had no experience with constitutional government whatever, and I think it is only normal that they make mistakes.

I think it is only normal that the situation should be a rather uneasy one, and I am sure it will continue uneasy for a long time to come, even though constitutional government may be resumed as the result of the efforts we are making and I believe indeed it will be.

But the Dominican Republic is almost a special situation. It exaggerates the situation of most Latin American governments because you have a people who are suffering from the very strange kind of psychological trauma as a result of their dreadful experiences under Trujillo, and it is a matter of nursing them back to some kind of political health. This isn't going to be easy.

GRADUATES OF U.S. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS

Mr. COTTRELL. I think it might be of use to point out, George, in the comparison of the Dominican Republican with the Peruvian situation that we don't expect the present junta would be permitted to carry on for a considerable period of time until elections.

What we are asking in the Dominican situation is they return right away to the constitution and not enjoy a long period of time before elections. The timeframe is compressed.

Mr. BALL. This request for restoration under the existing constitution or the constitution that preceded it, the 1962 constitution——

Senator SPARKMAN. How would that be brought about?

Would the present—they have presently a three-man triumvirate.

Mr. BALL. Yes, civilian and, by and large, the three men who have been selected are not bad.

Senator SMATHERS. One of them went to Yale.

Senator MORSE. These guys are graduates of our military establishments.

Senator SPARKMAN. One of the members of the military junta in Honduras is a graduate of Alabama.

Of the three who are in there now, who were selected by the military junta that took over, weren't they——

Mr. BALL. That is right, they were selected by the military forces.

ACCEPTABLE TO DOMINICAN PEOPLE

Senator SPARKMAN. Are they believed to be generally acceptable to the Dominican people?

I realize that must be a difficult problem.

Mr. BALL. I think it is hard to describe it in those terms because they are not necessarily even very well known to a great many of Dominican people. They are three men of respectable background who seem to be men of reasonably good character. I don't think that they are the people that one might have expected the Dominican people would select in a free election, because they are men of very little political stature in their own right.

So these are three people that the military have put in. I would suspect if there were free elections tomorrow, not one of them would be elected.

Mr. COTTRELL. Plus the cabinet they have organized with about a dozen cabinet members.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ELECTIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. Would one step of restoring constitutional government be an announcement that elections would be held within a certain time?

Mr. BALL. It could be done by announcing the restoration of the constitution with the mean who would have been the president's successor as the head of the state under the constitution.

Now, this could be the restoration of the present constitution or better actually, I think, the restoration of the 1962 constitution.

If it were the 1962 constitution it would be what, the vice president?

Mr. COTTRELL. President of the Supreme Court.

Senator SPARKMAN. YES.

Mr. BALL. President of the Supreme Court.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say one word, Mr. Secretary.

NEED FOR EXECUTIVE DISCRETION

What bothers me about it, the sentiment of this type of amendment, I think, we agree to, but it seems to me that when the legislature, when this body and the Senate, begins to put in hard and fast requirements limiting the flexibility of and the discretion of the executive that we get into great difficulties.

We get excited about this and hold hearings about once a year. The rest of the time we are preoccupied with other matters, and I don't know whether this would work. If the administration thinks it will, if they can operate under it, why of course, I would have no objection, but I question whether or not you would have the flexibility, as evidenced and explained by the Senator from Florida.

It seems to me we have to trust the discretion of the executive in dealing with these individual cases, each of which differs from every other one. Is it possible, coming down to this bill itself, which I hope we will start voting on Tuesday, can you by that time, you or the Senator from Oregon, agree upon an acceptable provision that would leave you the discretion?

If you can I have no objection to putting it into this bill. I don't want to object to that. I am always concerned about your responsibility; that is, as the executive, I think you have got to have some discretion.

Now, we can criticize you, and do very fully, as to how wise you are, but I still think, whether you are always wise, you have to have it, whether it is yours or any other administration. I think this is perhaps too narrow, although the general principle is acceptable to me and I think the whole Committee.

Mr. BALL. I think we would feel, Mr. Chairman, that there should be some discretion, but I would like to suggest that Secretary Rusk and I talk with Senator Morse and see if we couldn't agree on some language that might be useful.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be the way to resolve this, and I would hope any other amendments that anyone has in mind of offering, say, on Tuesday, that if you possibly can, you bring them up this morning and allow the administration to at least consider them.

Senator CHURCH. May I do that?

Senator MORSE. The Secretary, in effect, said the same thing about Senator Church's amendment the other day; he would be glad to talk about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it agreeable to you, Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. Sure, it is agreeable. I only have one additional comment to make, Mr. Secretary.

TEACH A LESSON TO LATIN AMERICA

I think it is so important procedurally as to what we put our sanction on in connection with the overthrown government of the Dominican Republic. Now, Bosch was elected. Don't kid yourselves. There was a hard-fought campaign, and his opposition was strong. The people made the choice, and he won by a pretty good majority. I don't see how you can deny that that at least was the sanction of the constitution.

I think the only constitution we ought to work through, Bosch out of the picture, but I still think there ought to be this matter of form in regard to Bosch, to go down the line of succession of that constitution until the people of the Dominican Republic approve another constitution. I think we ought to say that Congress ought to be reconvened by this junta. In my opinion these three civilians are a front for them; they have, in effect, set the Congress aside.

I think we ought to say, "You follow the procedure of this constitution until the people of the Dominican Republic set up some other constitution," and let their Congress get back into session. That will reflect the will, we hope, of public opinion in the Dominican Republic, and they may change that constitution.

You see under that constitution the Congress can change the constutition. You don't get the kind of double check that we have under our constitution.

But what I would like to see down there is to teach the lesson to all Latin America, "Listen, they had a constitutional system; they are going to follow that constitutional system, and let the people of the Dominican Republic change it." That is the important point.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?

GIVE THE PRESIDENT FULL DISCRETION

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would hope that some language can be worked out that will give the necessary flexibility and still help to serve the objective.

We have had a lot of talk about South American history, and we are all aware of it here this morning. The analysis that was made by Senator Hickenlooper, I think, is a very sound one.

But after all, the purpose of the Alliance for Progress is to try to bring South America along out of this tradition of feudalism and dictatorship. The objectives of the Alliance for which we are appropriating the money is to help further constitutional government and economic reform.

So if that is the meaning and purpose of our program, then let's try to adapt the law to help serve that goal. Let's deter these military juntas, if we can.

Now, we have a similar problem way out on the other side of the world, the problem of a very bad actor, Mr. Sukarno, and his present bellingerency toward the new federation of Malaysia, toward the United States. I suggested to Secretary Rusk the other day it seemed to me we could write into this law a deterrent which would put the Sukarnos of the world on notice that resort to military aggression would have certain penalties, and chief among which would be the suspension of aid.

I have tried to frame that amendment in such a way as to give the President full discretion in its application. The way it is framed is as follows:

> No assistance shall be furnished under this Act to any country which, in the judgment of the President, is engaging in aggressive military action against another country.

I think it would be useful that Sukarno and others know that certain penalties are going to follow.

The Secretary asked me if I would prepare the language. He would like to review it, but he seemed to indicate it might be possible for us to get together on a provision of that kind.

I have the letter. Can I give it to you, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. BALL. Yes, if you would, Senator Church, I would be glad to and we will be happy to talk with you about it between now and Tuesday.

Senator SMATHERS. It is not that you think the President should give aid.

Senator CHURCH. No, as a matter of law we put certain people on advance notice that this is what is going to happen. But we don't hamper the President. The President under this language makes the determination on whether or not aggressive action is in fact oc-

curring. So he has his discretion. But Sukarno is put on notice that certain penalties attach.

Mr. BALL. It appears this may have considerable merit. I will discuss this with the Secretary, and he or I will be in touch with you.

OTHER AMENDMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. I hate to suggest this, but it looks as if we may be making progress. [Laughter.]

Does anybody else have any amendments he would like to submit for consideration?

Senator CARLSON. Mr Chairman, I don't have a amendment, but we are going to start voting on next Tuesday.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly hope so, on Tuesday morning.

Senator CARLSON. It will not only be amendments on intent and direction but it will be dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. Under our practice here, if one wishes to move to reconsider action we have heretofore taken on dollars, it will be in order. I hope we don't disturb that too much, would be my own view, but anyhow you would have an opportunity if you wished to.

THE U.S. AID BURDEN

Senator CARLSON. While the Secretary is here this morning and it probably will be our last opportunity to discuss it with him, when Secretary McNamara was before our committee, he stated he didn't want a single dollar reduction in the military aid section. In fact, he said it was disastrous, and if there should be any cuts it should be in economic aid.

I assume the Secretary's view on that thing would be on the other side of the picture. Of course, he is interested in both.

I think we are as a nation carrying a much larger burden than we should have to in our military aid programs in comparison with our allies. I had some figures brought up the other day which really are somewhat startling. The average American taxpayer, this is average pays $277 a year in defense. The European taxpayer is spending on defense $53.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this overall defense, Frank?

Senator CARLSON. That is right, overall defense.

Now, the fact is, it seems to me, a much heavier burden than we should be carrying. European NATO is spending on defense 5.4 percent of its overall gross product. No European state is spending more than 6.5 percent of its gross national product. The United States is paying out 9.8 percent.

Now, with the European gross national product at 58 percent of ours, Europe's defense outlays are 32 percent of the U.S. defense budget. I mention this because per capital incomes in Europe have more than doubled since the end of the war except in Britain, but military expenditures have failed to keep pace and in several cases they are far below pre-World II levels.

It just seems to me that we ought to give some thought to it. There has been considerable discussion about reducing military aid in Latin America, and I would like to vote for some reductions. Then we run into this problem again with Secretary McNamara's statement; how far can we go?

Can we get further assistance from these European countries? We should.

LEVEL OF EFFORT OF EUROPEAN ALLIES

Mr. BALL. Let me say, Senator Carlson, we are not at all satisfied with the level of effort that our European allies, some of them, are making. We have been pressing them very hard to increase that level, and with some success.

There has been an increase. If you look at the figures over the past few years, you will find that there has been an increased level of aid in comparison with the national income of most of the European countries.

The problem we face is a difficult one in this sense. What we have seen in the period since the end of the war is the withdrawal of the European countries from world responsibility to a very considerable extent. Prior to the war they had responsibilities all over the world. It was within the framework of a colonial system, and with the dismantling of that colonial system since the war the European countries have withdrawn into Europe to a very large extent. They have been preoccupied with their own affairs. They have made contributions gradually, as their economic strength has increased, to the defense of Europe but even to that not enough, because they have gotten into a habit of mind of thinking that the United States which out of necessity had to move into the power vacuums that were created by the withdrawal of the European countries, that the United States has a total world responsibility.

I think that one of the major pieces of unfinished business that the free world has is a better reallocation of responsibilities. I am wholly in accord with what you say on that.

AID TO SPAIN

Senator CARLSON. What can we do in this bill about it?

For instance, you have just signed some leases with Spain on air bases, a 5-year term. The military aid that we have given Spain from 1954 to 1963, which is a long time, is $492,943,000. This bill carries about $29 million, and the average has been around $30, $40 million year-in and year-out. We don't seem to be able to reduce it.

I realize we don't give them economic aid. We give them some food I understand, but it is largely military.

We did make a loan, I noticed, through the Export-Import Bank of $100 million. It just seems to me—Spain's contribution to national defense, their own defense program, is 3.5 percent of their gross national product, and here we keep pouring money. Sometimes we ought to be able to cut back, and I would just like to have some help.

I don't want to ruin the program. I have supported it, but I am concerned and our people are concerned.

Mr. BALL. I would say this, there is some danger in comparisons of percentage of gross national product. I think there is a principle that necessarily applies here.

A very poor country—and Spain is by European standards a poor country, a very poor country should not be expected to spend the

same percentage of its gross national product, because the margin that is left for the development of its national life is very much less.

But nevertheless, furthermore, we have the situation where Spain is not a part of the NATO Alliance. It would like to be.

Senator CARLSON. You have gone a long ways in this last treaty. In fact, there is some criticism that you practically entered into a treaty that we are part of their national defense.

Mr. BALL. This was very carefully worked out, Senator, and I think if one reads exactly what was said, it is clear that we haven't done that. This is something they would like to have.

Senator CARLSON. Some people think you have.

Mr. BALL. And I may say the one thing that the Spanish Government was really most interested in in this base negotiation was a kind of respectability, more than anything tangible.

I do think that we are making progress in getting a higher level of assistance from these countries.

EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE

One of the problems—and I think the committee ought to think hard about this problem, not necessarily in this context, but as a general proposition—is that in the present institutional arrangement, governmental arrangement, political arrangement of our allies, no one of them is big enough to feel that it really can play a major role in world affairs, outside of France which has its own very special ambitions. So far as the European state is concerned, they are in kind of a psychological state where they think, "Well, we are not big enough to be a major partner, and after all, we had to withdraw from the world because of the anti-colonialism."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which we were very instrumental in forcing upon them, and which I don't disagree with. The United States practically forced these countries out of colonialism.

Mr. BALL. Something they will never let us forget.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They are saying, "All right, you shoved us out of the world picture. Now, you carry the ball."

We may not agree with that argument as a completely valid argument, but that is the argument in many cases.

Mr. BALL. This is a part of the problem we face.

If a state is small enough, then it doesn't feel that it can play a major role in world affairs, that it doesn't really participate in world decisions. It doesn't really feel any world responsibility. This is one of the great difficulties we face.

SPANISH ECONOMIC ADVANCES

Senator CARLSON. I mention Spain, Mr. Secretary, because every member of this committee gets a weekly Chamber of Commerce brief on how they are growing and how the tourist trade is pouring in.

As a matter of fact, Spain today, from the information I have, is growing at a more rapid rate percentagewise than any other European country. They are up to 10 percent while the rest of them are 6½.

Mr. BALL. That is because they started very low.

The CHAIRMAN. They started at a very low level.

Senator CHURCH. What is their foreign exchange? It is very strong.

Mr. BALL. Yes, it is strong. I think they have almost a billion dollars in reserves.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to raise the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any proposed amendments?

Senator CARLSON. I don't, but I hoped somebody else would that I could support.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church has submitted one about Europe that the committee has approved, and you have talked to the Department about some kind of a provision that would allow for these base agreements, is that not correct?

Senator CHURCH. Yes, I have, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. AGREEMENTS WITH SPAIN

I am wholly in accord with the thrust of Senator Carlson's statement, but I do think that these agreements that have been made with Spain, as I understand them, are pretty satisfactory agreements in terms of what we have before and what we are now getting.

Mr. BALL. That is our view, Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. I understand there is a $10 million commitment for military assistance for each of 5 years or 4 years, is it?

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator CHURCH. And that there is another $10 million offer of additional assistance each year on a matching basis, and that if the Spanish put up $10 million to match that each year, this will be a net plus for us on a balance of payments scale because their money will go on the plus side of the ledger, so that there is a balance of payments vacuum in this arrangement.

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator CARLSON. Just on that basis, however, last year, 1963, we carried $31,819,000 military aid for Spain. This year we are proposing $28,438,000. So there isn't much reduction.

Senator CHURCH. No. The agreement, however, that has been made, I don't know how it relates to this figure. This figure was a projected figure that was made prior to the agreement, was it not, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. It is in our book here and that is where I get it. That is all I know.

Senator CHURCH. I think in view of the fact that such an agreement has been made, the importance of retaining the bases, we ought to put some language in the report which excludes these two countries from the operation of the amendments. The amendments will end all further commitments of aid to rich self-supporting nations in Western Europe and elsewhere in the world, and finally close the program down in this area.

NATO INFRASTRUCTURE

The CHAIRMAN. Does that deal have any effect upon the $77 million that would go to infrastructure to NATO?

Mr. BALL. I don't think so, because I think that contribution is not in the form of aid to any NATO partner. I think this is simply funds that we spend on our own.

The CHAIRMAN. It is our contribution to NATO, isn't it, on the infrastructure?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, can I ask the Secretary a question for information?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

UNEXPENDED FUNDS IN THE PIPELINE

Senator MORSE. What does the Department say about an argument that is receiving wide circulation, I think, around the Hill, that if you voted no aid at all this year there is enough in the pipeline of unexpended funds that would involve a substantial aid program next year?

What is that answer to that argument? How much would there be in the pipeline?

Mr. BALL. I will ask Moscoso.

Mr. Moscoso. Can I answer that?

The trouble, Senator Morse, is you can't have a program with pipeline monies which have already been allocated for specific purposes.

Senator MORSE. Everything in the pipeline has been allocated?

Mr. Moscoso. That is right, everything in the pipeline has been programmed.

Senator MORSE. How much is the total?

Mr. Moscoso. I don't know what that figure is.

Mr. BALL. I will have to get it for you, Senator Morse. I don't have it for the aid program as a whole.

Senator MORSE. I think you have got to get us that information, because it is coming up on the floor.

Mr. BALL. Right.

Senator MORSE. The proposal was made to me yesterday by three Senators. They were thinking of moving a suspension of all foreign aid for one year until these commitments had been fulfilled and until some countries would take a look at what their policies are.

Mr. Moscoso. Senator Morse, it also would be well to look into the pipeline of the international financing agencies. You will find the same situation in the World Bank.

There has to be a pipeline. There is some, as much as four years of pipeline in the World Bank.

Senator MORSE. You had better get some of us a memorandum right away.

Mr. BALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You supply it to us.

Mr. BALL. Yes, sir.

Senator CARLSON. I want to make a statement in regard to the statement just made.

PROBLEM IN HANDLING APPLICATIONS

I have some figures on the investment guarantee program, and I want to read a statement I think is accurate: As of March 31, 1963, there were applications in process—you are talking about future, totaling $3.5 billion; as of June 30, 1963, the total in process rose to $4.5 billion. There are also large backlogs in applications for extended risk guarantees for housing guarantees. Then it goes on, testimony in the House committee hearings revealed that AID had only 15 or 17 professional employees working in the entire investment guarantee division and that currently none of this program—very few of these loans are being made.

Is that a true statement?

Mr. Moscoso. In the case of the housing guarantee, which is the one we handle in Latin America, Senator, we have asked under an interagency agreement for the FHA to assist us in handling these applications.

We had little or no experience with that type of program, so we have asked the FHA and they are already working with us.

Now, out of the $60 million which we have authority for making guarantees on housing, I would say that before the end of the year we will have exhausted that authority.

Senator CARLSON. What about this now, processing of loans and applications in process as of June 30, total $4.5 billion. We can vote authority here, but if you folks don't either have the administrative machinery or are not doing it, that doesn't help the country.

Mr. Moscoso. I agree with you, Senator. We are trying to work with the administrative funds we have at hand in trying to eat into the backlog.

Senator CARLSON. Is that what is lacking?

Mr. Moscoso. We have quite a limitation on administrative personnel.

Senator CARLSON. It just seems to me if the loans are—actually where there are loans to be processed and good loans to be in the interests of the country, we should have some responsibility in regard to that. It is news to me.

LOANS TO MEXICO

Senator SMATHERS. Will the Senator yield on that point? I have had information that Ted brought to me, and I presume it is correct, with respect to housing, which many of us have been interested in—Senator Morse, myself, Humphrey, Sparkman, Frank, Bourke, and everybody, that a loan was started under the FHA type in Mexico.

After many years of pressure, I applied some of the pressure where I could to try to get it started, investment guarantee type loan. Then the Federal Government, our government, turned around and gave to the Mexican Government, for houses a straight $40 million to let the government do it, which caused then, the Mexican Government, to withdraw their participating guarantee, which they had made to our government originally—we were guaranteeing, but we had asked them to join the guarantee, so a fellow is down there building some houses and he has got some houses finished and building, but because of the $40 million given directly

to the government over his head, bypassing the investment guarantee program, the Mexican Government has now pulled out and leaves the guy sitting there.

Mr. Moscoso. In the first place, the amount of loan we made to Mexico was $20 million, and it is for the purpose of setting up a system of housing financing that will include the usual agencies as we know them, FHA, savings and loan association. The type of housing they are going to try to build is of a different nature, quality, and price level. I do not know the detail of this Mexican guarantee being eliminated, but I do know that we are making investment guarantees for private housing in Mexico.

We are making the——

ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

Senator CARLSON. I will send you a memorandum on it, because I think we are always trying to encourage private capital to go into these fields.

Mr. Moscoso. Right.

Senator CARLSON. And we have encouraged the investment guarantee program which has worked well here, but sometimes we work against our own best interests by making a loan to the Government, to one big agency, and they are coming out to build what would amount to low-cost housing.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if you could clarify the factual matter that he brought us.

Could you give us a memorandum so Senator Smathers will know what the situation is on this?

Mr. Moscoso. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. This is much more than housing; this is $4½ billion, billions of dollars, in industrial plants which would put people to work and, I would think, help the economy.

I think housing is probably a minor part of this, very minor.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, this leads into another matter that Senator Hickenlooper ought to give some heed to.

STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION ON AMENDMENTS

We ought to find out from the State Department what its position is going to be on any of the proposals which we run into on the floor of the Senate. We ought to thrash them out here in the committee next week with respect to the Hickenlooper amendment, by way of any modifications of it.

I think, Mr. Chairman, you may be confronted with some proposals to do what proponents consider to be strengthening the Hickenlooper amendment. By that, they mean to broaden it and exercise greater control in connection with foreign takeovers.

Bourke, do you have any idea what some of those proposals are?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as that amendment is concerned, the committee has already tentatively, subject to any reconsideration they go into, the committee has already adopted some amendment I proposed weeks ago.

Senator MORSE. I know.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which strengthens it somewhat.

My feeling has been this, that with the genuine cooperation of the AID people and the State Department, these amendments which are strengthening a little bit, are sufficient.

One of the difficulties that I have found and I have said frankly to these people is, in the past we haven't had, in my judgment the vigorous cooperation of the AID people and the State Department on this. Therefore we had to put the amendment in last year, which was definitely opposed by a lot of administrative people, but many of whom say that it has been helpful.

I would prefer not to go so far in an amendment that you completely hamstring the discretion, but I would want to see a vigorous and a sincere administrative approach to this based upon this thing.

SITUATION IN ARGENTINA

I would like to see it. I have a couple of amendments which I don't know if I am going to introduce or not. I am waiting until this speech in Argentina.

We have this situation in Argentina. I was down there three years or so ago and talked to [Arturo] Frondizi. I talked to the economics ministers and so on down there, I talked to some of our oil people, and I talked to some local Argentinians. That was after they had entered into those contracts for the development of Argentine oil by several, I think there were two or three, American oil companies in it and some foreign oil companies, with the idea that they could produce their own oil and get that foreign exchange problem off their backs as far as having to buy oil outside is concerned.

From Frondizi on down, both the people who were producing and the government people and local people, they spoke in the highest terms of what they believed to be the equity of this contract. They said it would return, they thought, a fair profit to the people who developed it. I would solve the problem for Argentina. They would get oil at a fair price and they would have their oil developed.

As I understand it, Argentinians have taken this oil that has been developed by these people, and they now owe, I don't know how much it is, but somewhere around, $30 to $50, $60 million for oil they have taken and reused and just refused to pay the producers for them.

ABROGATION OF DEBTS

The platform of the party of the present president who will be inaugurated tomorrow, I understand, has a flat debt charge that they are going to declare these contracts null and void from the start. They are just going to abrogate them.

How far that will extend into repudiating any debt that they owe for oil they owned which they have drawn—I don't know how much it is, but it is a direct attempt at confiscation, not expropriation in the technical sense necessarily, just a repudiation of the contracts: "We don't owe the money and we are not going to pay the thing."

I don't hold any particular grief for the oil companies. I told a couple of them the other day who were talking about this, I said,

"You fellows can take care of yourselves; you don't need any help when you have a fair shake."

It is the theory of expropriation. If Argentina gets away with this, it will just add fuel to that expropriation wave which started with Cuba. Several Latin American politicians are just waiting, for if one country gets away with it, they will start it there. I am waiting to see the new president says in his inaugural speech.

You get various reports. First he is going to announce definitely he is going to continue with the abrogation of these contracts and the seizure of this property. Then you hear he is not going to and so on.

I don't know. I don't know whether I want to file these amendments or not. I would rather not file them. But a lot is going to depend on what he says tomorrow.

NO AID UNTIL DEBTS ARE PAID

Mr. Moscoso. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. Moscoso. Insofar as the non-payment of these debts is concerned, there is a section in the law that would prevent us from giving aid to Argentina unless the debts were paid.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What section is that?

Senator Moscoso. I don't remember.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You are not talking about the Dirksen amendments?

Mr. Moscoso. The Dirksen?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It doesn't apply.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see why the Hickenlooper amendment doesn't apply if they refuse to pay.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As I understand it, from a technical standpoint the political position that the Argentinians have there says these are contracts that were never legally entered into, they were bad from the first; therefore, there is no contract and there is no property right.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see why we are not the agency that determines whether or not this is confiscation. If we do, then the Hickenlooper amendment applies. I don't see how you can get away from it.

VIGOROUS ADMINISTRATION OF PROGRAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, I say that a great deal of the success of this depends upon the vigor and the determination with which we administer the program. There is a lot a discretion in this.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Ball is a lawyer. What is your view about whether or not that would apply?

Mr. BALL. We have in effect told President Arturo Carlos Ilia that we would consider that an abrogation of these contracts without immediate adequate compensation is a violation of the Hickenlooper amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. I would say there is your answer.

Mr. BALL. I think he understands that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If we take the position, that is OK.

Mr. BALL. I think he fully understands that. Ambassador Robert McClintock has talked with him.

Senator SMATHERS. Who did you say talked to him?

Mr. BALL. Ambassador McClintock.

Senator SMATHERS. Just to be brutally frank about it, I understand our Ambassador has been away on vacation, McClintock, he has been, 2 to 6 weeks he has not been there; he has not talked with him about it.

Mr. BALL. The last time he saw him was on the 9th of October. He discussed this with him at some length.

Senator SMATHERS. This was the day before yesterday?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator SMATHERS. Today is the 11th.

DISTURBING ELECTION PROMISES

Mr. BALL. Mr. Martin, who is the Assistant Secretary of State, is in Buenos Aires. He has a date to see President Ilia on the 13th, at which time this is going to be again brought up very forcefully.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I wonder about is what he will say tomorrow in his public utterance.

Mr. BALL. I agree.

I think this is a matter of concern because he has dug himself in in the election promises, which is a very disturbing thing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is right.

Mr. BALL. I wouldn't want to suggest that this is not a matter which is causing us very considerable concern. There has just been a report by a committee that was appointed to study this, which has attacked these contracts from a legal ground, as I understand it, that the YPF,[3] which is the Government corporation that made them, had no business doing so. The report, again, is more emotional than legal in tone.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is what I mean.

Mr. BALL. This is a political issue of consequence down there. I think we have to take a very tough position on this.

THE DIRKSEN AMENDMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Dirksen amendment, as I understand it—I haven't reviewed it in some little time—only says that where a foreign government owes an obligation which it acknowledges and has no defense, and only refuses to pay, then we cut off aid.

Mr. MOSCOSO. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But in this case they claim a defense; they claim they don't owe it. They claim a legal situation, and therefore technically the Dirksen amendment would not apply because of the controversy on the thing.

Mr. MOSCOSO. It would be your amendment that would apply.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it's yours.

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[3] Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales, an oil company.

TALKS WITH OIL COMPANY EXECUTIVES

Mr. BALL. May I say, Senator Hickenlooper, we have talked to the oil companies about this. In fact, I myself have talked to four or five of the companies on two or three occasions.

The course of action which we were taking was one which had their full approval in the sense they didn't want us to make a public issue of this during the period while President Ilia was getting ready for his inauguration, because they had a feeling if we made this a big public issue it would put Ilia in a position where he wouldn't be able to back away from the campaign position which he had taken.

The last time I talked with the president of four or five of these companies was, what, about three or four weeks ago as I recall.

Since then, as I understand it, there has been a meeting which some of them have had with Ilia.

Mr. Moscoso. Day before yesterday.

Mr. BALL. And they came away very discouraged about this matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had two talks, and the last one was maybe two weeks or so ago. I haven't talked to them since that time. They were worried about it, and I very frankly said I was not disposed to sponsor an amendment that went to unduly restrictive limits.

A lot of people want to put the boot to them on these things. I don't know everybody in the American investors group would want to do that. I think I have only talked to two of them, maybe three, but it has been a couple of weeks. But I am not anxious to extend a more constrictive amendment if the State Department and the AID program people are willing to vigorously take that position and use that influence, that is the point.

I think we are better off with less constriction than we are with more constriction, because I still follow the idea that a reasonable amount of discretion must be used in these things in taking care of our affairs. But I don't like to see us put upon and then bow and say, "Yes, thank you, Mister, we succumb to your seizure."

INDIAN STEEL MILL

Senator MORSE. Chairman, there is one other matter that is covered in the transcript that my understanding is you are going to make available to the Department of the long discussion we had the other day which was a general roundtable expression of dissatisfaction in regard to some of the administration of aid. While the Secretary is here, I think it has all been washed out anyway, you will remember in that discussion the matter of the Indian steel mill was raised and someone quoted our ambassador over there. Most of us have a very high regard for him, but we were disturbed about the quotation in which he said——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper raised it.

Senator MORSE [continuing]. In which he said, in effect, whether the Congress approved it or not there was enough money in the pipeline for other projects that could be diverted and used to help the Indian Government.

My recollection is you were going to take it up with the Department of State.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been taken up by Senator Hickenlooper and it was brought to the Secretary's attention to check on.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely raised the question of the report. I didn't have any independent knowledge of it. This report was, to the extent there was some documentation of it, Ambassador [Chester] Bowles said there were enough odds and ends that could be diverted if we didn't specifically vote this steel business, they could devote it to it and get the same results anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. It is my understanding it has been withdrawn and our government has no intention of backing the steel mill, is that true?

Mr. BALL. The Indian Government has withdrawn it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, that was the burden of the statement; that in spite of the fact they had withdrawn their request for a specific allocation of a steel mill, there were enough odds and ends on other projects down there that they could be withdrawn from other projects and actually put in a pot and devoted to the steel mill. They could circumvent this withdrawal and still give them the aid.

NO DIVERSION OF FUNDS

Mr. BALL. I am unfamiliar with any such statement, Senator Hickenlooper, but I will see that it is checked into right away. It sounds very unlikely to me that Ambassador Bowles would have made any such statement.

This certainly was not the intention of the Department.

Senator MORSE. That is what I thought. That is why I raised it. We ought to ge it pinned down and not run into it on the floor.

Senator SYMINGTON. Didn't you see the statement he made in the press?

Mr. BALL. I missed it, Senator Symington.

Mr. DUTTON. Secretary Rusk did check into this. It was a garbled report. What he said could be subject to the interpretation that could be put on it, but it was a wire service rewrite of it.

In any event Secretary Rusk talked with Bell. There is to be no diversion, and whatever interpretation that we would direct funds, either for us by incidental means or the Indian Government itself, to purchase equipment or parts for Bokaro will not be done. The Secretary is on top of this.

The CHAIRMAN. It was brought to the Secretary's attention the other day.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We had a newspaper clipping.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the time is running out and the Secretary must get back.

Are there any more specific amendments that we want their advice on before Tuesday?

If there are, just raise them and let them have an opportunity to comment.

The Senator from Missouri?

CANNOT AFFORD CURRENT AID PROGRAM

Senator SYMINGTON. First, my feeling is that just like a family likes to have two cars and two houses and longer vacations and so forth, all of those things are good if you can afford them. I have come to the conclusion reluctantly but sincerely that we cannot afford to continue on the present scale the foreign aid program. I think we have already to some extent been fooling ourselves. Anybody knows that a loan at three quarters of one percent for 40 years with no repayment of principal for ten years is not a loan as the word is understood by the American people.

In addition to that, I do not think that the Government has interpreted the newer weapons systems, primarily the very long-range bomber, the ICBM, and above all the Polaris submarine, in its closing up of based abroad which would save us many billions of dollars of money if we only closed those which to me are clearly unnecessary.

At one point I understood there was testimony that we are keeping the bases open in Spain as much for economic aid as for the military aid. Certainly, if true, that is not the way to give economic aid; it is not the best way.

For these reasons, I don't see how we can continue to promote this program the way we have. I have listened carefully to the many speeches made by the Senator from Oregon primarily because of our balance of payments problem.

We are running out of wealth. We are running out of our gold. Our currency is tied to the gold, and we are doing a lot about in in statements but we don't stop the loss of the gold.

One of the things that I think is particularly unfortunate, especially to a person who comes from a state like my own, is the welching on the debts and the expropriation of property. It is going on all around the world. People are breaking agreements. It almost seems to me sometimes they say, "If you don't give us the money, we will go into communism."

At other times they say, "If you don't give us the money we will go into dictatorship." In other words, "Any policy is the right policy in this country if it gives us more aid."

In any case, those are my observations in a very broad way.

THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT

I have a specific amendment that has nothing to do with the past, but would have something to do with the future, and from the standpoint of the problem. It is very short, Mr. Chairman, and with your permission I would like to read it to the Secretary and ask his comment on it.

On page 8, amendment to S. 1276, immediately after line 17 insert:

Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, with relation to prohibitions against furnishing assistance, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

No assistance shall be provided under this Act after December 31, 1964 to the Government of any less developed country which has failed to enter into an agreement with the President to institute the investment guarantee program under Section 221(b)(1) of this Act, providing protection against the specific risks of inconvert-

ibility under subparagraph (a) or expropriation or confiscation under subparagraph (b) of such section 221(b)(1).

I would ask the Secretary how he feels about this amendment, which to me is simply nailing down the fact that we don't want to have our citizens, taxpayers, invest in these countries and then have their investments taken away from them in the future as it has been in the past.

Mr. BALL. Senator Symington, let me say I am wholly sympathetic with the idea of trying to discourage expropriation. I think it is not only a bad thing as far as the world situation is concerned and in most cases very unfair to American investors, but it is a very bad thing for the country that does it because the consequences are to discourage the inflow of private investment capital, leaving those countries dependent wholly on public capital coming in and what meager capital accumulation they can achieve internally.

So I think that it is a very unwise policy for governments to follow.

With regard to this particular suggestion, again, I have great sympathy with this idea and I would like to have an opportunity to discuss this with my colleagues rather than to give you a direct answer and with the idea we can perhaps discuss it before Tuesday.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right, sir.

May I leave a copy with you?

Mr. BALL. If you would, please, I would appreciate it.

AMENDMENT ON INTEREST RATES

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I say just this, I have no amendment, but Senator Symington mentioned one that I think is going to give us considerable trouble. In fact, I am not so sure but what the committee has already adopted an amendment, and that is on that interest rate.

Was an amendment adopted?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, adopted and reconsidered.

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe it is still open. I believe that is going to be one of the most troublesome things for us to handle. The House adopted two percent, did it not?

Mr. MOSCOSO. Pardon?

Senator SPARKMAN. The House in their bill.

Mr. MOSCOSO. Two percent.

Senator SPARKMAN. From the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. Any grace period?

Mr. MOSCOSO. No I don't recall that it did.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to comment on that, Mr. Secretary?

BURDEN ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Mr. BALL. We are very much concerned about the problem of the burden on the balance of payments of the less developed countries. I myself made a speech to the Bank and Fund meeting a week or so ago in which I indicated that in our judgment this was one, was going to be one of the very big troublesome problems in the future, so to the extent that this can be placated, I think it is important to do so.

We considered one possibility of following a three-quarters of one percent rate and then scaled up as the country's ability to earn more exchange in the world markets was a better course to follow.

I naven't had an opportunity to discuss this with Mr. Bell at any length. I don't know exactly what his views are on it.

We would prefer to have seen the law leave us the flexibility to go down to three-quarters of one percent, with the expectation that as countries made progress at this, higher rate and shorter term loans would be made use of.

But this is something that I, again, would like to consult my colleagues on.

Mr. Moscoso. In the case of Latin America, Mr. Chairman, the debt servicing requirements have gone up from 7½ percent of export earnings to 14 percent in the last 5 years.

OBLIGATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA

Mr. Ball. May I say, excuse me, that Mr. George Woods, who is the president of the International Bank, said something in his speech the other day which I think was the most dismaying and startling statement that I have heard in a long time. For the whole of Latin America—he didn't say Latin America, he said a region of the world, but he didn't want to disclose this—one-half of the external obligations, which are both public and private, I think, one-half of the external obligations of the Latin American countries would be due within the next 5 years.

This presents us with a——

Senator Symington. It is a little bit of another matter, though.

BRAVE NEW WORLD LOANS

In other words, what worries me about this, the American people began to clearly disapprove of grants. Therefore, all of a sudden, brave new world loans, and we start given things which in effect are not loans at all.

All we hear in this country—we have some poor people over here, and we have a thing which helps them a lot called the REA. The growing feeling against the two percent REA loan because it is below the cost of money to the Government has gotten to the point where some of the agricultural Senators think it may affect the whole program. What worries me is the way we use these words in this program. If two percent is unfair for a farmer in America, then how can you say that two percent is too high for a poor farmer in another country and, of course, you can argue we have a standard of living that is higher.

It just seems to me the program itself is unrealistic, and I agree with Senator Sparkman that it is going to be a very serious matter to handle. On the other hand, it is a very serious matter to persuade the American people that we haven't gone far enough in the aid program.

Senator Aiken. If you don't get interest enough to cover the cost of servicing a loan, why do we call it a loan, if we have to put more money into it every year?

Senator Symington. That is my feeling, you can't service a loan at three-quarters of one percent.

As Fowler Hamilton said, which is one of the most significant statements about this entire program, when you went from grants to loans you immediately required many times more people and you automatically made the AID program by far the largest bank in the free world. That being true, at three-quarters of one percent, what you did was tremendously increase the cost of the program.

In my opinion, it would be far better to have it and give a grant than to make a loan at three-quarters of one percent, because when you give them the money and say, "Here it is, goodbye," you don't have these expenses.

When you lend it to them at three-quarters of one percent, just as the Senator from Vermont pointed out, you are going to have expenses that far exceed the three-quarters and therefore, in effect, you are adding to the cost of the program. There is, in my opinion, some subterfuge with respect to the use of the word.

[illegible] AND LONG-TERM LOANS

Senator AIKEN. The President of the International Bank is making on toward $100 million a year, on toward $100 million in reserve.

Why aren't they in position to convert these short-term loans to long-term better than we are?

Mr. BELL. There is some consideration which the bank has given to the possibility of applying at least a substantial part of its reserves to the IDA. IDA does make loans on 40-year, three-quarters of one percent basis itself. This is a possibility.

Senator AIKEN. Even IDA has not shown any losses so far.

Mr. BELL. That is true.

Senator AIKEN. And apparently hasn't done anything else to help it.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else.

Do you have anything else you would like to offer to the committee by way of advice?

Mr. BELL. I don't think so.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't want to say anything about the overall amounts that you hope the committee will provide us this?

[illegible] WE HAVE TO QUIT

Mr. BELL. I am sure that this is a speech which Secretary Rusk would have made had he been able to come this morning, because it is a matter on which we feel very strongly. We are in a position where, I think, the progress is being made. In many ways one could say that the world situation is one on which we could be more optimistic than we have been for some time, but the problems which we face are still enormous. As my colleague, the Secretary, very often says, this is no time to quit.

Now, our aid program is a matter which constitutes some burden. It is not, in our opinion and I think the opinion of many Americans, a major burden in relation to other things that they have to bear. In our judgment, what it buys in terms of security and the possibility of a greater progress toward a more stable world situation commends it as the best, almost the best possible use that we could make of part of our resources.

So, we feel very strongly that the dimensions of the program are not too high, even in the terms in which it was originally recommeded. We have done substantial paring when it was put up to the Congress at that time, and we would certainly hope that this committee will vote the program out in substantially the terms in which it was recommended to the President.

The CHAIRMAN. They have already taken action—and I am sure it will not be increased—which is substantially below what the President recommended, as you really know. In view of the House action, I just wondered, I don't know—there are not many members here—whether you can include them or not, but we are in for very stormy weather I am afraid.

Senator MORSE. Could I say this to the Secretary?

The CHAIRMAN. That is why we have him here. I hope you will unburden yourself.

COMMENDATION OF THE WHEAT SALE

Senator MORSE. I want to say although he will not convince me on foreign and, I want to commend him for the position the administration has taken on the wheat sale. I will go in there doing everything I can to meet the criticisms here and in the country on the wheat sale.

I think it is a very, very significant step forward, and I am strongly for it. I am glad you did it, and I want to commend you for the part you played, as well as the Secretary.

Mr. BALL. We are grateful for your support, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That doesn't reconcile you any more to the foreign aid bill.

Senator MORSE. I never bargain.

The CHAIRMAN. It isn't bargaining, but doesn't this ease the pain a bit on this?

Senator MORSE. I think it makes foreign aid less necessary. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. That is a non sequitur if I ever heard one. Our aid doesn't run to Russia.

Senator MORSE. It is a very logical argument, as I shall prove in due course.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I thank you very much. I am very hopeful that by Tuesday we can get down to business.

If in the meantime any other of these troublesome problems warrant your comment, I welcome them to have them available on Tuesday. I will do the best I can to push it along. I am very hopeful we will get it out next Tuesday.

Mr. BALL. We will talk to Senator Church and Senator Morse and Senator Symington.

The CHAIRMAN. It will ease the pain a bit if there is something you can take and something you can live with; it will help us.

The committee is adjourned.

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee recessed subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:30 a.m. in executive session in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1276), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, and Hickenlooper.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1276), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 1 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Humphrey, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1276), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:35 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Long, Lausche, Church, Hickenlooper, and Williams.

The committee continued and completed its markup of the bill (S. 1276), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

The bill was ordered reported favorably, as amended, on a voice vote.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:40 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CANADIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 4 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Aiken (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Morse and Symington.

The subcommittee chairman said the meeting had been called to get information on labor disputes on the Great Lakes, and the availability of shipping to Canada and the United States, the registry of certain American shipping, and on wheat sales of Canada to the Soviet Union.

Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, together with Delmar Carlson, of the Department of State, with others briefed the subcommittee on the foregoing problem and items.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee then adjourned at 4:50 p.m.]

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SITUATION IN VIETNAM

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In October 1963, the Kennedy administration suspended some non-military aid to Saigon as a means both of pressuring Ngo Dinh Diem to reform and of alerting his opposition to American dissatisfaction. Although CIA Director John McCone warned that he could see no alternative to Diem, the President instructed Ambassador Lodge to undertake efforts to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leaders.

[On November 1, Vietnamese generals staged a revolt and attacked the presidential palace. Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, escaped through a tunnel, but they were later captured in a Catholic Church where they had sought refuge. While being transported in an armored personnel carrier, Diem and Nhu were murdered, apparently by junior-ranking officers who acted independently. Col. Le Quang Tung, commander of the Vietnamese Special Forces, was also executed during the coup.

[The United States quickly recognized the new military regime, but it failed to stabilize South Vietnam. In January, 1964, it too was toppled. Not until June, 1965, did a relatively stable government emerge.]

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. St. Claire, and Mr. Henderson, of the committee staff.

[Douglas Henderson, nominated to be Ambassador to Bolivia, appeared on his own behalf.]

[Following his appearance, Senator Morse moved that his nomination be reported favorably to the Senate. The motion carried without objection.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we know you are under some strain with the development of the Autobahn situation which developed subsequent to our invitation for you to come, but we are very pleased you could come. I hope you can stay awhile with us this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ROGER HILSMAN, JR., DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, STATE DEPARTMENT

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I am glad to have a chance to be here. I ought to be going back without too much delay, because of the Autobahn situation.

I might just say briefly that the issue there is an attempt by the Soviet Union unilaterally to change the procedures that are normally used on the Autobahn. When we get into these procedures,

they tend to sound like a minuet or an elaborate dance. The details appear at first glance not to be very important, but what is important is that if the Soviets start unilaterally trying to change these in details, then they establish an attitude or a right with respect to the Autobahn which could be used cumulatively to nibble away at our position in Berlin and undermine the position there.

The present convoy is one of 12 vehicles, 20 passengers in the backs of the vehicles. Now, under our standing procedures, we do not dismount convoys that have less than 31 passengers in them.

Quite some years ago, 5 or 6 years ago, an American convoy commander on his own initiative on the spot on the Autobahn, commanding a fairly substantial convoy, asked his men to dismount in order to facilitate counting and expedite the procedures through the checkpoint. Since that time, the larger convoys have dismounted, and the Soviets, I suppose, now look upon that as an established procedure which cannot be changed.

RIGHT OF UNLIMITED ACCESS TO BERLIN

Our view has been that these procedures are not to be matters of agreement or decision by—but that we have a right to do what we feel necessary to do in our unlimited access to Berlin. Nevertheless, for convenience, certain procedures have become established.

In this instance, the Soviet commander asked our convoy to dismount its passengers. Our commander there properly refused under agreed tripartite arrangements. The Soviet then asked that tailgates be lowered.

Now, the tailgates problem sound rather small, but theoretically it is pretty important. We do not accept inspection of our vehicles. And we take the view that our tailgates are of sufficient height so they have no relevance to the counting of passengers on board, troops in the backs of the trucks.

The British tailgates are much higher, and the British have lowered their tailgates. But the procedure is that if a tailgate is not higher than 6 feet, tailgates will not be lowered. If they are over 6 feet, they will be lowered.

This came up at the time when there was a suspicion that refugees might be in the process of being brought out of Berlin, like on the floor of trucks.

The Soviets—this almost sounds ridiculous, if it were not really serious—the Soviets, I think, don't like to have their men at the checkpoints having to stand on tiptoe looking over tailgates. They think this is somewhat undignified. And they won't get a little platform there so they can look in anyhow.

But, anyhow, at the moment, the convoy is still standing there with Soviet armored personnel carriers in front of it. They had some armored personnel carriers behind our convoy as well—for what reason, I don't know. Those have been removed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Were those on West German territory?

Secretary RUSK. Those at the checkpoint. I am not certain of that, Senator. But those have been removed.

BRITISH AND FRENCH NONDISMOUNTABLE CONVOYS

Now, very, very much off the record in terms of not saying anything about it until it happens, today the British and the French will be moving nondismountable convoys.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That has already been announced over the radio. I heard it this morning.

Secretary RUSK. I had not seen it. They only got the London authority a half an hour ago.

Senator LAUSCHE. It was on the Today program.

Secretary RUSK. That British and French convoys would be moving? Well, then, I will leave you to the press reports rather than what I have just said. We didn't want that to be announced until it has been confirmed by the governments that they were moving.

In the last incident involving the U.S. convoy, our troops bivouacked, and the Soviets later then, perhaps without, so far as we could tell—without direct reference to the bivouac, passed the convoy through. Whether they told themselves that was a dismounting or something, I don't know.

We also don't dismount in the rain. It has begun to rain. Whether the Soviets will decide that this is an inclement weather situation that does not require dismounting, we don't know.

SOVIET MOTIVES UNCLEAR

But what is this all about?

This is the big question for us. And I would say to the committee we have seen no indicators anywhere, in any part of the world, troop movements, alerts, communications, or anything of that sort, to indicate that the Soviets are preparing for major crisis in this situation.

On the other hand, I think we have to discount completely any notion this is not something from a governmental level on the Soviet side. There can be no possibility under the circumstances that this is just local action by local military authorities.

Now, whether they are trying to test to see whether the three allies are concerted on these matters, whether they are trying to force some kind of a new kind of discussion of the Berlin problem, whether there is some difference within the Kremlin on how to deal with this particular situation—quite frankly we cannot really find a good therory to explain this action, other than one, an attempt to force some kind of talk, which is a bad way to open a discussion; or, secondly, to establish serious prestige challenge that would have to be accompanied by moves which we do not see the Soviets making.

We haven't got a good theory of it, because it doesn't appear to us to be logical in the situation, unless they were wanting to move towards a major crisis, for them to do it this way.

The last two incidents were resolved by their accepting existing procedures. If this one is not resolved by accepting existing procedures, as it must be, we cannot quite see from the Soviet side why they would do this, because it doesn't seem to make any sense in relation to a good many other things that they are involved with.

TENSIONS IN THE KREMLIN

There is some possibility that there is—and I say this with greatest caution, because it is always reckless to try to peer into the walls of Kremlin—there is some possibility there is some tension between the military on the one side and Mr. Khrushchev on the other, over budgetary matters and allocation of resources. We have has other glimpses of this possibility. And it may be that this comes out of some contest of that sort.

Senator AIKEN. Whose budgetary matters—theirs or ours?

Secretary RUSK. Theirs primarly. Mr. Khrushchev has been pressing very hard for an agreement to limit military budget, to make percentage reductions in military budgets, and he hinted to me in Moscow that he is having some trouble with his military on budgetary matters.

But we are still puzzled. I would not want to try to offer the committee an explanation, because we don't really have a good one at this moment.

We, however, do not at the moment see this building to a major crisis. We don't see movements of troops in East Germany; we don't see redispositions of shipping; we don't see alerts of forces—things of that sort.

Meanwhile, the tripartite solidarity is complete, and the contingency moves have been underway with expedition. The three governments are in close touch with each other, and with complete unanimity. So we think think the chances are that it will be resolved.

But then we will have to find out what it means and how the Soviets begin to pay for a repetition of these incidents in terms of other matters.

Now, we can have questions on that, or comments, Mr. Chairman.

GROWING PARALYSIS IN SAIGON

But let me just make a few comments on the present Vietnamese situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that was the main thing.

Secretary RUSK. In order to start out briefly, let me just say that I think we need to start with a growing paralysis in Saigon. Today I am going to be talking mostly about Saigon, because there are shadings of differences between the situation in Saigon and the rest of the country.

In the last several weeks there has been a growing paralysis of fear and suspicion and apathy in the city. The ministries, teh bureaucracy, tended to be grinding to a halt in their operations; ministers were not at their posts, or didn't know what to do when they were. The military and the police were looking at each other over their shoulders, in fear and suspicion. The contacts between Americans and Vietnamese were brought under almost complete monitoring, so that Vietnamese no longer kept in contact with their American colleagues. There were cases of arrests on the part of Vietnamese who were in normal contracts with Americans during that period.

There grew up more and more a feeling on the part of many observers and officials that we and the Vietnamese were on a slippery slope, and there could not be a successful outcome of the general effort there on the present track. And that varied all the way from those who were entirely loyal to President Diem personally, but who felt substantial changes in policy and personnel were required, all the way over to those who felt that a change in government, especially Brother Nhu, but some included President Diem, was necessary if the war against the Viet Cong were to be won.

These concerns were expressed by the foreign diplomatic corps, foreign ambassadors, who discussed it with us from time to time.

Again, I say both by loyal and by those who turned out to be disloyal officials, both military and civilian in the government.

RUMORS PRECEDING THE COUP

In the week preceding the week preceding the coup, there were three predominant rumors. These three were related to each other, no one of which were we able to check out and to authenticate or confirm with any degree of complete assurance.

The one was that the generals had informed President Diem that it would be necessary for him to reconstitute the government, put two or three of them in key posts, and rebuild the government to get on with the general effort, a move which would very efectively have reduced the role of this brother Nhu.

A second rumor was that there would be a major change in military leadership. I think the date that was used on that was November 1. The rumor was pointed toward an attempt by President Diem and his brother to remove and replace the then existing military leadrship of the country.

The third rumor, which came to us from an officer who provide to have been connected with the group, was that the generals themselves were considering a takeover of the government. We inquired of him as to who was involved, what troops were involved, what their purposes were, what their attitude was towards President Diem, and what their plans were in terms of movement, because we had great concern about the possibility of a prolonged civil war. We were also concerned about an attempt that would simply decapitate the government without putting anything effective in its place. And we know that we would be accused of being involved;

We didn't know what it was that we were going to be involved with.

This man claimed that he did not know who was involved in the coup. We had one or two names, including the General, Big Minh, who was in fact the head of the movement. He claimed not to have any information about their actual operating plans. I think he probably was correctly reporting that, because it seems to us in retrospect that this whole effort was done in compartments, so that very few, perhaps Big Minh himself and one or two others, knew what the different aspects of the different compartments were.

We were concerned about this, because, as we made a judgment on the basis of past experience and probable attitudes of various groups in the country and military leaders, it seemed to us that the

chances were very high that there would simply be a prolonged civil war, and that no one would gain from this but the Viet Cong.

NO ADVANCE NOTICE OF COUP

But when the events actually started—we got a telephone call at the moment that the coup started—this idea that we might have substantially advance notice disappeared into thin air. We were notified at the time the coup actually started, whch was the middle of the night Thursday, Washington time, about mid-day out there on November 1, Friday.

It turned out the generals, the military leadership, with a high degree of unanimity, were moving together on this. All of the field commanders from the northern border right on down to the delta joined in with the effort—the marines, the air force. The navy commander apparently had not, and even before the coup started he apparently was killed by some of his own men.

But the unanimity of the leadership in moving in on this was, I say, something that we had not fully anticipated or did not fully know about.

The role of Vice President [Nguyen Ngoc] Tho is of some importance here. We do not know of any involvement which he had with the coup prior to the coup itself. We had known that he had been discouraged by his attempts to mediate the Buddhist matter and to impose some moderation on the government.

As soon as the coup was well underway, however, he went to the generals' headquarters and made his services available. They were glad to have him because of the general respect in which he is held in the country.

FATE OF DIEM AND NHU

I do not, myself, believe, and I would have to say to the committee it is very hard to get hard and exact information on this kind of point—I do not myself believe that it was the intention of the generals to kill President Diem and his brother. There had been a broadcast shortly after the coup started indicating that the generals were offering President Diem a chance to resign and safe conduct.

Our ambassador telephoned the President, who was then available through telephone, through the palace, saying that he was concerned about this personal safety, he had noted this broadcast, that the ambassador was available to the president for anything that the president wanted him to do in the situation. The president indicated that his problem was to restore order, and he wasn't interested in the broadcast.

Then, shortly thereafter, the generals themselves got President Diem on the phone, and apparently each one of the generals, perhaps as many as a dozen of them, came to the phone to offer and to guarantee President Diem safe conduct if he would surrender.

I do not think we know exactly what President Diem said at that point. It seemed to be the expectation of the generals that he would surrender in exchange for safe conduct.

When the white flag went up over the palace, they arranged for a presidential escort, armored vehicles, to go there to escort the president to safekeeping, but he wasn't there.

Apparently before that, President Diem had left the palace through some sort of secret exit and had gone to the adjourning village of Cholon, where he had a house that had telephonic communication that ran through the palace, so anyone calling the palace would have the impression, perhaps, that he was available at the palace.

He went to Cholon with his brother and there they were seized. They were seized, apparently, in a church. They were taken to an armored car and either going to the armored car or after they reached the armored car they apparently were shot by the people who had them in control.

TRIGGER-HAPPY EXECUTION

Now, the question—was that assassination ordered? I am inclined to think not, because the generals themselves seem obviously upset about this. Indeed, there is some reason to think some of the generals participated in the coup only with the understanding that President Diem and his brother would be given safe conduct and would not be harmed in this exercise.

I, myself, believe that this was not a suicide, that it was an execution. I am inclined to think, also, that this was done by trigger-happy people down the line, and against the background of a failure of President Diem to accept safe conduct, and his escape under conditions that made it look as though he was still trying to organize a countercoup of some sort.

I think this is one of those most unfortunate aspects of it, which I must say I personally deplore, because President Diem, whatever his difficulties have been in recent months, had served his country well over a period of many years.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I ask this, what was this place they went to?

Secretary RUSK. C-h-o-l-o-n. It is a suburb——

Mr. HILSMAN. It is much like the Twin Cities, in Minneapolis, sir. Cholon is basically a Chinese city, but it is side by side with Saigon.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Hilsman just tells me there was a broadcast this morning saying the two escorting officers shot the two after Diem and Nhu had taunted them, on their own authority. I don't know. That is just another report. We just have not yet—we don't have hard and firm information.

MADAME NHU AND FAMILY

As far as Madame Nhu's children are concerned, they are in Rome. She had requested us about 2 days ago——

The CHAIRMAN. Already in Rome?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. She had requested us 2 days ago through a friend, actually through a newspaper reporter, Miss Marguerite Higgins, to get them to Rome as soon as possible.

Then when she sent us a cable yesterday, asking to bring them through to Los Angeles, we tried to get ahold of the people on the

spot, and found on the basis of her earlier request they had already departed, and gone to Bangkok, and from there, apparently on to Rome. Her earlier request had been performed before there was any change to discuss a revision in the light of her latest request.

I gather she, herself, is now going to Rome. The children have been turned over to the custody of the brother, the Archbishop, who is not in Rome with the ecumenical meeting.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT

As far as the new government is concerned, what we are likely to see for the months immediately ahead is a situation somewhat like the situation in Turkey, where there is a military committee in the background exercising final authority but the actual operations of government for the most part are turned over to an ordinary cabinet with a prime minister.

Former Vice President Tho will be prime minister. There are three generals, I think, in the cabinet. The rest of them seem to be civilians. Many of them are the number 2 men in the ministries under President Diem. So there will be a good many familiar faces in the new government.

The present intention is to move further toward turning over to civilian government as soon as they can work it out.

Of course, the big question now is whether this new government can rally the people to get on with the big tasks in front of them. We think there is some possibility that they can succeed in this. They have taken steps to moderate some of the attitudes that have caused so many problems in the last several months, since May, particularly. Whether they can organize the national effort that is necessary is, or course, the big question. We think there is a good chance they can do it, but there are still a good many problems in front of them.

IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA

There may be some possibility of improving relations between Vietnam and certain of its neighbors, particularly Cambodia. If that could occur, following the personal and bitter rivalries and bitter feelings of President Diem and Prince Sihanouk, the responsibility of which is a horse race as far as I am concerned, it might be possible to organize the defenses against infiltration from Cambodia in a more effective way and move in on that situation better.

But the sitaution still is somewhat unclear. They have announced their government. We would suppose we would recognize them shortly and try to get on with the job.

This is an outline.

ABORTIVE COUPS IN THE PAST

I would also say in conclusion that this matter of rumors of coup is something that has been endemic in that situation for a very long time, certainly since the 1960 abortive coup.

In 1961 there was an air force attack on the palace. There have been six or eight different groups rumored to be plotting coups at different times.

In August there was a serious indication of a military coup planning. Our people had been in touch with that, in the sense of trying to get information about it and see what their plans were. It proved to have no substance in it.

I must say that I, myself, had considerable skepticism about the latest report the week before the present coup, based on the information provided by one of the military officers. I had considerable skepticism about whether there was a real affair or simply another rumor.

But it turned out to be real and much more unanimous and concerted than I must say we thought at the time.

That is, in essence, Mr. Chairman, the report on the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you stay for a few questions?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?

U.S. RECOGNITION OF NEW GOVERNMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. Did I understand you correctly to say that it was probable that we would recognize the new government very shortly?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I would think so.

Senator SPARKMAN. When? How shortly?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe that we have given instructions in particular, but presumably the next 2 or 3 days is what we had in mind.

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. Have military activities continued under General Harkins, or has this brought that to a standstill?

Secretary RUSK. There has been some reduction in military activity in the last week. Some of the troops were moved into Saigon by their commanders. The military leaders themselves have been wholly preoccupied with the coup.

On the other hand, the Viet Cong have not seemed to move unusually in any military sense during this situation. We may get two different kinds of reactions out of the Viet Cong. We are not sure yet.

They may simply step up their military activity and try to go for maximum effort during the period of some uncertainty, or they may play a line that was reflected in the morning press, that they might be moving towards some sort of a neutralist, unified Vietnam, might try a political venture at this time. We just don't know which one they themselves would take on.

Our indications are—from the generals, the leadership of the coup—that the forces that were brought into Saigon will be returned to their posts straightaway, that they will get on with it. The general have tried to tell the troops, including those that were loyal to President Diem, that there is not going to be any general purge, that they are prepared to go right on and give them their chance to work for the country. This is also true of the civil servants, the bureaucracy.

We, of course, have much hope that they will turn their hands to the main problem as quickly as possible.

EXECUTION OF COLONEL TUNG

Senator SPARKMAN. Was the report that the leader of the loyalist forces was executed——

Secretary RUSK. Colonel Tung, the leader of the secret police and the presidential guard group, apparently was executed. We don't yet have a complete report on casualties. Our military estimated that the casualties in the vicinity of the palace, where most of the fighting occurred, might run to something like a hundred. That may be increased in later estimates that I have not seen yet. There may be a half dozen leaders killed.

As far as the coup forces are concerned, the estimate is that there were 5 killed in action and 30 wounded in action, and perhaps more than that on the loyalist side, during the palace fighting. Perhaps half a dozen leaders—the commander of the navy was apparently killed by his own men prior to the actual opening of the coup, some premature action by somebody.

Senator SPARKMAN. He was slow about moving in, was he?

Secretary RUSK. The navy was not, apparently, as much a part of this as the other forces.

Colonel Tung was killed. I think his deputy was killed of course, President Diem and brother Nhu.

But there has not been a wholesale purge stimulated by the generals. I think the generals, under the pressure and leadership of former Vice President Tho, will do their best to pacify and unify the country without these types of actions that deeply split one group from another. We are at least hopeful of that, and are using our influence in that direction.

POSSIBILITY OF A NEUTRALIST GOVERNMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. I am disturbed by the reports that there might be some kind of a neutralist set-up there. We couldn't live with that very well, could we?

Secretary RUSK. Not on any basis that we have heard about thus far. We are not looking for an ally in Vietnam or a base in Vietnam. If South Vietnam could be independently free, then presumably that is the object of the exercise.

We would be glad to bring out the forces that we have put in there the last few years to try to get that job done. But the idea that Ho Chi Minh in the north could somehow lead a neutralist Vietnam just seems to be utterly absurd and ridiculous.

There was some indication and I don't want to emphasize this, because we don't really have information—there was some indication that there had been some palavering back and forth between North and South Vietnam, perhaps stimulated from the north, but no real indication that anyone in the south really took it seriously or was moving in that direction.

One of the charges made against President Diem was that some of his people, or his brother or someone, had been in some contact with the north. There was some indication there had been some discussions with some of the Viet Cong leaders. But the impression was that this was not at all in terms of turning South Vietnam over to the Communists or anything of that sort.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What part do you foresee at the moment for the Vietnamese Ambassador who resigned here, the father of Madame Nhu?

Secretary RUSK. To make a personal prediction at this point, I would think he would not go back to Saigon to become a minister in the government. I think the fact that his wife is a member of the family would, in any event, probably rule that out. I suspect he would be an ambassador abroad, perhaps in Washington again, when the new government gets shaken down.

POTENTIAL MINISTERS

One of the men we were rather interested in is the former foreign minister, who had been foreign minister for about 8 years. They did try to get him into the government. He said he, after having spent 8 or 9 years at it, would much prefer to be advisor to Prime Minister Tho rather than take a ministerial post. He is a pretty substantial and solid fellow, and can add some strength to that regime.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What about this fellow who was the budget director of Vietnam, and who resigned in a huff about a year or so ago, and let loose a blast on Diem?

Mr. HILSMAN. He is not in the initial line-up, but he may well end up in some post.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He appeared to have a considerable amount of capability and perception.

Secretary RUSK. There are some good men who were in the earlier government that we hope can be retrieved.

For example, the man who was in charge of President Diem's own office, Mr. Twan, you perhaps met him—a pretty capable fellow. Unless his relations with the new leadership have been too seriously compromised by his earlier position——

The CHAIRMAN. Did he go to Paris?

Secretary RUSK. At what time?

He has been in Saigon lately.

The CHAIRMAN. This was about 2 weeks ago. They said he was coming here the 25th of this month.

APPOINTMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL DINH

Secretary RUSK. I do want to say to the committee there was one appointment here that we are not too enthusiastic about, and it could be a source of some trouble later. I would urge that we not discuss it prematurely in public. Maj. Gen. Ton That Dinh is in the government as minister of public security.

Now, he is a highly emotional, unreliable kind of person. I think his own colleagues don't trust him too much, and he could be a source of some trouble in the future. But he has had forces under his command in the Saigon area, and it was felt that they had to give him a chance in this particular post.

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Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is my impression that there are a number of quite capable people in South Vietnam, depending on their political complexion and what their attitudes are and so on. I am just wondering how they might be welcomed into this new set-up there or how they might be used. Of course, their idea and philosophies might be antagonistic—I don't know.

I just have a note here that it is suggested that this former budget director is at Howard University.

Is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. I don't identify him at the moment.

Mr. HILSMAN. He has been teaching at a university in the United States, sir. I didn't think it was Howard; I thought it was Cornell.

ARREST AND RELEASE OF TRAN QUO BO

Secretary RUSK. The committee might be interested to know that in the confusion and excitement of the coup, someone arrested Tran Quo Bo, who is a highly respected labor leader in the labor unions there, one of the few strong non-governmental organizations in the country. He has now been released by the military committee. That is, I think, a very good step. Our embassy has worked on that pretty hard. And also Mr. Pepp—some of you might have met him in the parliamentary unions. He, again, was arrested in the excitement of the moment and has been released.

We think both those steps are constructive.

DIEM'S BROTHER IN HUE

Now, there is likely to be a problem with the younger brother of President Diem, who is up in the Hue area. There was a high degree of indignation and threatened mob action in Hue, based upon the rumors that they had discovered mass graves on his estates and have opened up dungeons where he had kept people in prison in his own state there, in the Hue area.

He was a man that our own people over the years have not thought well of, but he came to our consulate to ask to be given protection. The general in command of the forces there told us that he would try to protect the consulate if we elected to receive him there, but that he could not guarantee that he would be able to do so, because there was a tremendous upsurge of popular psychology in the Hue area when these rumors began to go around. He was moved to Saigon. The generals gave complete guarantees that he would be handled legally and juridically.

Under our standard rules on such matters, where there was not the threat of mob action and where legal process was insured, we did not make an effort at the airport to get him to the embassy, but turned him over—but let him be seized or arrested by the present authorities.

If these rumors in Hue turn out to be correct—and we don't know that they are—I would think that his future is not very promising. But if they are not correct, I think it is possible he might be given some lesser form of punishment.[1]

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[1] On authorization from Ambassador Lodge, Ngo Dinh Can was turned over to the Vietnamese military. In 1964 he was executed.

But we have that kind of problem on our hands, which, again, is not very agreeable.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey?

MIXED UP WITH A BUNCH OF BANDITS

Senator HUMPHREY. I am really not very well informed about this area, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I don't know more about it, because it is such a confusing area—it would seem to be very interesting if I knew something about it.

I would just say, Mr. Secretary, as this thing unfolds, from what I read in the paper, we sure are mixed up with a bunch of bandits. That is my general reaction. I don't know whether anybody else around there is of higher quality.

Secretary RUSK. Could I make a comment on that—well, I don't mind it being on the record.

I feel that the real problem here came to be Brother Nhu, that it was not President Diem. President Diem got into a position where he felt himself utterly dependent upon his brother, and it was impossible for him to separate himself from his brother.

Now, we have reason to think that his brother was the one who persuaded President Diem not to accept safe conduct out of the country, but to go ahead and make a fight for it to the very end. But his brother got to be the man who struck terror into everybody in Saigon, who managed the secret police.

I have really very deep regret about President Diem, because I think that he was for many years and could still have been a different kind of man. But this inseparability of the two and the growing distortion of Brother Nhu's own thinking about the use of power caused the downfall.

DIEM FACED A TOUGH SITUATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have met and visited with Diem twice. There are many things that Diem did that we would not do the same way, but I think if you look back at the history of that terrible cesspool which is the south end of that country there, when Diem went in, he did some really remarkable and courageous things for establishing law and order. In his own way, I became convinced he was trying to do a great deal for the country within the limitations of their ability to absorb it and get it done.

I have been up north, in the resettlement areas, and various other things.

Now, we can't approve of everything he did—I don't mean to say that. But he had a tough situation there, awfully tough. He cleaned out the bandity, he cleaned out the organized graft, he cleaned out the organized prostitution, he cleaned out what amounted to a moral cesspool there, at least in the southern part of that country. And, in doing so, he had to do some rather precipitous things.

I don't know 1-2-3 about it, compared to the Secretary, but I would tend to agree that his brother was really the Machiavellian influence there. It went from bad to worse, as far as his hold of the secret police. And then he got ahold of Diem.

OPPOSITION TO DIEM

The CHAIRMAN. McNamara and Taylor reported to us hardly any opposition to Diem, outside of Saigon.

Secretary RUSK. At the time they were out there the situation seemed to us to be that the troubles in Saigon had not yet moved into the countryside, but that they threatened to rapidly unless the situation in Saigon could be improved. This is why Ambassador Lodge pressed President Diem so hard to take some moves, almost any kind of move to begin to restore the sense of contact between the population and the president.

This effort, unfortunately, failed. There was practically a public boycott of their national day ceremonies on the 20th of this past month. The people just stayed away because of the apathy and the distrust of the government.

We had a report about a week before the coup from a corps commander—there are four corps spread across the country from north to south. One of the corps commanders—he was nearest the Saigon area—said he was very much concerned about the prospect of defection of large numbers of his troops. He said he would not be surprised if 80 percent of them wouldn't defect. There were increasing reports of students leaving the countryside and going out into Cambodia, with the strong indication they would hook up with the Viet Cong.

Senator LAUSCHE. When did that develop?

Secretary RUSK. This kind—well, actually, we got—almost as soon as Secretary McNamara and General Taylor got back, this type of report built up rapidly.

The infection seemed to spread very fast in the 3 or 4 weeks before the coup.

POOR POLITICAL REPORTS

Senator HUMPHREY. I said to Senator Sparkman awhile ago— I have never been there or met these people. I have been so confused in the reports that you read. I have been hearing from some people that were Vietnamese that were exiled, so to speak, and I thought they were sort of nuts and crackpots. The trouble is they turned out to be right.

I was looking over a file of that material last night and found out all the things they were saying is just what has happened. We had the belief here that this President Diem had such a fine record for a long time, that he had control of the country, and that he had popular support.

Our political reporting—that is what bothers me. What I really feel is wrong here is in country after country we fail to seem to understand what is happening with the people. We sort of feel that if the military come back and report to us that things are in fairly good shape, or we are getting along with the generals, somehow or another everything is okey-dokey. We just don't get good political reports. This surprises me, because we are supposed to know something about this. We never were known as the greatest warriors, but we are supposed to know something about political observations.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, our political reporting from the countryside confirmed the general impression we had from the military reporting, both in Saigon and from the countryside, that these problems in Saigon had not spread to the countryside as late as the time of Mr. McNamara's visit out there, in any significant way.

But Saigon itself became a real sankepit.

DIEM'S IMPOSSIBLE TASK

Mr. Chairman, in relation to Senator Hickenlooper's remarks, I would like to call attention to a paragraph which is in a memorandum that we furnished in answer to a question from Senator Morse about the job that Diem faced when he took office there. I think we might want to hear part of that.

He was faced with a host of seemingly insoluable problems: housing, feeding, clothing, and rendering self-sustaining some 860,000 refugees from the Communist areas in the north; governing with a bureaucracy which had been virtually paralyzed by the confusion of eight years of civil war; coping with the problems of economic dislocation resulting from the wartime flight from the southern countryside to the cities of more than a million peasant families; reorganizing the national army; finding funds when the national income had nearly disappeared. In short, Ngo Dinh Diem appeared to have an impossible task, and there was little expectation from Vietnamese or foreigners that he could surmount the obstacles before him.

In other words, that is what he started from, and that is why this end is tragic in so many different ways.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In addition, I think we could add there probably—at least my impression—and utter moral apathy in that area. I don't mean physical morals, but I mean the whole moral posture was nil.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

COMPARISON OF VIETNAM AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I am not exactly bursting with pride this morning over our operations in South Vietnam, and I don't believe that the picture on the front of the Post intimating that the lid has been taken off in Saigon is likely to evoke many cheers from the public.

But here is one thing that I would like to know: President Diem and his government were considered strongly anti-Communist, pro-U.S. They were overthrown by a military coup.

In the Dominican Republic, there was a president, not a strong president as far as I could judge, who nevertheless was reasonably friendly to the United States, perhaps rather tolerant, more tolerant of Communists than Diem was. He was overthrown by a military coup, too.

Why is it considered more justifiable to immediately recognize the South Vietnam Government than it is the Dominican Government—except that President Diem and his brother were killed? President Bosch was let live.

If we are to frown on military governments, governments that result from military coups, why is one more justifiable than the other?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this is something that is hard to deal with on the basis of a completely generalized proposition. It is not always true that whether one wears the uniform or civilian suit makes that kind of difference in terms of basic constitutional processes and the relation between the government and its people.

After all, Stalin was basically a civilian and President Eisenhower was a soldier. There are enormous differences here that cut across these lines of uniform and civilian.

OBJECTIVE IS THE SAME

I think one would have to say in candor that you had in Saigon prior to the coup what amounted to a very tight, small, military dictatorship, run by Brothers Nhu and Colonel Tung, the special forces and the secret police, and that this move itself is a move towards a broader based government, with a higher respected man, Vice President Tho, as the head of it, with commitments to restore normal civil liberties and move promptly towards an even higher degree of civilian control.

Now, there is another difference, and that is we have, I think, a different kind of responsibility here in the Western Hemisphere. We have hemispheric commitments into which countries have entered into. We have, if anything, a higher degree of responsibility in the hemisphere to try to help move towards constitutional government.

If we could find ways and means of bringing this Dominican group back toward constitutional government, we would very much like to do so, and those are being explored almost every day.

But our objectives here in the two cases are the same. The steps by which you move towards them may differ with different circumstances.

Senator AIKEN. I don't see how we can bring a government of another country around to our way of thinking by holding them at arm's length so much.

Secretary RUSK. This is something—I think we have to deal with a problem of this sort in the hemisphere in closest consultation with the other governments of the hemisphere. We are in touch with them on it.

I would not want to predict too much today, but we are not completely discouraged that something can be worked out in the Dominican Republic that would move them towards constitutional government.

Senator AIKEN. We had five Dominican senators here a couple of months ago, who had lunch with us. One of them is in jail now, and another one is in the cabinet.

I have no more quesions, but I take it that Vietnam is considered a matter of urgency.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. As far as I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, I think the Secretary is more needed at his post than down here, so I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM

Senator CARLSON. Just this, Mr. Secretary. We have some 20,000 people over there now. What is our situation? Are we being accepted as a country that is anxious to help the new government? What is the feeling?

Or haven't we had time to develop that feeling yet—toward our own people?

Secretary RUSK. This is something—in the first place, there was a tremendous outburst of friendliness for the Americans at the time of the coup, even though the general who had told us that there was a coup being planned would not give us any details or discuss plans with us, because he said, among other things, "We don't want you people in this at all." I think that there will be a much better attitude toward the Americans there following the coup than there was in the several months preceding the coup.

I might also say I don't think that President Diem considered that we were a part of the coup. We have the impression that he, himself, had some of his own intelligence information about this sort of planning, plotting. It goes on frequently. He had a very extensive secret police apparatus.

I think the fact that there were no casualties among the Americans at any point here—he didn't try to put Americans in a hostage position or anything of that sort—is possibly related to the fact that he, through his own sources of information, knew that were were not a part of this situation.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to go now, Mr. Secretary, or can you stay?

Secretary RUSK. I can stay for another question or two, but I ought to go in about 5 minutes, if I could, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

AN UNHAPPY EVENT

Senator GORE. I really have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

It is a most unhappy event, as the Secretary said. I cannot speak too strongly my deep feelings that this constant and repetitive identity of the United States with military coups and repressive regimes will in the long run erode the image of the United States in many parts of the world.

I have thought for 3 years we should find a way to withdraw our support from them. I am not sure we are not worse off now. I have no solution to it, though. I sympathize with you.

I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

DIEM'S GOVERNMENT WAS CONSTITUTIONAL

Senator LAUSCHE. Was Diem's government a constitutional government chosen by the people?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, they had three elections in the last—two presidental elections.

Senator LAUSCHE. I merely wanted to make a statement.

There is a widespread belief, and one that is willingly accepted more and more, that we probably are participating in these coups. I am of the belief that the failure to recognize the Dominican Republic Government and the prompt recognition of the junta in South Vietnam will convince people around the world that we were participants. You cannot distinguish between the two. They are both constitutional democracies. In the one, there was looseness with Communists; in the other, there was firmness. If reason prevails, you would seem to accept the one that was hostile to Communists as being improperly overthrown, rather than the one that was loose with Communists.

I am of the belief that if you recognize South Vietnam, you cannot do anything else but promptly recognize the Dominican Republic. Frankly, Mr. Secretary, I cannot follow your efforts to distinguish between the two, and I also frankly and sincerely say that the people of the nation will not be able to distinguish the treatment given to the two.

That is all I have got to say.

Senator MORSE. I register my dissent.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?

DIEM REGIME WAS GOING TO LOSE THE WAR

Senator CHURCH. I want to say I could not disagree more with what the Senator from Ohio has said. It seems to me that whatever the elections held in South Vietnam, their efficacy is subject to some rational question when Madame Nhu got 99.8 percent of the vote in her district. I don't think anyone has taken those elections very seriously. And I don't think that the regime in the Dominican Republic was a constitutional regime and was established on the basis of a legitimate election.

I think that what has happened in South Vietnam is the thing that I certainly had hoped for, because it was becoming increasingly evident the incompetence and corruption of this regime was going to lose the war against the Communists. We can hope that the regime that follows can establish some rapport with the people and sufficient popular support to summon the will and resolution to win that war.

I see great distinction between the two. I do hope that this new government can summon the necessary support, necessary approval of the people of the country, to win the war.

So I don't think that anything we do in South Vietnam in connection with recognizing the new regime should be a precedent, nor some sort of mold for determining what our policy should be in the Dominican Republic.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I state for the record that you have another situation that is very important. Bosch was overthrown through a combined and rather uniform judgment of the military

and the people. In South Vietnam, it was not the participation of the people at all, but only of the military in Saigon.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smathers?

RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT

Senator SMATHERS. Briefly, I will just add this: Mr. Secretary, I am not at all unhappy about what has happened in South Vietnam. To that extent I agree with my colleague from Idaho. I cannot help but come to the final conclusion, though, as to what the Senator from Ohio said, that if we don't do something—I don't know if we can compare the two exactly, but what bothers me about the Dominican situation is I am afraid if we do not recognize this junta very shortly, we are going to let that situation deteriorate further, and then we will have, I am afraid, a government which would be the type of Fidel Castro. And we will have lost it all.

So I would like to see us, frankly, and I think we should go ahead and move with respect to the Dominican Republic—getting from them all the guarantees we can get with respect to returning to constitutional government as quickly as is practical. To that extent, I agree with the Senator from Ohio.

But, other than that, I know you have got a lot of problems. I know this is a little different. You have to judge every one on its own. I don't think you can generalize. I think as far as South Vietnam is concerned, it is going to be to our benefit.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Does anyone wish to ask Mr. Hilsman anything?

We have two bills we would like to act on as long as you are here.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

[The chairman then called up the bill (S. 2213), to provide certain basic authority for the United States Information Agency. After discussion, and on motion by Senator Morse, the bill was ordered reported subject to reconsideration, unanimously.

[The bill (S. 949), to amend the United Nations Participation Act, as amended, was passed over.]

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcripts.

[The committee adjourned at 11:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 1:30 p.m., in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (subcommittee chairman), and Senator Lausche.

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, briefed the subcommittee on the situation in Europe.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee continued into executive session at 11:25 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman and Lausche.

The nominations of Benson E. L. Timmons III, to be Ambassador to Haiti, and of Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., to be Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, were ordered reported without objection.

The committee discussed an invitation from the Parliament of India to send a U.S. delegation to meet with a like group from the Indian Parliament in India. It was agreed to not formalize any meeting with the Indians, but to answer the invitation in saying that perhaps some U.S. Senators would come to India on a visit and at a convenient time.

The committee decided to request the Agency for International Development to submit its reports on foreign loans on a semi-annual basis.

Consideration of new committee regulations for the handling of classified material was passed over.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:30 a.m.]

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MINUTES

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m. in executive session in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The chairman announced the meeting had been called to clear the committee calendar of a few measures.

The first order of business was the bill (H.R. 7406), to provide for increased participation by the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank. On the suggestion of Senator Aiken, and others, the bill was passed over temporarily.

The next item was the bill (S. 2214), to amend the International Development Association to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the International Development Association. On suggestion of Senator Sparkman, the bill was set aside pending further testimony to be taken on it.

The next item was the bill (S. 949), to amend the United Nations Participation Act. On motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Aiken, to strike section 3, and report the bill favorably, as amended, the clerk called the roll, and the members responded to their names, as follows:

Yeas: Senator Morse, Senator Gore, Senator Lausche, Senator Aiken, Senator Carlson, Senator Williams.

Nays: Senator Sparkman, Senator Humphrey, Senator Fulbright. Senator Symington voted present.

So the motion carried, 6 to 3.

Whereupon Senator Morse again moved the bill be reported, as amended, which was agreed to on voice vote, without objection.

The next item of business was the bill (S. 2213), to provide certain basic authority for the United States Information Agency. On motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Symington, the bill was ordered favorably to be reported, on voice vote and without objection, with substitute language included therein.

Proposed regulations for the handling of classified material and classified transcripts in the committee were discussed and a decision on their adoption put over until another time.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]

MINUTES

WESNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:15 a.m. in room 4221, NSOB, in executive session.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Symington, Dodd, and Aiken. Senator Proxmire also attended.

The committee took testimony on the bills (H.R. 7406), relating to increasing the stock in the Inter-American Development Bank, and (S. 2214), relating to increasing the resources in the International Development Association, from N.R. Danielian, of Washington, DC, C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, and others.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:30 a.m. in executive session in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman), and Senators Fulbright, Morse, Symington, Dodd, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

On motion by Senator Aiken, and on voice vote, the bill (S. 745), to provide for adjustments in annuities under the Foreign Service retirement and disability system was voted to be reported favorably, as amended. The Acting Chairman announced that Senators Williams, Lausche, and Carlson were recorded as opposed.

On motion by Senator Aiken, and on voice vote, the committee voted to report favorably the bill (H.R. 9009), to amend further the Peace Corps Act.

All other items on the agenda were put over for further consideration.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee continued into executive session at 11:55 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Church, and Symington.

The chairman laid before the committee the bill (H.R. 7406), to provide for increased participation by the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank, and the bill (S. 2214), to amend the International Development Association Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the International Development Association.

Senator Sparkman moved to report both bills favorably, and on the call of the roll, the members responded to their names as follows:

Yeas: Senator Sparkman, Senator Humphrey, Senator Mansfield (proxy), Senator Long (proxy), Senator Church, Senator Dodd (proxy), Senator Smathers (proxy), Senator Hickenlooper (proxy), Senator Carlson (proxy), The Chairman.

Nays: None.

Senator Symington changed his vote from present to Aye.

So the motion carried, 11 to 0.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:55 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2:15 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

The chairman presented the Convention with Mexico on the Chamizal Treaty (Executive N, 88–1) to the committee for its consideration. Senator Sparkman moved that the committee recommend the Treaty to the Senate for consent and ratification.

On a roll call, the members answered to their names as follows:

Yeas: Senator Sparkman, Senator Humphrey, Senator Mansfield (proxy), Senator Long (proxy), Senator Lausche (proxy), Senator Church, Senator Symington, Senator Dodd (proxy), Senator Smathers (proxy), Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Aiken, Senator Carlson, Senator Mundt (proxy).

Nays: None.

It was announced that Senator Morse, Senator Williams and Senator Lausche also favored the motion.

So the motion was agreed to, 16 to 0.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 2:25 p.m.]

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MINUTES

MONDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9:15 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Lausche (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Sparkman, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Fulbright.

Howard Jones, Ambassador to Indonesia, and others briefed the subcommittee on the situation in Indonesia.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

MONDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:45 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Lausche, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Mundt.

The chairman made the first order of business the bill (H.R. 7044), to amend Public Law 193, Eighty-third Congress, relating to the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission.

Robert J. Ballantyne, Officer in Charge, Philippine Affairs, Department of State, appeared on behalf of the bill.

Senator Lausche moved an amendment in the nature of a substitute to the bill, and the amendment was rejected on a voice. Whereupon, on motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Aiken, the committee, by voice vote, voted favorably to report the bill (H.R. 7044).

The chairman stated the next order of business to be the resolution (H.J. Res. 778), to provide for participation by the Government of the United States in the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International (Rome) Institute for the Unification of Private Law, and authorizing appropriations therefor.

Senator Sparkman moved the favorable report of the resolution, and it was agreed to on voice vote.

The next item of business was the resolution (H.J. Res. 779), to amend the joint resolution of January 28, 1948, relating to membership and participation by the United States in the South Pacific Commission, and for other purposes.

Edward E. Rice, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, appeared on the measure.

The bill was amended, and on motion of Senator Sparkman, and by a voice vote, ordered favorably reported to the Senate.

On motion by Senator Lausche, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee approved for report a list of promotions and appointments in the diplomatic service, dated December 10, 1963.

Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, appeared and discussed moves to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in the United Nations.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

APPENDIX A

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS PUBLICATIONS FOR 1963: HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

HEARINGS PRINTED IN 1963

Jan. 22, 1963	Nominations of Christian A. Herter, William T. Gossett, and David E. Bell.
Jan. 23, 1963	Nomination of Bill D. Moyers to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps.
Feb. 4 and 6, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 1.
Feb. 18, 1963	United Nations Special Fund.
Mar. 4, 1963	Activities and Procedures of UNESCO.
Mar. 8, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 11.
Mar. 11, 1963	Test Ban Negotiations and Disarmament.
Mar. 12, 1963	International Coffee Agreement, 1962.
Mar. 13, and June 20, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 4.
Mar. 13, 1963	Review of U.S. Participation in the United Nations.
Mar. 25, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 7.
Mar. 28, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 3.
Mar. 29, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 5.
Apr. 4, 5, 29 and May 1, 1963	Training of Foreign Affairs Personnel.
Apr. 10, 1963	To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
Apr. 12 and May 6, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 8.
Apr. 18, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 2.
May 7, 1963	Foreign Service Buildings Act Amendments of 1963.
May 14, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 13.
May 23, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 9.
June 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 21, 25, and July 11, 1963.	Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.
June 14, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 6.
July 10, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 10.
Aug. 1, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals. Pt. 12.
Aug. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, and 27, 1963.	Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Nov. 15 and Dec 4, 1963	Amendments to the Inter-American Development Bank and International Development Association Acts.
Nov. 19, 20, and 21, 1963	Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments.

Dec. 12, and 13, 1963	Convention with Mexico for Solution of the Problem of the Chamizal.

COMMITTEE PRINTS

Jan. 22, 1963	Berlin in a Changing Europe: Report of Senators Mansfield, Boggs, Pell, and Smith of Massachusetts.
Jan. 29, 1963	Events in the States-Cuban Relations: A Chronology.
Feb. 25, 1963	Vietnam and Southeast Asia: Report of Senators Mansfield, Boggs, Pell, and Smith of Massachusetts.
Feb. 1963	The 17th General Assembly of the United Nations: Report by Senators Gore and Allott.
Undated	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference, Lagos, Nigeria.
March 1963	Staff Memorandum on Claims Programs Administered by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as Amended.
Mar. 1, 1963	Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals: Testimony of John A. O'Donnell.
Mar. 13, 1963	A Report on the Alliance for Progress, 1963, by Senator Humphrey.
Mar. 15, 1963	Study Mission to Southeast Asia, November-December 1962: Report of Senators McGee, Church, and Moss.
Apr. 8, 1963	8th NATO Parliamentarians' Conference.
June 4, 1963	Consultative Subcommittees.
July 1963	Semiannual Report on the Financial Situation of the United Nations, as of Dec. 31, 1962.
Dec. 2, 1963	Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group: Report on the 3rd Meeting.

SENATE DOCUMENTS

S. Doc. 5, Jan. 24, 1963	51st Conference on the Interparliamentary Union.
S. Doc. 21, June 17, 1963	Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership II.

SENATE REPORTS

S. Rept. 1 (S. Res. 25), Jan. 15, 1963	Study of Foreign Policy.
S. Rept. 2 (S. Res. 26), Jan. 15, 1963	Study of Nondiplomatic Activities of Representatives of Foreign Governments.
S. Rept. 178 (H.R. 5207), May 15, 1963	Amendments to the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926.
S. Rept. 179 (S.J. Res. 60), May 16, 1963	Amendments to the Constitution of the International Labor Organization.
S. Rept. 215 (S. 777), June 6, 1963	Amending the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
S. Rept. 342 (S. Res. 168), July 2, 1963	Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.
S. Rept. 343 (S.J. Res. 64), July 2, 1963	Amending the Joint Resolution Providing for United States Participation in the International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property.
S. Rept. 357 (S. 1627), July 15, 1963	Contributions to the Expenses of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos.

S. Rept. 358 (S. 1512), July 15, 1963	Authorizing 1 Additional Assistant Secretary of State, and for Other Purposes.
S. Rept. 386 (S.J. Res. 72 and S.J. Res. 67), Aug 2, 1963.	Invitations to Hold the 1968 Olympic Games in the United States.
S. Rept. 588 (H.R. 7885), Oct. 22, 1963	Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.
S. Rept. 625 (H.R. 7405), Nov. 1, 1963	World Bank Capital Stock Increase.
S. Rept. 676 (S. 949) Dec. 4, 1963	United Nations Participation Act Amendment.
S. Rept. 677 (S. 2213,) Dec. 4, 1963	Providing Certain Basic Authority for USIA.
S. Rept. 759 (H.R. 9009) Dec. 10, 1963	Peace Corps Act Amendments.
S. Rept. 777 (H.R. 7406), Dec. 13, 1963	Increasing U.S. Participation in the Inter-American Development Bank.
S. Rept. 779 (H.R. 2214), Dec. 13, 1963	Amendment of International Development Association Act.
S. Rept. 781 (H.J. Res. 779), Dec. 16, 1963	U.S. Participation in the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International (Rome) Institute for the Unification of Private Law.
S. Rept. 782 (H.J. Res. 779), Dec. 16, 1963	South Pacific Commission.
S. Rept. 783 (H.R. 7044), Dec. 16, 1963	Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission.
S. Rept. 813 (S. Res. 277), Dec. 19, 1963	Adjustments in Foreign Service Annuities.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS

Ex. Rept. 1 (Ex. H, 87-2), May 13, 1963	The International Coffee Agreement, 1962.
Ex. Rept. 3 (Ex. M, 88-1,) Sept. 3, 1963	The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Ex. Rept. 4 (Ex. D. 88-1), Oct. 7, 1963	The Protocol to Amend the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
Ex. Rept. 5 (Ex. E, 87-2; Ex. F, 87-2; Ex. E, 88-1), Oct. 7, 1963.	Convention on Extradition with Sweden; an Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Extradition with Brazil; Extradition Convention with Israel.
Ex. Rept. 6 (Ex. B and I, 88-1), Oct. 16, 1963.	Consular Conventions with Korea and Japan.
Ex. Rept. 7 (Ex. N, 88-1), Dec. 14, 1963	Convention on the Chamizal.

APPENDIX B

VOLUMES PUBLISHED TO DATE IN THE HISTORICAL SERIES

Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine.
Foreign Relief Act: 1947.
Foreign Relief Assistance Act of 1948.
The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty.
Military Assistant Program: 1949.
Extension of European Recovery Program: 1949.
Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949–50.
Reviews of the World Situation: 1949–50.
Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

Volume I, Eightieth Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1947–48.
Volume II, Eighty-first Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1949–50.
Volume III, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, 1951.
Volume IV, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, 1952.
Volume V, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, 1953.
Volume VI, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, 1954.
Volume VII, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session, 1955.
Volume VIII, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session, 1956.
Volume IX, Eighty-fifth Congress, First Session, 1957.
Volume X, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second Session, 1958.
Volume XI, Eighty-sixth Congress, First Session, 1959.
Volume XII, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session, 1960.
Volume XIII, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-seventh Congress, First Session, 1961.
Volume XIV, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session, 1962.
Volume XV, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session, 1963.

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